202441693 – HOW’S THE OUTLAW FARING AS A JUDGE?
CONCERNED OWNERS OF PARK SQUARE vs. PARK SQUARE CO-OWNERS ASSOCIATION (THE)
(Court 189, OUTLAW CRAFT)
JUL 1, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 18, 2025
In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00340-CV
IN RE PARK SQUARE CO-OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS
189th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-41693
Order
On May 5, 2025, relator, Park Square Co-Owners Association, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. Relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Tamika Craft-Demming, presiding judge of the 189th District Court of Harris County, to vacate the trial court’s “Order Granting Motion for Contempt” signed on May 2, 2025.
Relator claims respondent abused her discretion by granting “Plaintiff’s Motion to Hold Defendant in Contempt for Violating the Court’s September 26, 2024, Temporary Injunction.”
Relator also filed a motion for temporary stay of the underlying proceedings pending our decision on the petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.10.
It appears from the facts stated in the petition and motion that relator’s request for relief requires further consideration and that relator will be prejudiced unless immediate temporary relief is granted.
We therefore GRANT relator’s motion and issue the following order:
We ORDER the trial court’s “Order Granting Motion for Contempt” signed on May 2, 2025 in trial court cause number 2024-41693, Concerned Owners of Park Square v. The Park Square Co-Owners Association, STAYED until a final decision by this court on relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, or until further order of this court.
In addition, this court requests the real party in interest, Concerned Owners of Park Square, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before May 20, 2025. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Hart and Bridges.
Argument
For the numerous reasons set forth herein, the issuance of the Contempt Order was a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
A. Standards for imposing contempt
“‘Contempt of court is broadly defined as disobedience to or disrespect of a court by acting in opposition to its authority.’”
In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1995)).
Although courts have “broad and inherent” power to issue contempt orders, the Texas Supreme Court has warned:
“‘Contempt is strong medicine—the alleged contemnor’s very liberty is often at stake—and so it should be used only as a last resort.’”
In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011).
There are two types of contempt: direct and constructive.
Id. at 365.
Defiance of a court order that occurs in the presence of a court is known as direct contempt and does not require the constitutional due process of notice and hearing.
Id.
Even then, the court’s authority to hold one in contempt is not unlimited.
Id.
Defiance of a court order that does not occur in the presence of the court is constructive contempt.
Id.
A contemnor accused of constructive contempt “is always entitled to notice and a hearing in order to defend or explain the charges.”
Id.
Constructive contempt is classified as either civil or criminal contempt.
Id.
To know whether civil or criminal contempt has been ordered, one considers the purpose behind the contempt order.
Id.
“[C]ivil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature—the contemnor carries the keys to the jail cell in his or her pocket since the confinement is conditioned on obedience with the court’s order, while criminal contempt is punitive in nature—the contemnor is being punished for some completed act which affronted the dignity and authority of the court.”
Id. (cleaned up).
“Thus, the distinction between criminal and civil contempt does not turn on whether the underlying litigation is civil or criminal, but rather on the nature of the court’s punishment.”
Id.
Criminal contempt requires additional due process safeguards.
“[D]ue process requires that the alleged contemnor receive full and unambiguous notification of the accusation of any contempt.
This notice should be by show cause order or equivalent legal process personally served on the alleged contemnor, and it should state when, how and by what means the defendant has been guilty of contempt.”
Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988).
One purpose of requiring notice is to give the alleged contemnor an opportunity to investigate and prepare a defense to the charge.
In re Warrick, No. 08-13-00255-CR, 2014 WL 2466105, at *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, orig. proceeding).
B. The trial court abused its discretion by entering a Contempt Order when Plaintiff failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Relator engaged in contemptuous acts.
Imposition of criminal contempt of a court order requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
(1) a reasonably specific order;
(2) a violation of the order;
and
(3) the willful intent to violate the order.
In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 721.
Plaintiff did not meet its burden to establish these elements.
1. Insufficient Evidence of a Reasonably Specific Order
The Association acknowledges the Injunction is a reasonably specific order that the Association (1) cannot implement and enforce the 2024 Special Assessment, or (2) enter into any contracts or commence work related to the corrective maintenance plan.
The Association did neither of those things.
The trial court thus must have read the Injunction to apply to other, non-specified activities, which is improper.
…Once the trial court issued its Injunction, the Association rescinded the 2024 Special Assessment and proceeded to address the desired corrective maintenance plan work through its annual budgeting process (MR 33-34, 36-41)—in other words, the Association did just as Plaintiff requested.
This cannot be a violation of the Injunction.
The Contempt Order also finds the Association violated the Injunction because the increased annual assessments show an “intent” and a “hope” to perform the work enjoined by the trial court.
MR 84.
This was an abuse of discretion.
Contempt of court requires an action, not an intent.
Ex parte Taylor, 807 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Even if the Association is making preliminary plans to perform the required maintenance, all the evidence before the trial court established the Association had no intent to undertake the challenged maintenance unless and until the Injunction was dissolved or no longer in effect and was expressly informing the owners of its compliance with the Injunction.
MR 33, 40.
There is no injunction prohibiting Relator from planning future maintenance projects.
The trial court further found that there was “no notice to the owners including Plaintiff” that the Association filed the balcony maintenance policy with the Harris County Real Property Records.
MR 84.
Nothing in the Injunction required the Association to give the owners notice of the filing of the balcony maintenance policy.
That policy does not violate or seek to violate the Injunction.
Rather, the balcony maintenance policy reinforces the provision in the Declaration providing that the Association is responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of the balcony slab and other structural components of the building while the owners are responsible for the exterior surfaces of the balconies.
MR 102-104.
The Injunction does not prohibit the Association from passing policies under the authority granted by the Texas Property Code.
C. The trial court’s Contempt Order was an abuse of discretion given the lack of due process Relator was afforded.
Because the trial court’s Contempt Order arises from the Association’s conduct outside the courtroom (MR 1-81), the trial court held the Association in constructive contempt.
See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 365.
Under the Contempt Order, the Association had no way to avoid punishment.
MR 82-86.
By definition therefore, the Association was held in criminal contempt.
In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 365. The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the Contempt Order because the Association was not afforded proper due process.
Before the trial court issued the Contempt Order, the Association did not have clear and unambiguous notice of Plaintiff’s contempt allegations; rather, Plaintiff vaguely referenced the Association’s “intent” to perform work, and the Association’s “hope” to perform work in the future.
MR 1-81.
The Association was never provided clear notice of when, how, and by what means it allegedly violated the court’s Injunction.
Plaintiff failed to allege when, how, and by what means the Relator collected the 2024 Special Assessment at issue in the lawsuit, entered into any contracts related to the balconies or driveways, or violated any other provisions of the Injunction.
In fact, the 2024 Special Assessment had been rescinded at a December 2024 Board meeting (MR 36), making it impossible for the Association to violate any provisions of the Injunction related to the 2024 Special Assessment.
The Association provided clear and direct testimony at the hearing on the Contempt Motion that the 2024 Special Assessment was rescinded, that no work related to the corrective maintenance plan had taken place, no contracts related to any work in the corrective maintenance plan had been executed, and that no other violation of the Induction had occurred.1
Because the Association was left to speculate about what actions violated the Injunction, the notice it was provided falls woefully short of meeting the requirements of due process and amounts to no notice at all.
1 The Association has ordered the record of the contempt hearing and intends to supplement the mandamus record with that reporter’s record as soon as possible.
D. The trial court abused its discretion by holding certain individuals jointly and severally liable for fines and attorneys’ fees when the individuals were not parties to the lawsuit, and were never personally served with the Injunction, a subpoena or show cause order.
The Contempt Order holds the Association’s general manager and the Board’s individual directors jointly and severally liable for paying the fines and attorney’s fees.
MR 82-86.
These individuals are not named parties to the litigation, were not personally served with the Injunction, were not served with a show cause order or even a subpoena to appear at the contempt hearing, and were not personally served with even the Contempt Motion or otherwise given notice of their allegedly contemptuous actions.
They were not afforded an opportunity to hire counsel or prepare a defense.
Holding them in contempt was an undeniable violation of their due process rights and a clear abuse of discretion.
See Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d at 599
(holding that contempt for conduct outside the presence of the court requires notice “by show cause order or equivalent legal process personally served on the alleged contemnor”).
E. The trial court abused its discretion by requiring the Association to pay fines and attorneys’ fees yet prohibiting the Association from using its only source of funds to pay the fines and attorneys’ fees.
The Contempt Order requires the Association to pay fines in the amount of $14,200.00 and attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $38,546.51, yet prohibits the Association from making the payment from any funds that have been collected from Plaintiff, its members, or any of the other owners in the Park Square property.
MR 85.
This was an abuse of discretion because there was no evidence that the Association has any funds or source of funds other than assessments collected from the Park Square owners.
The Declaration and Chapter 82 of the Texas Property Code provide the Association the authority to collect funds for common expenses from unit owners.
MR 98-101; Tex. Prop. Code § 82.102(2).
Neither the Declaration nor the Texas Property Code provide authority for the Association to engage in other acts of business to generate income.
The only funds available to the Association to pay the fines and fees ordered in the Contempt Order are those monies it has collected from unit owners.
The trial court abused its discretion in issuing an order impossible for the Association to obey.
F. The trial court abused its discretion by effectively prohibiting the Association from running its affairs.
The trial court’s Contempt Order effectively prohibits the Association from meeting its obligations duties under the Declaration and the Texas Property Code.
Not only did the trial court impose contempt for actions not barred by the Injunction, if the trial court intended that the Association be prohibited from exercising any of its powers, duties, obligations, and responsibilities under the Declaration, the trial court was required to issue a reasonably specific order prohibiting the Association from these actions.
The trial court’s Injunction did not meet this standard.
LIT’s Explosive Series on Harris County District Judge Tami Craft
OCT 11, 2023
In this case, LIT highlights the risk of title deed irregularities or potential fraud, which is clearly evident.
The situation involves a property dispute where quitclaim deeds were executed without the necessary approval from the probate court.
The court ruled that these deeds were not valid, emphasizing that the guardian lacked the authority to convey the property without proper approval.
This raises concerns about the integrity of the title transfer process and highlights the risks associated with:
Lack of Legal Authority: Executing property deeds without the required approval from the probate court can lead to a lack of legal authority in the transfer process. In this case, the court found that the guardian exceeded her authority, rendering the quitclaim deeds ineffective.
Title Deed Issues: The use of quitclaim deeds, which typically transfer the rights the grantor possesses but don’t guarantee a clear title, can contribute to title deed issues. The deeds were deemed legally insufficient due to the absence of proper authorization.
Potential Fraud: While the court did not explicitly use the term “fraudulent,” the circumstances surrounding the unauthorized property transfers could be seen as a species of title deed fraud. This emphasizes the importance of transparency and adherence to legal procedures in property transactions.
Legal Repercussions: The court’s decision to reverse the adverse possession finding underscores the legal repercussions of improper property transfers. Such cases can result in significant legal battles, affecting the rights and claims of both parties involved.
Property Disputes: Title deed irregularities can lead to prolonged and complex property disputes. In this case, the lack of proper authority in the conveyance process initiated a legal conflict over ownership, requiring court intervention for resolution.
This situation serves as a cautionary tale, emphasizing the need for individuals involved in property transactions to adhere to legal procedures, secure proper approvals, and ensure transparency to mitigate the risks of title deed issues and potential fraud.
Here’s Ten Bucks, sayeth Tami Craft-Demming
Johnson v. Mcclintock
202 S.W.3d 821
(Tex. App. 2006)
OPINION
Opinion by Justice HINOJOSA.
Appellants, Kevin Johnson, Nona K. Roberts, Thurman Johnson, William Johnson, and Geraldine Johnson, appeal the trial court’s finding that under the five-year statute, appellee, Melvin McClintock, adversely possessed certain property in Wharton County, Texas.
In one issue, appellants contend the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of adverse possession.
We reverse and render.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Anne Stevens owned the following three tracts of land in Wharton County: (1) Lot 5A, (2) Lot 3, and (3) Lot 3A.
In 1993, Stevens was declared incompetent, and Mabel Davis was named guardian of her person and estate.
In 1994, Davis asked the probate court for permission to sell Lot 5A to appellee.
Appellants contested the sale, and the probate court denied Davis’s request.
On February 25, 1994, without consulting the probate court, Davis executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Lot 3A to appellee and his wife.
A year later, on March 19, 1995, Davis executed another quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Lot 3 to appellee’s wife.
Stevens died on June 19, 1995.
From 1994 to 2005, appellee paid off a lien that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) had placed on the property, paid taxes on the property, and executed a gas, oil, and mineral lease on the property.
Throughout this period of time, appellants were aware of appellee’s use of and dealings with the land.
After paying off the HUD lien in 2003, appellee filed suit to quiet title to the property.
In response, appellants demanded that appellee vacate the property and filed a trespass-to-try-title counterclaim.
After a bench trial, the trial court found that, under the five-year statute, appellee had adversely possessed Lots 3 and 3A. After the trial court denied their motion for new trial, appellants filed this appeal.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellant may challenge a trial court’s findings of fact for legal sufficiency; we review those findings under the same legal standard that we apply to the review of jury findings.
BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005).
We will sustain a legal sufficiency point if the record reveals the following: (a) the complete absence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.
Id. at 810.
The fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony.
See id. at 819.
C. ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER FIVE-YEAR STATUTE
Appellants contend the trial court erred in finding that appellee adversely possessed Lots 3 and 3A, because appellee did not satisfy all the elements of the five-year statute.
Section 16.021 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines adverse possession as “an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. KEM. CODE ANN. § 16.021(1) (Vernon 2002); Clements v. Corbin, 891 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
To establish adverse possession under the five-year statute:
(a) A person must bring suit not later than five years after the day the cause of action accrues to recover real property held in peaceable and adverse possession by another who:
(1) cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property;
(2) pays applicable taxes on the property; and
(3) claims the property under a duly registered deed.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 16.025(a) (Vernon 2002).
Appellants contend that appellee did not satisfy the third element of the statute.
They assert that because a quitclaim deed only transfers the rights that the transferor possesses, and Davis, as grantor, did not have the right to transfer Stevens’ property, appellee did not present evidence at trial of a duly registered deed.
Generally, “an instrument which purports to convey such right, title, and interest as a grantor may have and no more will not qualify as a deed under the statute as it does not purport to convey the land itself nor does it specify any particular interest which is purportedly conveyed.”
Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1965); see Rogers v. Ricane Enter., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1994) (providing that a quitclaim deed passes the interest of the grantor in the property); Garza v. Maddux, 988 S.W.2d 280, 289 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
A guardian does not have authority to convey the property of a ward without approval from the probate court.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 820 (Vernon 2005).
The first time she attempted to sell Stevens’ land, Davis asked the probate court for permission to sell, but her request to sell Lot 5A was denied.
Davis never asked the probate court for permission to convey either Lot 3 or Lot 3A to appellee and his wife.
Instead, she circumvented the probate court and purported to convey Lots 3 and 3A by quitclaim deeds.
Both quitclaim deeds transferred “all the right, title, land, interest and claim” that Davis, as guardian, had.
However, without the probate court’s permission, Davis, as guardian, had no right, title, interest, or claim to either Lot 3 or Lot 3A.
Thus, Davis conveyed nothing by her quitclaim deeds.
Because the record contains no evidence that appellee’s claim to Lots 3 and 3A was under duly registered deeds, we hold the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellee adversely possessed Lots 3 and 3A.
Appellants’ sole issue is sustained.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is rendered that appellee take nothing by his suit.
G. The trial court’s Contempt Order of fines is impermissible under section 21.002(b) of the Texas Government Code.
Section 21.002(b) of the Texas Government Code describes the available punishment for contempt of a court.
It provides for a fine of not more than $500.00.
The Texas Supreme Court held in Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962 (Tex. 1995), that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to assess a fine of more than $500 for each contempt.
Here, the trial court issued a fine for each day the court found that the Association was in violation of the Injunction.
In layman’s terms, a quitclaim deed is a legal document used to transfer interest in real estate from one person or entity to another. Unlike a warranty deed, a quitclaim deed doesn’t make any guarantees about the property’s title. Instead, it transfers whatever interest the grantor (the person transferring the property) has in the property to the grantee (the person receiving the property).
Think of it like this: If you have any rights to a property, a quitclaim deed allows you to give up those rights to someone else. However, it doesn’t guarantee that you actually have any rights or that the property is free of other claims. It’s a way of saying, “Whatever interest I have in this property, I’m giving it to you, but I’m not making any promises about what that interest is.”
Quitclaim deeds are often used in situations where there is already a level of trust between the parties involved, such as transferring property between family members or divorcing spouses. They are not typically recommended for transactions where a clear title is crucial, like when buying or selling real estate on the open market, because the grantor does not guarantee the quality of the title being transferred.
A “trespass-to-try-title” counterclaim is a legal action that can be taken in response to a claim or lawsuit related to the ownership or title of real property. Let’s break down the key terms:
Trespass-to-Try-Title: This refers to a legal cause of action where a person (the plaintiff) seeks a court judgment to establish or clear title to a piece of real property. It is a legal remedy to resolve disputes over ownership of land.
Counterclaim: In a legal context, a counterclaim is a claim made by a defendant in response to the claim of the plaintiff. It’s a way for the defendant to assert their own rights or seek a remedy against the plaintiff.
Putting them together, a “trespass-to-try-title counterclaim” would occur when a defendant in a lawsuit concerning the ownership or title of real property responds by filing a counterclaim asserting their own rights to the property and seeking a judgment from the court to establish or defend their title.
This type of counterclaim is often used in situations where there is a disagreement about the rightful owner of a piece of land, and both parties want the court to resolve the issue and officially determine the legal owner. It’s a legal process aimed at settling disputes related to property titles.
OUTLAW JUDGE TAMI CRAFT SELF-RECUSES AFTER VIOLATING EVERY TEXAS LAW, RULE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
JAN 25, 2023
On Dec. 11, 2023, LIT’s founder, Mark Burke, filed a motion to disqualify Judge Tamika Craft-Demming, aka Tami Craft.
She had 3 days to decide – mandatory rule. Craft failed to do anything, rather blanking the motion. Thereafter, she went on a tirade of retaliatory acts.
First, the court refused to accept the filing, claiming the exhibits had to be renamed. Mark refused, citing to prior examples of naming convention for exhibits accepted by the court. The court would then rename all exhibits as “Exhibit”.
Then on Dec. 27, 2023 she’d be the assigned ancillary judge for party Joanna Burke in her request for a TRO in case; 202386973 – BURKE, JOANNA vs. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (Court 011). At the oral hearing she DENIED the TRO without reason, despite the overwhelming evidence supporting the TRO. See signed ORDER denying TRO, dated Dec. 27, 2023.
Next, on submission day – Jan. 8, 2024, Mark intervened in the matter; 202366239 – IDEA 247 INC vs. EPPS, RAYMOND (A/K/A RAY EPPS) (Court 189) and the court would GRANT Idea’s motion to STRIKE the INTERVENTION, despite the objections and request for hearings which were also blanked by the court. The order was signed at 3.35 pm.
Also, at 1.16 pm earlier that day, the court – in the case 202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM (Court 189) – would email Mark falsely claiming “The courts do not have a record of a Proposed Order for the following setting. Please file one or contact the court if there is one on file.”. This was a ruse and Mark wittingly chose to ignore the premeditated invite to respond.
As detailed below, today, Jan. 23, 2023, the court and Outlaw Craft would contradict their own rule by holding the hearing (no proposed order, no hearing) and 3 minutes later stating it was PASSED. Shortly thereafter, it is clear from the online docket, Craft would then enter her self recusal – once her trail of destruction was complete.
Let it be known, this is only the beginning, Outlaw Craft, not the end of your ongoing relationship with Mark Burke and LIT.
See; Barnhill v. Agnew, No. 12-12-00080-CV, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2013)
(“When a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge, the responding judge, regardless of whether the motion complies with the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, must, within three business days after the motion is filed (1) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal or (2) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).
Failure to comply with the rule renders void any actions taken subsequent to the violation.
In re A.R.,236 S.W.3d 460, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).”)
Notably, no email from the Court advising of this sua sponte recusal
Absent from the Docket as at Jan. 23 - An Order re Self-Recusal by Outlaw Tami Craft
Immediately after hearing...
3 minutes...
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