Appellate Judges

US Bank Referred to as a ‘Party In Interest’ by 5th Cir., But the Whole Lawsuit Is About a Non Party, the Mortgage Servicer

The Fifth Circuit Should Have Dismissed for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction as Rushmore is not a Party to the Lawsuit in the Lower Court.

LIT OPINION:

The Fifth Circuit Should Have Dismissed for Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction as Rushmore is not a Party to the Lawsuit in the Lower Court.

“Lenders cannot be held vicariously liable for their servicers’ violations of the Mortgage Servicing Rules.”

See; Christiana Trust v. Riddle, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36217 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018).

OCT 6, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: OCT 7, 2021

This case caught LIT’s attention due to (1) the judges on the panel, (2) the fact it was a 10 page foreclosure opinion. That’s a long opinion for a foreclosure appeal, and (3) the facts of the case raised red flags. After LIT downloaded the docket from the lower court, the details therein confirmed our suspicions.

First, Jason LeBeouf is the lawyer for the homeowner, Anton. He’s a former creditor rights attorney for Barrett Daffin, aka BDF Law Group, an Addison foreclosure mill. When he left, he switched sides, and decided to become a foreclosure defense attorney. BDF have a close relationship with the Fifth Circuit.

Second, Anton had 3 lawyers on the case, including Vilt, where LeBoeuf worked for a short time, if recollection serves us well. So it was a fairly high profile foreclosure case and understandable why the Chief Judge would want to shoot down the homeowners herself to ensure their post 2008 corrupt precedential opinions would remain intact. For example, the Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2013) which was authored by former Chief Judge Carl E. Stewart, who claimed in 2021 to “not knowing Texas foreclosure procedures, at all“. In 2020, he sat on 8 foreclosure panels.

Third, it is well known that the foreclosure defense attorneys will not question an opinion e.g. the fact the mortgage servicer is not a named party as they know if they baulk the system of fraud BY the judiciary, life as an attorney in Federal and Appellate Courts in Texas would become untenable.

2208 Indian Creek Dr, Fort Worth, TX 76107

Despite losing at the Fifth Circuit in 2021, TAD lists David Anton and Lauren Anton as Owners, last checked July 16, 2022.

Licensee.io

David Barnett Anton
Real Estate Broker
8301 Camp Bowie West, Fort Worth, Texas, 76116
214-632-3490

David Barnett Anton is a licensed real estate broker in Fort Worth, Texas and has a total experience of 15 years in real estate business. The real estate license number 570012 was issued by TREC to David Barnett Anton on 30 March, 2007. The current status of license is Current and Active and address listed on David Barnett Anton’s license document is 8301 Camp Bowie West, Fort Worth, Texas, 76116. The license will expire on 31 July, 2021. You can reach out to David Barnett Anton via phone number 214-632-3490.

David Barnett Anton has a license type of Real Estate Broker which allows a real estate professional to perform services such as selling, buying, renting, auctioning, advertising of real estate properties for compensation commonly in the form of commission. Licensed real estate professionals / entities are also commonly referred to as real estate agents or Realtors.

Realtor’s Profile
Name David Barnett Anton
Credentials Real Estate Broker
Experience 15 yrs
Complete Address 8301 Camp Bowie West, Fort Worth, Texas, 76116
Phone Number 214-632-3490
Email Address danton @ chilenoproperties . com

Real Estate Agents.

Stealth Mode Realtor, No Signage

After 12 years of association, David Anton and Peter Juul Founded Dantex Partners, LLC in 2009. Dantex is a full-service construction and development organization.

Dantex is an organization of a combination of long time experience in the general contracting and development fields and young energetic well educated and tech savvy up and coming leaders. Between our veteran leadership we have over 65 years experience in all facets of general contracting.

Founded by David Anton and Peter Juul in 2009, Dantex is a full-service construction and development organization that will proudly tackle all types of projects, but provides top quality medical facilities design & construction services as a primary focus.

Acme Architectural Hardware, Inc vs David Anton, Individually and d/b/a Dantex Partners LLC

5/20/2015
Default Judgment
(Judicial Officer: Rymell, Jennifer)
Judgment of $33,148.62
Awarded To: Acme Architectural Hardware, Inc
Awarded Against: David Anton

Trust Capital Funding, LLC vs Chileno Properties, LLC, David Anton

10/29/2020
Final Agreed Judgment
(Judicial Officer: Rymell, Jennifer)

Anton related companies use this Address, the Offices for RSC Flooring

David Anton,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

US Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-862

OWEN, PRISCILLA R.

CLEMENT, EDITH B.

DUNCAN, STUART K.

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Clement and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:*

David Anton sued U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”)1 claiming, inter alia, that U.S. Bank breached an adjustable-rate note and deed of trust, as well as various alleged modifications thereto.

Anton also sought to enjoin U.S. Bank from selling the real property securing the note.

The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Anton’s complaint with prejudice.

Anton timely appealed.

We affirm.

I. Facts and Proceedings

In 2005, Anton executed an adjustable-rate note in favor of Chevy Chase Bank, FSB. The note was secured by a deed of trust first lien on certain real property. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB later indorsed the note and deed of trust to U.S. Bank. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC (“Rushmore”) serviced the loan on behalf of U.S. Bank, though U.S. Bank maintained physical possession of the note.

Anton defaulted on the loan in May 2018.

At that time, Anton and Rushmore allegedly communicated via email to discuss a repayment plan to cure the default, which specified that Anton would make certain payments in May, June, and July of 2018 to bring the loan current (“July Repayment Plan”). Anton made the first payment, but he failed to make the next two. Rushmore referred the loan for foreclosure on July 20, 2018.

In the Fall of 2018, Anton made various payments to Rushmore that it applied to his escrow obligations, as well as his principal and interest obligations for March 2018 through September 2018. Then, in December 2018, Rushmore and Anton agreed, in writing, to a repayment plan (“December Repayment Plan”) pursuant to which Anton would make payments to Rushmore for November and December on December 18 and December 31, respectively. Anton attempted to make those payments, but his bank reversed the payments for insufficient funds. Accordingly, on January 3, 2019, Rushmore mailed Anton a notice of default and intent to accelerate the loan. Anton made a payment to Rushmore on January 31, 2019, to cover the November and December payment obligations still owed, but it was insufficient to cure his outstanding balance.

*Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

1 In the district court, the named defendant was U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT. As discussed herein, Rushmore Loan Management Services was the entity that serviced the loan, but the legal party in interest was U.S. Bank. The parties did not dispute this point.

On May 23, 2019, counsel for Rushmore mailed Anton and his wife a notice of acceleration. On August 20, 2019, counsel for Rushmore mailed a notice of foreclosure sale to Anton and his wife, which specified that the foreclosure sale for the real property located at 2208 Indian Creek Drive, Fort Worth, Texas 76107 was scheduled for October 1, 2019. Counsel for Rushmore also filed a notice of foreclosure sale with the office of the Clerk for Tarrant County and posted a notice of the foreclosure at the Tarrant County Courthouse.

On September 27, 2019, Anton sued U.S. Bank in the District Court of Tarrant County, Texas and alleged the following causes of action:

(1) breach of contract;

(2) common law fraud;

(3) promissory estoppel;

(4) violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act (“TDCA”);

(5) breach of the duty of cooperation;

and

(6) negligent misrepresentation.

Anton also sought to enjoin the foreclosure sale.

On October 10, 2019, U.S. Bank removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

U.S. Bank filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts in Anton’s complaint, which the district court granted, dismissing Anton’s complaint with prejudice. Anton timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.

Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2016).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A disputed fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]”

Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 177 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

“We construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[.]”

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2005)).

III. Discussion

Anton appeals only the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank as it pertains to his breach of contract claims and his TDCA claims.

We will address each claim in turn.

A.

Anton’s breach of contract claims ultimately depend on the enforceability of the alleged July Repayment Plan and “escrow repayment plan.” He alleges that U.S. Bank breached the July Repayment Plan in July 2018 when Rushmore referred the loan for foreclosure prior to the end of the month. He further alleges that, despite an agreement to spread his escrow payment obligations over a 60-month period, Rushmore instead spread them over a 24-month period.

To succeed on a breach of contract claim in Texas, a plaintiff must show: “

(1) the existence of a valid contract;

(2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff;

(3) breach of the contract by the defendant;

and

(4) damages to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s breach.”

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 884 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Caprock Inv. Corp. v. Montgomery, 321 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2010, pet. denied)).

The district court correctly concluded that the alleged July Repayment Plan was not an enforceable contract.

In Texas, “[a] loan agreement in which the amount involved in the loan agreement exceeds $50,000 in value is not enforceable unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the party to be bound or by that party’s authorized representative.”

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.02(b).

And “[a]n agreement to modify such a loan must also be in writing to be valid.”

Bynane v. Bank of New York Mellon for CWMBS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2006-24, 866 F.3d 351, 361 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2013)).

It is undisputed that, following his default in May 2018, Anton and Rushmore had various discussions via email and telephone regarding a repayment plan to bring the loan current.

However, those emails are nowhere to be found in the record.

Anton produced a number of emails that refer to a repayment plan, but they do not evidence an offer and acceptance of that plan, nor do they contain any other material terms relating to the plan.

For example, on July 3, 2018, Rushmore’s representative, David Viggiano, emailed Anton the following:

“From what I am seeing, you still owe the June and the July repayment plan amounts to complete – correct?”

Then on July 30, Mr. Viggiano emailed Anton asking:

“How much were you planning to pay today? The full amount to reinstate since the plan was originally set to complete end of July?”

Anton responded:

“13k. I was told I had to get this in prior to end of July. That is why I’m calling today.”

And Mr. Viggiano replied:

“The last payment made was on 6/5/18 that was for the May repayment plan payment. There was no payment rest of June and nothing in July so on 7/20/18, your file was referred to FC. The plan that we set up was to complete the reinstatement by end of July.”

Thus, it is apparent that there was some sort of understanding between Anton and Rushmore pursuant to which Anton could cure his default.

But the terms of that “agreement”—including without limitation the precise amounts owed, payment deadlines, and consequences for incomplete and/or untimely payments—are wholly absent from the record.

To satisfy the statute of frauds in Texas, a writing “must be complete within itself in every material detail and contain all of the essential elements of the agreement.”

Sterrett v. Jacobs, 118 S.W.3d 877, 879–80 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2003); see also Bynane, 866 F.3d at 361–62.

The emails Anton produced were not complete in themselves in every material detail.

Without an adequate written record of the agreement reflecting all the material terms and details describing the parties’ respective rights and obligations, the alleged July Repayment Plan is an unenforceable contract under the statute of frauds.

Absent an enforceable contract modifying the terms of the original loan, Anton cannot maintain a cause of action against U.S. Bank for breaching the alleged July Repayment Plan.

The district court properly dismissed Anton’s breach of contract claim on this ground.

B.

For the same reasons, the district court correctly concluded that Anton cannot maintain a claim against U.S. Bank for breaching the alleged “escrow repayment plan.”

Anton did not produce any evidence of a written agreement by U.S. Bank or Rushmore to apportion his escrow payment obligations in any specific way.

Instead, he produced a series of emails between himself and Mr. Viggiano reflecting only that Rushmore calculated certain escrow payments based on a 60-month spread.

First, Anton produced an email from Mr. Viggiano, dated August 2, 2018, stating:

“Got the investor to approve the paying of the $33,729.05 by the 20th and keep with the current escrow analysis that you are currently set up on.”

Second, he produced an email from Mr. Viggiano, dated October 2, 2018 reflecting that certain escrow payments, calculated based on a 60-month spread, were outstanding.

Third, he produced an email that he sent to Mr. Viggiano on May 29, 2019, in which he stated:

“I desperately want to make that happen and hope that the investor will approve the same escrow spread that they did last time and allow me to wire funds as soon as Friday this week in order to stop the process.”

At most, these emails indicate that Rushmore—or, as Anton suggests in his Declaration, its “predecessor in interest”—calculated certain escrow payments based on a 60-month spread.

But this is far from evidence of a signed, written agreement by U.S. Bank or Rushmore obligating it to calculate every escrow payment based on that same spread.

The emails that Anton claims provide evidence of an “escrow repayment plan” are insufficient, taken together, because they are not complete in themselves and lack all the material terms required to form an enforceable contract.

See Sterrett, 118 S.W.3d at 879–80.

Accordingly, we conclude that, absent evidence in the record of an “escrow repayment plan” that satisfies the statute of frauds, the district court properly dismissed Anton’s breach of contract claim on this ground.

C.

To the extent that Anton premises his breach of contract claim on the December Repayment Plan, that claim also fails. It is undisputed that he and Rushmore entered a written agreement in December 2018, pursuant to which Anton would make payments for November and December on December 18 and December 31, respectively.

It is likewise undisputed that Anton failed to do so—his bank reversed the two payments he attempted to make due to insufficient funds.

Anton cannot succeed on a claim that U.S. Bank breached the December Repayment Plan by mailing him the notice of default and intent to accelerate on January 3, 2019.

He had once again defaulted, and as the district court observed, “[i]t is unreasonable to require Defendant to continue to arrange for a repayment of money already owed to it just to have Plaintiff not make the agreed-upon repayments.”

Because Anton again failed to make full and timely payments, the district court properly dismissed Anton’s breach of contract claim on this ground.

United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-862

FINAL ORDER AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR U.S. BANK BY JUDGE O’CONNOR

D.
Anton also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank as it relates to his TDCA claims. He argues that U.S. Bank violated § 392.304(a)(8) of the Texas Finance Code by making false statements that his loan was in default and by representing that a payment plan was in place when in fact the payment plan had been cancelled and the property referred for foreclosure.

Section 392.304(a)(8) of the Texas Finance Code prohibits debt collectors from “misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount of a consumer debt, or misrepresenting the consumer debt’s status in a judicial or governmental proceeding.”

To prevail on his claim for misrepresentation about a debt, Anton must show that U.S. Bank made a misrepresentation that led him “to be unaware

(1) that he had a mortgage debt,

(2) of the specific amount he owed, or

(3) that he had defaulted.”

Rucker v. Bank of Am., N.A., 806 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 726 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Anton does not provide evidence supporting any of these three elements.

First, there is no dispute as to whether Anton knew he had a mortgage debt, and that he knew he was in default. Anton’s own briefing reflects this; indeed, his default on the original loan was the very reason he and Rushmore discussed repayment options in the first place. Similarly, Anton does not provide any evidence that misrepresentations by U.S. Bank or Rushmore led him to be unaware of the amount he owed.

Instead, Anton merely alleges that Rushmore incorrectly stated that he was in default, when he was not, and that a repayment plan was in place, when in fact the property had been referred for foreclosure. But these allegations are unsupported. To be sure, Rushmore referred the loan for foreclosure on July 20, 2018.

But that was only after Anton had failed to make certain payments for June and July that were outstanding. In fact, Anton knew on July 3, 2018 that certain payments were missing for June and July.

There is no evidence in the record that Rushmore somehow gave Anton the false impression that he was current on the loan when, in fact, he was not.

And there is similarly no evidence that it referred the loan for foreclosure before Anton had a fair opportunity to cure his default by making timely payments for June and July.

For the foregoing reasons, Anton cannot maintain a TDCA claim against U.S. Bank for violations of § 392.304(a)(8).

Anton failed to provide evidence that U.S. Bank or Rushmore made misrepresentations that caused him to be unaware of his debt obligations or that he had defaulted. The district court properly dismissed his TDCA claim on this ground.

E.

Anton further argues that U.S. Bank violated § 392.304(a)(19) by failing to properly credit payments to his account. This argument is similarly unavailing.

Section 392.304(a)(19) makes it unlawful for debt collectors to “us[e] any other false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer.”

To support his claim that U.S. Bank violated § 392.304(a)(19), Anton points to email discussions with Mr. Viggiano from October 2018 in which Mr. Viggiano indicated that Rushmore had received payments from Anton, but that they were not yet fully reflected in the system.

But this is hardly evidence that Rushmore misapplied those payments. In fact, those same emails reflect that Mr. Viggiano was diligently working to ensure that the payments Anton did make were reflected in the system properly—even if they were not reflected properly right away.

For example, on October 18, 2018, Mr. Viggiano emailed Anton:

“Trying to get the payments that we took earlier this month to reflect in the system correctly Will get handled. Will keep you posted.”

And, in any event, by October 26, 2018, Mr. Viggiano represented to Anton that the system “finally reflect[ed]” the proper amounts outstanding for October.

There is simply no evidence that Rushmore made any misrepresentations about how it applied Anton’s payments.

If anything, the emails between Anton and Mr. Viggiano showed the opposite—that Rushmore was communicating truthfully with Anton about the status of his payments in the system and directing its efforts to ensure that Anton’s payments were reflected in the system properly.

The district court correctly dismissed Anton’s TDCA claim on this ground.

IV. Conclusion

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any of the counts in Anton’s complaint that he raised on appeal, the district court properly granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment as to those counts and dismissed the same with prejudice.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

 

Eight Reasons Why You Cannot Trust a Federal Judge to Follow Their Oath nor The Rule of Law

Self-dealing caused Judge Bennett to enter judgment against Plaintiffs and equity will not enforce judgments procured by fraud.

A Federal Notice of Appeal is Not Limited to 30 Days, that’s a Judicial Rule Subordinate to Statute

Re: timeliness of appeals in federal civil cases: Section 2107 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code (a federal statute) v FRAP 4 (a court-made rule).

Pro Se Randall Rollins Allowed to Amend his Federal Complaint Four Times in SDTX, Houston Div’n

Judge Eskridge: Rollins has filed four complaints in federal court. Even so, he fails to state claims that can survive jurisdictional attack.

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:19-cv-00862-O

Anton v. U.S Bank National Association as Trustee
Assigned to: Judge Reed C. O’Connor

Case in other court:  67th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, TX, 067-312088-19
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, 20-11159

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 10/10/2019
Date Terminated: 07/10/2020
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Plaintiff
David Anton represented by Jason Andrew LeBoeuf
LeBoeuf Law Firm, PLLC
675 Town Square Blvd, Suite 200
Building 1A
Garland, TX 75040
214-206-7423
Fax: 214-730-5944
Email: jason@leboeuflawfirm.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bar Status: Admitted/In Good StandingKerry L Prisock
Law Office of Kerry Prisock
5177 Richmond Avenue
Suite 1142
Houston, TX 77056
214-632-3823
Email: kprisocklegal@sbcglobal.net
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bar Status: Admitted/In Good StandingRobert C Vilt
Vilt and Associates PC
5177 Richmond Avenue Suite 1142
Houston, TX 77056
713-840-7570
Fax: 713-877-1827
Email: clay@viltlaw.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
V.
Defendant
US Bank National Association
as Trustee
represented by Mark D Cronenwett
Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann PC
14160 N Dallas Parkway, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75254
214-635-2650
Fax: 214-635-2686
Email: mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
10/10/2019 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL from In the District Court Tarrant County, Texas, 67th Judicial District, case number 067-312088-19 filed by U.S Bank National Association as Trustee. (Filing fee $400; receipt number 0539-10329029) In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms and Instructions found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Cover Sheet, # 3 Cover Sheet Supplement Pages 1-2, # 4 Cover Sheet Supplement Page 3) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
10/10/2019 2 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by U.S Bank National Association as Trustee. (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
10/10/2019 3 New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. File to: Judge O Connor. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge. Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (bdb) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
11/15/2019 4 ORDER REQUIRING SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND REPORT FOR CONTENTS OF SCHEDULING ORDER: The Joint Report shall be filed on or before December 16, 2019. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 11/15/2019) (skg) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
11/25/2019 5 NOTICE of Joint Report Regarding Contents of Scheduling Order re: 4 Order for Scheduling Order Proposal filed by US Bank National Association (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 11/25/2019)
11/25/2019 6 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosures filed by US Bank National Association (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 11/25/2019)
11/27/2019 7 SCHEDULING ORDER: Joinder of Parties due by 1/27/2020. Amended Pleadings due by 1/27/2020. Motions due by 6/22/2020. Deadline for mediation is on or before 4/22/2020. Discovery due by 5/22/2020. Pretrial Order due by 9/24/2020. This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning October 19, 2020 in US Courthouse, Courtroom 2nd Floor, 501 W. 10th St. Fort Worth, TX 76102-3673 before Judge Reed C. O’Connor. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 11/27/2019) (skg) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
02/21/2020 8 Designation of Experts by US Bank National Association. (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 02/21/2020)
02/27/2020 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by US Bank National Association (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/27/2020 10 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by US Bank National Association re 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/27/2020 11 Appendix in Support filed by US Bank National Association re 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
03/19/2020 12 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by David Anton (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 03/19/2020)
03/20/2020 13 ORDER granting 12 Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline. Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment due by 3/27/2020. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 3/20/2020) (skg) (Entered: 03/20/2020)
03/26/2020 14 Agreed MOTION to Continue (for Continuance) filed by US Bank National Association (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 03/26/2020)
03/30/2020 15 ORDER granting 14 Motion to Continue. Plaintiff Response to Deft’s Motion for Summary Judgment due by 4/10/2020. Bench Trial reset for 1/25/2021 before Judge Reed C. O’Connor. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 3/30/2020) (wrb) (Entered: 03/30/2020)
04/10/2020 16 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by David Anton (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (LeBoeuf, Jason) Modified on 4/13/2020 (wrb). (Entered: 04/10/2020)
04/13/2020 17 ORDER granting 16 Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply. Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment is due by 4/13/2020. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 4/13/2020) (wrb) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
04/13/2020 18 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by David Anton re 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
04/13/2020 19 Appendix in Support filed by David Anton re 18 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion Part 1 (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
04/13/2020 20 Appendix in Support filed by David Anton re 19 Appendix in Support Part 2 (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
04/27/2020 21 Unopposed MOTION to Extend Time to File Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by US Bank National Association (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
04/28/2020 22 ORDER granting 21 Motion to Extend Time. Defnedant’s reply brief due by 5/4/2020. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 4/28/2020) (wrb) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
05/04/2020 23 REPLY filed by US Bank National Association re: 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
07/10/2020 24 ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 7/10/2020) (wrb) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
07/10/2020 25 FINAL JUDGMENT… Having resolved all matters between the parties, Plaintiffs case against Defendant is dismissed with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 7/10/2020) (wrb) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
07/15/2020 26 BILL OF COSTS by US Bank National Association. (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 07/15/2020)
07/30/2020 27 Costs Taxed in amount of $ 400.00 against Plaintiff David Anton (wrb) (Entered: 07/30/2020)
08/07/2020 28 MOTION for New Trial filed by David Anton (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 08/07/2020)
08/21/2020 29 RESPONSE filed by US Bank National Association re: 28 MOTION for New Trial (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 08/21/2020)
08/21/2020 30 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by US Bank National Association re 29 Response/Objection to Motion for New Trial (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 08/21/2020)
10/19/2020 31 ORDER: The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 28 ) should be and is hereby DENIED. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O’Connor on 10/19/2020) (bdb) (Entered: 10/20/2020)
11/18/2020 32 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 24 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to the Fifth Circuit by David Anton. Filing fee $505, receipt number 0539-11369811. T.O. form to appellant electronically at Transcript Order Form or US Mail as appropriate. Copy of NOA to be sent US Mail to parties not electronically noticed. IMPORTANT ACTION REQUIRED: Provide an electronic copy of any exhibit you offered during a hearing or trial that was admitted into evidence to the clerk of the district court within 14 days of the date of this notice. Copies must be transmitted as PDF attachments through ECF by all ECF Users or delivered to the clerk on a CD by all non-ECF Users. See detailed instructions here. (Exception: This requirement does not apply to a pro se prisoner litigant.) Please note that if original exhibits are in your possession, you must maintain them through final disposition of the case. (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 11/18/2020)
11/30/2020 33 USCA Case Number 20-11159 in United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit for 32 Notice of Appeal, filed by David Anton. (tle) (Entered: 11/30/2020)
12/02/2020 34 Transcript Order Form: transcript not requested Reminder to appellant: this document must also be filed with the appeals court. (LeBoeuf, Jason) (Entered: 12/02/2020)
US Bank Referred to as a ‘Party In Interest’ by 5th Cir., But the Whole Lawsuit Is About a Non Party, the Mortgage Servicer
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Laws In Texas is a blog about the Financial Crisis and how the banks and government are colluding against the citizens and homeowners of the State of Texas and relying on a system of #FakeDocs and post-crisis legal precedents, specially created by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to foreclose on homeowners around this great State. We are not lawyers. We do not offer legal advice. We are citizens of the State of Texas who have spent a decade in the court system in Texas and have been party to during this period to the good, the bad and the very ugly.

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