The Book of Lehman: Texas Felon On Paper Andrew ‘Thug with a JD’ Lehman Should be Revoked

MOTION TO INTERVENE

Mark Burke (“Burke”), in his capacity as sole director of Blogger Inc., (not Blogger, Inc., a non-existent entity), respectfully files this Verified Motion to Intervene in the above-captioned matter, and states the following:

INTRODUCTION

Mark Burke is the sole director of Blogger Inc., the purported entity named as the Defendant in this proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks to domesticate a void foreign judgment that includes an injunction requiring specific actions by Blogger, Inc., which – by misnomer – directly implicates Burke in his role as the purported entity’s responsible agent.

As any perceived compliance with the void injunction is contingent upon actions by Burke, intervention is necessary to protect Burke’s legal interests and ensure procedural fairness.

BASIS FOR INTERVENTION

Under Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Burke is a necessary party because the void injunction purportedly requires compliance from him as the agent of Blogger, Inc. However, Burke is only the sole director of Blogger Inc., importantly without a comma.

Additionally, intervention is warranted under Rule 60, which allows any party with a direct and substantial interest in the litigation to intervene.

Mark Burke has a direct interest in this proceeding because:

Compliance with the void purported injunction directly impacts him in his personal and professional capacity.

Failure to intervene may unlawfully subject him to potential liability, apparently including criminal contempt for any alleged noncompliance with the void judgment, as threatened repeatedly by the Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT

Mark Burke seeks to intervene for the purpose of defending his legal rights and interests, as well as ensuring the lack of enforceability of the referring court’s void judgment and order is handled properly and fairly by an impartial judge, and in compliance with due process and the Texas Constitution.

Denial of intervention would result in significant prejudice to Burke, as his ability to respond to claims against him individually or comply with court orders would be compromised.

Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Instead, it will facilitate a more complete and fair resolution of the issues at hand.

Burke has provided substantial background, argument and legal authority in support of this motion to intervene in his simultaneously filed Verified Plea to the Jurisdiction, and this Plea should be incorporated herein as supporting memorandum and authorities, as and when this court takes judicial notice of its own docket to determine the merits of Burke’s timely and compliant motion.

VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]

In closing, I, Mark ….

CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED

For these reasons, Mark Burke respectfully requests that this Court grant his Motion to Intervene and allow him to participate in the proceedings. A proposed order is filed separately. Burke further requests any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of April, 2025.

This case was initiated by sole Plaintiff Andrew P. Lehman, also known as Andrew Peter Lehman and Andrew Lehman, Sr (“Lehman”), who filed a Petition to Domesticate a Foreign Judgment as a pauper. The alleged default judgment from the Los Angeles Superior Court in California is void and must be dismissed with prejudice to refiling.

THE PENNILESS LEHMAN IS NOT ACTING ALONE

Importantly, although Lehman files this suit as an individual, he has been constantly aided and abetted by business associates, including members of various entities he owns who are known as criminals and felons in Texas.

For example, co-Plaintiff Monica Lynn Riley, absent from this petition as she was remanded to a Texas jail on February 28, 2025 for five years.

Lehman’s co-conspirators include (but not exhaustive); Samuel ‘Sam’ Elliott; Daniel Goldstein; Ashleigh Smith; Kim Lewis; Harriett Cozean; Kim Morrell; Kris Munoz; Nicole Meier, and; private investigator and process server Lindsey Smith.

PROCEDURAL MALFEASANCE

This response begins by addressing the blatant disregard for essential procedural checks by the California judge.

The Statute of Limitations has Expired: First, the lawsuit is time-barred, as admitted by the Judge in her judgment and order, which confirms the date of the disputed article was published in June of 2020.

The underlying case was not even filed until Jan. 9, 2023. Texas has a one-year statute of limitations.

Blogger, Inc. Does Not Exist in Delaware:

Furthermore, the legal entity sued does not exist, and even if it did, there was neither subject-matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction to justify the venue or sustain this deceptive filing.

The Judgment & Order Postal Addresses Do Not Match:

The California court previously rejected Plaintiffs’ requests for default judgment pertaining to the address[es] on file.

The final judgment and order fails to comply with the legal requirements in this respect.

Community Supervision in Texas:

The lawsuit was initiated by an indicted Texas felon, currently out on bond and community supervision which requires a court-ordered ankle monitor, regular testing and importantly, he always remains in the local court and county jurisdiction as part of his guilty plea and/or bail conditions.

Lehman has a documented history of vexatious litigation and an extensive criminal background which reveals a consistent pattern of exploiting the judicial system and threatening those who dare to challenge him.

ANALYSIS OF FRAUD

Next, the Defendant (referring to Blogger Inc., not Blogger, Inc., and Proposed Intervenor Mark Burke) highlights the fraudulent actions and perjury committed by the Plaintiff, along with the involvement of co-conspirators who also bear unclean hands.

This analysis does not address the merits of the case but instead provides a comprehensive examination of misconduct throughout the proceedings.

This includes Lehman’s perjury, venue and jurisdiction fraud, and the addition of a co-Plaintiff and co-conspirators to aid and abet these fraudulent efforts.

Central to this analysis is Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

This pivotal exhibit thoroughly documents the Plaintiffs’ continuous presence in Texas and their repeated probation violations through criminal acts and misconduct.

Its findings underscore the foundation of the Defendant’s claims and provide a clear framework to evaluate the fraudulent nature of these proceedings.

STATEMENTS OF FACT AND PLEA

This timely response and Plea to the Jurisdiction offers a detailed history of the parties, emphasizing that all parties involved reside and are domiciled in Texas—apart from the purported legal entity, Blogger, Inc.

The Defendant also outlines the legal requirements of the Texas Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”) and explains why Lehman’s petition fails entirely on every front.

CONCLUSION

Finally, the Plea addresses the pending Motion to Unseal Lehman’s pauper application.

It explains the Defendant’s objections to Lehman’s request to waive court fees as poverty-stricken, based on dishonesty.

BLOGGER, INC. IS NOT A LEGAL ENTITY IN DELAWARE

In these proceedings, Plaintiff Andrew P. Lehman attempted to serve or sought to serve both privately (paid service) and via the court (without payment of fees), certified legal process on two entities:

(i) Blogger Inc., a purported Delaware non-profit entity, via its registered agent in Delaware,

and

(ii) Mark Burke, identified as the sole Director of Blogger Inc., at his physical mailing address in Texas.

However, a thorough review of both the judgment and service of process reveals that the entity named on the citation is not Blogger Inc., the entity who was served, but rather Blogger, Inc. (notably with a comma).

Additionally, the attached judgment is also in the name of Blogger, Inc.

This entity does not legally exist and this case warrants dismissal on this fact alone, as established in New Residential Mortg. v. Legacy Brokerage, LLC, No. 05-23-00259-CV, at *9 (Tex. App. Mar. 18, 2024)

(“NRM’s issue concerning defective service is sustained, and we need not reach the remaining issues.”).

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE GAIL KILLEFER’s DEFAULT JUDGMENT, ORDER OF $1.9M+ DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA STATE COURT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION BASED UPON PERJURY AND FRAUD

“The law abhors default judgments.” – New Residential Mortg. v. Legacy Brokerage, LLC, No. 05-23-00259-CV, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 18, 2024)

Subject-matter jurisdiction deals with the court’s authority to hear certain types of cases based on the nature of the legal issues, and it’s entirely separate from personal jurisdiction.

“Subject-matter jurisdiction is always front and center and must always be confirmed.

“Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.”

No jurisdiction equals no judicial power, meaning courts always have an affirmative duty to confirm jurisdiction exists.

A court without jurisdiction has power to do only one thing: dismiss.

Conversely, any action other than dismissal necessitates an inference that the court believed its action properly surmounted any jurisdictional obstacles.

Given the judiciary’s sua sponte duty to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction, a party’s pleadings will always place jurisdictional requisites at issue.”

– State v. Naylor (In re State), 466 S.W.3d 783, 805 (Tex. 2015).

Personal jurisdiction pertains to a court’s authority over the parties involved in a lawsuit.

General and specific jurisdiction are both subsets of personal jurisdiction.

General and specific jurisdiction describe different ways this authority can be established,:

·       General jurisdiction applies when a defendant has substantial and continuous connections to the state, allowing the court to hear any case against them.

·       Specific jurisdiction applies when the legal dispute arises directly from the defendant’s activities in the state.

·       Legal authority: A question of law, personal, general and specific jurisdiction is detailed in NATIONWIDE CAP. v. H. EPPS, No. 13-04-308-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 20, 2006).

A review of the void Los Angeles court order by Judge Gail Killefer (“Judge Killefer”) reached only part of the mandatory jurisdictional assessment, specifically, process of service upon Blogger, Inc., a non-existent legal entity.

As discussed above, “A judgment based on improper service is void. As the Texas Supreme Court has observed, “we rigidly enforce rules governing service when a default judgment is entered because the only ground supporting the judgment is that the defendant has failed to respond to the action in conformity with the applicable procedure for doing so.”

Hubicki v. Festina, 226 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. 2007).

– New Residential Mortg. v. Legacy Brokerage, LLC, No. 05-23-00259-CV, at *5 (Tex. App. Mar. 18, 2024).

That stated, for the purposes of illustration and argument, even assuming service was deemed sufficient for the purposes of a default judgment, Judge Killefer’s order remains void, as she reached the merits without first fully assessing jurisdiction over the case and parties.

General jurisdiction:

“…recent Supreme Court cases have clarified that the general jurisdiction analysis entails a high bar.

Indeed, a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant only if its “affiliations with the [s]tate are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.

“Continuous and systematic contacts that fail to rise to this relatively high level are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Thus, when a nonresident corporation owns an in-state subsidiary, this ownership is not ipso facto sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident owner itself.

Courts do not have general jurisdiction over corporate defendants that are neither incorporated in the forum state nor have their principal place of business there, absent some relatively substantial contacts with the forum state.”

– Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., No. 14-0293, at *20 (Tex. June 17, 2016).

The California court did not determine, nor could it, that there was general jurisdiction over Blogger, Inc., or for that matter, Blogger Inc., because it’s a Delaware ‘nonresident’ corporation, and unlike Searcy, does not even own an in-state subsidiary, and has zero connections in the State of California.

“Specific jurisdiction . . . arises when

(1) the defendant purposefully avails itself of conducting activities in the forum state,

and

(2) the cause of action arises from or is related to those contacts or activities.

In a specific jurisdiction analysis, we focus . . . on the relationship among the defendant, the forum[,] and the litigation.”

Kelly v. General Interior Const., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).

“But the mere existence of a cause of action does not automatically satisfy jurisdictional due process concerns.

A state is powerless to create jurisdiction over a nonresident by establishing a remedy for a private wrong and a mechanism to seek that relief.

Instead, jurisdictional analysis always centers on the defendant’s actions and choices to enter the forum state and conduct business.

Kelly at 660.

In simple words, a state can’t just make laws or set up courts to create authority (jurisdiction) over someone who doesn’t live there.

It doesn’t matter if the state provides a way for people to fix a private problem, like suing for damages and awarding $1.9 million dollars.

If the nonresident has no meaningful connection to the state—like living there, doing business there, or having some other link—the state’s courts don’t automatically get the right to involve them in legal cases.

In essence, jurisdiction over a nonresident requires more than just the state creating rules or processes.

There must be a legitimate reason tied to the entity or person’s actions or presence in the state.

Furthermore, Lehman knowingly and maliciously filed his vexatious lawsuit in California, trying to claim jurisdiction there, but all parties are Texas residents (domiciled in Texas) except for the entity Blogger Inc. of Delaware, and who is not a party – as the entity sued does not exist, namely Blogger, Inc.

In summary, jurisdiction isn’t just about where someone chooses to file a lawsuit — it must be based on legitimate ties to the state, like residency, business activities, or other meaningful connections.

Filing in California, Lehman invoked venue and judge shopping to manipulate jurisdiction.

Judge Killefer willingly, knowingly and maliciously played along, creating jurisdiction over a nonresident entity.

The LASC court, as well as the California Supreme Court were all on notice.

All original parties were nonresidents.

As such, her premeditated order is void due to fraud by both Plaintiffs and Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Gail Killefer.

The California court has no subject-matter or personal jurisdiction over anyone, or any entity.

The purported judgment is both unconstitutional and void.

A VEXATIOUS LAWSUIT FILED IN CALIFORNIA BY AN INDICTED FELON WITH A JD, ANDREW PETER LEHMAN, WHO WAS AND REMAINS ON BOND, AND RESTRICTED FROM LEAVING TEXAS WITHOUT APPROVAL BY TX COURTS

When Andrew P. Lehman, aka Andrew Peter Lehman, aka Andrew Lehman, Sr “Lehman”) and/or his agents first approached Blogger Inc to take down the offending article, the email[1] claimed Lehman would sue in Harris County District Court, the correct venue for such proceedings.

However, at the time of filing in a Los Angeles, California state court, Lehman was embroiled in contentious litigation of his own, refusing to leave a rental home in Hitchcock, Texas.

There, he admittedly failed to pay rent for months, and delayed court ordered eviction repeatedly.

Rather than file his lawsuit in Harris County, he switched to Los Angeles, California, a hoax venue, electing to invoke judge shopping to file the defamation lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior Court, California (“LASC”) on January 9, 2023.

Shortly thereafter, around January 19, 2023, he faced eviction from his rental home by a Galveston court order and writ of possession.

Shockingly, and despite the facts as detailed in this case, the assigned judge in Los Angeles, Gail Killefer, would enter a default judgment, damages more than $1.9 million dollars and command that certain blog and social media posts be removed by Blogger, Inc.

Defendant objects to the order and judgment rendered by Judge Gail Killefer, LASC as void.

The lawsuit was fraudulently submitted by Texas domiciled Plaintiff Andrew Peter Lehman under the penalty of perjury, and once again, Lehman requested the taxpayer pay for his criminal actions.

This was granted by the California court by approving his Pauper application(s) and that of his later added co-Plaintiff and co-Conspirator in those proceedings, Texas Inmate Monica Lynn Riley.

The Los Angeles Superior Court judgment is a nullity, in law.

The Defendant now provides this court with supporting background, evidence and legal authority to dismiss this frivolous case, with prejudice.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

THE ORIGINAL PETITION AND PARTIES

In between a busy schedule of criminal and frivolous civil court cases—except for the Harris County District Court case numbered 202504610 (Office of the Attorney General vs. Lehman, Andrew Peter, in Court 247)—the Plaintiff, Andrew Peter Lehman aka Andrew Peter Lehman Sr., took legal action.

On Monday, March 4, 2025, the Plaintiff, a convicted felon who is currently out on a $12,500 bond in Harris County Criminal Court for case number 180764001010 (The State of Texas vs. Lehman, Andrew, in Court 263), filed a void and fraudulent “Petition for Domestication of a Foreign Judgment.”

Despite repeated violations of his suspended three-year jail sentence, Lehman was rearrested for charges including vehicle theft, child endangerment, and drug possession.

He also tested positive for methamphetamine.

His co-Plaintiff was also charged.

As discussed later, Monica Lynn Riley is not a named Plaintiff in this Petition as she was recently sentenced to five years in jail on February 28, 2025;

Case No. 20-CR-2856 – The State of Texas vs. MONICA LYNN RILEY, In the 122nd District Court of GALVESTON, TEXAS.

Lehman’s mirror case in Galveston has many documents and orders which have been unlawfully restricted from public viewing online.

As a result, it is unknown if the $30,000 bond set in that case for Lehman has been paid, with a minimum amount of $3,000 payable on that sum alone.

One would have thought that it was paid, as he has been out-on-bond.

However, after Defendant highlighted these facts on social media, the court has now set another hearing for Apr. 9, 2025, which one could reasonably speculate due to the unlawful docket sealing, it is not paid.

These Galveston charges have led to a motion to adjudicate guilt in Lehman’s Harris County rider case, and which had been scheduled for a hearing on April 2, 2025.

However, whilst preparing this Plea, Defendant has noted that the hearing has been altered to April 22, 2025, rather than formally reset.

Returning to the these proceedings, the petition Lehman filed included a purported “Certified Copy of the Los Angeles Superior Court Judgment” dated December 2, 2024 [sic], against Defendant “BLOGGER INC., d/b/a LAWSINTEXAS,com [sic],” labeled as Exhibit “A.”[2]

Accompanying this petition were additional filings: “Filing Last Known Address,” “Certificate of Service,” and, relevant to this motion, a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs or an Appeal Bond” (referred to as “Lehman’s Affidavit”).

However, Lehman’s Affidavit was sealed without adhering to the requirements outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a.

As such, on Mar. 24, 2025 the Defendant formally requested by motion that Lehman’s Affidavit be unsealed to uphold transparency, comply with Texas laws and rules, and allow the Defendant to separately brief their objections and formally contest Lehman’s Affidavit under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145.

On Tuesday, March 5, 2025, Defendant Mark Stephen Burke (“Mark”), acting on behalf of Blogger Inc., received a UPS delivery of the Petition with Exhibits.

This was the mailing by Lehman, utilizing Kim Morrell as notary and postal office.

Morrell owns a USPS Store and more background regarding Morrell is available on a published LIT article.

Subsequently, on Friday, March 7, 2025, Blogger Inc., a non-profit Delaware Limited Liability Company, was notified by its registered agent in Delaware of formal “rush” service of process.

Once more, this was initiated and paid for by Lehman.

Blogger Inc., (importantly, not Blogger, Inc.) and Mark Burke now appears and files this formal response and plea to the jurisdiction.

See; 202514186 – OVE LLC vs. Wildcat Lending Fund One, LP (Court 334, Judge Dawn Rogers):

Ancillary Judge Donna Roth of Court 334 held a hearing at 12:30 PM on March 3, 2025, and granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with a cash bond of $250 to pro se Plaintiff Ori Vaisbort for OVE, LLC.

The TRO was duly signed at 4:07 PM;

Accord; 202475990 – Foreman, Chase vs. Burrell Family Irrevocable Trust (Court 234, Judge Lauren Reeder).

PROCEDURAL STEPS TO DOMESTICATE A VALID FOREIGN JUDGMENT

To properly domesticate a foreign judgment in Texas under the UEFJA, a judgment creditor must comply with the following statutory requirements, citing Atlas Survival Shelters, LLC v. Isidro, 679 S.W.3d 761, 764-65 (Tex. App. 2023):

1. File a “copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or a statute of this state … in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state[;]”

2. At the same time as the filing of the judgment, file with the clerk of the court an affidavit showing the name and last known post office address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor;

3. Promptly mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address provided for the judgment debtor in the affidavit;

4. File proof of mailing of the notice to the judgment debtor with the clerk of the court; and

5. Pay the applicable filing fees.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 35.003(a), 35.004(a)–(b), 35.007.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

DILATORY PLEAS AND AUTHORITIES

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction without regard to whether the asserted claims have merit.

Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000);

see also City of San Antonio v. Maspero, __S.W.3d__, 2022 WL 495190, at *4 (Tex. 2022)

(proper function of a dilatory plea does not authorize an inquiry so far into the  substance of the claims that plaintiffs are required to put on their case to establish jurisdiction).

Subject-matter jurisdiction:

Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008)

(“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004).”).

Texas law is certain:

“If the court has no jurisdiction, it should proceed no further with the case other than to dismiss it for want of power to hear and determine the controversy.

In such a case, any order or decree entered, other than one of dismissal is void.”

Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1046 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1931), affirmed 55 S.W.2d 797.

See; City of Hutto v. Legacy Hutto, 684 S.W.3d 810, 819 (Tex. App. 2022)

(“However, subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to entertaining the merits, and when a court finds a lack of jurisdiction, it is obligated to go no further and dismiss.”).

Accord; City of Houston v. Ledesma, No. 01-22-00377-CV, at *10 (Tex. App. Aug. 29, 2023)

(“Without jurisdiction, a court lacks authority to act at all in a case other than to determine that it lacks jurisdiction. A court may not assume jurisdiction for purposes of deciding the merits of a case, and a judgment is void if rendered by a court without jurisdiction.

Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot “be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of the proceeding.”).

BACKGROUND

Andrew Lehman complains of a blog post which republished a federal court case initiated by the CFPB, and where he was named as a defendant.

The article was published June 20, 2020 on the blog located at the domain name lawsintexas.com (“LIT”).

The first time LIT received communication from Lehman about the blog post was in an email dated Feb. 2022.

Texas has a one year statute of limitations and his threat to sue in Harris County District Court on Feb. 22, 2022 never materialized, and in any event, he did not provide ten days’ notice.

The next communication LIT received was in Dec. 2022, from Daniel Goldstein, who sent a demand letter for $1,000,000 and stated that as “a service provider”, LIT was mandated to take down the blog posts and related requests, including Lehman’s “mugshot”, from LIT’s blog.

LIT is not “a service provider” and no formal notice of suit was provided either directly in the email or by Lehman himself, just a stranger by the name of Goldstein who never identified himself as his legal representative or otherwise.

However, the email was sent from a Google mail address with the vanity handle “goldsteinlawfirmca [at gmail dot com]”, which infers it is from a law firm in California.

Next, Lehman filed a rambling, error-laiden complaint as docketed on Jan. 9, 2023 in Los Angeles Superior Court, California.

The case would be assigned to Judge Gail Killefer.

The Plaintiff was joined by his “Minor Children” and the listed “Defendant” as: “Blogger, Inc., a Delaware 501 ©(3) Not for Profit Corporation, BROWSERWEB INCORPORATED, a Texas Corporation, and John Burke, and individual, and Joanna Burke, an individual, and DOE 11 to DOE 21”.

On June 20, 2023, Lehman and Riley would submit their first amended complaint, styled as; … v. BLOGGER, INC., D/B/A LAWINTEXAS.COM, a Delaware 501(c)(3) Not for Profit Corporation; BROWSERWEB INCORPORATED, a defunct Texas Corporation; BROWSE R WEB, LLC, a defunct Texas Limited Liability Company; JOHN BURKE, an individual; JOANNA BURKE a/k/a JUANNA BURKE, an individual; MARK S. BURKE, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10.

The Jan. 9, 2023 Complaint in LASC named Andrew Lehman as Plaintiff along with his “Minor Children”. On June 20, 2023, he amended the complaint to specifically add Monica Lynn Riley.

The “Minor Children” were removed on January 2024, as Lehman was first admonished by the court for attempting to represent the children himself, and Lehman later admitted that he was unable to obtain counsel for the children.

Likewise, his list of Defendants would fizzle, with only one remaining: Blogger, Inc.

Leaving the entity as the sole Defendant should have raised significant concerns for the court, as Judge Killefer effectively excluded a necessary party — Mark Burke.

Nevertheless, by issuing her unconstitutional and void default judgment, which included an outrageous award of over $1.9 million in damages and extreme injunctive relief, she failed to address the critical issue of jurisdiction.

It is fundamental that jurisdiction be established first and foremost, yet this essential prerequisite was disregarded.

SUMMARY OF THE PLEA

The Plaintiff seeks to domesticate a foreign judgment from the State of California under the Texas Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”).  This Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the judgment for the following reasons:

–        The lawsuit was time-barred as Texas only allows one year to file suit.

–        The judgment is void as the legal entity Blogger, Inc., does not exist.

–        The judgment is void due to the California court’s lack of jurisdiction over all parties.

–        The California judgment is not authenticated and deficient (names and addresses).

–        Co-Plaintiff Monica Lynn Riley is an indispensable party.

–        There is no assignment of rights by Co-Plaintiff.

–        Non-party Mark Stephen Burke is an indispensable party.

–        Violations of the Constitution and Due Process.

–        Andrew Lehman has failed to pay the mandatory filing fee.

–        Andrew Lehman’s declaration or affidavit is not based on personal knowledge.

–    The judgment was obtained through perjured testimony and bad faith actions.

–    The judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.

–   The Plaintiff’s conduct violates equitable principles, barring enforcement under the doctrine of unclean hands.

Jurisdictional Defects in the California Judgment

The California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, a Delaware nonprofit organization. The Defendant has no meaningful contacts with California sufficient to establish “minimum contacts” as required by the Due Process Clause.

The alleged actions and all parties were domiciled in Texas, and the court in California improperly asserted jurisdiction based solely on service of process without factual basis in law.

The failure to address jurisdictional facts renders the judgment void and unenforceable.

Perjury and Procedural Misconduct

The judgment was obtained through perjured testimony and fraudulent representations made by the Plaintiffs in the California proceedings, including misrepresenting their domicile and jurisdictional facts.

Perjury directly undermines the validity of the judgment. Under Texas law, foreign judgments obtained through fraud or procedural misconduct cannot be enforced.

Unclean Hands Doctrine

Plaintiffs’ bad faith actions, including providing false testimony and manipulating the judicial process, violate the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.

Relief under the Texas Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”) is equitable in nature, and courts must deny enforcement when the party seeking relief has unclean hands.

Violation of Procedural Standards

The Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Texas Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”), including failing to include co-plaintiff Monica Riley in the domestication filing.  Procedural defects further bar enforcement of the foreign judgment in Texas.

MARK STEPHEN BURKE IS AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY

Mark Stephen Burke (“Burke”) was named in the LASC suit but later dismissed (Nov. 17, 2023).

Setting aside for the purposes of this response the fact an entity was sued, and the judgment was rendered against a legal entity that does not exist in Delaware, the default judgment went further than just a default.

Judge Killefer improperly reached the merits of the case without first addressing the foundational issue of jurisdiction.

She subsequently issued a judgment awarding nearly $2,000,000 in damages and injunctive relief, including the mandatory removal of 14 blog posts on the keyword-domain LawsinTexas.com (not LawsinCalifornia.com) and a social media link.

Even if this judgment were valid—which it is unequivocally not, as it is void and a legal nullity—its enforcement would rest solely with the director of Blogger Inc., Mark Burke, who is domiciled in Harris County, Texas.

Furthermore, it must be noted that Blogger Inc. owns no keyword domains in California, underscoring the jurisdictional disconnect and further invalidating her judgment.

Additionally, Lehman has repeatedly and publicly put Mark Burke on notice that he will pursue him personally, both civilly and criminally in threatening written comments and emails and even in his responses to pleadings before this court.[3]

“YOU ARE VIOLATING A COURT ORDER BY PUBLISHING MATERIALS AFTER THE COURT ORDERED YOU TO STOP AND REMOVE ALL OF THE FALSE DEFAMATORY ARTICLES!!!

YOU WILL PAY EVERY PENNY OF THE $2 MILLION JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU.

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IS THE NEXT COURSE OF ACTION!”

– One of several Blog comments from Andrew Lehman using his email lehmanlaw2002@gmail.com (in quarantine) received on lawsintexas.com on Feb. 23, 2025 at 5.15 am CST.

This case exemplifies a rare scenario where Mark Burke, as the director of Blogger Inc., is an indispensable party.

His role is pivotal because the rendering court’s injunctive relief directly requires him personally, as the responsible person, to act by removing blog and social media posts, and which ties him intrinsically to the enforcement of the judgment.

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39, a person must be joined in an action if:

1. Their absence prevents the court from granting “complete relief.”

2. Their interests are significantly impacted, or their absence risks inconsistent obligations for the existing parties.

“A person must be joined as a party if ‘in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.'”

(quoting Tex.R.Civ.P. 39(a)(1)).

“If a necessary party cannot be joined, the court must determine ‘whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed.'”

(quoting Tex.R.Civ.P. 39(b)).

While the failure to join a party rarely deprives a court of jurisdiction,

as noted in In re Tr. A & Tr. C., 690 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. 2024),

this case diverges from the norm because Burke’s involvement is fundamental to effectuating the court’s order.

Without him, the relief sought cannot be fully implemented, distinguishing this matter as an exceptional circumstance under Rule 39.

Moreover, considering Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1991), procedural defects such as improper service cannot be cured by actual notice.

Even though Lehman attempted multiple times to serve Burke, including seeking alternative service by publication (which apparently the LASC court rejected), these efforts failed to satisfy procedural requirements.

This reinforces that proper service, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, must be achieved to include indispensable parties.

The failure to properly serve Burke and the subsequent omission of an indispensable party thus contravenes Rule 39’s requirements.

Hence, Burke’s Motion to Intervene should be granted.

PROCESS OF SERVICE INVALID

Lehman provided a purported but disputed certified copy of the void judgment obtained in Los Angeles Superior Court as “Exhibit A”.

A review of that Exhibit shows the purported judgment as against Blogger, Inc., not Blogger Inc. D/B/A/ LAWSINTEXAS,COM [sic], or similar.

One can clearly see the court has stricken out D/B/A LAWINTEXAS.COM, styling the Defendant as BLOGGER, INC., a Delaware 501(c) (3) Not four [sic] Profit Corporation.

In short, on every page of the judgment it refers to the defaulting entity as Blogger, Inc., not the correct legal name of the Delaware registered entity, Blogger Inc.

Both process server’s affidavits provide that BLOGGER, INC. was served.

The Delaware registered entity is legally named:

“BLOGGER INC.” (no comma).

In short, the judgment is void for this fact alone, and the attempts at service – defective.

Legal Authority

“The law abhors default judgments.” New Residential Mortg. v. Legacy Brokerage, LLC, No. 05-23-00259-CV, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 18, 2024);

“The correct name of a corporate entity, however, is not a minute detail”,

at *7-8;

“Although the strict compliance requirements sometimes lead the courts to rather weird conclusions, preventing us from making even the most obvious and rational inferences, we believe good public policy favors the standard…

This policy justifies what may at first blush seem a hyper-technical rule.”

at *8;

“Proper service not being shown, there is error on the face of the record.

See Primate, 884 S.W.2d at 153.

NRM’s issue concerning defective service is sustained, and we need not reach the remaining issues.

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.” at *9.

Relatedly;

“This suit was filed against a nonexistent entity and a default judgment was obtained.

When this situation was called to the trial judge’s attention, the default judgment was set aside.

The tenant refiled the suit against the correct defendant and proceeded to trial.”

A. B. Inv. Corp. v. Dorman, 604 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).

MULTIPLE PLAINTIFFS

Even setting aside the error in the legal naming convention for the purposes of discussing Lehman’s petition, the void judgment obtained in LASC named two Plaintiffs: Andrew P.[eter] Lehman (“Lehman”) and Monica Lynn Riley (“Riley”).

Here, there is only one Plaintiff, Andrew P. Lehman aka Andrew Lehman, Sr (citing to Lehman’s own case styling in his pleadings).

Notably, Monica Lynn Riley is not a named Plaintiff in this Petition as she was recently sentenced to five years in jail on February 28, 2025;

Case No. 20-CR-2856 – The State of Texas vs. MONICA LYNN RILEY, In the 122nd District Court of GALVESTON, TEXAS.

As such, this court could not GRANT a WRIT, and the Defendant could not appeal, as this would be an interlocutory judgment because the petition failed to include a mandatory Plaintiff (Monica Lynn Riley) in these proceedings.

Monica Lynn Riley as an Indispensable Party

Lehman’s petition suffers from a fundamental procedural flaw due to the exclusion of Monica Lynn Riley, a named co-plaintiff in the original Los Angeles Superior Court judgment.

Notably, Lehman specifically amended his California complaint to include Riley as a co-Plaintiff, underscoring her indispensable role in the case.

By doing so, he acknowledged that any judgment arising from that action necessarily involved the rights and interests of both Lehman and Riley.

The current petition to domesticate the California judgment is procedurally defective because Riley is neither named as a plaintiff nor assigned her interest in the judgment to Lehman.

Without her inclusion—or evidence of a formal assignment or waiver—the petition fails to meet the legal requirements for domestication under Texas law.

Additionally, Riley’s absence precludes this court from issuing any enforceable writ or order, as her exclusion leaves the petition incomplete and interlocutory.

As codified in Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, all persons with a significant interest in the proceedings must be joined to ensure complete relief and prevent prejudice to the absent party.

In conjunction with the principles of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”), this defect highlights a failure to include a necessary party and renders the petition subject to dismissal.

The fact that Riley is currently serving a five-year sentence in Texas (Case No. 20-CR-2856, The State of Texas vs. Monica Lynn Riley, 122nd District Court, Galveston, Texas) further complicates any potential assignment or waiver of her interest, making her joinder indispensable.

Furthermore, Lehman’s unilateral decision to file this petition, while knowingly excluding Riley, underscores his disregard for procedural compliance and reveals a calculated attempt to bypass jurisdictional requirements.

Indeed, given their shared child (not one of the 3 Minor Children listed in the complaint, who were from his previous marriage to Falisha Lehman), and the history of contentious child custody and domestic abuse proceedings, Lehman’s actions strongly suggest an intent to exclude Riley in order to monopolize the [void] judgment for his own benefit.

As such, the petition must be dismissed with prejudice for failing to include a mandatory party.

Lehman’s sole Plaintiff Petition fails for these reasons alone.[4]

Sufficient Notice of Objection to Riley’s Absence

This plea to the jurisdiction is sufficient to put the court and opposing party on notice regarding the defect caused by the omission of Monica Lynn Riley as a necessary party under Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

While Khalilnia v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., No. 01-12-00573-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2013), states that objections to the absence of a necessary party must be raised through a verified plea in abatement or special exception if the defect is apparent on the face of the petition, this plea satisfies notice requirements as it addresses the fundamental defect in jurisdiction caused by Riley’s exclusion.

Further, this objection is raised at the earliest stage to ensure procedural compliance with Rule 39 and to prevent any prejudice to the absent party.

Riley’s indispensable status stems from her inclusion in the original Los Angeles Superior Court judgment and the lack of evidence of her assignment of interest or waiver.

NO ASSIGNMENT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT EQUALS NO STANDING

At the time of filing his Petition, Lehman lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of Monica Lynn Riley.

As the sole Petitioner, Lehman has not presented any evidence of an assignment of the default judgment to him, nor has he demonstrated a waiver of Riley’s interests.

Importantly, standing must exist at the time of filing and throughout every stage of the legal proceedings.

This fundamental requirement cannot be fulfilled retroactively.

Lehman was required to establish standing based on a formal assignment or other legally recognized transfer of Riley’s interest at the time of filing.

The absence of any such assignment or waiver is fatal to Lehman’s petition.

As the Texas Court of Appeals stated in Southwest Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. The Boeing Co., No. 05-20-01067-CV, at *8 (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2022)

(“Standing must exist at the time a plaintiff files suit and must continue to exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal;

if the plaintiff lacks standing at the time suit is filed, the case must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an interest sufficient to support standing.”).

NON-PAYMENT OF FEES

The sole Petitioner Lehman has failed to pay the applicable filing fees and past evidence shows that his IFP applications[5] are false, and subject to criminal charges.

See; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 35.007:

(a) A person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the clerk of the court the amount as otherwise provided by law for filing suit in the courts of this state.

(b) Filing fees are due and payable at the time of filing.

This provision — explicitly requiring the payment of filing fees as part of the domestication of a foreign judgment — stands out.

While filing fees are generally a prerequisite in many procedural matters, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 35.003(a), 35.004(a)–(b), 35.007 is distinctive because it explicitly and separately emphasizes this requirement in the context of enforcing foreign judgments under the Texas Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”).

By doing so, it leaves little ambiguity and ensures compliance with the formalities of domestication.

Defendant could not find a case in Texas where a “debt collector” aka Lehman, would be allowed to start the process of domestication to pursue collection of the purported $1.9 million dollar judgment without payment of filing fees and avers that it would be absurd to grant a pauper application in these proceedings as Lehman could:

(i)              easily have retained a registered debt collection law firm on a contingency basis, or;

(ii)             assigned the debt to a debt collector for a fee.

(iii)          Additionally, as recently as Jan. 29, 2025, Lehman was released on $12,500 bond and the minimum amount in Texas law that Lehman had to pay in cash is ten percent, or $1,250.

If he could pay the bond at such short notice, there is no excuse for non-payment of filing fees in these proceedings.

(iv)           Domestication of the judgment can occur at any time up to 10 years and can even be extended for another 10 years.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 34.001.

There is no necessity to “rush” for judgment at the expense of taxpayers.

(v)             Indeed, Lehman paid privately to “rush” process of service at a cost of $158 (See; Envelope No. 98384219, Mar. 12, 2025) – independent of the court’s ‘cost free’ service.

It shows that Lehman can clearly afford to pay for these services.

In conclusion, Lehman’s fees are Lehman’s responsibility, and this court should deny his statement of inability.

The fees should be enforced by this court, and failure to pay the court costs and fees in these proceedings should result in dismissal, with prejudice, as a sanction.

AFFIDAVIT

Lehman’s affidavit is not based on personal knowledge.

He qualified his statement as “true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief”.

Texas law rejects Lehman’s statement.

See; Young v. Di Ferrante, 553 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Tex. App. 2018)

(“The phrase “true and correct to the best of my belief and personal knowledge” does not show personal knowledge and does not satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement”).

As stated, Lehman’s phrase is not based on personal knowledge.

See; Atlas Survival Shelters, LLC v. Isidro, 679 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App. 2023)

(“Siddiqui failed to state that the facts represented within the affidavit were true and did not demonstrate that the affiant had personal knowledge of its contents, the affidavit was deficient and did not comply with the filing requirements of the UEFJA, precluding domestication of the Indiana judgment.”).

HARRIS COUNTY CRIMINAL BONDS: TEN PERCENT CASH

On Jan 9, 2025 Lehman made bond for $12,500 in Harris County Case No. 180764001010 – 3.

Ten percent cash payable by Lehman equals $1,250.

Additionally, the Motion to Adjudicate Guilt stated he was overdue $240 in mandatory court fees.

On Feb. 22, 2023 in the same case number 180764001010 – 3, the original bond was set at $10,000.

This was set as a Personal Bond, so no cash payment is required.

However, there’s a $300 court fee shown on the order, which was not waived.

On Sep. 15, 2022 Lehman made bond for $75,000 in Harris County.

This case, No. 178499801010 – 3, pertains to the Agg. Assault (driving Porsche Cayenne at Riley with intent to do bodily harm).

Ten percent cash payable by Lehman equals $7,500.

On Feb. 21, 2022 Lehman made bond for $30,000 in Harris County.

There’s two cases, 175980101010 – 3 and 175980201010 – 3, which pertained to Injury to a Child Under 15 / Bodily Injury and Assault Family House Member with Intent to Impede Breathing / Circulation.

Note: For other counties and jurisdictions, including Lehman’s $80,000 bond in Galveston, see;

Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

CONTEST

On March 24, 2025, the Defendant filed DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MOTION TO UNSEAL PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT / AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COURT COSTS – TRCP 145 and will be formally challenging Lehman’s Affidavit separately.

That stated, for the purposes of this plea, Defendant provides a synopsis.

Legal Authorities

“”[a]n uncontested affidavit of inability to pay is conclusive as a matter of law.”

Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 38

(quoting Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1984))”, No. 04-23-00931-CV, at *13 (Tex. App. May 15, 2024).

Rangel v. Rangel, No. 04-23-00931-CV, at *13 (Tex. App. May 15, 2024).

See; Trayvone Wheatly-Porter v. DLP Capital, No. 01-24-00354-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. July 11, 2024)

(“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 permits a party a party to file a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(b).

Although a clerk, court reporter or party may file a motion challenging the statement of inability, the trial court may also on its own motion require the party to prove his or her inability to afford costs.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(e).”).

Harris County

Vexatious litigant Lehman has 7 Civil Cases listed in Harris County District Court.

Five of those Cases Since 2022, all declaring Pauper status and Inability to Pay Fees and Costs.

These most recent five cases are all filed, claiming “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs or an Appeal Bond”.

All applications are currently restricted from public viewing (sealed), contrary to Texas rules and laws as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas.

Convicted Felon Lehman has 10 Criminal Cases listed in Harris County District Court.

The key cases are detailed in Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

Galveston County

Vexatious Litigant Lehman has 19 Civil Cases listed where He’s a Party in Galveston County District Court:

The key cases are detailed in Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

Montgomery County

Vexatious Litigant Lehman has 3 Civil Cases listed Where He’s a Party in Montgomery County District Court:

One, as Plaintiff Where He Paid $486 Court Costs and Fees (Apr. 2023).

The key cases are detailed in Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

Fort Bend County

Vexatious Litigant Lehman has 3 Civil Cases listed Where He’s a Party in Fort Bend County District Court:

All three  as Plaintiff, two Declaring Pauper Status and Inability to Pay Fees and Costs) and two of those cases targeting Monica Riley (obtaining an Ex Parte Protective Order on no fee motion).

There is also one criminal case against Monica Riley, and where the complainant was Andrew Lehman.

The key cases are detailed in Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

THE FAUX ADDRESSES

Lehman’s address is a virtual address, not a physical address. “…in Siddiqui, the court of appeals explained that the filing of an affidavit with the clerk of the court providing the parties’ names and addresses is mandatory under the UEFJA. 655 S.W.3d at 658.”

Atlas Survival Shelters, LLC v. Isidro, 679 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App. 2023).

Past evidence shows that he used a virtual address in Los Angeles Superior Court and at least one time he refused to supply his postal address to the court.

The Roadmap Addresses Lehman’s Misuse of Addresses

Lehman’s Exhibit “A”, filed Mar. 4, 2025 attaches the purported Certified judgment’s Certificate of Mailing shows his address as:

5551 Hollywood Blvd, Suite 1038, Hollywood, CA, 90028.

This is a FEDEX store which rents Postal Boxes, also referred to deceptively by Lehman as a “Suite”.

See; https://local.fedex.com/en-us/ca/los-angeles/00w2j, last visited on Mar. 7, 2025.

That stated, it is not the address per the judgment and order, which shows his address as 7190 W Sunset Blvd, Suite 237, Los Angeles, CA 99028 (also a virtual mailing address).

However, in his current Petition, to obtain jurisdiction of this court, he lists 957 Nasa Parkway, Suite 1102, Houston, TX, 77058;

FedEx Authorized ShipCenter – Nasa Postal at Houston, TX – 957 Nasa Pkwy 77058 , last visited on Mar. 7, 2025.

This constant use of virtual addresses based on geographical location to the courthouse where he files his vexatious and contemptuous lawsuits as a pauper, is to mask his true location and domicile, which is Texas.

Exhibit 222 — THE LEHMAN [& RILEY] ROADMAP.

See; Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Douglas, No. 01–05–00707–CV, 2006 WL 490888, at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“The parties are California residents; thus, Texas has no interest either in protecting its citizens or in policing the activities of a corporation authorized to do business in the state.”).

Here, none of the parties were California residents and the Los Angeles court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, let alone render judgment.[6]

This is unequivocal fraud on the parties and the court(s), and which resulted in a $1.9M fraudulent and void judgment in Los Angeles Superior Court (“LASC”), a nullity in law.

See; Ad Villarai, LLC v. Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2017)

(“we have held that an order “is void when a court has no power or jurisdiction to render it.”

Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Court, 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986).

Void orders are not waivable on direct review.

See, e.g., Easterline v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1932)

(“The decisions hold that a void judgment is one entirely null within itself, and which is not susceptible of ratification or confirmation, and its nullity cannot be waived.”).”).

Co-Plaintiff Monica Lynn Riley’s Address is Finally Determined

On Feb. 25, 2025, Monica Lynn Riley was arrested regarding her Oct. 25, 2024 arrest – for child endangerment in a stolen vehicle, meth in the vehicle, tested positive for drugs.

The record shows the indictment of Riley on Feb. 18, 2025.

She was served Feb. 25, 2025 (precept and return).

On Feb. 28, 2025, Monica Lynn Riley was sentenced to 5 years in Jail on Feb. 28, 2025.

Lehman’s Address Should Also Be Finally Determined

Lehman’s address ought to be determined by his Texas inmate number after the scheduled hearing(s) in Texas criminal courts to revoke and adjudicate guilt.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Defendant’s Response and Verified Plea to the Jurisdiction, in accordance with Texas law and without addressing the merits of the Los Angeles Superior Court judgment, irrefutably rejects the Plaintiff’s void and fraudulent “Petition for Domestication of a Foreign Judgment.”

The Defendant’s arguments are firmly grounded in Texas law, the Texas Constitution, and relevant legal authorities.

VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]

In closing, I, Mark….

CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED

The Defendant has presented a thorough and reasoned argument in this verified motion, supported by appropriate legal authority. Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Grant this Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismiss the Plaintiff’s attempt to domesticate the foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction;

2. Declare the judgment void and unenforceable in the State of Texas; and

3. Grant any other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

A proposed order is included.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of April, 2025.

[1] Exhibit 2. Email with $1,000,000 Demand Letter from Daniel Goldstein.

[2] Lehman’s exhibits are non-compliant. See this courts’ procedures at “XVIII. Exhibits A. Exhibits should be marked with numbers, not letters.”.

[3] See Exhibit 2222.

[4] In each of the listed deficiencies in this pleading, Defendant discusses only the sole Petitioner, Lehman, but these deficiencies equally apply to Riley, e.g., her address is not shown in Lehman’s filing(s).

[5] Here, the pauper application is ‘restricted’ e.g. sealed from public inspection.

[6] Judge Gail Killefer’s Opinion does not even address jurisdiction, which is also fatal to the void judgment.

DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO UNSEAL

“[P]erjury is among the worst kinds of misconduct.” No one needs to be warned not to lie to the court, and courts have sanctioned Martin repeatedly for making false statements. Such action is to corrupt the litigation process, waste judicial resources and the time and money of honest parties. In this case, the district court’s parsing of Martin’s doctored forms required substantial unnecessary work and diverted the court’s attention from honest litigants. Martin’s continued abuse of the judicial process easily warrants even the severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice.

– Martin v. Redden, 34 F.4th 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up, citations omitted).

STATEMENTS OF FACT

In between a busy schedule of criminal and frivolous civil court cases—except for the Harris County District Court case numbered 202504610 (Office of the Attorney General vs. Lehman, Andrew Peter, in Court 247)—the Plaintiff, Andrew Peter Lehman aka Andrew Peter Lehman Sr., took legal action.

On Monday, March 4, 2025, the Plaintiff, a convicted felon who is currently out on a $12,500 bond in Harris County Criminal Court for case number 180764001010 (The State of Texas vs. Lehman, Andrew, in Court 263), filed a void and fraudulent “Petition for Domestication of a Foreign Judgment.”

Despite repeated violations of his suspended three-year jail sentence, Lehman was rearrested for charges including vehicle theft, child endangerment, and drug possession. He also tested positive for methamphetamine. These charges have led to a motion to adjudicate guilt, provisionally scheduled for a hearing on April 2, 2025.

The petition Lehman filed included a purported “Certified Copy of the Los Angeles Superior Court Judgment” dated December 2, 2024 [sic], against Defendant “BLOGGER INC., d/b/a LAWSINTEXAS.com [sic],” labeled as Exhibit “A.”[1]

Accompanying this petition were additional filings: “Filing Last Known Address,” “Certificate of Service,” and, relevant to this motion, a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs or an Appeal Bond” (referred to as “Lehman’s Affidavit”).

However, Lehman’s Affidavit was sealed without adhering to the requirements outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a. The Defendant formally requests that Lehman’s Affidavit be unsealed to uphold transparency, comply with Texas laws and rules, and allow the Defendant to separately brief their objections and formally contest Lehman’s Affidavit under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145.

On Tuesday, March 5, 2025, Defendant Mark Stephen Burke (“Mark”), acting on behalf of Blogger Inc., received a UPS delivery of the Petition with Exhibits. Subsequently, on Friday, March 7, 2025, Blogger Inc., a non-profit Delaware Limited Liability Company, was notified by its registered agent in Delaware of formal “rush” service of process.

Blogger Inc. now appears and files this initial, formal motion.

See; 202514186 – OVE LLC vs. Wildcat Lending Fund One, LP (Court 334, Judge Dawn Rogers): Ancillary Judge Donna Roth of Court 334 held a hearing at 12:30 PM on March 3, 2025, and granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with a cash bond of $250 to pro se Plaintiff Ori Vaisbort for OVE, LLC. The TRO was duly signed at 4:07 PM; Accord; 202475990 – Foreman, Chase vs. Burrell Family Irrevocable Trust (Court 234, Judge Lauren Reeder).

LEGAL AUTHORITIES

TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a

“Court records may be sealed only upon a party’s written motion, which shall be open to public inspection… Any person may intervene as a matter of right at any time before or after judgment to seal or unseal court records.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a.

“Rule 76a does not require a hearing on a motion to unseal records. Tex.R.Civ.P.76a(4). Given the presumption recited in Rule 76a that favors records being open to the public, it logically follows that a hearing would be required to seal records, but not to unseal records. Tex.R.Civ.P.76a(1), a(4). Similarly, Rule 76a does not require the same notice for unsealing, as it does for sealing. Tex.R.Civ.P.76a(1), a(3).” – Enriquez v. Orihuela, No. 14-22-00868-CV, at *23 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2024).

TEX. R. CIV. P. 145

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 permits a party to file a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(b). A clerk, court reporter or party may file a motion challenging the statement of inability and asking the trial court to require the declarant to pay costs. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(e). – In re Boles, No. 01-22-00737-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2023) (emphasis added).

ARGUMENT

Lehman’s affidavit should be unsealed in order that Defendant may contest his affidavit. Relevant here is (e)(1) – “A motion filed by the clerk, the court reporter, or a party must contain sworn evidence-not merely allegations-either that the Statement was materially false when made or that because of changed circumstances, it is no longer true.” (emphasis added).

Without unsealing, Defendant would be unable to contest Lehman’s affidavit, which is a legal right, not a privilege.

Lehman’s affidavit should not be redacted and “must include the information required by the [Texas Supreme] Court-approved form.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(b). Walker v. Taub, Appellate case number: 01-20-00580-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Oct. 20, 2020).

VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]

In closing, I, Mark ….

CONCLUSION

The Defendant has provided full reasoning in this verified motion with relevant authority provided. The Defendant prays the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s Verified Motion to Unseal, and for such other and further relief at law or in equity to which Defendant may be justly entitled. A separate proposed order is included.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 24th day of March, 2025.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

__________________

Mark Burke for Blogger Inc.

[1] Lehman’s exhibits are non-compliant. See this courts’ procedures at “XVIII. Exhibits A. Exhibits should be marked with numbers, not letters.”.