Why is Federal Judge Kenneth Hoyt’s former Son-in-Law Associatin’ with Crooks n’ Bandits

Plaintiffs Anthony D. Jackson and Superior Consulting Group brought this suit against Defendants AmCap Mortgage Ltd. and Planet Home Lending in Texas state court, after which Planet Home Lending removed it to this Court. ECF No. 1.

AmCap Mortgage Ltd. then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 4, and Planet Home Lending filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5.

At a hearing held on January 17, 2024, the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgement and the Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), and for the reasons set forth at the hearing, final judgment is hereby ENTERED for Defendants AmCap Mortgage Ltd. and Planet Home Lending.

DEFENDANT AMCAP’S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant AmCap Mortgage, Ltd., (“AMCAP”) files its Motion for Interlocutory Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Anthony D. Jackson and Superior Consulting Group (“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a and shows the following:

I.  Preliminary Statement

1.                 This is a suit to prevent foreclosure of a deed of trust lien encumbering real property at 15407 Arrowhead Ridge Drive, Humble, Texas 77396 (the “Property”). Plaintiffs bring three causes of action against “Defendants”, none of which apply to AMCAP.

The loan originated on February 4, 2019. Servicing of the loan transferred to Planet Home Lending on March 1, 2019. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) assigned its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to Planet Home on September 13, 2022.

AMCAP is not the mortgagee or mortgage servicer, is not seeking to foreclose the lien, and has no duties under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act relating to loss mitigation.

2.                 There was only one (1) transfer of this loan. The most basic review of publicly available documents readily shows the record of this transfer filed in the real property records of Harris County.

II.  Summary Judgment Evidence

3.                 In support of this Motion, AMCAP offers the following summary judgment evidence:

Affidavit I: Affidavit of AMCAP;

Exhibit A:  February 4, 2019, Note executed by Plaintiff, Anthony D. Jackson (“Jackson”), in the amount of $295,948.00 payable to AMCAP over thirty years with interest accruing at 5.625%.

Exhibit B: February 4, 2019, Deed of Trust executed by Jackson;

Exhibit C: February 19, 2019, correspondence from AMCAP advised Jackson that effective March 1, 2019, servicing of the loan would transfer to Planet Home Lending;

Exhibit D: September 13, 2022, Assignment from MERS, as nominee for AMCAP, to Planet Home Lending, LLC (“Planet Home”); and

I.         Facts

1.                 Jackson owns the Property.1

Jackson claims that “Defendants” claim to be the mortgagee servicer and mortgagee of the Deed of Trust encumbering the Property and are attempting to foreclose.2

1 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”), p. 2, § 8.

Plaintiffs claim to not have received a notice of sale or notice of intent to accelerate and that Planet Home has not provided proof of the current amount owed.3

Jackson purchased the Property in 2019 and Superior Consulting has acquired an interest in the Property from Jackson.4

Jackson signed the Note and Deed of Trust.5

Exhibits A and B.

2.                 Plaintiffs dispute that they have defaulted under the Deed of Trust, that Defendants have the right to foreclose, and that Plaintiffs received “sufficient legal notice.”6

Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants” failed to “satisfy loss mitigation procedures” or provide Jackson with notice of loss mitigation options.7

3.                 On February 19, 2019, AMCAP advised Jackson that the servicing of the loan was being transferred to Planet Home effective March 1, 2019.

Exhibit C.

The servicing rights were actually transferred to Planet Home on or before February 19, 2019.

Affidavit I.

The Note was indorsed in blank by AMCAP and delivered to Planet Homes. Affidavit I. The first payment due under the Note was due March 1, 2019.

Exhibit A.

AMCAP never intended to collect payments under the Note or to act as mortgage servicer and does not regularly act as mortgage servicer on any of the loans it originates.

2 Complaint, p. 2, § 9.

3 Complaint, p. 2, § 10. There is no indication as to why Superior Consulting would be entitled to such notice.

4 Complaint, p. 3, § 11.

5 Complaint, p. 3, § 12.

6 Complaint, p. 3, § 14. AMCAP is not the mortgagee or mortgage servicer, has not asserted that the loan is in default, is not seeking to foreclose, and is under no duty to provide “sufficient legal notice.” Despite disputing the alleged default, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Jackson alienated an interest in the Property in violation of the due-on- sale provision in the Deed of Trust and that Jackson “bell behind on his mortgage payments as a result of adverse events arising from the Covid-19 pandemic.”

7 Complaint, p. 3, § 15.

4.                 When Jackson failed to make payments, MERS assigned its interest in the Deed of Trust to Planet Home.

The Assignment is dated September 13, 2022.

Exhibit D.

It was recorded in the Harris County real property records on September 13, 2022. Id.

5.                 Plante Home apparently posted the Property for foreclosure, which prompted this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs allege three claims against “Defendants.”

First, Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants” did not provide notice of default or notice of the foreclosure sale and that the notice of sale (which “Defendants” are alleged to have never sent…) fails to provide the name and address of the sender, the language required by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and no signature or address for either Defendant.

Next, Plaintiff seeks declarations

(1) of the balance owed on the loan and whether “Defendants” can enforce the power of sale in the Deed of Trust,

and

(2) that “Defendants” failed to provide the notices prerequisite to exercising the power of sale, and that “Defendants” failed to comply with the “federal requirements” relating to loss mitigation efforts.

Finally, Plaintiffs violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by “mishandling” the loss mitigation procedures and failing to “follow through with a loan medication” with Jackson and to provide face to face counseling. Plaintiffs seek actual and exemplary damages, treble damages, temporary and permanent injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.

6.                 AMCAP no longer holds this Note and is not the party who initiated any foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff’s property.

There will be no evidence to controvert these facts.

As such, AMCAP had no duty to send Plaintiffs to provide notice of Jackson’s default, notice of any intent to accelerate the Note, or notice of the foreclosure sale.

AMCAP has no privity with or obligation to Superior Consulting Group, which has not established what interest, if any, it has in the Property that would give it standing to file this Complaint.

7.                 Because AMCAP is not a mortgagee or a mortgage servicer, it owes no duties to Plaintiffs.

Accordingly, this Court should grant interlocutory summary judgment in AMCAP’s favor.

III. Argument and Authorities

A.  Traditional Summary Judgment Standard.

2.                 AMCAP is entitled to summary judgment if it can establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2001).

Movant bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

Latimer v. Smithkline & French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990).

3.                 Once the movant meets its burden, the non-movants must show that summary judgment is not appropriate.

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

This burden is not satisfied by expression of metaphysical doubt as to material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence. Id.

Instead, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Matsushita Elec. Ind. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The non-moving party must show that the evidence is sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.

Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000).

B.             Plaintiffs’ claims fails as to AMCAP.

i.                    Plaintiffs’ “lack of notice” claims fail.

4.                  Plaintiff contends that AMCAP failed to send notice of Jackson’s default or notice of the sale, that AMCAP failed to provide proof of the amount owed, and that the notice of sale (which Plaintiffs alleged they did not receive) is defective because

(i) it does not include addresses for either Defendant,

(ii) does not bear a signature from anyone representing either Defendant,

and

(iii) does not bear the signature of the original trustee.

5.                  AMCAP is under no duty to send notice of default or notice of sale to Jackson.

Superior Consulting is not entitled to notice of anything from anyone.

(a).       AMCAP has no duty under the Property Code.

6.                  The Property Code imposes no duty on AMCAP. Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code governs non-judicial foreclosure. Section 51.002 provides:

(b). Except as provided by Subsection (b-1), notice of sale which must include a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin, must be given at lest 21 days before the date of the sale by: (3) serving written notice of the sale by certified mail on each debtor who, according to the records of the mortgage servicer of the debt, is obligated to pay the debt.

(d).  Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the mortgage servicer of the debt shall serve on a debtor in default under a deed of trust or other contract lien on property used as the debtor’s residence with written notice by certified mail stating

that the debtor is in default under the deed of trust or other contract lien and giving the debtor at least 20 days to cure the default before notice of sale can be given under Subsection (b).

Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(b) and (d) (emphasis added).

“Mortgage servicer” means the last person to whom a mortgagor has been instructed by the current mortgagee to send payments for the debt secured by the instrument.

TEX. PROP. CODE §51.0001(3).

Under Section 51.0025, a mortgage servicer may administer a non-judicial foreclosure sale on behalf of a mortgagee.

TEX. PROP. CODE §51.0025.

“Mortgagee” means (A) the grantee, beneficiary, owner, or holder of a security instrument; (B) a book entry system; or (C) if the security interest has been assigned of record, the last person to whom the security interest has been assigned of record.

TEX. PROP. CODE §51.0001(4).

7.                  AMCAP is not the mortgage servicer.

Affidavit I, Exhibit C.

While AMCAP was the original lender, it transferred the servicing rights to Jackson’s loan effective March 1, 2019, and directed Jackson to make payments to Planet Home.

Because AMCAP does not meet the Property Code’s definition of “Mortgage servicer,” none of the duties imposed upon mortgage servicers inure to AMCAP.

8.                  AMCAP is no longer the mortgagee. AMCAP was the “Lender” identified in the Deed of Trust.

The grantee was the original trustee, Richard A. Ramirez.

The beneficiary was MERS. The owner (or holder) is Planet Homes.

I, Exhibit D.

AMCAP is not a book entry system and Plaintiff has not and cannot allege that it is. Planet Homes is the last assignee of record.

Exhibit D.

As of September 13, 2022, AMCAP does not fit within any definition of “mortgagee” found in the Property Code. Therefore, the duties imposed by the Property Code on the “mortgagee” simply do not apply to AMCAP.

AMCAP alienated its rights in the Note and Deed of Trust and as a result, lacks standing to enforce either.

Because AMCAP cannot enforce the Deed of Trust (and has made no effort to do so) it has no duty to Jackson under the Property Code. Any claim by Jackson.

9.                  Superior Consulting is a stranger to the Note and Deed of Trust.

The Property Code imposes a duty on the mortgagee, mortgage servicer, or trustee, to serve notice of default, and notice of sale on “debtors” that are in default and responsible for paying the debt.

Superior Consulting is not responsible for paying the debt and the Note cannot be enforced against Superior Consulting.

Superior Consulting is not entitled to notice of default or sale under the Property Code.

Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Hous. v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. 1975); Khan v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181711 at *8-9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2014).

Any claim based on Superior Consulting’s alleged right to notice fails as a matter of law.

The Court must grant summary judgment in favor of AMCAP.

(b).   AMCAP has no duty under the Deed of Trust.

1.                  The Deed of Trust imposes upon the “Lender” the duty to provide “borrower” with notice of default and notice of sale:

Exhibit B, p. 8, §24

“Borrower” is “Anthony D. Jackson.”

Exhibit B, p. 1, §B.

“Lender” is AMCAP, but “includes any holder of the Note who is entitled to receive payments under the Note.

Exhibit B, p. 1, §C.

1.                  While “Lender” as defined in the Deed of Trust conceivably encompasses AMCAP after AMCAP’s assignment and alienation of the loan, Plaintiffs do not allege a viable claim against AMCAP.

Plaintiffs’ claims are based on actions, omissions, and events that occurred after AMCAP transferred its interest in the Note and Deed of Trust.

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” improperly commenced and prosecuted a non-judicial foreclosure sale but make no specific allegations about the acts or omissions of AMCAP.

Plaintiffs do not even make specific allegations that AMCAP had any involvement in the loan or the Property following the transfer of servicing rights and the assignment.

Absent factual allegations of alleged misconduct by AMCAP, Plaintiffs can show no basis for imposition of liability against AMCAP.

See McAuley v. Ameripro Funding, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195718 at *36 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) adopted and recommendation approved at 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192178 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 20134)

(finding dismissal of claims based on foreclosure deficiencies appropriate as to original lender where such claims are based on acts and omission occurring after assignment of lien);

Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 20006)

(conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent motion to dismiss);

Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006)

(plaintiff must plead specific facts, not conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal).

Plaintiffs do not allege that AMCAP had a duty too provide any notice and do not allege that AMCAP failed to meet that duty.

Rather, Plaintiffs alleged that “Defendants” collectively failed to properly notice acceleration and foreclosure.

The summary judgment evidence conclusively demonstrates that AMCAP transferred the servicing rights to Jackson’s loan effective March 1, 2019, and MERS assigned beneficial rights under the Deed of Trust on September 13, 2022.

The Court must enter summary judgment in favor of AMCAP on those claims based on failure to give proper notice or, in the alternate, dismiss those claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

i.                    Plaintiffs’ RESPA claims fail.

2.                  Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” failed to follow HUD’s “loss mitigation regulations,” by mishandling loss mitigation procedures and by failing to provide face to face counseling.

Plaintiffs do not identify a specific regulation that “Defendants” violated, but point to a general duty on the part of “mortgagees” to engage in loss mitigation actions under 12 U.S.C. §1715u.

3.                  Section 1715u states “Upon default of imminent default, as defined by the Secretary, of any mortgage insured under this title, mortgagees shall engage in loss mitigation action for the purpose of providing and alternative to foreclosure… as provided in regulations by the Secretary.”

12 U.S.C. §1715u.

Section 1707 defines “mortgagee” to include the original lender.

12 U.S.C. § 1707(b).

There is no private right of action under 12 U.S.C. §1715u.

Rizvi v. JP Chase Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1991100, at *5 (N.D. Tex. April 9, 2014);

Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 1977)

(holding that regulation promulgated under the National Housing Act do nor create a private right of action.).

Because Section 1715u cannot be enforced by a mortgagor through a private cause of action, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law and summary judgment in favor of AMCAP is warranted.

4.                  Plaintiff argues that “Defendants” failed to follow loss mitigation regulations and identifies 12 U.S.C. §1709 et seq; and 24 C.F.R. §203.500 et seq. as the source of the violation.

The National Housing Act is incorporated into the United States Code as 12 U.S.C. §§1701 through 1750.

To the extent Plaintiffs seek relief under the National Housing Act, they have no cause of action.

Roberts, 556 F.2d at 362.

To the extent Plaintiffs seek relief under 24 C.F.R. §203.500 et seq., they have no cause of action.

Roberts, 556 F.2d at 362; See also Lloyd v. N.J. Hous. & Mortg. Fina. Agency, 845 Fed. Appx. 139, 142 (3rd Cir. Feb. 3, 2021)

(dismissing claim based on failure to provide face to face counseling under 24 C.F.R. §203.604 because there is no private right of action);

Gary v. BWW Law Grp., LLC. 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190885 at *24-25 (D.Md. Sept. 30, 2021) (accord).8

5.                  To the extent Plaintiffs attempt a more obliquely stated claim under the RESPA statute, that claim is also doomed to failure.

RESPA is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§2601 – 2617.

The servicing of mortgage loans is governed by 12 U.S.C. §2605.

The RESPA legislation is silent as to any loss mitigation duties.

Promulgated under RESPA’s grant of authority, 12 C.F.R. §1024.41 imposes certain duties with respect to loss mitigation efforts on mortgage servicers.

It is unclear from the Petition how “Defendants” are alleged to have “mishandled” the “loss mitigation procedures.”

What is clear is that Plaintiffs allege violations of 12 C.F.R. §1024.41.

6.                  Every portion of 12 C.F.R. §1024.41 references actions that must be taken by “a servicer.”9 “Servicer” means a person responsible for the servicing of a federally related mortgage

8 “The question here is whether the mortgagor may recover damages for breach of a certain provision of the deed in a private cause of action.

The answer to that question lies within the HUD regulations themselves.

Section 203.500 foo Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that noncompliance with the FHA mortgage servicing regulations empowers the Secretary of HUD to impose a “civil money penalty, including a penalty under §30.35(c)(2), or withdrawal of HUD’s approval of a mortgagee.”

This enforcement scheme comports with the notion that the regulations enacted pursuant too the NHA were intended to govern the relationship between the mortgage and the government rather than, as Neal would have it, the mortgagee and the mortgagor.

The overall purpose of the FHA mortgage insurance program is to encourage leading lenders, in exchange for a government guarantee of the loan, to extend mortgages to those carrying higher credit risks.

The regulations setting forth the rules and procedures for the program, including the loss mitigation regulations pointed to by Neal and alluded to in paragraph 9(d) of the deed, address how participating lenders are to conduct their activities.

Thus, the regulations do not control directly the relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee and my not be invoked by the mortgagor as a sworn in an offensive cause of action against the mortgagee.”

Garey, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *24-25, quoting Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 719-720 (2007).

9 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(a): “Noting in §1024.41 imposes a duty on a servicer to provide any borrower with any specific loss mitigation option.” 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(b)(2)(i):

“if a servicer receives a loss mitigation application 45 days or more before a foreclosure sale, a servicer shall…”

12 C.F.R. §1024.41(c):

“… if a servicer receives a complete loss mitigation more than 37 days before a foreclosure sale, then, within 30 days of receiving the complete loss mitigation application, a servicer shall…”

12 C.F.R. §1024.41(d):

“If a borrower’ complete loss mitigation application is denied for any trial or permanent loan modification option available to the borrower pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section, a servicer shall state in the notice sent to the borrower…”

12 C.F.R. §1024.41(e):

“Subject to paragraphs (e)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, if a complete loss mitigation application is received 90 days or more before a foreclosure sale, a servicer may require that a borrower accept or reject an offer of a loss mitigation option….”

12 C.F.R. §1024.41(f):

“A servicer shall not make the first notice or filing required by applicable law for any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure process unless…” 12 C.F.R. §1024.41(g):

“If a borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application after a servicer has made the first notice or filing required by applicable law… a servicer shall not move for foreclosure judgment or order of sale…”

Subsections (h), (i), (j), and (k) also address actions taken by a servicer.

loan (including the person who makes or holds such loan if such person also services the loan.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2(b).

“Servicing” means receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any federally related mortgage loan, including amounts for escrow accounts under section 10 foo RESPA, and making the payments to the owner of the loan or other third parties of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts received form the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the mortgage servicing loan documents or servicing contract.” Id.

1.                  Section 1024.41 imposes duties only on “servicers.”

Trust v. Riddle, 911 F.3d 779, 804 (5th Cir. 2018).

AMCAP has not been the “servicer” of Jackson’s loan since March 1, 2019.

The RESPA regulations simply do not impose any loss mitigation related duties on AMCAP.

The Court must enter summary judgment in favor of AMCAP.

See e.g. Hmes v. AmCap Mortg., Ltd., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243764 at *18 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2020).

i.                    Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claims fail.

2.                  Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action does not request a specific declaration.

Rather, Plaintiffs state that they seek a declaration specifying Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ rights and duties in connection with the Deed of Trust, complain that there is a dispute as to the balance owed on the loan (and demand an accounting), and complaint that “Defendants” did not “follow proper procedure pursuant to the Deed of Trust,” comply with “applicable federal requirements,” and failed to provide notice of default and notice of sale.

As discussed above, AMCAP has no duty to provide notice of default or notice of sale, and not duty to engage in loss mitigation activities under any federal regulation.

AMCAP is not attempting to exercise the power of sale in the Deed of Trust or otherwise foreclose on the Property.

AMCAP is not servicing the loan, takes no position as to the amounts due, and could not produce an accounting if ordered to do so.

There is simply no reason for Plaintiffs to seek the (sort-of) requested declarations as to AMCAP.

For this reason alone, the Court should enter summary judgment in favor of AMCAP or, in the alternate, dismiss the claims against AMCAP for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

1.                  Even if there were some point to seeking these declarations against AMCAP, Plaintiffs claims for judicial declarations cannot stand alone. A declaratory judgment claim cannot stand alone. The Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is merely a procedural device; it does not create any substantive rights or cause of action.

Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F..3d 746, 752 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996).

When all underlying substantive claims fail, a claim for declaratory judgment cannot survive.

Lopez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173070, at *16-17 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2018); Hill v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265877 at *6 (S.D. Tex. April 23, 2020).

For this reason, the Court should grand summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment in favor of AMCAP, or in the alternate, dismiss the claim with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

2.                  AMCAP is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims because AMCAP has no duty to provide notice of default or notice of sale under the Texas Property Code or the Deed of Trust, AMCAP is not a ‘servicer’ under RESPA or the regulations promulgated under RESPA, AMCAP has no interest in the loan, is not attempting to enforce the power of sale, and takes no position as to the amount currently owed, and because in the absence of a substantive cause of action against AMCAP, Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action cannot stand

The Court must enter summary judgment on all claims in AMCAP’s favor and order that Plaintiffs take nothing.

VII. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant AMCAP Mortgage, Ltd. prays the Court grant it summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims and order:

·                      Plaintiffs take nothing on their claims against AMCAP,

·                      AMCAP be dismissed from this suit,

·                      And such further relief at law or in equity to which AMCAP may show itself entitled.

Respectfully Submitted

HUGHES, WATTERS & ASKANASE, L.L.P.

By: /s/ Damian W. Abreo

Damian W. Abreo Tex. Bar No.24006728
Total Energies Tower
1201 Louisiana, 28th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 759-0818
Facsimile: (713) 759-6834

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, AMCAP MORTGAGE, LTD.

Judge David Hittner’s dismissal for want of prosecution.

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Peter Bray

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 12/11/2019. Case called.

No one appeared. Appearances:None.

(ERO:R. Guerrero), filed.(jmarchand, 4) (Entered: 12/11/2019)

Defendant Planet Home Lending’s Notice of Filing Removal to Federal Court