The War on Whistleblowers: Insights into Our American Government’s Dirty Tactics Employing Judicial Enforcers

As explained in Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179

California courts have inherent power to ‘… control [their] proceedings. [Citation.]

From their creation by article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution, California courts received broad inherent power not confined by or dependent on statute. [Citations.]

This inherent power includes ‘fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation. [Citations.]

B]ecause courts should hear only actual disputes, and should prevent harassment of defendants, California courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss cases that are fraudulent or ‘vexatious. [Citations.] This inherent power of a trial court is to be exercised to achieve justice and prevent misuse of [its] proces[s]………………………………………………….. ’

[Citations.]

(Id. at pp. 181–182 [internal citations and quotations omitted].)

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Since this action was filed before the Orange County Superior Court found Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant, Plaintiff was not yet subject to any prefiling requirements. (CCP § 391.7[1]) Consequently, City Defendant requests an immediate stay of this action or, in the alternative, an

Order requiring Plaintiff to furnish security. The proposed amount for security is not stated by City Defendants.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that “he is so indigent and has no employment income” due to his disabilities and that he cannot provide any form of security. (Opp. at pp. 5:27-6:1.)

City Defendants are correct in pointing out that if Plaintiff is unable to furnish a security, the litigation must be dismissed as to the defendant for whose benefit the security was ordered furnished. (CCP § 391.4.)

Plaintiff cites no legal authority that excuses Plaintiff from furnishing a security due to his alleged indignant status.

(See McColm v. Westwood Park Ass’n (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1219 [$1,000 amount was not an undue burden for indigent plaintiff] disproved on other grounds by John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91;

Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 786

[rejecting argument that an order to furnish security unconstitutionally discriminates against vexatious litigants of “modest means” where plaintiff was employed as a paralegal].)

The fact that Plaintiff may be unable to furnish a security does not dispense with the requirement to furnish a security.

“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that –

(A) the allegations of poverty is untrue;

or

(B) the action or appeal –

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

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“According to the complaint, Defendants are all residents of, and/or are doing business in, Newport Beach, California. (Id. at 1.)

Thus, there is no indication that any of the individual defendants reside in the District of Nevada.

Further, the factual allegations reveal that the actions in question occurred in California-specifically action taken with respect to a California case/court proceeding.

The only tie to this District is that Jensen currently resides in Reno, Nevada. (Id.)

However, a civil action must be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state where the district is located,

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,

or

(3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (emphasis added).

In sum, Jensen has not alleged that any defendant resides in the District of Nevada, that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action transpired here and she has not otherwise alleged any connection to this District.

Therefore, it appears the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants and venue is improper here.

Jensen v. McKennon, 3:21-CV-00483-RCJ-CLB, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2022)

BLOGGER INC. IS A DELAWARE CORPORATION WITH A PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN TEXAS

“In Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1065, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Texas had 350 of its 42,000 employees working in California.

That presence was held insufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over the company.

( Id. at p. 1070, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 915.)”

Brue v. Shabaab, 54 Cal.App.5th 578, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)

State court jurisdiction is rooted in geography.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in that law school favorite Pennoyer v. Neff,

“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”

( Pennoyer v. Neff (878) 95 U.S. 714, 720 [ 24 L.Ed. 565].)

This territorial concept of jurisdiction has two corollaries:

“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory” and “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without [(i.e., outside)] its territory.”

( Id. at p. 722.)

Even when these principles were relaxed by the doctrine of minimum contacts (see Internal. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [ 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154] ( International Shoe)), jurisdiction was still limited by “presence” in a state as evidenced by activities within its territory

( id. at p. 317).

Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court (Epicor Software Corporation), 196 Cal.App.4th 1623, 1629 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)

The Thug with a JD has quite a reputation.

Civil Cases in Texas where Andrew [Peter} Lehman is the Plaintiff.

He qualifies as a Vexatious Litigant in Texas law, having commenced 5 cases or more in the last 7 years, and where he was unsuccessful in his civil proceedings.

The Legislature titled Chapter 37 of the Texas Penal Code,

“Perjury and Other Falsification,”

indicating “perjury” is distinguishable from “other falsification.”

See generally Tex. Penal Code Ann. Ch. 37.

Indeed, perjury—a Class A misdemeanor—relates to statements made under oath.

See id. § 37.02.

Aggravated perjury—a third-degree felony—also relates to statements made under oath “during or in connection with an official proceeding.”

Id. § 37.03.

False report to a peace officer, on the other hand, relates to statements made during a criminal investigation, not under oath during an official proceeding.

See id. § 37.08.

And false report to a peace officer is a Class B misdemeanor—a lower-level offense than both perjury and aggravated perjury. See id.

McCreary v. State, 649 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. App. 2022)