202366239 –
IDEA 247, INC. vs. RAYMOND EPPS A/K/A RAY EPPS
FEB 20, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAR 11, 2024
APR 29, MAY 13,
JUN 6 13, 2024
After Outlaw Tami Craft was replaced by Judge Manor, she’s been unmoved by attempts to reverse a default judgment she entered in favor of Idea 247.
Above is the date LIT Last updated and/or visited this article.
SUBMISSION DAY ON MONDAY
MAR 18, 2023
Other Harris County District Judges, not so much;https://t.co/T6lB87hVWA
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) March 18, 2024
FED. JUDGE STOPS FORECLOSURE
Divorced Harris County Judge Manor and now ex-Hubby (lawyer) Faced Foreclosure Before Judge Al Bennett Intervened as Refi Loan Specialist https://t.co/Ea6p78IM7X @RocketMortgage @BankofAmerica @WellsFargo @usbank @BNYMellon @GoldmanSachs @DSNewsDaily— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) March 25, 2024
OUTLAW JUDGE TAMI CRAFT SELF-RECUSES AFTER VIOLATING EVERY TEXAS LAW, RULE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
JAN 25, 2023
On Dec. 11, 2023, LIT’s founder, Mark Burke, filed a motion to disqualify Judge Tamika Craft-Demming, aka Tami Craft.
She had 3 days to decide – mandatory rule. Craft failed to do anything, rather blanking the motion. Thereafter, she went on a tirade of retaliatory acts.
First, the court refused to accept the filing, claiming the exhibits had to be renamed. Mark refused, citing to prior examples of naming convention for exhibits accepted by the court. The court would then rename all exhibits as “Exhibit”.
Then on Dec. 27, 2023 she’d be the assigned ancillary judge for party Joanna Burke in her request for a TRO in case; 202386973 – BURKE, JOANNA vs. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (Court 011). At the oral hearing she DENIED the TRO without reason, despite the overwhelming evidence supporting the TRO. See signed ORDER denying TRO, dated Dec. 27, 2023.
Next, on submission day – Jan. 8, 2024, Mark intervened in the matter; 202366239 – IDEA 247 INC vs. EPPS, RAYMOND (A/K/A RAY EPPS) (Court 189) and the court would GRANT Idea’s motion to STRIKE the INTERVENTION, despite the objections and request for hearings which were also blanked by the court. The order was signed at 3.35 pm.
Also, at 1.16 pm earlier that day, the court – in the case 202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM (Court 189) – would email Mark falsely claiming “The courts do not have a record of a Proposed Order for the following setting. Please file one or contact the court if there is one on file.”. This was a ruse and Mark wittingly chose to ignore the premeditated invite to respond.
As detailed below, today, Jan. 23, 2023, the court and Outlaw Craft would contradict their own rule by holding the hearing (no proposed order, no hearing) and 3 minutes later stating it was PASSED. Shortly thereafter, it is clear from the online docket, Craft would then enter her self recusal – once her trail of destruction was complete.
Let it be known, this is only the beginning, Outlaw Craft, not the end of your ongoing relationship with Mark Burke and LIT.
See; Barnhill v. Agnew, No. 12-12-00080-CV, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2013)
(“When a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge, the responding judge, regardless of whether the motion complies with the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, must, within three business days after the motion is filed (1) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal or (2) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).
Failure to comply with the rule renders void any actions taken subsequent to the violation.
In re A.R.,236 S.W.3d 460, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).”)
Notably, no email from the Court advising of this sua sponte recusal
Absent from the Docket as at Jan. 23 - An Order re Self-Recusal by Outlaw Tami Craft
Immediately after hearing...
3 minutes...
202366239 –
IDEA 247, INC. vs. RAYMOND EPPS A/K/A RAY EPPS
FEB 20, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAR 11, 2024
MAR 11 23, 2024
Above is the date LIT Last updated and/or visited this article.
Plaintiff’s Notice of Written Submission (INDF 3.18.2024)
ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE TO ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT SIGNED
TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
ORDER SIGNED RECUSING JUDGE
02/06/2024
A general warranty deed with a third-party vendor’s lien is a legal document used in real estate transactions to transfer ownership of property from a seller (grantor) to a buyer (grantee) while providing certain assurances and protections regarding the title to the property.
Here’s what each component means:
General Warranty Deed: A general warranty deed is a type of deed used in real estate transactions where the seller (grantor) guarantees that they hold clear title to the property and has the legal authority to transfer ownership to the buyer (grantee). It provides the highest level of protection to the buyer, as the seller is warranting against any defects in the title that may arise from the seller’s actions or previous ownership of the property.
Third-Party Vendor’s Lien: A vendor’s lien is a legal claim that a seller has on the property being sold until the buyer fulfills their obligation to pay the purchase price in full. In the context of a third-party vendor’s lien, this means that the seller has granted a lien to a third party (someone other than the buyer) on the property being sold. This lien serves as security for the seller’s debt or obligation to the third party. Until the debt is satisfied, the third party retains the right to enforce the lien, potentially through foreclosure or other legal means, to recover the amount owed.
LIT COMMENTARY
JAN 8, 16, 18 2024
Three days after LIT posted this expose about the Outlaw on the Bench named Tamika Craft-Demming aka Tami Craft, she’d retaliate against LIT’s founder in a court lawsuit which LIT was proposing to intervene, by unlawfully striking the intervention by court order, despite so many reasons the plaintiff’s motion should have been passed, or stricken. Aside from the rules violations, the court ignored the substance of the complaint, namely that the debt collectors clients, a firm owned by a duo of Florida lawyers, were charging usury rates for their Texas loan. Despite this being a crime in Texas law, this was snubbed by the newly appointed Outlaw in a Dirty Black Robe.
The Banana Republic formerly known as Texas is hiring in 2024. If you’re a legal Outlaw or Bandit then Texas WANTS YOU to be on the bench and lyin’, cheatin’ and stealin’ from your citizens. Send your applications to @GovAbbott @TXAG @KenPaxtonTX @statebaroftexas @uscourts et al. pic.twitter.com/AYK8uopAdk
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) January 16, 2024
202366239 –
IDEA 247, INC. vs. RAYMOND EPPS A/K/A RAY EPPS
SEP 26, 2023 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: NOV 15, 2023
NOV 16, 22, 30, DEC 4, DEC 12, 2023
JAN 18, FEB 7, 2024
Above is the date LIT Last updated and/or visited this article.
Plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. files this motion for interlocutory default judgment against defendant Ray Epps.
1. OVERVIEW
In this debt collection suit, defendant Raymond Epps guaranteed a loan provided to his company by plaintiff Idea 247. His company defaulted, and plaintiff filed this suit to enforce the guarantee made by defendant Epps.
Though served with citation, defendant Epps has failed to answer. Accordingly, Idea 247, Inc. seeks an interlocutory default judgment against defendant Epps regarding liability.
2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2023, Quick Tube Systems, Inc. borrowed money from plaintiff pursuant to a Revolving Loan Agreement (the note). Defendant Epps, owner of Quick Tube, guaranteed the note. Quick Tube failed to timely make its note payments, so Idea 247 has sued defendant Epps on his guarantee.
3 . DEFENDANT WAS SERVED WITH CITATION
This suit was filed on September 26, 2023. Defendant Epps was served with citation, along with a copy of Plaintiff’s Original Petition, on October 9, 2023. See Exhibit 1. Accordingly, the deadline for defendant Epps to file his answer was no later than Monday, October 30, 2023.
4 . DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO APPEAR AND ANSWER
To date, defendant Epps has failed to appear and answer herein.
5 . THE CITATION AND PROOF OF SERVICE HAVE BEEN ON FILE FOR MORE THAN TEN DAYS
The citation with proof of service was filed with this Court on October 9, 2023. See Exhibit 1. Therefore, in compliance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(h), the proof of service has “been on file with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment.”
6 . DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. is entitled to a default judgment against defendant Epps. Pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 239, “at any time after a defendant is required to answer, the plaintiff may in term time take judgment by default against such defendant if he has not previously filed an answer and provided that the return of service shall have been on file with the clerk for the length of time required by Rule 107.”
7 . DAMAGES
Plaintiff’s damages in this suit may or do include unliquidated damages. As a result, plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. requests an interlocutory default judgment as to liability, and it requests that, at a future date and time, the Court consider “evidence as to damages and render judgment therefor,” as provided by TEX. R. CIV. P. 243.
8 . LAST KNOWN ADDRESS OF DEFENDANT
Pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 239a, plaintiff Idea 247 certifies that the last known mailing address of defendant Epps is:
12519 Oak Park Drive, Houston, Harris County, Texas 77070
Attached as Exhibit 2 is a Certificate of Last Known Address pertaining to defendant Epps.
9 . NON- MILITARY DECLARATION
Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a declaration confirming that defendant Epps is not an active-duty service member.
10 . CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory default judgment against defendant Epps for the reasons set forth above.
Wherefore, plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. requests the Court to enter an interlocutory default judgment for plaintiff on the issue of liability against defendant Raymond Epps, to consider the evidence of plaintiff’s damages in the future in accordance with the Court’s procedures, and, following that, to sign a final default judgment for plaintiff against defendant Epps for plaintiff’s actual damages, together with prejudgment interest, post- judgment interest, attorney’s fees, costs of Court, and such other further relief, at law and in equity, to which plaintiff may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Burford Perry, LLP
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF IDEA 247 INC’s MOTION TO STRIKE INTERVENTION BY SUBMISSION AND REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING
Intervenor Mark Stephen Burke, individually, files this objection to Idea 247 Inc.’s Motion to Strike and hearing by submission. Mark formally requests an oral hearing date and time by zoom from the court.
Objection to Motion by Submission
Idea has set this for submission. Mark objects and requests the motion to be set for an oral hearing.
Timeline of Facts
On Nov. 17, 2023, Idea submitted their Motion to Strike, violating rule 3.3.6 as there was no certificate of conference.
The court approved this non-compliant motion to be filed.
On Nov. 21, 2023, Mark emailed Jay, counsel for Idea and first advised the motion violates local rule 3.3.6 as there is no certificate of conference, and second, Mark objects to a motion by submission and asked that Jay arrange for an oral hearing. Mark further stated he assumed this would be acceptable, or Jay would have to resubmit Idea’s opposed motion as Mark would seek to have the motion stricken for non-compliance.
On Nov. 22, Mark provided a courtesy follow-up requesting a timely response.
On Nov. 27, Jay sent an email asking if Mark was opposed or unopposed to Idea’s Motion to Strike and Mark replied by return, stating he was opposed (as he had already stated in his Nov. 21 email).
On Nov. 27, the docket shows Jay filing a stand-alone Certificate of Conference and not providing a Notice of Hearing by Zoom or recognizing Mark’s email objections to a Motion by Submission.
Argument
Mark, relying upon Harris (Tex.) Civ. Dist. Ct. Loc. R. 3.3.6 (requiring a certificate of conference on all motions except summary judgments, default judgments, agreed judgments, motions for voluntary dismissal or non-suit, post-verdict motions and motions involving service of citation) did confer with Jay by emailing him on November 21st and again on the 22nd, expressing his opposition to Idea’s motion to strike and the setting by submission. Jay’s subsequent actions and recent filing of the certificate of conference but not amending the submission to a hearing as requested is clearly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
Request for Hearing
Mark formally objects to the motion by submission and requests an oral hearing. He respectfully asks the court to provide a date, time and zoom link due to the court’s busy schedule and limited oral hearing dates.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 4th day of December, 2023.
Mr. Jackson,
I understand that legal professionals, like yourself, have demanding schedules and I appreciate your time.
I am circling back regarding my previous email and note that I have not yet received a response. I recognize that your commitments may extend beyond your control, and I certainly don’t presume any intentional oversight on your part.
Considering the importance of the matters at hand and in the spirit of maintaining open communication, I have taken the liberty of forwarding my initial email to you, including a few of your colleagues. My intention is not only to ensure that my concerns are acknowledged promptly but also to adhere to the principles of the Texas lawyer’s creed that emphasize professional courtesy and cooperation.
In the event that you are currently away, I would appreciate any indication of your return date or an alternative contact person who may be able to address the matters raised. I am more than willing to engage with a member of your staff or one of your colleagues if they are authorized to assume the lead attorney role in your absence.
I believe that a collaborative and transparent approach is fundamental to the civil practice of law, and I look forward to your earliest response or, if necessary, the involvement of a suitable representative from your side.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I appreciate your cooperation in facilitating a timely resolution.
Cheers,
Mark Burke
Blogger Inc.
Additional emails sent to;
rburford@burfordperry.com
efauser@burfordperry.com
202366239 – IDEA 247 INC vs. EPPS, RAYMOND (A/K/A RAY EPPS) (Court 189)
Top of the morn,
I refer to the above motion which I discovered on the docket today. First, it violates local rule 3.3.6 as there is no certificate of conference.
Second, I object to a motion by submission and would kindly ask that you arrange for an oral hearing. I assume this is acceptable, as you’ll have to resubmit your opposed motion or I will seek to have the motion stricken for non-compliance.
I look forward to hearing from you shortly.
Cheers,
Mark Burke
Blogger Inc.
Attached please find the requested service document.
Be sure to forward the petition to your service provider and include the case number and assigned court.
Sincerely,
Marilyn Burgess
Harris County District Clerk
Wesner v. Southall, Civil Action 3:22-CV-0927-B, at *22-23 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2023) (“Under Texas law, “[t]o prevail on a claim of usury, a party must prove (1) a loan of money, (2) an absolute obligation to repay the principal, and (3) the exaction of greater compensation than is allowed by law for the borrower’s use of the money.” Williams v. Bell, 402 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). “The basis of the action is a claim or demand for usury made by the creditor …. Whether the debtor actually pays off the loan is immaterial.” Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. 1987).”)
PLAINTIFF’ S MOTION TO STRIKE INTERVENTION
Plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. files this motion to strike the intervention of Mark Burke.
1.
OVERVIEW
Defendant Raymond Epps guaranteed a loan, and this is a simple suit to enforce that guaranty agreement.
However, Mark Burke—who has no connection to any party or transaction in this case—filed a plea in intervention, evidently seeking to use this suit as a platform to pursue his political agenda and to obtain an advisory opinion about his view of the Texas Finance Code.
His plea should be stricken because, as shown below, it would vastly complicate this case, he does not have standing, and he seeks an advisory opinion, something which the constitution prohibits.
2.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
By a promissory note dated May 8, 2023, Quick Tube Systems, Inc. borrowed money from plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. Defendant Epps guaranteed the loan.
Later, Quick Tube defaulted, Epps did not pay, and so Idea 247 filed this case to enforce the guaranty.
Out of the blue, Burke filed a pro se1 intervention in this suit.
Burke is not the borrower.
He is not the guarantor.
He is not the lender.
And he is not related to any of the above.
Instead, he is a complete stranger to this case as well as to the transaction made the
1 Mark Burke is not listed as a licensed attorney on the State Bar of Texas website, accessed November 17, 2023: https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/Customsource/ MemberDirectory/Result_form_client.cfm
basis of it.
Burke is a frequent litigant.
· This summer, Burke’s suit (Cause No. 2022-68307A) against Hon. Lauren Reeder and Hon. Susan Brown was dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2023, and his motion for reconsideration was denied on August 2, 2023;
· On August 8, 2023, Burke’s suit (Cause No. 2022-68307) against HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood was dismissed, along with his claims against the attorneys representing HCA Houston Healthcare; in fact, monetary sanctions were awarded against Burke (see also the Court’s order dated July 19, 2023);
· Currently, Burke is a defendant in a defamation suit that is pending in this Court; it was filed against him by attorney Robert Kruckemeyer based upon statements Burke made in his blog that Kruckemeyer had violated the Texas Finance Code.2
Despite Burke’s experience filing pleadings (in the above three suits, alone, he has filed approximately 104 pleadings, excluding countless exhibits), Burke’s intervention in this case3 completely fails to reveal any standing or justiciable interest.
3 .
LEGAL STANDARD FOR STRIKING INTERVENTIONS
Many courts have discussed the standard for interventions and for striking them. For instance, in Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2019), the Supreme Court confirmed that, under TEX. R. CIV. P. 60, anyone “may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.” Importantly, the Court observed that the “rule authorizes a party with a justiciable interest in a pending suit to intervene in the suit.” Id. at 721 (italics added).
2 Robert Kruckemeyer vs. Blogger Inc. d/b/a LawIn Texas.com, Cause Number 2023-11266, In the 189th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.
3 Burke’s pleading is entitled Verified Petition in Intervention and Third-Party Petition of Mark Stephen Burke; it was filed at 4:03 p.m. on November 15, 2023, and a “Corrected” version was filed about 12 hours later at 4:29 a.m. on November 16, 2023.
Additionally, “If any party to the pending suit moves to strike the intervention, the intervenor[ ] ha[s] the burden to show a justiciable interest in the pending suit.” Id.
Thus, Burke has the burden to prove he has a justiciable interest.
A justiciable interest exists for a person seeking to intervene as a plaintiff if the would-be “intervenor could have brought the same action, or any part thereof, in his own name.”
In re Arch Ins. Co., No. 08-23- 00223-CV, 2023 WL 7171473, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 31, 2023, no pet. h.).
Moreover, even if the person seeking to intervene has established a justiciable interest, the trial court retains “broad discretion to determine whether the plea in intervention should be struck.”
Brown v. Freed, No. 03-21-00556-CV, 2023 WL 4873181, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.).
It can strike an intervention if it will “complicate the case by an excessive multiplication of the issues.”
Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2019).
Similarly, when determining whether to strike an intervention, the trial court can consider whether the request will impose an “unreasonable burden” on the court or unnecessarily add complexity.
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Geter, 620 S.W.3d 702, 714 (Tex. 2021).
Accordingly, to prove an abuse of discretion in striking his intervention, Burke would have to show that he
“(1) could have brought the same action, or any part of it, in his own name . . .
(2) the intervention would not complicate the case by excessively multiplying the issues,
and
(3) the intervention is almost essential to effectively protect the intervenor’s interest.”
De La Rosa v. Avery, No. 12-23-00112-CV, 2023 WL 7178022, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 31, 2023, no pet. h.) (italics added).
4 .
BURKE’ S INTERVENTION SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Burke’s intervention should be stricken.
As a stranger to the parties and to the transaction, he fails to meet the first and most important requirement to intervene: viz., he has failed to show that he has any justiciable interest in this case.
Whether Idea 247 wins or whether it loses this case, that will not affect Burke’s interest, simply because he has no interest in the case whatsoever.
Even if Burke had a justiciable interest, his intervention should be stricken because it multiplies the parties and vastly increases the complexity of the issues.
This is a simple suit about a guarantee of a debt.
Yet Burke wants to turn it into some arcane challenge of the Texas Finance Code, dragging in issues—like whether bonding requirements apply in consumer loans—that have no relationship to this suit.
And, he also seeks to drag three more parties (besides himself) into the case, including the Attorney General of Texas.
None of this is necessary or suitable to the straightforward claim made the basis of this suit.
Finally, there is nothing in this case “essential to effectively protect” Burke’s interest, because he has no such interest.
No judgment in this case, one way or the other, will operate as res judicata, collateral estoppel, or in any manner affect his legal rights.
Accordingly, Idea 247 requests the Court to strike Burke’s intervention.
5 .
BURKE HAS NO STANDING
The law requires a party to have standing to pursue a legal action.
Last year, the Supreme Court explained that “plaintiffs have standing to sue when they allege a concrete personal injury traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and the relief requested is likely to redress that injury.”
Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 646 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. 2022).
Similarly, the Court said two years earlier that a “plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved.”
Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 775 (Tex. 2020) (italics in the original).
“An injury is ‘particularized’ for standing purposes if it ‘affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”
Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021).
Furthermore, standing is critically important to a person’s ability to bring a suit.
“[S]tanding is a ‘prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.’”
Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 593 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex. 2020).
“In Texas, the standing requirement stems from two constitutional limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Data Foundry, id. at 700.
In fact, standing is so important that courts “‘have an obligation to examine our jurisdiction any time it is in doubt.’
Constitutional standing requires a concrete injury that is both traceable to the defendant’s conduct and redressable by court order.”
Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 616 S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex. 2021).
As a result, normally standing is a “threshold determination of whether a plaintiff has a sufficient ‘justiciable interest’ in the suit’s outcome to be entitled to a judicial determination.”
In Interest of H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018).
That is because, “‘without standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction’ over the case, and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot be litigated or decided.” Id.
In this case, Burke has no standing.
He has no concrete injury “traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”
Indeed, he has no injury whatsoever.
As a result, he has no injury that can be “redressed by a favorable decision.”4
Consequently, this Court does not have jurisdiction to decide any legal issue for Burke.
6 .
BURKE IS SEEKING AN ADVISORY OPINION
“Under article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, courts have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions.”
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tex. 2013).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and recently affirmed that the constitution does not empower courts to issue advisory opinions.5
And, “the opinion of a court without jurisdiction is advisory.” Id.
“‘The distinctive feature of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law without binding the parties.’” Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Maverick Cnty., 642 S.W.3d 537, 549 (Tex. 2022), reh’g denied (Apr. 22, 2022).
Here, Burke, by his intervention, seeks to determine whether, in the Kruckemeyer suit mentioned above6 a surety bond is required and what work lawyers can perform, based upon the “‘type’” of debt.7
He claims, and apparently seeks a ruling, that “all debt is ‘consumer’ debt.”8
Burke also asserts that, “in Bob’s debt collection practices, he invokes the same interpretation of the law and statute(s) to pursue individuals for corporate related debt which is allegedly in default.
Mark disputes this unsupported interpretation of Texas
4 Data Foundry, id. at 696:
“To maintain standing, a plaintiff must show:
(1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action;
and
(3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
5 Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022), reh’g denied (Sept. 2, 2022) (the constitution “prohibits courts from rendering advisory opinions”).
See e.g. Interest of J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021), reh’g denied (Sept. 3, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. R.S. C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, 142 S. Ct. 1139, 212 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2022)
and
State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018), as corrected on denial of reh’g (Dec. 21, 2018)
(advisory opinion “is ‘outside the jurisdiction conferred by Texas Constitution article II, section 1’”).
6 Robert Kruckemeyer vs. Blogger Inc. d/b/a LawIn Texas.com, Cause Number 2023-11266, In the 189th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.
7 Verified Petition in Intervention and Third-Party Petition of Mark Stephen Burke at p. 12.
8 Id. at 13.
laws.”9
In addition, Burke asks for a declaration about how the Texas Finance Code defines specific practices and whether surety bonds are required.
Burke goes on to say that certain laws in Texas are “ambiguous,” and the interpretations of it are “fervently disputed,”10 evidently by him.
As a final point, Burke pleads that he can only “fine-tune” his claim for relief after there is a determination of the interpretation of a statute.11
Nowhere in Burke’s 20-page screed does he state how he has been harmed—or has standing to sue—Idea 247 or its law firm or lawyer.
Rather, Burke’s intervention is his attempt to hijack this suit between private parties in order to establish his preferred idiosyncratic interpretation of Texas law.12
Wherefore, plaintiff Idea 247, Inc. requests the Court to strike the intervention of Mark Stephen Burke in this suit, and to grant such other further relief, at law and in equity, to which plaintiff may be justly entitled.
9 Id. at 14.
10 Id. at 17.
11 Id. at 17.
12 See, e.g., Burke’s reference to “Arden Silverman of Capital Asset Protection in California,” id. at 13;
Burke has blogged aggressively about this individual, and his post includes references to California debt collection practices;
this reveals Burke’s agenda to alter the application of the Texas Finance Code.
See https://lawsintexas.com/out-of-state-debt-collector-and-former-lawyer-who- resigned-facing-discipline-arrives-in-texas/.
Even more illuminating of Burke’s obsession with debt collection is his appellant’s brief in Browserweb Media Agency v. Maxus Energy Corp., No. 01-14- 01028-CV, 2016 WL 66540, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 5, 2016, no pet.).
In that case, Maxus filed suit to enforce an arbitration award it obtained against Browserweb, Burke’s company. Browserweb’s (unsuccessful) appeal was based upon Burke’s claim of a defective service of citation. In spite of this being the appellate issue, the opening sentence of Burke’s brief stated:
“This case revolves around an alleged collection of a debt law suit by the Appellees and their debt collecting attorneys,” and his next sentence mentioned the “Federal Truth in Lending Act.”
Thus, Burke has injected his opinions about what the law of consumer debt collection should be into an appellate brief, the Kruckemeyer suit, and now this one.
Respectfully submitted,
Burford Perry, LLP
By: /s/Clyde J. “Jay Jackson III
Clyde J. Jackson III
State Bar No.: 10502500
909 Fannin St., Suite 2630
Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: (713) 401-9790
Facsimile: (713) 993-7739
jackson@burfordperry.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of plaintiff’s motion to strike intervention was served by e-service, efiling, certified mail/return receipt requested, hand- delivery, or telephonic document transfer on the 17th day of November, 2023 upon each person indicated below:
Mr. Mark Stephen Burke
46 Kingwood Greens Drive
Kingwood, Texas 77339
Telephone: 346-763-2074
Telecopier: 866-705-0576
browserweb@gmail.com
Intervenor Pro Se
/s/ Clyde J. “Jay” Jackson III
Clyde J. “Jay” Jackson III
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Cynthia Vargas on behalf of Clyde James “Jay” Jackson III Bar No. 10502500
cvargas@burfordperry.com
Envelope ID: 81781372
Filing Code Description:
Motion (No Fee)
Filing Description:
Status as of 11/20/2023 8:13 AM CST
Case Contacts
Clyde J. “Jay” Jackson III
jackson@BURFORDPERRY.COM
11/17/2023 4:34:08 PM
SENT
Burford Perry Service
service@burfordperry.com
11/17/2023 4:34:08 PM
SENT
Request for Issuance of Service
Third Party Plaintiff – Payment of fee
Return of Service
| Case (Cause) Number | Style | File Date | Court | Case Region | Type Of Action / Offense | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 202367074- 7 Active – Civil |
IDEA 247, INC. vs. NASR II, INC. | 9/28/2023 | 234 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract | |
| 202366239- 7 Active – Civil |
IDEA 247, INC. vs. RAYMOND EPPS A/K/A RAY EPPS |
9/26/2023 | 189 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract | |
| 202358191- 7 Disposed (Final) |
PIENKOWSKA, JOLANTA vs. HEINS, JAMES D | 8/30/2023 | 234 | Civil | Foreign Judgment | |
| 202333997- 7 Ready Docket |
FRANCOIS, ALICIA MONIQUE vs. PLACE, ARIANA M |
6/1/2023 | 270 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202301356- 7 Active – Civil |
LUXURY ASSET CAPITAL LLC (D/B/A LUX & LUX EXCHANGE) vs. BAILEY, F KENNETH (JR) | 1/9/2023 | 164 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Other | |
| 202231284- 7 Disposed (Final) |
CARNEY, ROBERT PATRICK vs. MILANO, ELAINE MERALIS CARVAJAL |
5/24/2022 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202219890- 7 Hold For Judgment |
DAWSON, CARRIE vs. WHITE, JAMES BOYD | 4/1/2022 | 157 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202206465- 7 Disposed (Final) |
QUDDUS, HUSAN vs. DMG LOGISTICS HOT SHOT SERVICES |
2/1/2022 | 189 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202183007- 7 Disposed (Final) |
NORMAN, IAN vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY | 12/22/2021 | 129 | Civil | Insurance | |
| 202181088- 7 Ready Docket |
LONGORIA, RENE vs. ARSEMIO SALAMANCA LLC |
12/13/2021 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202178465- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LICARI, RUTH vs. LEVINE, ADAM | 12/2/2021 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202174769- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DIETZ, JOEL vs. DEGOLLADO, MARTE (A/K/A MARTE ANVAR DEGOLLADO OR A |
11/15/2021 | 189 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202174412- 7 Disposed (Final) |
FRISBEE, JOHN vs. GEORGE, COLLIN ROBERT | 11/12/2021 | 334 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202170893- 7 Disposed (Final) |
GARNER, PATRICK vs. ROBERTS, JUSTIN |
10/27/2021 | 061 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202162466- 7 Disposed (Final) |
WILLIAMS, REGINA vs. COLEMAN, ALEXIS CANDICE | 9/27/2021 | 080 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202150772- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ANSTINE, ELIZA vs. HARRYMAN, WAYNE |
8/16/2021 | 215 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Fraud / Misrepresentation | |
| 202139536- 7 Disposed (Final) |
RAMOS, CHRISTINE (ANF OF ZS) (A MINOR) vs. ROQUE, ROLANDO SALINAS | 6/30/2021 | 152 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202128650- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MAHDAVI, KATAYOUN vs. RANDOLPH, LANCE |
5/13/2021 | 215 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 202068445- 7 CONSL Case Disp |
COSTOSO, MARVIN GARCIA vs. ROLL-LIFT USA INC | 10/23/2020 | 055 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 202042250- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MOUNT, PHILIP vs. JJZ INCORPORATED |
7/15/2020 | 333 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 202034116- 7 Disposed (Final) |
HDK ENTERPRISES INC vs. LEE S POLLACK MD (A TEXAS PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION | 6/8/2020 | 334 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Other | |
| 202032302- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ORTIZ, JOSE vs. HIWIRE BUCKET TRUCKS LLC |
5/28/2020 | 125 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 202018602- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ROOFING AND RESTORATION INC vs. KISON, JUNIOR (AKA JAY KASON) | 3/20/2020 | 152 | Civil | Foreign Judgment | |
| 201983342- 7 Disposed (Final) |
GOGLAS, WILLIAM D vs. SESCO CEMENT CORP |
11/19/2019 | 129 | Civil | Termination | |
| 201965320- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SEGURO CONSTRUCTION LLC vs. COLORADO, JESUS | 9/10/2019 | 133 | Civil | Bill of Review – Civil | |
| 201960468- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LAZAREV, ALEXANDER vs. MAYETA-GONZALEZ, YORDAN |
8/27/2019 | 164 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201960596- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DAWSON, CARRIE vs. ADVENT PARTNERS LLC (D/B/A 40FIFTYFIVE APARTMENT H | 8/27/2019 | 189 | Civil | Premises | |
| 201809647A- 7 Disposed (Final) |
COLORADO, JESUS vs. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION (A/K/A BANK OF AMERICA) |
5/17/2019 | 133 | Civil | GARNISHMENT (AFTER JUDGMENT) | |
| 201927369- 7 Disposed (Final) |
NGUYEN, CHARLES vs. CEDILLO, ALEXANDER | 4/17/2019 | 133 | Civil | Securities / Stock | |
| 201923138- 7 Disposed (Final) |
TIAN, WEI vs. K INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS INC |
4/1/2019 | 295 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Fraud / Misrepresentation | |
| 201907439- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SESCO CEMENT CORP vs. TORRES BROTHERS READY MIX INC | 1/30/2019 | 190 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract | |
| 201901140- 7 Disposed (Final) |
GOMEZ, MANUEL (AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DANNY vs. STAR FURNITURE COMPANY |
1/3/2019 | 129 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201876492- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DIAZ, LUIS vs. IN RE: | 10/22/2018 | 164 | Civil | OTHER CIVIL | |
| 201865291- 7 Disposed (Final) |
FRANCOIS, RODNEY vs. CONRAD, BAILEE L |
9/18/2018 | 234 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201842330- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ROMAN, JOSE vs. HIGGS, JEANNE | 6/25/2018 | 080 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201840392- 7 Disposed (Final) |
PARSON, STEPHEN vs. NOXXE OIL AND GAS LLC |
6/18/2018 | 269 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201830356- 7 Disposed (Final) |
VALDEZ, ELIZARDO (JR) vs. SMART, CHARLES W | 5/4/2018 | 129 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201824745- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BAILEY, DERRICK (INDIVIDUALLY ANF OF ANNIE JOHNSON vs. GRACES, BRANDY |
4/12/2018 | 270 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201824071- 7 Disposed (Final) |
GALLEGOS, ADAM vs. DORCHESTER APARTMENTS INC (D/B/A DORCHESTER APARTMENTS) | 4/10/2018 | 080 | Civil | Premises | |
| 201821406- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MILLER, TAMIRA vs. WEST, KERRY WAYNE |
3/29/2018 | 129 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201819263- 7 Disposed (Final) |
GRISBY, VICTOR vs. MEJIA BANEGAS, VICENTE ALFREDO | 3/22/2018 | 190 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201819592- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LOPEZ, ROSA vs. MAS AMIN 1336 INC (DOING BUSINESS AS IHOP #1336) |
3/22/2018 | 113 | Civil | Premises | |
| 201806492- 7 Disposed (Final) |
TREVINO, SILVIA C (F/K/A SILVIA MALDONADO) vs. MALDONADO, ELEAZER | 1/30/2018 | 234 | Civil | OTHER CIVIL | |
| 201800170- 7 Disposed (Final) |
IBARRA, MAKENLY vs. RIOS, ANGEL |
1/2/2018 | 113 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201786018- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BRUNER, TRACY (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRE vs. BRISCOE, MOSES | 12/29/2017 | 152 | Civil | Premises | |
| 201785189- 7 Disposed (Final) |
WEB, PAXTON (INDIVIDUALLY AND NEXT FRIEND OF H W) (A MINOR vs. KATZ BOUTIQUE 6 INC |
12/27/2017 | 189 | Civil | Premises | |
| 201785083- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MARTINEZ INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTAT, VERONICA vs. AZPW SERVICES MAINTENANCE CO INC | 12/22/2017 | 157 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201783965- 7 Disposed (Final) |
KOENNING, KENNETH vs. SHAMBURGER, JOSHUA |
12/19/2017 | 215 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201780347- 7 Disposed (Final) |
KHAN, SARAH vs. ARANDA, PABLO | 12/1/2017 | 190 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201767264- 7 Disposed (Final) |
TEJADA, NILSON (AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MARIO vs. PROJECT SURVEILLANCE INC |
10/10/2017 | 333 | Civil | Construction | |
| 201765222- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ESTRADA, MIGUEL vs. GLENN, LEE ANN | 10/2/2017 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201758549- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DAVIS, CARLA vs. DAVIS, DONALD III |
9/7/2017 | 164 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201748194- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MENDOZA, MARISOL (INDIVIDUALLY AND A/N/F OF FIDEL HERNANDEZ) vs. HEADLEY, JEFF ALAN | 7/20/2017 | 190 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201747561- 7 CONSL Case Disp |
CUEVAS, SANDRA (INDIVIDUALLY AS PERSONAL REPRESENT vs. LMN SAFETY SOLUTIONS INC (D/B/A SAFETY BY DESIGN) |
7/18/2017 | 333 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201742731- 7 Disposed (Final) |
WOODS, AMY vs. CAMPBELL, CLEATUS RAY | 6/27/2017 | 113 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201732324- 7 Disposed (Final) |
JOHNSON, GRIER vs. LAWSON, SHIRLEY |
5/12/2017 | 133 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201731936- 7 Disposed (Final) |
WOOD, MICHAEL vs. LLK MANAGEMENT LLC | 5/11/2017 | 189 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201722703- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BENOIT, DAMIEN vs. GIANT HOTEL LIQUIDATORS LLC |
4/3/2017 | 190 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201710995- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LLOYDD’S CARPET SERVICES INC (D/B/A RAIN vs. ABRAHAM WATKINS NICHOLS SORRELS & FRIEND | 2/16/2017 | 281 | Civil | Other Contract | |
| 201701137- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BONILLA, RAMON vs. ROBERTS, JOHN |
1/6/2017 | 189 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201700555- 7 Disposed (Final) |
EAGLE, DYLAN vs. ACOSTA, MARIBEL | 1/4/2017 | 334 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201686817- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ALVARADO, DELMIS (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REP vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY |
12/19/2016 | 125 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201680094- 7 CONSL Case Disp |
JOHNSON, ERIC vs. ZHAO, PING | 11/18/2016 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201660167- 7 Disposed (Final) |
VEGA, ASHLEY vs. ZHAO, PING |
9/7/2016 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201651504- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SIMS, CARL vs. PALAFOX, ETTHEL | 8/3/2016 | 295 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201649432- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DIZON, STACEY (INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE E vs. RAGLAND, SHEVON |
7/26/2016 | 127 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201643631- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ALVARADO, DELMIS vs. HUSSAIN, ZAIN MUSTAFA | 6/28/2016 | 333 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201642974- 7 Disposed (Final) |
STEIB, BRELAND vs. ALSHAMMARY, TAHANI |
6/24/2016 | 334 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201634378- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ALVAREZ, ELIZABETH (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEN vs. HURACAN DISCO INC | 5/25/2016 | 055 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201627222- 7 Disposed (Final) |
CAROLAN, MARY L (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF vs. WILLIAMS, AUSTIN (M D) |
4/27/2016 | 234 | Civil | Malpractice – Medical | |
| 201618825- 7 Disposed (Final) |
CAREY, HENRY JR vs. BIG JAX TRANSPORTATION LLC | 3/23/2016 | 189 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201617259- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MENDOZA, MARIA DEYSI (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRI vs. RODRIGUEZ, PEDRO A MAJANO |
3/16/2016 | 281 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201614095- 7 Disposed (Final) |
CRUZ, KATARINA (INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF LYNETTE CASTRO) vs. SALIY, IRINA | 3/3/2016 | 129 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201608422- 7 Disposed (Final) |
ELSON, JUDY vs. TBES INC |
2/10/2016 | 055 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201606423- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SHIN, JIHAE vs. HEAD, SCARLETT | 2/1/2016 | 129 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201576339- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SOTELO, SANDRA vs. HOUSTON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY INC |
12/22/2015 | 269 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201570301- 7 Disposed (Final) |
A 3 H FOODS LP vs. AHMED, MOHAMMED | 11/23/2015 | 157 | Civil | Securities / Stock | |
| 201558399- 7 Disposed (Final) |
AW BUILDING LLC vs. LLOYDDS CARPET SVCS (DBA RAINBOW INTERNATIONAL RES |
9/30/2015 | 333 | Civil | OTHER CIVIL | |
| 201550044- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MARTINEZ, GABRIELA (ANF OF DANIEL GUERRERO) (MINOR vs. MOLINA, ALEJO | 8/26/2015 | 152 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201545375- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SWEITZER, JOHN vs. WILLIAMS, JOSHUA |
8/4/2015 | 133 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201538430- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SANTAMARIA, ASHLEY vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE C | 7/2/2015 | 333 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201536923- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MONTEMAYOR, MARY (AS NEXT FRIEND OF ALIANA GARCIA) vs. GARCIA, LINDA |
6/26/2015 | 333 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201533643- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LATAQUIN, LORNA vs. ALLSTATE COUNTY MUTUTAL INSURANCE COMPAN | 6/11/2015 | 334 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201533643A- 7 Disposed (Final) |
LATAQUIN, LORNA vs. ALLSTATE COUNTY MUTUTAL INSURANCE COMPAN |
6/11/2015 | 334 | Civil | SEVERANCE | |
| 201526407- 7 Disposed (Final) |
WATSON, TRICIAL vs. WELLS, SHANAE | 5/6/2015 | 113 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201523137- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DESERT SAGE L L C vs. U & U L L C |
4/22/2015 | 164 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Consumer / DTPA | |
| 201512601- 7 Disposed (Final) |
COLTRIN, ROBERT vs. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 12TH MAN FOUNDATION | 3/4/2015 | 189 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Other | |
| 201512339- 7 Disposed (Final) |
KISH, CARRIE vs. COOK, JUSTIN |
3/3/2015 | 151 | Civil | Motor Vehicle Accident | |
| 201512434- 7 Disposed (Final) |
FLORES, MARIA vs. WOMBLE COMPANY, INC., | 3/3/2015 | 234 | Civil | Other Injury or Damage | |
| 201502373- 7 Disposed (Final) |
NALL, CORNELIA vs. CUMMINS, BRANDON |
1/16/2015 | 164 | Civil | PERSONAL INJURY – AUTO | |
| 201502408- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BLOCKER, NOEL vs. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 12TH MAN FOUNDATION (A/K/A TH | 1/16/2015 | 080 | Civil | BREACH OF CONTRACT | |
| 201502712- 7 Disposed (Final) |
HARRIS, GEORGE G JR vs. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 12TH MAN FOUNDATION |
1/16/2015 | 011 | Civil | BREACH OF CONTRACT | |
| 201501104- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SIMPSON, GARY A vs. TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY 12TH MAN FOUNDATION (A/K/A | 1/9/2015 | 334 | Civil | BREACH OF CONTRACT | |
| 201473941- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MILLER, JOHN vs. THE 12TH MAN FOUNDATON (A/K/A TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY |
12/23/2014 | 157 | Civil | BREACH OF CONTRACT | |
| 201470406- 7 Disposed (Final) |
BETTS, JAMIE vs. LIBERTY COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY | 12/3/2014 | 281 | Civil | PERSONAL INJURY – AUTO | |
| 201466078- 7 Disposed (Final) |
SWEET, DORIS vs. FARMERS TEXAS COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO |
11/11/2014 | 127 | Civil | CONTRACT | |
| 201461539- 7 Disposed (Final) |
CHILDERS, JOHN BARRY vs. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY | 10/21/2014 | 061 | Civil | RAILROAD DAMAGES | |
| 201448423- 7 Disposed (Final) |
RAY, JOSEPH vs. STATE FARM COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPA |
8/22/2014 | 215 | Civil | CONTRACT | |
| 201447955- 7 Disposed (Final) |
MOFFETT, MICHAEL LEWIS vs. BROOKFIELD PROPERTIES CORPORATION | 8/20/2014 | 215 | Civil | PERSONAL INJURY (NON-AUTO) | |
| 201434428- 7 Disposed (Final) |
DEFOE, DERV vs. SHERWOOD VALVE LLC |
6/16/2014 | 333 | Civil | PERSONAL INJURY (NON-AUTO) |
| Case (Cause) Number | Style | File Date | Court | Case Region | Type Of Action / Offense | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 202367074- 7 Active – Civil |
IDEA 247, INC. vs. NASR II, INC. | 9/28/2023 | 234 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract | |
| 202366239- 7 Active – Civil |
IDEA 247, INC. vs. RAYMOND EPPS A/K/A RAY EPPS |
9/26/2023 | 189 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract | |
| 202270260- 7 Disposed (Final) |
IDEA 247 INC vs. ROBINSON 45 ENTERPRISE INC | 10/26/2022 | 157 | Civil | Debt / Contract – Other |
Jay worked alongside Randy Sorrels at Abraham Watkins. He worked for the law firm for 17 years, from 2002-2019.
Mr. Leto a Member of the Florida Justice Association, The National Trial Lawyers Association, and the Miami-Dade County Bar Association, where he served on the Board of Directors for the Young Lawyers Section. In addition, he has been recognized on various occasions by Superlawyers Magazine, South Florida Legal Guide, and Florida Legal Elite. Mr. Leto is also an invited member of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum, a group that recognizes lawyers throughout the country that have achieved results for their clients in excess of $1 million.
Mr. Leto focuses his career on cases involving personal injury, wrongful death, traumatic brain injury,medical negligence, product liability and commercial litigation.
In his career, he has tried cases in courts in Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, Broward County, Palm Beach County, Osceola County, Hillsborough County, Pinellas County, Hernando County, and in the Southern District of Florida. Most notably, Mr. Leto received a verdict in a highly contested medical malpractice case in the amount of $11.1 million. In that case, which was tried in Pinellas County, Florida,Mr. Leto convinced the jury that All Children’s Hospital committed malpractice by failing to properly hydrate an infant child who was ill for several days. The child suffered brain damage and the hospital claimed that the injury was caused by a rare genetic disorder. After a four week trial, the jury deliberated for four days before reaching a verdict in favor of the child for $11.1 million. This verdict was one of the highest medical malpractice verdicts in Pinellas County, Florida and, as a result, Mr. Leto was honored as a nominee for Most Effective Lawyer 2011 by the Daily Business Review.
Aside from his experience as an aggressive trial lawyer, Mr. Leto has also been successful in the appellate courts. Mr. Leto has handled appeals in the Second District, Third District, Fourth District, Fifth District and Florida Supreme Court. In one notable case, Mr. Leto represented a marina in Ft. Lauderdale that was the victim of an incorrect survey performed by a local surveying company. The marina suffered significant damage as a result of the inaccurate survey and filed suit against the surveyor. After the trial court dismissed the case based on the application of the economic loss rule, Mr. Leto appealed the matter to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court found in the marina’s favor in a case that changed the way in which the economic loss rule applies to professionals in the State of Florida. The opinion can be read by clicking here.
Mr. Leto was born in Staten Island, NY. He attended the University of Arizona where he received his degree in Business Administration in 2000. He received his law degree, cum laude, from the University of Miami School of Law in 2003.
Mr. Leto is admitted to practice in all State Courts in Florida as well as the Southern District of Florida and the Middle District of Florida.
Larry is a tenacious and results-oriented litigator who focuses his practice on commercial litigation and family law. Larry’s commercial clients operate in a variety of industries, including architecture and interior design, political consulting, hospitality, real estate development and finance.
His experience representing clients with diverse business backgrounds and interests has honed Larry’s skills in fashioning winning strategies. He has an extensive background litigating business tort cases, such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, contract-related claims, intellectual property claims, defamation claims and shareholder actions, among others. Larry has substantial jury trial, bench trial, and appellate experience.
Larry represents clients in divorce proceedings, the negotiation and preparation of prenuptial agreements and the modification of child support and alimony, among other family law-related issues. His family law clients value his commercial litigation background, as Larry offers a comprehensive approach to sophisticated matters, such as business valuation and accounting matters.
Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC
Jul 7, 2015
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently analyzed the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”) and reached a conclusion relating to claims under the TDCA that is significant for lenders and mortgage servicers. The court ruled that the TDCA extends beyond the parties to a consumer transaction and that persons other than a debtor may maintain an action for violations of the TDCA.
In McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 14-40114 (June 15, 2015), after a borrower died, her son and daughter-in-law, David and Marilyn McCaig (the “McCaigs”), took over her mortgage payments. The loan fell into default, but eventually, the McCaigs and the loan servicer entered into a settlement and forbearance agreement. In that agreement, the parties agreed that the loan “remained in default,” but the servicer agreed not to foreclose on the property so long as the McCaigs followed a 35-month payment plan. The McCaigs adhered to the plan, but the servicer made mistakes in servicing the loan by initiating the foreclosure process, dispatching multiple erroneous notices of default and posting the property for a foreclosure sale. Additionally, the servicer repeatedly sent statements indicating that, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement, it was assessing late fees based on the continued delinquency of the loan. The servicer never consummated a foreclosure sale, and when the McCaigs had finished paying under the payment plan, the servicer brought the loan current and waived all late fees.
Based on these facts, the McCaigs brought suit against the servicer for violation of the TDCA. In particular, the McCaigs asserted that the servicer violated Section 392.301(a) of the Texas Finance Code. The relevant part of this statute provides: “In debt collection, a debt collector may not use threats, coercion, or attempts to coerce that employ any of the following practices:… (7) threatening that nonpayment of a consumer debt will result in the seizure, repossession, or sale of the person’s property without proper court proceedings; or (8) threatening to take an action prohibited by law. Tex. Fin Code § 392.301(a). A jury found that the servicer violated the TDCA and awarded the McCaigs almost $400,000.
On appeal, the servicer raised several challenges to the judgment entered by the trial court. Among these challenges was the assertion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim under the TDCA because they were not borrowers on the loan. Texas Finance Code Section 392.403 creates a private right of action for TDCA violations and provides: “A person may sue for actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter.” Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(2). The servicer argued that the scope of this section was limited to claims asserted by a borrower on a loan transaction. Because the Texas Supreme Court has not defined the scope of Section 392.403(a)(2) and statutory standing to bring TDCA claims, the Fifth Circuit was required to predict how the court would rule based on precedent set by intermediate state appellate courts. In making this prediction, the Fifth Circuit observed that the statute is written broadly and that Texas courts have recognized that Section 392.403’s grant of standing is not limited to debtors. Based on this precedent, the Fifth Circuit found that any person that has sustained damages from a TDCA violation has standing to sue.
As a result, lenders and servicers must be mindful of the provisions of the TDCA even when working with third-parties to a loan transaction. The prohibited debt collection methods can be found in Chapter 392, Subchapter D, Sections 392.301-392.306 of the Texas Finance Code.
Read on lawofbanking.com
🔥 WE HAVE QUESTIONS @statebaroftexas @uscourts
ABOUT BANDIT LAWYER ROBERT CLAYTON VILT’s Purported “Resignation”. Namely, Has He Resigned as His Nov. 4 Notice of Resignation States? If No, That’s Perjury. If Yes, Why is He Still Active and Filing Cases in TX Courts? #TWO #NMA pic.twitter.com/kBMYhNGBXU— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) November 11, 2023
VERIFIED PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND THIRD-PARTY PETITION OF MARK STEPHEN BURKE
Intervenor Mark Stephen Burke, individually, files this Petition in Intervention and Third-Party Petition against Plaintiffs.
Parties
Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke (“Mark”), is an individual residing at 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas, 77339.
Plaintiff and Third-party Defendant, Idea 247, Inc. (“Idea”) is a Florida Corporation. Idea has already appeared in this lawsuit and no further service is required.
Third-party Defendant, Burford Perry LLP (“Burford”) is a Texas Limited Liability Partnership and operates as a law firm. Burford has already appeared in this lawsuit and no further service is required.
Third-party Defendant, Clyde J. “Jay” Jackson III (“Jay”) is a Texas lawyer. Jay has already appeared in this lawsuit and no further service is required.
Third-party Defendant, Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr., (“Ken”) is currently the Texas Attorney General, who may be served at; Office of the Attorney General, 300 W. 15th Street, Austin, TX 78701 or wherever he may be found.
Jurisdiction, Venue & Intervention
Both jurisdiction and venue for this civil action, pursuant to Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Section 15.002(a)(1), is believed to be in Harris County, Texas, given that a significant portion of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred within this jurisdiction.
Rule 47 Statement
For the statements and arguments provided herein, Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke, seeks monetary relief over $1,000,000, and the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits of this court per Tex. R. Civ. P. 47, see; Durbois v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 20-11082, at *8 (5th Cir. June 16, 2022).
Discovery Control Plan
Plaintiff respectfully requests this case be governed by Level 3, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 190.4. This suit is not governed by the expedited-actions process under Rule 169 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Facts
The Intervenors’ Interest in this Lawsuit
A party has a justiciable interest in a lawsuit when its interest will be affected by the litigation. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. 2008).
A party may intervene in a suit if it could have brought all or part of the same suit in its own name. See Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718, 721 n. 16 (Tex. 2019).
A party has a justiciable interest in a lawsuit, and thus a right to intervene in the suit, when its interests will be affected by the litigation, see; Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 615 S.W.3d 580, 602 (Tex. App. 2020).
For the reasons provided herein and the related case, which is incorporated here, there is no question Mark has a justiciable interest in this case:-
Third-Party Debt Collectors in Texas
In this case, Jay is a Texas lawyer for Burford, a third-party debt collector retained on behalf of out-of-state Idea (Florida) to collect on an alleged delinquent debt. They filed suit in this court to collect a “commercial” or “business” debt against an individual, Raymond “Ray” Epps, (“Ray”) relying upon a personal guarantee within the loan contract between Ray’s Texas corporate business, Quick Tube Systems, Inc., and Idea.
Neither Jay nor Burford hold an active surety bond with the State of Texas to collect this alleged delinquent debt from Ray. Nor does Idea have an active surety bond. See; Tex. Fin. Code. § 392.101. As such, they are in violation of the Texas Finance Code (“TFC”), Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”) and consumer protection laws in Texas. See; Bentson v. Chyma, Civil Action No. 4:15-CV-523, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2017).
Jay regularly collects debt in Texas and this year alone he has represented his clients in Florida, two licensed attorneys, Larry Bassuk and Justin C. Leto of law firm Leto Bassuk, as well as their financial services business Idea 247, Inc., in two other active cases, both before Judge Lauren Reeder; (i) 202358191 – PIENKOWSKA, JOLANTA vs. HEINS, JAMES D (Court 234, Judge Lauren Reeder), See Exhibit HEINS (ORDER, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT FILED, Aug. 30, 2023); (ii) 202367074 – IDEA 247, INC. vs. NASR II, INC. (Court 234, Judge Lauren Reeder), See Exhibit NASR (Plaintiffs Original Petition and Exhibit 01, Sep. 28, 2023).
Usurious Interest Rate
Ray Epps Loan
The first question Mark considered after review of the Ray Epps loan contract was; If the monthly default interest rate is 2.9717%, what is the APR? The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is approximately 38.40% which is based on the given monthly interest rate.
The second question Mark considered after review of the Ray Epps loan contract was; If the monthly standard interest rate is 2.5550% what is the APR? The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is approximately 31.69% which is based on the given monthly interest rate.
Section 303.009(a) states “[i]f the rate computed for the weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annualized ceiling is less than 18 percent a year, the ceiling is 18 percent a year.” TEX. FIN CODE ANN. § 303.009(a). As related to Ray Epps loan agreement, both the standard and default APR rates exceed the usury rate of 18 percent per year set by Section 303.009(a) of the Texas Finance Code.
However, for a contract made, extended, or renewed under which credit is extended for a business, commercial, investment, or similar purpose, the limitation on the ceilings determined by those computations is 28 percent a year. TEX. FIN CODE ANN. § 303.009(c).
Taking this higher rate and applying it to the above calculation, both the standard and default interest rate is still determined as usurious.
NASRI Loan
The first question Mark considered after review of the NASRI loan contract was; If the weekly default interest rate is 0.5541%, what is the APR? The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is approximately 29.66% which is based on the given weekly interest rate.
The second question Mark considered after review of the NASRI loan contract was; If the weekly default interest rate is 0.4582% what is the APR? The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is approximately 25.02% which is based on the given weekly interest rate.
Section 303.009(a) states “[i]f the rate computed for the weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annualized ceiling is less than 18 percent a year, the ceiling is 18 percent a year.” TEX. FIN CODE ANN. § 303.009(a). As related to the NASRI loan agreement, both the standard and default APR rates exceed the usury rate of 18 percent per year set by Section 303.009(a) of the Texas Finance Code.
However, for a contract made, extended, or renewed under which credit is extended for a business, commercial, investment, or similar purpose, the limitation on the ceilings determined by those computations is 28 percent a year. TEX. FIN CODE ANN. § 303.009(c).
Taking this higher rate and applying it to the above calculation, the default interest rate is determined to be usurious.
Nicholas Chagouris Loan
Mark maintains the opinion Idea know their loan interest rates violate Texas laws, yet they continue to unlawfully pursue individuals residing in this state, in violation of Texas laws. One only needs to review the case styled 202270260 – IDEA 247 INC vs. ROBINSON 45 ENTERPRISE INC (Court 157, Judge Tanya Garrison), filed on October 26, 2022. It would be non-suited and dismissed on Idea’s motion on January 19, 2023 without an appearance from Robinson 45 or individual Nicholas Chagouris. Why?
First, when reviewing the complaint itself, the Texas debt collection lawyer Harold Tummel of Tummel & Casso (“Harold”) – who unsurprisingly also fails to maintain a surety bond with the State of Texas – was appointed by Idea in that case. Harold disclosed upfront the interest rates charged as 35.73%, which clearly violates usury thresholds. See Exhibit Harold. Second, the revolving loan agreement is unlawfully sealed in violation of Rule 76a. See Exhibit Garrison.
Combined, Mark avers the case was quickly dismissed as it is well known in the public domain and Harris County District Court(s) that Mark’s legal blog was zealously monitoring, investigating and reporting violations of Texas debt collection laws by rogue law firms during the time this suit was filed, and subsequently dismissed.
The Ken Bailey Debt Collection Timesheet
Jay and Burford are currently representing Luxury Asset Capital LLC in pursuing and most recently requesting judgment against Ken Bailey from Judge C. Elliot Thornton. See; 202301356 – LUXURY ASSET CAPITAL LLC (D/B/A LUX & LUX EXCHANGE) vs. BAILEY, F KENNETH (JR) (Court 164).
What’s of importance to note is there’s apparently two lawyers working on the case at Burford, namely Jay and associate Erica Fauser. Their timesheets mirror Bob and his attorney son, Michael, insofar as they clearly show that they all perform non-attorney works while pursuing debt collection. As such, Texas Finance Code Sec. 392.001(7) applies. See Exhibit Timesheet. This confirms Mark’s statements in his recent filing in the related case, in relevant part;
Affidavit for Attorney Fees: Bob and Mike’s Non-Lawyer Duties
Bob claims he does not have any non-attorney’s, but that is a play on words, not roles within his small practice. An attorney can perform non-lawyer/paralegal/legal assistant/secretarial duties and that’s exactly the situation at The Kruckemeyer Law Firm. See; Gorrellv. Wake Cnty., 5:21-CV-00129-M, at *20 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2022) (“A lawyer may perform nonlegal work “because he has no other help available,” but these activities “may command a lesser rate.” See id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989)) (explaining that the “dollar value [of such work] is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it”).”).
The Intervenor’s Related Case
On February 21, 2023, Blogger Inc. was sued in the same court as the above styled case by a third-party Texas debt collector, Robert J. Kruckemeyer of The Kruckemeyer Law Firm, pro se, (“Bob”); 202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM [sic] (Court 189). Bob and his firm do not have an active surety bond on file at the Secretary of State’s office to collect debts in Texas.
Blogger Inc. is owned and operated by Mark. On Sunday, June 4, 2023, Bob amended his complaint to sue Mark in his individual capacity and purported to add lead counsel, Randall O. Sorrels of Sorrels Law, (“Randy”) in this amended filing.
Disputed Interpretation of Texas Finance Code, Statutes and Laws
In summary form, Bob’s suit and dispute revolve around the necessity of said surety bond in Texas, what ‘type’ of debt triggers this requirement, and finally, if lawyers can perform non-attorney work, which has already been answered above in the affirmative.
Bob claims he’s a commercial debt collector and as such, not a third-party debt collector as defined in law, relying upon his own interpretation of the Texas Finance Code (“TFC”). In short, his unsupported view is that ‘commercial’ debt is not covered by TFC, which is focused on ‘consumer’ debt.
On the contrary, Mark claims that there is no legal definition for “commercial” debt and all debt is “consumer” debt. Indeed, this was verified by another complaining debt collector, Arden Silverman of Capital Asset Protection in California, who stated in an email to Mark; “First there is no such thing as commercial collections per-se. It’s either consumer debt or not. The term debt as defined in Federal and most states is consumer debt.”
Furthermore, similar to the case in hand, Mark challenges Bob’s pursuit of individuals for “commercial” or “business” loans under the “guarantor” section of the loan agreement/contract(s).
In Idea’s suit, they have attached the contract, which clearly states that Jay is personally responsible for the business loan, and as such they can pursue him personally, attaching any final judgment of the court to his personal assets. In effect, this strips any shield Jay’s corporation may have provided against such lawsuits. Similarly, in Bob’s debt collection practices, he invokes the same interpretation of the law and statute(s) to pursue individuals for corporate related debt which is allegedly in default. Mark disputes this unsupported interpretation of Texas laws. He maintains the debt is defined as consumer debt, and as such it is covered by TFC, including the necessity of an active surety bond to collect debts lawfully in Texas as a third party debt collector.
Causes of Action
Damages for Violation of TFC and TDCA
Texas Finance Code Section 392.403 creates a private right of action for TDCA violations and provides:
Actual Damages: “A person may sue for actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter.” Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(2), see; McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), N.A., 788 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2015).
Statutory Damages: See Sec. 392.403. CIVIL REMEDIES. (e) “A person who successfully maintains an action under this section for violation of Section 392.101, 392.202, or 392.301(a)(3) is entitled to not less than $100 for each violation of this chapter.”.
Reasonable Damages: “Reasonable damages” are not limited to actual damages but may include future damages. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Mitchell, 510 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 2016).
Exemplary Damages: The phrase also includes exemplary damages on a showing of malice, see; Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. v. Mitchell, 510 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Tex. App. 2016).
Summary: For the reasons provided herein and in the related case, where Bob seeks a financial judgment in excess of $1,000,000 against Mark personally, Mark’s request for actual, statutory, reasonable and exemplary damages is warranted.
Declaratory Judgment
Purpose: The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to clarify legal rights and relationships before any actual harm occurs. It allows parties to seek a binding determination from the court on the interpretation of a contract, statute, or other legal document. As discussed herein, and in the related case, Bob is suing Mark on a disputed interpretation of Texas laws.
Statutory Basis: Texas law provides for declaratory judgments under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act (Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code). This statute allows a party to seek a declaration of their rights and legal relations.
Here, Mark wishes a declaration that the Texas Finance Code does define Bob, Jay and their Texas law firms as third-party debt collectors who are required to file an active surety bond with the Secretary of State. See; Tex. Fin. Code. § 392.101. Further, Mark wishes a declaration confirming all debt collection is “consumer” debt collection, and there is no legal basis for claiming “commercial” or “business” debt collection is distinguishable.
Requirements: To seek a declaratory judgment in Texas, Mark must demonstrate that there is an actual controversy or uncertainty that needs resolution. Mark meets this requirement. The law and interpretation pertaining to debt collection and consumer laws and statutes in Texas is ambiguous and fervently disputed, in particular the Texas Finance Code and Texas Debt Collection Act, leading to unnecessary, expensive, time-consuming, stressful and emotionally exhausting lawsuits, as identified.
Discretion of the Court: The court may consider factors such as whether the judgment would effectively and conclusively settle the legal issues at hand. As argued in the related case, the court cannot intervene or make a ruling without the involvement and joinder of Ken, an indispensable party to the proceedings, see; Tex. R. Civ. P. 39.
Scope of Relief: Mark’s general request for declaratory judgment and relief can be fine-tuned once the statute’s ambiguous interpretation is addressed and decided, including whether or not the statute(s) and laws are constitutional in their current textual and legislative format.
Additionally, engaging in debt collection without filing a bond with the secretary of state is a violation of Chapter 392 and may also be a criminal offense. Tex. Fin. Code § 392.402. The attorney general or a district or county attorney may investigate an alleged violation of Chapter 392.
As such, this will require joinder of the additional and necessary party, discovery and most likely a trial on the merits.
Verification, Prayer & Relief
In closing, I, Mark Stephen Burke, as Intervenor with due authority and competency, and as a presiding resident of Kingwood in the livable forest of Harris County, Texas, born on June 20, 1967 in Harare, Zimbabwe, and currently holding a valid British Passport and U.S. Permanent Residency Card (last 3 digits are 529), a valid State of Texas Driver License (last 3 digits are 949), and a Social Security Card (last 3 digits are 162), do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.
This verified declaration, made under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holds significant weight in legal precedent, as evident in ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020), McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, at *15-17 (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021), and In re Whitfield, No. 03-21-00170-CR, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2021).
Accordingly, Mark Stephen Burke respectfully requests after final trial or hearing of these proceedings that he receives judgment in his favor, that he be awarded the damages, declaratory and other relief alleged above, that he recovers damages as may be established at trial, that he recover costs and prejudgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law, and that Mark Stephen Burke have and recover all other and further relief to which he may be entitled.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 15th day of November, 2023.
Uncovering the Next Personal Injury Law Firm Lawyer Protected by Harris County District Judges from LIT: https://t.co/8YPS5wLdAx @rks127th @MikeEngelhart @CDMenefee @txag @statebaroftexas @JusticeWillett @RMFifthCircuit @courthouse_mom @JacksonLeeTX18 @Jackson_Walker #txlege #TMO pic.twitter.com/intBrprA0Y
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) November 14, 2023
202301356 –
LUXURY ASSET CAPITAL LLC (D/B/A LUX & LUX EXCHANGE) vs. BAILEY, F KENNETH (JR)
JAN 9, 2023 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: NOV 16, 2023
It’s no longer an “Emergency” Heist.https://t.co/0ocsaMUqe3 https://t.co/fvZmB07CQV pic.twitter.com/oRPpkZ5kIS
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) June 13, 2024
SAVE THE DATE: WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 2024 AT 3.30PM
Luxury Asset Capital, LLC’s Emergency Motion to Request Expedited Hearing
Declaration of Dewey Burke in support of plaintiff’s emergency for expedited hearing on Lux’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment
Luxury Asset Capital® is the leading provider of confidential non-bank loans that use borrowers’ luxury assets as collateral. The company serves clients through its highly trusted brands including Borro, Beverly Loan Company, and New York Loan Company, providing short-term loans that fund in 1-2 business days using a borrower’s luxury asset(s) as collateral.
Our brands have loaned over one billion dollars to tens of thousands of clients across the country making Luxury Asset Capital the nation’s largest privately-held provider of non-bank loans that use borrowers’ luxury assets as collateral.
3 Years In Litigation: Vinh Truong Sued for Title Deed Fraud Defended by Bandit Lawyer Jeff Jackson https://t.co/wwAOkVQw1W #TWO #NMA
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) November 13, 2023
202270260 –
IDEA 247 INC vs. ROBINSON 45 ENTERPRISE INC
SEP 26, 2023 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: NOV 15, 2023
Debt Collectin’ Cowboy Bob Kruckemeyer Switches Hats to Defend Non-Payment of Debt for His Client
Texas lawyer Bob Kruckemeyer has timidly entered Harris County District Court late to lay down a general denial to the complaint.
AEG Fuels Filin’ Debt Collection Lawsuits in Miami, Florida Since Kruckemeyer Stopped in Texas
The law firm of Duane Morris are busy filing in Federal Court and it appears to coincide with AEG General Terms Update 2023 on aegfuels.com.
A Legal Cowboy and the Stallones in Harris County District Court Complainin’ About a Chain Saw Operator
Debt Collectin’ lawyer Robert Kruckemeyer files suit on behalf of Jeff and Pam Stallones complaining about the felling of pine and oak trees.
