NUMBER 13-24-00285-CV COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JASON BRYANT AND LINDSEY BRYANT AND IN THE INTEREST OF B.B. AND S.B., CHILDREN
ON APPEAL FROM THE 267TH DISTRICT COURT OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca Opinion by Justice Fonseca
MAY 15, 2025 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 22, 2025
EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE
An extrajudicial source refers to information, influence, or bias that comes from outside the legal proceedings themselves—meaning it’s not based on evidence presented in court or the judge’s direct participation in the case.
Here are a few examples:
Personal Relationships
If a judge has a close friendship or enmity with one of the parties, their bias stemming from that relationship would be considered extrajudicial.
Media Coverage
– If a judge forms an opinion on a case based on news articles or social media rather than the arguments and evidence presented in court.
Political Pressure
If outside political groups or officials attempt to sway a judge’s decision through persuasion or influence.
Prior Personal Experiences
If a judge has personal experiences similar to the case at hand and allows those experiences to cloud their judgment.
Financial Interests
If a judge stands to benefit financially from ruling a certain way, whether through investments or business ties to involved parties.
An extrajudicial bias is problematic because it means the judge is not relying solely on the legal process to reach their decision. That’s why courts often scrutinize judges for impartiality when such concerns arise.
A LIVE CONTROVERSY AS A CASE STUDY
In judicial proceedings, bias is considered impermissible when it originates from an extrajudicial source, leading to an opinion on the case outside of what the judge has learned through direct participation.
This principle was highlighted in Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002), where it was recognized that judicial bias must stem from evidence presented within the proceedings rather than external influences.
In the present case study, currently bankrupt and facing foreclosure judge Nathan Milliron of Harris County District Court #215, previously practiced as a creditor rights and foreclosure mill attorney.
He publicly expressed hostility toward a publication on LIT, going so far as to leave a comment threatening legal action over a published article.
When LIT’s founder later appeared before the judge in court, the judge failed to recuse, despite an apparent history of antagonism.
This situation raises concerns about extrajudicial bias under two key categories:
1. Media Coverage Influence (Extrajudicial Source #2) – The judge’s reaction to LIT’s article indicates that Milliron’s perception was already shaped by external, non-case-related information.
2. Prior Personal Experience (Extrajudicial Source #4) – A previous dispute with LIT has clearly contributed to preconceived opinions and failure to communicate, affecting judicial impartiality.
Given these factors, a reasonable argument can be made that the judge’s involvement risks violating the standard of neutrality required in legal proceedings.
When extrajudicial bias is evident, self recusal is mandated to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
Failure to recuse under these circumstances undermines the principle of judicial impartiality.
According to Canon 3(B)(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are required to step aside in cases where disqualification is required or recusal is appropriate.
Furthermore, Canon 3(B)(5)-(6) emphasizes that judges must perform their duties without bias or prejudice, ensuring decisions are based solely on case evidence rather than external influences.
Since the judge’s prior interactions with LIT could reasonably call Milliron’s impartiality into question, self-recusal is mandated to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
Place 4
Justice Ysmael D. Fonseca was born and raised in South Texas.
He graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a B.A. degree, with honors, in Political Science and Spanish Literature in 2003 and a J.D. degree, with honors, in 2009.
Prior to attending law school, he served as a Paralegal Specialist for the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division in Washington, D.C. assisting in the prosecution of civil rights cases, with a particular focus on the prosecution of human trafficking offenses.
He continued in public service while in law school through his work with the United States Attorney’s Office in McAllen, Texas and with Senator John Cornyn in the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate.
During his law school years, Justice Fonseca served in the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy as note editor, and in the Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic as a student-lawyer representing indigent clients in small estate, guardianship, and other probate matters.
Justice Fonseca’s career as an attorney began with his service as judicial law clerk for Justice Randy Crane of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
He then continued his practice at Guerra & Sabo, PLLC (formerly Guerra, Leeds, Sabo & Hernandez, PLLC) where he specialized in civil defense, municipal law, and small business and non-profit representation.
By appointment of Governor Greg Abbott, from 2019 to 2020, Justice Fonseca served as Judge of the 464th District Court of Hidalgo County, and, from 2023 to 2024, Justice Fonseca served as Judge of the 476th District Court of Hidalgo County, courts of general jurisdiction overseeing criminal, family and civil cases.
Justice Fonseca’s service extends to several entities and organizations in his community.
He currently serves on the boards of the Basilica of Our Lady of San Juan Del Valle, McAllen Pregnancy Center, and RGV LEAD.
Justice Fonseca is a member of the Texas Bar Foundation and the College of the State Bar of Texas.
Justice Fonseca was elected to Place 4 of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals on November 5, 2024. His tenure on the Court began January 1, 2025.
Y’all think you’d get a fair trial before Milliron if he left you this comment?
“Bald face lie. Have you read the Texas Finance Code? No. No. No. Looking forward to the defamation claim. Take it down and issue an apology or be ready to deal with the law (which you won’t).” pic.twitter.com/dSxuKx2WwE
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 21, 2025
Relevant Extracts from COA13’s Opinion re Judicial Bias and Extrajudicial Source
1. Judicial Bias
Generally, it is disfavored for trial judges to call and question witnesses.
Johnson v. Hawkins, 255 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied);
see also Galvan v. State, 988 S.W.2d 291, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d)
(“Texas is ‘second to none’ in its disapproval of judges’ examination of witnesses during a jury trial ”).
But, though not favored, extensive and adversarial questioning by a trial judge is permissible in a bench trial if the questions are relevant to the issues before the court and the judge’s impartiality is not affected.
See In re R.P., 37 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.);
Trahan v. Trahan, 732 S.W.2d 113, 114-15 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 1987, no writ);
see also Gale v. State, No. 05-17-00592-CR, No. 05-17-00595- CR, No. 05-17-00596-CR, 2018 WL 3434511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We have previously held in a criminal sentencing case that a defendant may complain of a trial court’s partiality for the first time on appeal if the conduct is so egregious as to deem the judge biased.
Hernandez v. State, 268 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.).
This decision arose out of the reasoning in Blue v. State that a right to an impartial judge is an absolute requirement and that due process allows complaint for the first time on appeal where a trial court’s comments are “so egregious” as to deem the judge biased.
41 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality op.).
While we have not applied this reasoning in a civil case previously, the Third Court of Appeals has suggested that this reasoning would apply in a civil case where the bias demonstrated is “of such nature and extent as to deny due process of law.”
Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. v. Pub. Util. Com’n, 185 S.W.3d 555, 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (citing Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).
Bias is considered impermissible when it comes “from an extrajudicial source and result[s] in an opinion on the merits of the case other than what the judge learned from participating in the case.”
Id. (citing Rosas, 76 S.W.3d at 774).
Here’s Monica Lynn Riley-Lehman
She was revoked and jailed on a speedy trial basis for the same crimes that Felon Andrew Lehman faces.
Remember, they were both arrested in a stolen vehicle, with their newborn while intoxicated and in possession of a controlled substance. pic.twitter.com/5hpJb2dPI0
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 20, 2025
While the trial court’s adversarial questioning of witnesses alone does not rise to the level of bias, when considered in combination with the trial court’s hostile comments about his own gun possession, and potential stalking charges, which are facts entirely irrelevant to the case, and repeated indications that accusations not leading to criminal charges are “unfounded,” the record indicates that the trial court judge was not acting as an impartial factfinder attempting to arrive at the truth.
Instead, the trial court was actively seeking to discredit appellant and made light of serious accusations of family violence.
See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(A)
(stating that a judge “should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”);
see also Ramos v. State, 2023 WL 885008, at *14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (citing Lagrone v. State, 209 S.W. 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919)
(“The law contemplates that the trial judge shall maintain an attitude of impartiality throughout the trial.”)).
Appellee argues that appellant’s claims of judicial bias are akin to seeking recusal of the trial court judge and, as appellant failed to move at trial to recuse the judge and failed to object to the trial court’s comments, that such error was waived.
However, we have previously held in a criminal context that a party can raise the issue of a lack of judicial impartiality on appeal for the first time when the conduct is so egregious as to deem the judge biased.
See Hernandez, 268 S.W.3d at 184.
Though this is not a criminal matter, we are persuaded by the Third Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. that similar reasoning should apply in a civil case where the judicial conduct and bias is so egregious as to violate due process.
185 S.W.3d at 574.
Bias rises to this level when coming from an extrajudicial source, as it did in this matter.
See id.
The trial judge’s predeterminations about the outcome of the CPS investigation, comments about his personal gun ownership, and statements on not yet being charged with a stalking offense all arise from an extrajudicial source, and not the facts adduced at trial.
Therefore, following Off. of Pub. Util. Couns., we apply our reasoning from Hernandez in this matter and find that the trial court’s conduct here was egregious enough to be considered biased, thereby depriving appellant of a fair trial, allowing this to be raised for the first time on appeal.
See id.; Hernandez, 268 S.W.3d at 184.
Further, appellant argues that the trial court’s conduct is not a matter of recusal but goes to the abuse of discretion review and sufficiency issues.
Based on our review of the record, we agree.
While we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court’s and must defer to the trial court’s witness credibility determinations and weight given to any particular piece of evidence, the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support a finding that appellant cannot “give first priority to the welfare of the children” and reach shared decisions with appellee, or that appellant cannot encourage a positive relationship between appellee and their children.
See In re N.P.M., 509 S.W.3d at 564– 65; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134(a)(2)–(3).
The trial court asked questions of appellant at trial implying that appellant could not make shared decisions with appellee due to her constant unfounded criminal complaints against him.
..
The trial court had discretion to disbelieve all the above evidence, discredit the testimony of appellant and find that appellee had not committed acts of family violence.
And again, we cannot substitute our judgment and enter a finding that appellee did commit such acts.
But considering the trial court’s biased comments about his own irrelevant gun ownership, the evidence that appellant committed acts of family violence, and the lack of evidence regarding the parties’ inability to make shared decisions or put the best interests of their children first, we find the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the presumption in favor of both parents being appointed as JMCs was rebutted is factually insufficient.
Based on the record, the appointment of appellee as SMC was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
We sustain appellant’s second issue.
D. Remand vs. Render
The parties have expressed disagreement about the appropriate remedy in the event this Court sustained one of appellant’s issues. Appellee notably asserts that if this matter were remanded, the trial court would only be able to appoint both parties as JMCs as appellant did not challenge the court’s determination that appellee be given the right to designate the residence of the children. Appellee accordingly requests this Court to render judgment appointing both parties as JMCs. However, appellee misunderstands the scope of a new trial.
This Court has determined that the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination was factually insufficient and that the trial court judge was biased.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy is remand for new trial.
Appellant challenged appointment of appellee as SMC on appeal, which inherently includes the right to determine the residence of the children.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.132(1).
The new factfinder will have to evaluate the evidence introduced at the new trial to determine whether appellee be appointed as SMC, appellant be appointed as SMC, or both parties be appointed as JMCs.
The new trial will not be solely bound by the evidence introduced at the first trial as appellee incorrectly assumes.
Similarly, the new factfinder will have the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses and physical evidence to make their own determinations about the credibility and weight of the evidence.
I. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment insofar as it grants a divorce between the parties and disposes of the community assets. As we have sustained appellant’s second issue, we reverse the remainder of the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for a new trial concerning the issue of conservatorship.1
Because the trial court judge that presided over the original trial has retired, we find no need to order the regional presiding judge to appoint a new judge for this matter.
YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the 15th day of May, 2025.
