Outgoing Judge Schaffer’s Memberships, Donations and Election Litigation Creates Judicial Conflict

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), Brief in Support, and Appendix (ECF Nos. 39–41), filed June 7, 2024; Plaintiff’s Response and Appendix (ECF No. 59–60), filed July 31, 2024; and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 61), filed August 14, 2024.

After reviewing the briefing and relevant law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s defamation claim concerning antisemitic remarks and Plaintiff’s Count II for injurious falsehood.

However, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s remaining defamation claims in Count I for Defamation.

I.                   BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff John Sabal (“Sabal”) is the sole owner of a company called The Patriot Voice (“TPV”), which has a channel on the social media site, Telegram.

Content on TPV’s Telegram channel comes from three sources.

First, Sabal posts comments he personally writes.

Second, Sabal posts content from other Telegram accounts by forwarding those posts to TPV’s channel.

Third,

1 All undisputed facts pertaining to Defendant’s Motion are drawn from Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40), unless otherwise specified.

Sabal gives several people administrative access to also post on the channel, whom he trusts will post appropriate content.

Sabal forwards a post when it “resonates with [his] values or [his] stance on things,” and he checks the posts for accuracy.

TPV is also utilized to organize conservative political events and to “showcase pertinent and dynamic speakers, whose messages are timely and relevant.”2

Defendant Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”) is a non-governmental organization that uses public, open-source material to monitor individuals, groups, movements, and ideas.

ADL follows and writes about movements and individuals who advocate beliefs that ADL considers to be extremist and/or hateful.

In the view of ADL’s experts, extremist ideologues are dangerous because their ideas may induce others to engage in violence and other antisocial conduct.

Sabal filed this lawsuit, bringing two claims against ADL:

one for defamation and one for injurious falsehood.3

Specifically, Sabal claims ADL defamed him when:

(1) ADL said Sabal was known to peddle antisemitic beliefs in “The QAnon Backgrounder”;

(2) ADL included him in their “Glossary of Extremism”;

and

(3) ADL included Sabal in their report on extremism in Texas.

Sabal’s claim for injurious falsehood incorporates the three above alleged defamatory statements.

The facts pertinent to each of these claims are presented below.

A.     Backgrounder: QAnon

The first ADL publication at issue is entitled,

“Backgrounder: QAnon” (“Backgrounder”).4

The Backgrounder serves as ADL’s profile on the QAnon movement. The Backgrounder references Sabal twice.

The first reference states that “several aspects of QAnon lore mirror longstanding antisemitic tropes, and multiple QAnon influencers, such as . . . QAnon John (John

2 Pl.’s Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.

3 Id. at 7–10.

4 Backgrounder QAnon, ADL (May 4, 2020), https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/qanon; Def.’s App. in Supp. 1692–1708, ECF No. 41-15.

Sabal), have been known to peddle antisemitic beliefs.”5

The second reference states that “[i]n October 2021, several elected officials and candidates spoke at the Patriot Double Down conference hosted in Las Vegas, Nevada by antisemitic QAnon influencer John Sabal (QAnon John).”6

To support its representation, ADL points to multiple posts from Sabal that espouse the blood libel trope7, promote known antisemitic writings, suggest that Israel and prominent Jews were behind the 9-11 attacks, and claim that certain Ashkenazi Jews participate in human sacrifice and cannibalism.

B.     Glossary of Extremism

The second publication at issue is ADL’s “Glossary of Extremism and Hate” (“Glossary”), which compiles information ADL’s Center on Extremism has gathered into a single, user-friendly database for the public to access.8

The Glossary includes the names of about 300 people, as well as entries for ideas, movements, symbols, and other categories of information.

Some of these people are terrorists and known white supremacists while some are non-violent individuals ADL considers hateful or extreme.

The Glossary entry at issue here provides that “John Sabal, also known as ‘QAnon John,’ is a QAnon influencer who runs The Patriot Voice website, which he uses to advertise QAnon-related conferences.

These conferences, the first of which was held in May 2021, have showcased the mainstreaming of QAnon and other conspiracy theories.”9 ADL

5 Id. at 1695.

6 Id. at 1703.

7 See Privler v. CSX Transport Inc., No. 118CV1020BKSCFH, 2021 WL 3603334, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021) (defining blood libel as “an antisemitic canard . . . in which Jews have been falsely accused of kidnaping and murdering children for ritual purposes during Passover”).

8 Glossary of Extremism and Hate, ADL CTR. ON EXTREMISM, https://extremismterms.adl.org/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2024).

9 John Sabal, Glossary of Extremism and Hate, ADL CTR. ON EXTREMISM, https://extremismterms.adl.org/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2024).

included Sabal because it believed that “Sabal was an example of an extremist leader who propagates ideas that can inspire others to engage in criminal activity.”10

C.     Hate in the Lone Star State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Texas Report

The final ADL publication at issue is the report entitled,

“Hate in the Lone Star State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Texas” (“Lone Star Report”).11

The Lone Star Report “discusses a wide variety of extremists”12 and was written “to educate the public about the extremist landscape”13 operating within the state of Texas. The Lone Star Report identifies Sabal in connection with a Dallas conference:

Over the last few years, Texas has been at the heart of several notable QAnon events and incidents.

The state has been home to multiple QAnon-themed conferences, highlighting the mainstreaming of QAnon and other conspiracies among conservative communities and the GOP.

The most notable was “For God & Country: Patriot Roundup,” which took place on Memorial Day weekend 2021.

Organized by John Sabal, known online as “QAnon John” and “The Patriot Voice,” the event featured then-Congressman Louie Gohmert (R-TX), then-Texas GOP chair Allen West, Lt. General Michael Flynn, attorney and conspiracy theorist Sidney Powell and various QAnon influencers.

During the event, Michael Flynn seemingly endorsed a Myanmar-style coup in the U.S., although he has since backtracked on his remarks.14

In the Lone Star Report’s introduction, ADL states that one of the factors that drives the significant extremist activity in the state is “QAnon supporters who have gathered for conferences and rallies across the state.”15

The Lone Star Report includes key statistics showing “Antisemitic Incidents,” “Extremist Plots and Murders,” and “Extremist Events,”

10 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 30, ECF No. 40.

11 Hate in the Lone Star State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Texas, ADL (Sept. 21, 2023), https://www.adl.org/resources/report/hate-lone-star-state-extremism-antisemitism-texas; Def.’s App. in Supp. 1574–96, ECF No. 41-14.

12 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 30, ECF No. 40.

13 Pl.’s App. in Supp. (Segal Dep.) 27:17–18, App. 95, ECF No. 60.

14 Def.’s App. in Supp. 1585, ECF No. 41-14.

15 Def.’s App. in Supp. 1577, ECF No. 41-14.

which include “protests, rallies and meetings”.16

ADL states it believes that Sabal has, through his conferences, advocated ideas that directly call for political violence.

II.                LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings and evidence show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Summary judgment is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but rather an “integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, ‘which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id.

The movant must inform the court of the basis for its motion and identify the portions of the record that reveal there are no genuine disputes of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 389 (5th Cir. 2013).

“Moreover, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id.

Lastly, if there appears to be some support for disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the court must deny the motion for summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

III.             ANALYSIS

A.     Count I: Defamation

Under Texas law,17 the plaintiff must prove four elements to state a defamation cause of action:

“(1) the defendant published a false statement;

(2) that defamed the plaintiff;

(3) with the requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the statement (negligence if the plaintiff is a private individual);

and

(4) damages, unless the statement constitutes defamation per se.”

Warren v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 932 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bedford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017)).

There are currently three statements or publications that Sabal alleges ADL published with defamatory impact.

As such, Plaintiff contends that these are genuine disputes of material fact.

ADL characterizes these statements as “either substantially true and/or protected opinion.”18

ADL also argues that Sabal is a limited-purpose public figure (“LPPF”) and that summary judgment is warranted because he failed to “demonstrate that the challenged statements were published with actual malice.”19

These elements concerning Plaintiff’s status as an LPPF (element three) and whether ADL’s publications are non-actionable opinion (element one) are threshold issues for the Court.

Only after resolution of these elements can the Court analyze whether each specific “publication is capable of [a] defamatory meaning.”

Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

17 Both parties agree that is case is governed by Texas law.

18 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 40.

1.      Threshold Issues

a.      Limited-Purpose Public Figure

To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must also plausibly establish the “requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the [defamatory] statement.”

Warren, 932 F.3d at 383.

If Plaintiff is an LPPF, actual malice is the degree of fault required instead of negligence.

WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998).

“Because a defamation plaintiff’s status dictates the degree of fault he . . . must prove to render the defendant liable, the principal issue in this case is whether [Sabal] is a public figure.” Id.

Texas courts have recognized two types of public figures:

“(1) all-purpose, or general-purpose, public figures,

and

(2) limited-purpose public figures.” Id.

Both parties concede that Sabal is not a general-purpose public figure.

The Court must decide as a matter of law whether Sabal is an LPPF or a private individual.

To determine whether an individual is an LPPF, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a three-part test:

(1)   the controversy at issue must be public both in the sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its resolution;

(2)    the plaintiff must have more than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy;

and

(3)   the alleged defamation must be germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.

Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1987).

To determine the controversy at issue, the Court “must examine whether persons actually were discussing some specific question.”

WFAA-TV, 978 S.W.2d at 572.

“A general concern or interest will not suffice.” Id.

The Court may also consider whether “the press was covering the debate, reporting what people were saying and uncovering facts and theories to help the public formulate some judgment.” Id.

Lastly, a “person may be a public figure for some aspects of a multi-faceted public controversy, but a mere observer for other aspects . . . [and], therefore, the scope of the controversy is limited to the actual dispute within which the defamation claim is situated.”

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Ackerman Mcqueen, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-2074-G, 2021 WL 3618113, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2021).

Here, the Court finds no evidence that there is a public controversy at issue.

As the Court stated in its Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the asserted defamatory statements concern Sabal’s alleged antisemitism (the Backgrounder) and Sabal’s alleged status as a dangerous extremist and criminal threat (the Glossary and Lone Star Report).20

A court in this district provided in Ackerman that while there may be an overall controversy that the plaintiff is a part of (i.e., Sabal and QAnon), the plaintiff’s “voluntary participation in controversies extraneous to the instant suit” does not lend credence to a broadening of the controversy at issue. Id.

The controversy at issue, though broader than Sabal and ADL’s specific statements, is limited to the discussion surrounding Sabal’s status as an antisemite and dangerous extremist.

Even broadening the controversy at issue to antisemitism and extremism in general, Sabal does not have more than a trivial or tangential role in that controversy.

“An individual is not a limited-purpose public figure when a media defendant discusses the individual repeatedly or where the individual’s actions become a matter of controversy as a result of the media defendant’s actions.”

Butowsky v. Folkenflik, No. 4:18CV442, 2019 WL 3712026, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019).

Rather, “a defamation defendant must show the plaintiff relinquished . . . his interest in the

20 See Mem. Op. & Order 5–6, ECF No. 35.

protection of his own name by engag[ing] the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of an issue of public concern.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Outside of the present litigation, there exists no public controversy as it pertains to ADL’s publications regarding Sabal, let alone a public controversy.

Therefore, because Sabal’s status as an LPPF fails the first prong of the Trotter test, Sabal is considered a private individual and his claims are not subject to the actual malice standard.

Warren, 932 F.3d at 383 (5th Cir. 2019).

Instead, his defamation claims are subject to the negligence standard for private individual defamation claims. Id.

Under Texas law, to establish negligence Sabal must prove that the ADL “knew or should have known that the defamatory statement[s were] false.”

Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976).

Defendant argues that “[t]he record in this case is devoid of any such evidence.21

Plaintiff counters by highlighting facts in the record that indicate Defendant knew or should have known the statements were false, including informing the Irving Police Department that ADL did not have any concerns with Sabal.22

The Court holds that since “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [Sabal]”, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to ADL’s negligence.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

b.      Non-actionable Opinion

The second threshold element relates to the status of the statements themselves.

Specifically, if a statement is considered pure opinion, then the statement is non-actionable.

Teel v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 3:15-cv-2593-G, 2015 WL 9478187, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2015)

(holding that “[t]o be actionable, a statement must be a factual assertion; expressions of opinion are not actionable”);

see also Carter v. Burlington N. Santa Fe LLC, No. 4:15-cv-366-O,

21 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 49, ECF No. 40.

22 Pl.’s App. in Supp. (McCarthy Dep.) 32:12–33:25, App. 49–50, ECF No. 60.

2015 WL 11022766, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2015)

(explaining that an actionable “statement must assert an objectively verifiable fact rather than an opinion”).

“Whether an alleged defamatory statement constitutes an opinion rather than a verifiable falsity is a question of law.”

Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. 2023).

To evaluate this question, the Court must surmise “the meaning of a publication, and thus whether it is false and defamatory, [which] depends on a reasonable person’s perception of the entirety of a publication and not merely on individual statements.”

Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 579 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. 2000).

This Court addressed each of ADL’s statements at the Motion to Dismiss stage and determined that they were all plausibly provably false statements.23

After discovery and subsequent briefing, the Court reaffirms its previous analysis and determines that each of the statements, when placed within the meaning and context of the entire publication in which they appear, are written as to imply assertions of verifiable fact, as opposed to non-actionable and protected opinion.24

Moreover, the names of each of the publications indicate to a reasonable person that their information is factual, not opinion.

That is, the Backgrounder is a background of information essential to the understanding of a problem; the Glossary of Extremism is a glossary, or collection of definitions; and the Lone Star Report is a report giving a detailed account on an issue.

23 Mem. Op. & Order 10, 11, 13, ECF No. 35.

24 Id. at 10

(stating that “the Backgrounder implies materially true facts” and that “a reader would also understand [the Backgrounder’s] context as revealing. . . factual assertions about [Sabal] peddling theories”);

id. at 11

(stating that “the Glossary’s context appears [to] convey factual assertions about persons with Glossary entries rather than mere opinion”);

id. at 13

(stating that the “Lone Star Report . . . factually implies Sabal is a particular type of extremist who engages in, or is otherwise responsible for, dangerous criminal activity.”).

Therefore, these publications contain assertions of fact and the alleged defamatory statements are actionable.

The Court must next analyze “[w]hether [each] publication is capable of [a] defamatory meaning” and if that defamatory meaning is substantially true.

Double Diamond, 109 S.W.3d at 854 (defamatory meaning); Polk Cnty. Publ’g Co. v. Coleman, 685 S.W.3d 71, 77 (Tex. 2024) (substantial truth).

2.      QAnon Backgrounder

A reasonable reader would view the statements “known to peddle antisemitic beliefs,” including the “antisemitic trope of blood libel,” as factual assertions about Sabal.25 ADL’s statements are possible to prove:

“either Sabal has made such statements or he has not.”26

The Court concludes that Sabal has made such statements because he has espoused theories similar enough to the blood libel trope that ADL’s statements are substantially true.

Indeed, Sabal shared a video on his Telegram channel “describ[ing] how Jews are killing non-Jewish children in synagogue basements to use their blood for Passover rituals” and then selling their flesh to make sausage and hamburger.27

Sabal does not deny sharing these posts.28

Because the “underlying facts as to the gist of the defamatory charge are undisputed,” this Court can determine substantial truth as a matter of law.

McIlvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990).

Therefore, given that Sabal forwarded and reposted similar tropes on numerous occasions, the Court holds that ADL has established the affirmative defense of truth as to its statements in the Backgrounder.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the statements made are substantially true, the Court need not address the defamatory nature of the statements. ADL’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim

25 Id. at 8.

26 Id. at 9.

27 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3–4, ECF No. 40.

28 Pl.’s Resp. 37, ECF No. 59.

of defamation regarding its publication in the Backgrounder concerning antisemitic remarks is hereby GRANTED.

3.      Glossary of Extremism

Sabal’s Complaint next alleges that ADL’s inclusion of his name as an entry in the Glossary of Extremism is defamatory because it implies Sabal is “a dangerous, extremist threat, and even a criminal.”29

ADL contends that his entry cannot be defamatory because “each Glossary entry simply means what it says – and nothing more.”30

ADL’s contention fails, and the Court holds that there is a genuine dispute as to the defamatory nature of Sabal’s entry in the Glossary.

a.      Defamatory meaning

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that the defamatory meaning of a publication “may arise implicitly as a result of the [publication’s] entire gist” or “implicitly from a distinct portion” of the publication.

Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 628 (Tex. 2018).

Sabal has alleged the former31 and does not contend that the distinct portion (his entry alone) is defamatory.

Accordingly, the Court must “evaluat[e] the [publication] as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it.”

D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 439 (Tex. 2017).

ADL’s contention that “Sabal’s entry in the Glossary does not support the claim that ADL intended to imply that he engages in, or is responsible for, terrorism and mass murder,”32 is undermined by ADL’s testimony and published statements.

ADL’s Center on Extremism, which published and maintains the Glossary, touts its mission as being to “strategically monitor, expose

29 Pl.’s Compl. 8, ECF No. 1.

30 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 36, ECF No. 40.

31 Pl.’s Compl. 8, ECF No. 1 (“Defendant falsely implied . . . by including [Sabal] on its ‘Glossary of Extremism.’”).

32 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 37, ECF No. 40.

and disrupt extremist threats.”33

Directly below the Center on Extremism’s mission statement is the link to the Glossary, which on “the main landing page . . . explains that the entries include individuals ‘associated with movements and groups that subscribe to and/or promote extremist or hateful ideologies.’”34

ADL states that the “extremist ideas [Sabal] promotes can induce violence by others”35 and that Sabal’s conspiracy theories are particularly dangerous because they “usually inspire[] believers to take action against [persons, groups and institutions].”36

Considering Sabal’s entry within the context of the publication as a whole, and in light of the surrounding circumstances, a jury may conclude Sabal’s entry is defamation by implication.

ADL does not portray itself as an organization fighting opinions with which it disagrees.

Instead, the Center on Extremism and glossary exist to expose and disrupt extremist threats, highlighting individuals that promote extremist or hateful ideologies because the promotion of these ideologies can and/or usually induce violence.37

Thus, through ADL’s statements, Sabal has sufficiently demonstrated “especially rigorous showing of the publication’s defamatory meaning,” which is required to survive summary judgment on a claim for defamation by implication.

Dall. Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 633 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

b.      Defense of Truth

ADL has also asserted the affirmative defense of truth as it pertains to Sabal’s implication.38

ADL argues that Sabal has advocated criminal and violent conduct because he called for “‘open rebellion’ to remove the President,” as well as the use of military tribunals to try

33 Center on Extremism, ADL, https://www.adl.org/research-centers/center-on-extremism (last visited Dec. 9, 2024);

Pl.’s App. in Supp. (McCarthy Dep.) 17:13–15, App. 43, ECF No. 60.

(“Our team is dedicated to monitoring, exposing, disrupting extremist activity and threats across the ideological spectrum.”).

34 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 37, ECF No. 40 (emphasis omitted).

35 Id. at 31.

36 Id. at 24.

37 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 24, ECF No. 40.

38 Id. at 37.

civilians, and he potentially traveled to Washington D.C. and committed violent criminal conduct.39 Considering each assertion in turn, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Sabal is a dangerous, extremist threat, or a criminal as true or substantially true.

First, Sabal immediately clarified his post advocating for open rebellion, stating that he was “calling for a nonviolent ‘mutiny.’”40 Because the Court “must consider all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” the Court cannot hold that Plaintiff’s clarified statement was reactionary or false.

Ion, 731 F.3d at 389.

Moreover, ADL admits Sabal “tried to clarify that what he was calling for was not violent” but it disagreed that such a mutiny could be done in a nonviolent manner.41

Second, advocating for military tribunals—the tribunals that ADL correctly described as unconstitutional—is not criminal.

And neither is encouraging soldiers to go “AWOL.”42

Third, while the Court may conclude that based on his silence that Sabal engaged in violence on January 6, 2021, the Court declines to do so at this stage because of the lack of independent evidence provided by ADL.

The only evidence proffered to prove Sabal’s criminality on that day is a post that Sabal was intending to go to Washington D.C.43 and Sabal’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment when asked about the subject/date in his deposition.44

This evidence is not enough for the Court to infer criminality.

See State Farm Life Ins. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990)

(recognizing that courts reject drawing a negative inference from the pleading the

39 Id. at 37–38.

40 Id. at 17.

41 Pl.’s App. in Supp. (McCarthy Dep.) 34:25, 35:1–5, App. 51–52, ECF No. 60.

42 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449, 447 (1969) (stating that it is unconstitutional for states to “punish mere advocacy . . . on pain of criminal punishment” “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).

43 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 18, ECF No. 40.

44 Def.’s App. in Supp. (Sabal Dep.) 78:16–80:18, App. 42–44, ECF No. 41.

fifth when provided “no independent evidence to support it” and “a party seeking summary judgment cannot rely solely on the other party’s exercise of her fifth amendment rights”).

Therefore, The Court concludes ADL’s statement that Sabal “has advocated criminal and violent conduct” is neither true nor substantially true based on the summary judgment evidence.

c.       Time-barred

Lastly, ADL contends that Sabal’s claim challenging the Glossary is time-barred since a hyperlink is not a republication.45

The Court disagrees.

Republication by hyperlink is an issue of fact heavily dependent “upon the specific context of the hyperlink . . . [including] whether a new audience [has been] reached.”

Wiswell v. VerticalScope, Inc., No. A-11-CA-737-SS, 2012 WL 13136295, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012).

Here, ADL states that the purpose of the Lone Star Report was to “provide an overview of recent extremist and hate-related activity in the state of Texas.”46

ADL included the hyperlink to the Glossary within the Lone Star Report.

Though ADL did not admit that the Lone Star Report was intended for a new audience—citizens of the state of Texas—when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the new audience is inescapable.

At the very least, Sabal has raised a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the link in the Lone Star Report was intended for a new audience, thus constituting a republication.

The Court holds that Sabal’s Glossary entry is not time-barred because there exists a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the Glossary hyperlink in the Lone Star Report is republication.

*              *              *              *

In sum, Sabal has shown that his inclusion in the Glossary creates “a defamatory impression by . . . juxtaposing facts in a misleading way.” Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 115.

45 Def.’s Br. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 38–39, ECF No. 40.

46 Pl.’s App. in Supp. (McCarthy Dep.) 87:1–2, App. 76, ECF No. 60.

At the very least, there exists a genuine dispute as to the defamatory nature of Sabal’s entry in the Glossary.

Because the statements are neither true nor substantially true and because the Glossary entry is not time-barred as a matter of law, summary judgment is not appropriate at this stage in the litigation.

ADL’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to its publication of Sabal in the Glossary is hereby DENIED.

4.      Lone Star Report

Like the Glossary, Sabal asserts defamation by implication pertaining to the Lone Star Report.

Incorporating the above arguments regarding the truth of the implication, the Court again declines to adopt ADL’s defense of truth as it pertains to this subsequent publication.

Therefore, the only question that remains is whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists concerning the defamatory nature of the statements.

Here, the allegedly defamatory statement is in the Lone Star Report’s reference to Sabal’s 2021 “QAnon-themed” event discussing antisemitic incidents, hate crimes, and terrorist activities in Texas.47

As previously stated, “including Sabal alongside antisemites and extremists in a report highlighting ‘[h]ate [c]rime [s]tatistics’ and ‘[e]xtremist [p]lots and [m]urders,’ a reasonable reader could objectively understand the publication’s context as making a factual assertion that Sabal’s events are associated with such criminal activity.”48

And further evincing this potential factual imputation is the Lone Star Report’s hyperlink to Sabal’s Glossary entry.49

As stated above, Sabal has sufficiently demonstrated the “rigorous showing of the publication’s defamatory meaning” required to survive summary judgment on a claim for defamation by implication.

Dall. Morning News, 554 S.W.3d at 633 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

47 Def.’s App. Mot. Dismiss 153, ECF No. 22-1.

48 Mem. Op. & Order 13, ECF No. 35.

49 Def.’s App. Mot. Dismiss 153, ECF No. 22-1.

Summary judgment is not appropriate.

ADL’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to its publication of Sabal in the Lone Star Report is hereby DENIED.

B.     Count II: Injurious Falsehood

To prevail on a claim for injurious falsehood, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant

(1) published false and disparaging information about him,

(2) with malice,

(3) without privilege,

and

(4) that resulted in special damages.

Forbes v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. 2003).

Corrosion Prevention Techs. LLC v. Hattle, 2020 WL 6202690, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2020).

“An action for injurious falsehood or business disparagement is similar in many respects to an action for defamation” and “[m]ore stringent requirements have always been imposed on the plaintiff seeking to recover for injurious falsehood.”

Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 995 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 582 F. App’x 279 (5th Cir. 2014).

Here, Sabal failed to proffer any evidence that the alleged defamatory comments produced special damages.

In his facts, Sabal points to deposition testimony that he “had his services canceled with payment processing companies such as PayPal and Total Systems Services” shortly after ADL published their alleged defamatory statements.50 However, this is the extent of Sabal’s analysis and proffered evidence on special damages.

Indeed, the testimony from Plaintiff’s girlfriend shows that his cancellation from PayPal occurred in 2021, the year prior to any of ADL’s alleged defamatory publications.51

Also, though Sabal provided some facts that relate to the elements of injurious falsehood briefly while responding to ADL’s Motion for Summary Judgment, he did not to address his injurious-falsehood count in his response.

It is simply not the Court’s job to attempt to parse together Sabal’s legal reasoning pulled from his statement of facts and attempt to apply it to his injurious falsehood claim.52

50 Pl.’s Resp. 13, ECF No. 59.

51 Pl.’s App. in Supp. (Nuttall-Zwaan Dep.) 70:9 –11, App. 22, ECF No. 60.

ADL’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Sabal’s injurious falsehood count.

IV.             CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as it relates to his injurious falsehood claim and its publication in the Backgrounder concerning antisemitic remarks.

However, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as it relates to his other claims of defamation.

SO ORDERED on this 13th day of December, 2024.

Reed O’Connor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

52 See Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Ctr., 2004 WL 2348229, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (granting summary judgment for defendant on claims where “Plaintiff tacitly concedes the[ Defendant’s] arguments by failing to address them in his response”).

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”), Brief in Support, and Appendix (ECF Nos. 20–22), filed December 15, 2024; Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 26), filed January 19, 2024; and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 27), filed February 2, 2024.

After reviewing the briefing, relevant law, and applicable facts, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED only in regard to the defamation claim arising out of Congressional testimony.

However, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED for all other claims of defamation and injurious falsehood.

I.                   BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff John Sabal started his own business, The Patriot Voice, to organize conservative political events. The purpose of these events is to showcase “pertinent and dynamic speakers,

1 All undisputed facts pertaining to Defendant’s motion are drawn from Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, unless otherwise specified. See Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. At the 12(b)(6) stage, these facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff provides the website links to the four publications identified in his Complaint. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 8 n.1, 10 n.2, 13 n.4, 17, ECF No. 1. Additionally, full copies of these publications are also provided in Defendant’s the Appendix to its Motion. Def.’s App. to Mot. to Dismiss 098–114, 115, 116– 141, 142–164, ECF No. 22-1. Because these publications are “documents incorporated into the [C]omplaint by reference,” the Court may rely on Defendant’s copy. Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

whose messages are timely and relevant.” These events also “feature speakers of every color and creed, including those of the Jewish faith.” Defendant Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”) is a non- governmental organization founded in 1913. It is the world’s oldest organization dedicated to combatting antisemitism.2 Sabal contends that ADL defamed him. As a result, Sabal brings claims against ADL for defamation and injurious falsehood.

Both claims are premised on the same alleged statements and implications found in three ADL publications and Congressional testimony.

A.     Backgrounder: QAnon

The first ADL publication at issue is entitled, “Backgrounder: QAnon” (the “Backgrounder”). The Backgrounder includes two references to Sabal.

The first states that “several aspects of QAnon lore mirror longstanding antisemitic tropes, and multiple QAnon influencers, including . . . QAnon John (John Sabal) have been known to peddle antisemitic beliefs.”

The second states that “[i]n October 2021, several elected officials and candidates spoke at the Patriot Double Down conference hosted in Las Vegas, Nevada by antisemitic QAnon influencer John Sabal (QAnon John).”

The words “spoke at the Patriot Double Down conference” link to an article published by the Arizona Mirror reporting on “some extremely antisemitic imagery,” such as visuals of Hitler and the Star of David superimposed against a picture of the 9/11 attacks.

B.     Glossary of Extremism

The second publication is ADL’s “Glossary of Extremism and Hate” (“Glossary”), which “provides an overview of many of the terms and individuals used by or associated with movements and groups that subscribe to and/or promote extremist or hateful ideologies.”

The Glossary entry at issue here provides that “John Sabal, also known as ‘QAnon John,’ is a QAnon influencer who runs The Patriot Voice website, which he uses to advertise QAnon-related conferences.

These

2 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 5–6, ECF No. 20.

conferences, the first of which was held in May 2021, have showcased the mainstreaming of QAnon and other conspiracy theories.”

C.     “Hate in the Lone Star State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Texas” Report

The third ADL publication at issue is the report entitled, “Hate in the Lone Star State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Texas” (the “Lone Star Report”), which “explore[d] a range of extremist groups and movements operating in Texas and highlights the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022.”

The Lone Star Report identifies Sabal in connection with a Dallas conference:

Over the last few years, Texas has been at the heart of several notable QAnon events and incidents.

The state has been home to multiple QAnon-themed conferences, highlighting the mainstreaming of QAnon and other conspiracies among conservative communities and the GOP.

The most notable was “For God & Country: Patriot Roundup,” which took place on Memorial Day weekend 2021.

Organized by John Sabal, known online as “QAnon John” and “The Patriot Voice,” the event featured then-Congressman Louie Gohmert (R-TX), then-Texas GOP chair Allen West, Lt. General Michael Flynn, attorney and conspiracy theorist Sidney Powell and various QAnon influencers.

During the event, Michael Flynn seemingly endorsed a Myanmar-style coup in the U.S., although he has since backtracked on his remarks.

D.     Testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security

The final ADL publication at issue involves the live testimony of Scott Richman, ADL’s Regional Director for New York and New Jersey, before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security (“Richman Testimony”) on October 3, 2022.

Richman testified that “[i]n 2021, disparate groups of QAnon adherents, election fraud promoters and anti-vaccine activists organized events around the country to promote their causes.

This phenomenon underscores the extent to which the line separating the mainstream from the extreme has blurred, and how mainstream efforts to undermine our democratic institutions are bolstered by extremist and conspiratorial narratives and their supporters.”

Richman then provided multiple examples, including one mentioning Sabal as the organizer of conferences in which one such “narrative” was “popular” among attendees:

“That a global cabal of pedophiles (including Democrats) who are kidnapping children for their blood, will be executed when Donald Trump is reinstated as president (popular at The Patriot Voice: For God and Country conference, organized by QAnon influencer John Sabal, a/k/a ‘QAnon John,’ and at the We the People Patriots Day event and the OKC Freedom conference).”

II.                LEGAL STANDARD

A.     Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

The Rule “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this standard, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Unlike a “probability requirement,” the plausibility standard instead demands “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

Where a complaint contains facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Sonnier, 509 F.3d at 675.

However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

To avoid dismissal, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts rather than conclusory allegations.

Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

A court ruling on a motion to dismiss “may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”

Randall D. Wolcott, 635 F.3d at 763 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In defamation suits, courts may review at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage the challenged publications referenced in the complaint.

See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of AM. v. Ackerman Mcqueen, Inc., 2021 WL 3618113, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Tex Aug. 16, 2021)

(reviewing a letter with allegedly defamatory statements because it was central to the plaintiff’s claims and part of the pleadings even where it was not attached to the complaint); Busch

v. Viacom Int., 477 F. Supp. 2d 764, 775 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (reviewing a DVD of a television program attached by the defendants in evaluating the motion to dismiss a defamation claim).

III.             ANALYSIS

A.     Count I: Defamation

The Complaint alleges that ADL published four false statements with defamatory impact:

(1) “falsely claimed that Mr. Sabal espouses antisemitic beliefs;

(2) “falsely implied that Mr. Sabal espoused the belief that Jews murder Christian children for ritualistic purposes;”

(3) “falsely implied in Congressional testimony that Mr. Sabal promoted the belief that ‘a global cabal of pedophiles (including Democrats) who are kidnapping children for their blood, will be executed when Donald Trump is reinstated as President;”

and

(4) “falsely implied that Mr. Sabal is a dangerous, extremist threat, and even a criminal.”3

ADL characterizes these statements are “non- actionable opinions” that are “largely premised on alleged implications” that lacked defamatory meaning.4

As a result, ADL argues that Sabal’s “Complaint fails to meet the demanding standard Texas law requires to state a claim for defamation by implication.”5

Under Texas law, the plaintiff must prove four elements to state a defamation cause of action:

“‘(1) the defendant published a false statement;

(2) that defamed the plaintiff;

(3) with the requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the statement (negligence if the plaintiff is a private individual);

and

(4) damages, unless the statement constitutes defamation per se.’”

Warren v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 932 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Bedford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W. 3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017)); accord WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W. 2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)

(reciting Texas defamation elements).

1.      Threshold Elements: Publication of a False and Defamatory Statement6

Defamation claims, particularly those that arise from the context of harsh political debate, often present two threshold questions captured by the first two elements. First, in every defamation case, “[w]hether a publication is capable of the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff is a question of law to be determined by the court.”

Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

Alleged defamatory meaning may also occur by implication.

Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 579, 581–82 (Tex. 2002). Texas law holds that

3 Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 24–27, ECF No. 1.

4 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1, 11–12, ECF No. 21.

5 Id.

6 The first two defamation elements—“published statement” and its “defamatory” impact—are addressed simultaneously despite the fact that they are distinct elements. This is consistent with how other courts have analyzed defamation. E.g., WFAA-TV, Inc., 978 S.W. 2d at 571; Warren, 932 F.3d at 383. Notably, the parties in this case also intertwine these elements.

“[f]or a court to subject a publisher to liability for defamation by implication, the ‘plaintiff must make an especially rigorous showing’ of the publication’s defamatory meaning.”

Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 633 (Tex. 2018).

Specifically, in addition to the analysis that applies in every defamation case, a plaintiff must also “point to ‘additional, affirmative evidence’ within the publication itself that suggests the defendant ‘intends or endorses the defamatory inference.’”

Id. at 635 (citation omitted).

Second, the Texas Supreme Court has long held that, pursuant to both Article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and the First Amendment, “[a]ny limitation that defamation law places on free speech, however, may not muzzle a speaker from asserting an opinion in an ongoing debate.”

Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2023).

Accordingly, “[t]o be actionable, a statement must be a factual assertion; expressions of opinion are not actionable.”

Teel v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 3:15-cv-2593-G, 2015 WL 9478187, at*4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2015);

see also Carter v. Burlington N. Santa Fe LLC, No. 4:15-cv-366- O, 2015 WL 11022766, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2015)

(explaining that an actionable “statement must assert an objectively verifiable fact rather than an opinion”).

“Whether an alleged defamatory statement constitutes an opinion rather than a verifiable falsity is a question of law.”

Lilith Fund, 662 S.W.2d at 363.

To evaluate this question, courts “focus[] the analysis on a statement’s verifiability and the entire context in which it was made.”

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 581; see also Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)

(“The analysis for distinguishing between an actionable statement of fact and a constitutionally protected expression of opinion focuses on the statement’s verifiability and the entire context in which it was made.”).

The disclosure of facts to support the statement at issue may show that it is a non-actionable opinion.

Brewer v. Capital Cities/ABC, 986 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).

ADL argues that Sabal fails to provide sufficient facts satisfying the first two elements.

According to ADL, Sabal’s “basic complaints are not about statements of fact, but rather about ADL’s opinions about facts.”7

Likewise, ADL contends that “whether a belief or image discussed at a conference is ‘antisemitic’ or ‘extreme’, or whether an organizer of conferences should be considered responsible for ‘peddling’ information shared by speakers there, is the classic stuff of opinion, which defamation law expressly protects.”8

Sabal rejects these characterizations and instead argues that ADL’s publications contain verifiable statements capable of being proven false that also carry defamatory impact.9 The Court addresses each ADL publication in turn.

a.      Backgrounder

The Complaint alleges that the Backgrounder is defamatory by falsely stating that Sabal has been “known to peddle antisemitic beliefs, including the “antisemitic trope of blood libel.”10

But according to ADL, “[w]hether a particular belief is antisemitic is inherently subjective and cannot be proven true or false,” let alone whether it is “objectively verifiable [if] beliefs are ‘peddled.’”11

The Court disagrees.

From a review of the Backgrounder, the Complaint plausibly contends that a reasonable reader would view the statement “known to peddle antisemitic beliefs” as a factual assertion about Sabal.

True, some courts have found calling a person “antisemitic” to be a non-actionable opinion.

See, e.g., Vecchio v. Jones, No. 01-12-00442-cv. 2013 WL 3467195, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston

7 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 20.

8 Id.

9 Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4–5, 9–10, ECF No. 26.

10 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 8., ECF No. 1.

11 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 12, ECF No. 20.

[1st Dist.] 2013, no. pet)

(finding a statement non-verifiable “when the facts underlying an opinion are set out in the publication itself, thereby allowing the listener to evaluate the facts and either accept or reject the opinion”).

However, Texas law makes clear that this determination depends on context, which may reveal that an opinion instead functions as a factual assertion.

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 582, 585

(holding that calling someone “corrupt” was actionable defamation based on the challenged publication’s context because a reasonable reader could view the statement as an assertion of fact).

Taking as true the allegations that Sabal has never expressed or endorsed antisemitic views,12 ADL’s statements seem possible to verify: either Sabal has made such statements or he has not, making ADL’s assertions capable of being proven false.

To accept Defendant’s argument that a reasonable viewer would not attribute the blood libel conspiracy to Sabal would require the Court to ignore illustrative context in the Backgrounder.13

Contextual clues plausibly suggest to a reasonable reader that Sabal factually believes and endorses this antisemitic belief.

For instance, the Backgrounder’s description of the blood libel conspiracy immediately follows the explicit mention of four “QAnon influencers” by name.14

One of those names is Sabal.15

ADL identifies these influencers as those who are “known to peddle antisemitic beliefs.”16

The textual proximity of the blood libel theory appears to function as an example of one such antisemitic belief.

A reasonable reader could conclude that ADL mentioned Sabal and the other three names to provide examples of people who espouse the specific antisemitic belief of blood libel.

12 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 9, 13, 19, ECF No. 1.

13 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 14–15, ECF No. 21.

14 Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 6, ECF No. 26.

15 Id.

16 Id.

In an effort to argue that naming a specific person does not factually convey that the person promotes the blood libel conspiracy, ADL highlights other individual references to Hillary Clinton, John Podesta, and Barack Obama.17

But once again, contextual clues are instructive.

Unlike the apparent attribution of blood libel to Sabal, the reference to Clinton, Podesta, and Obama seems to function as an example of a QAnon conspiracy theories about them—not that these individuals espouse antisemitic conspiracy theories.

Not only is it entirely plausible that a reasonable reader would differentiate these references based on the publication’s full context, but such a reader would also understand this context as revealing when the Backgrounder attempts to convey factual assertions about who is peddling theories versus being the target of them.

The Complaint also plausibly shows that ADL’s statements in the Backgrounder carry defamatory impact.

In Texas, a statement is defamatory if it is “obviously hurtful to a plaintiff’s reputation.”

Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2013).

This includes statements that injure a person in their “office, profession, or occupation.”

Id. at 64.

A further example includes accusing someone of a crime.

Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1162 (5th Cir. 2006).

ADL’s accusation that Sabal espouses abhorrent beliefs is plausibly harmful to his reputation and occupation—just like calling someone “corrupt” in certain contexts carries the same potential harm, Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 582—because such allegations do not carry “innocent” meaning.

Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 626.

Sabal alleges as much in his Complaint by stating that ADL’s false statements “tended to injure Mr. Sabal in his trade, businesses, or profession by accusing [him] of having racial and ethnic intolerance.”18

Viewing the entire context—and not merely the individual statements—the Backgrounder implies “materially true facts from which a defamatory inference can reasonably be drawn.”

Id. at

17 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 14, ECF No. 21.

18 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 30, ECF No. 1.

635 (citation omitted).

Such context makes a sufficiently “‘rigorous showing’” of defamatory meaning at this stage.

Id. at 633 (citation omitted).

Therefore, assuming the veracity of the Complaint’s allegations, the Court determines that Sabal sufficiently pleads that the Backgrounder’s published statements are provably false and carry defamatory impact.

b.      Glossary of Extremism

Sabal’s Complaint next alleges that ADL’s inclusion of his name as an entry in the Glossary of Extremism is provably false and defamatory because it implies Sabal “is a dangerous, extremist threat and even a criminal.”19

Published by ADL’s Center on Extremism, the entry links to a mission statement advising readers that ADL “track[s] extremist trends, ideologies and groups across the ideological spectrum” and its “staff of investigators, analysts, researchers and technical experts strategically monitor, expose and disrupt extremist threats.”20

ADL argues that the Glossary entry is not defamatory because it includes entries for many persons beyond Sabal.21 As such, a description about one person does not necessarily apply to others.22

But the Glossary has one overarching theme shared by all entries: extremism.

The Glossary even states that “many of the terms and individuals used by or associated with movements and groups that subscribe to and/or promote extremist or hateful ideologies.”23

Although ADL contends that calling someone an extremist is not defamatory,24 the type of extremism featured in the Glossary is of a highly criminal and depraved nature.

Combined with the mission statement, the Glossary’s context appears convey factual assertions about persons with Glossary entries rather than mere opinion.

19 Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 11, 27, ECF No. 1.

20 Id. ¶ 11 n.3.

21 Id. ¶ 11.

22 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 6, ECF No. 21.

23 Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 7, ECF No. 26.

24 Id. at 16–17.

To a reasonable reader, the Glossary may objectively indicate that all persons on this list are similarly dangerous and abhorrent.

In his Complaint, Sabal pleads that Defendant wrongly likened him to “murderous Islamic terrorists—such as Nidal Hasan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and ISIS—notable white supremacists—such as David Duke—and racist mass-murderers—such as Dylann Roof (the Charlestown church shooter), Brenton Tarrant (the Christchurch shooter), and Patrick Cruscius (the El Paso Walmart shooter).”25

In the full context of the Glossary, it was plausibly defamatory to call Sabal an extremist by including him alongside obviously dangerous terrorists and mass murderers. Cf. Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 581–82 (holding that, while the term “corrupt” is normally used as opinion, it can be used as a statement of fact in certain contexts).

Further revealing the plausibility of this defamatory implication is the absence of additional information about Sabal in the Glossary to counter the likelihood that a reasonable reader would understand this publication as a factual assertion about Sabal. Brewer, 986 S.W.2d at 643.

Moreover, listing Sabal in the Glossary is plausibly “hurtful to [his] reputation.”

Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 63.

Such inclusion could certainly injure a person in their “office, profession, or occupation.” Id. at 64. And the potential for this injury increases given the highly criminal nature of the entire list.

Roehrs, 470 F.3d at 1162.

Indeed, Sabal pleads that ADL’s false statements “tended to injure Mr. Sabal in his trade, businesses, or profession by accusing [him] of having racial and ethnic intolerance” and “implying that he is a dangerous, extremist threat, and even a criminal.26

Such imputation does not carry any “innocent” meaning.

Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 626.

Therefore, it is plausible that the inclusion of Sabal as an entry in the Glossary factually implies that he is a particular type of dangerous extremist who engages in, or is otherwise responsible for, similar criminal activity.

As a result, the Court determines that Sabal pleads

25 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1.

26 Id. ¶ 30.

sufficient facts at this stage to show that the Glossary entry is a provably false statement and, in context, carries defamatory impact.

c.       Lone Star Report

Similar to the Glossary and the Backgrounder, the third allegedly defamatory statement is found in the Lone Star Report’s reference to Sabal’s 2021 “QAnon-themed” event when discussing antisemitic incidents, hate crimes, and terrorist activities in Texas.27

ADL’s sole argument is that most of the statements in this publication are not attributable to Sabal.28

But a contextual review of the entire Lone Star Report tells a different story.

By including Sabal alongside antisemites and extremists in a report highlighting “[h]ate [c]rime [s]tatistics” and “[e]xtremist [p]lots and [m]urders,”29 a reasonable reader could objectively understand the publication’s context as making a factual assertion that Sabal’s events are associated with such criminal activity.

Further evincing this potential factual imputation is the Lone Star Report’s hyperlink to Sabal’s Glossary entry.30

As with the publications discussed above, inclusion of Sabal by name in a report about criminal extremism and antisemitism is “obviously hurtful to [his] reputation” in Texas and carries the potential to injure his “office, profession, or occupation.”

Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 63, 64.

Therefore, the Court determines that Sabal pleads sufficient facts at this stage to show plausible defamation based on the Lone Star Report because it factually implies Sabal is a particular type of extremist who engages in, or is otherwise responsible for, dangerous criminal activity. And such an implication is far from innocent.

Therefore, the Court determines that Sabal pleads sufficient facts at this stage to show plausible defamation based on the Lone Star Report.

27 Id. ¶ 17; Def.’s App. to Mot. to Dismiss 153, ECF No. 22-1.

28 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 19, ECF No. 21.

29 Def.’s App. to Mot. to Dismiss 146, ECF No. 22-1.

30 Id. at 153.

d.      Congressional Testimony

Sabal alleges that Richman’s Congressional testimony falsely implied that Sabal “promoted the belief that ‘a global cabal of pedophiles (including Democrats) who are kidnapping children for their blood, will be executed when Donald Trump is reinstated as president.”31

As a result, Sabal contends that Richman “implied that Mr. Sabal was a dangerous, extremist threat” given the title of the testimony:

“Countering Violent Extremism, Terrorism and Antisemitic Threats.”32

In response, ADL argues that Sabal’s challenge to testimony presented to Congress is not actionable because it is “barred by the absolute privilege Texas law recognizes for statements made in legislative proceedings.”33

The Court agrees with ADL.

Congressional testimony is subject to an absolute privilege from defamation liability.

See, e.g., Moore & Assocs. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ)

(“Absolute privilege is limited to communications uttered in executive, legislative, judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.”);

Shanks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1999)

(“Texas law regards its privilege for communications made in the context of judicial, quasi- judicial, or legislative proceedings as a complete immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability”);

Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2015)

(finding that “statements made during legislative and judicial proceedings” are absolutely privileged).

This “rule is based upon the public-policy principle that every citizen should have the unqualified right to appeal to the agencies of his government for redress without the fear of being called to answer in damages for libel.”

Moore & Assocs., 604 S.W.2d at 489.

And “the agencies of government, in order to properly perform their functions, should be authorized to call upon any citizen for full disclosure of

31 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 27, ECF No. 1.

32 Id. ¶ 26.

33 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 21.

information without subjecting the citizen to a claim for libel.” Id.

Courts have recognized an exception to this absolute privilege from defamation liability when the challenged testimony is republished by an actor other than Congress.

See, e.g., Am. Addiction Ctrs., Inc. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Addiction Treatment Providers, 515 F. Supp. 3d 820, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2021)

(finding no absolute immunity for Congressional testimony republished during annual meeting and to media outlets).

Since Sabal admits that Richman’s Testimony was presented to the U.S. House of Representatives,34 any defamation claim allegedly arising from such testimony must be dismissed unless the allegations in the Complaint plausibly demonstrate the applicability of the privilege exception.

Sabal’s allegations fall short here.

The Complaint identifies only one source of republication: a link to the document maintained on an official Congressional website.35

While Sabal correctly notes that no privilege does attaches when testimony is “not limited to the hall of [C]ongress,” he does not allege any republication by ADL.36

To hold that the posting of testimony on Congress’s official website qualifies as a republication that triggers the absolute privilege exception would wholly undermine the entire purpose of such privilege.

See Moore & Assocs., 604 S.W.2d at 489

(recognizing the “public-policy principle that every citizen should have the unqualified right to appeal to the agencies of his government for redress without the fear of being called to answer in damages for libel”).

Even if Sabal is correct that Richman’s Testimony included defamatory statements, the testimony is not actionable due to lack of a qualifying republication.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in this regard.

*          *          *          *          *

34 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 1.

35 Id. ¶ 13 n.4 (linking to publication of the testimony by Congress).

36 Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 8, ECF No. 26.

Looking at each non-Congressional statement, individually and in context, it is plausible that each is provably false.

That is not to preliminarily determine that each statement is, in fact, false.

Instead, the Court merely recognizes that evidence could be produced to prove the falsity of the challenged statements, which leads to the conclusion at this stage that they are factual assertions rather than opinion.

Similarly, these statements plausibly carry defamatory significance due to the lack of innocent meaning that is hurtful to Sabal’s business and reputation.

Therefore, the Court concludes at this stage that Sabal plausibly alleges defamation based on statements contained in three of the four ADL publications.

As explained above, Sabal does not plead facts showing that the Richman Testimony before Congress is not subject to absolute privilege.

2.      Limited-Purpose Public Figure

To survive early dismissal, a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must also plausibly establish the “requisite degree of fault regarding the truth of the [defamatory] statement.”

Warren v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 932 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2019).

The requisite degree of fault depends on the defamation plaintiff’s status.

See WFAA-TV, Inc., 978 S.W. 2d at 571 (explaining that a defamation defendant must “act[] with either actual malice, if the plaintiff was . . . a public figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual, regarding the truth of the statement”).

Questions concerning the defamation plaintiff’s status “is a matter of law for the court to decide.”

Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987).

More recently, courts have recognized a third category—limited-purpose public figures— in which a private individual can become a public figure in particular situations. Id.

“Generally, limited public figures are persons who have “thrust[] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,” or “voluntarily inject [themselves] or [are] drawn into a particular public controversy.” Id. (citations omitted).

A three-part test determines whether a person is a limited public figure:

“(1) the controversy at issue must be public both in the sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its resolution;

(2) the plaintiff must have more than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy;

and

(3) the alleged defamation must be germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.”

Id. at 433–34.

“It is not enough that a plaintiff is involved or associated with a matter of public or general interest, no matter how significant or sensational.

‘A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention’ or is newsworthy.”

Klentzman v. Brady, 312 S.W.3d 886, 904 (Tex. App. 2009)

(quoting Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)) (internal citations omitted).

Some courts assess whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure at the motion to dismiss stage.

See, e.g., Immanuel v. Cable News Network, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 3d 557, 566 (S.D. Tex. 2022)

(concluding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure at the motion to dismiss stage); Chevalier v. Animal Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (same); Simien v. Freeman, 2007 WL 9701229, at *6 (M.D. La. May 16, 2007) (same).

But “defining a public figure has been likened to trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.”

Trotter, 818 F.2d at 433.

Most Fifth Circuit jurisprudence on public figures dates from the 1970s and 1980s, decades before the advent of social media, and courts have increasingly recognized the limitations of the limited-public figure doctrine.

ADL argues that Sabal is a limited-purpose public figure “by virtue of his active involvement in public political debates.”37

If correct, Sabal must show that ADL acted with actual malice to successfully establish defamation.

ADL argues the Complaint does show actual malice.38

37 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 21.

38 Id. (arguing that Sabal “fails to plausibly allege that ADL published these statements with actual malice”).

But if Sabal is a private individual, a negligence standard applies.

Under this lower standard, there appears to be no dispute that Sabal sufficiently pleads negligence.39

The requisite degree of fault that flows from Sabal’s status is a question of law for the Court to ultimately decide.

In candor, this is a close call. And the chaotic state of case law on limited-purpose public figures only further complicates this question.

See, e.g., Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2429 (2021) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)

(lamenting that “the very categories and test this Court invested and instructed lower courts to use in this area—‘pervasively famous,’ ‘limited purpose public figure’—seem increasingly malleable and even archaic when almost anyone can attract some degree of public notoriety in some media segment”).

As a result, the Court determines that it is appropriate to instead evaluate whether Sabal is a limited-purpose public figure at a later stage in these proceedings with the benefit of additional briefing and development of the factual record.

Indeed, there are times when “[i]ssues pertaining to [a plaintiff’s] defamation claims are better resolved at the summary judgment stage.”

Jackson v. Wright, No. 21-cv-00033, 2022 WL 179277, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2022)

(denying motion to dismiss because resolution of the defamation claim was better suited for summary judgment).

Because the Complaint plausibly states facts establishing all other defamation elements at this stage, the Court DEFERS making any determination regarding whether Sabal is a limited- purpose public figure pursuant to Federal Rule 12(i).

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (explaining that “any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–(7) . . . must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the question of whether Sabal is a limited-purpose public figure at a later stage in these proceedings.

*          *          *          *          *

39 See generallly id. (lacking any argument that ADL’s allegedly defamatory statements are not negligent); Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 27 (same).

Therefore, assuming the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court determines that the Complaint plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief based on three of the four challenged publications containing defamatory statements.

Some of these statements are direct accusations while others occur via implication from the context of the entire publication.

What these statements have in common is an objectively verifiable communication to readers of the factual assertion that Sabal is an antisemite and an extremist.

While these terms may in other contexts constitute non- actionable opinion, the record at this stage reveals sufficient facts that a reasonable reader would understand ADL’s statements in a way that is harmful to Sabal’s reputation.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts at this stage to survive early dismissal.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiff’s defamation claims based on all publications except for those arising directly from Congressional testimony.

B.     Count II: Injurious Falsehood

To prevail on a claim for injurious falsehood, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant

(1) published false and disparaging information about him,

(2) with malice,

(3) without privilege,

and

(4) that resulted in special damages.

Forbes v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. 2003); Corrosion Prevention Techs. LLC v. Hattle, 2020 WL 6202690, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2020).

“An action for injurious falsehood or business disparagement is similar in many respects to an action for defamation” and “[m]ore stringent requirements have always been imposed on the plaintiff seeking to recover for injurious falsehood.”

Van Duzer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 995 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 582 F. App’x 279 (5th Cir. 2014).

ADL only challenges Sabal’s injurious falsehood claim on the first and fourth elements.

At a minimum, a claim for injurious falsehood fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the underlying statement is defamatory.

See Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W. 3d 716, 728 (Tex. App. 2013)

(“The words at issue must be defamatory to be actionable as business disparagement.”);

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Norris, 949 S.W. 2d 422, 427 Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied)

(“Non-defamatory statements will not support a claim for business disparagement.”).

A plaintiff may not re-purpose a failed defamation claim as a different tort, and courts routinely dismiss as duplicative injurious falsehood claims challenging the same conduct at issue in a defamation claim.

See, e.g., Am. Energy Servs., Inc. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 2001 WL 953736, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2001, no pet.)

(“Because we have heretofore held that statements directly attributable to UPRC were not defamatory . . . we find no merit to AES’s claim of business disparagement.”);

Hellmuth v. Efficiency Energy, L.L.C., 2016 WL 642352, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2016)

(“The court finds that Defendants’ business disparagement and defamation counterclaims fail as a matter of law because the statements at issue in those counterclaims cannot be objectively verified.”).

ADL’s primary argument is that Sabal fails on the first element.

According to ADL, Sabal’s “tagalong claim for injurious falsehood fails for the same reason as his defamation claim.”40

However, the Court already determined that three of the four alleged sources of defamation—the Backgrounder, the Glossary, and the Lone Star Report—survive dismissal at this stage.

For the same reasons, the Court likewise finds that Sabal’s allegations regarding the defamatory impact of these sources plausibly show that ADL published false and disparaging information about him.

ADL also argues that the injurious falsehood claim fails because Sabal does not plead any independent basis to satisfy the fourth element.41

But this contention is belied by allegations in the

40 Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 21.

41 Id. at 17; see also Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 10, ECF No. 27 (arguing that Sabal’s injurious falsehood claim is not independent from his defamation claim “since both claims are based on the same allegedly false statements”).

Complaint.

For instance, Sabal pleads that he was “forced to cancel several planned events.”42

Likewise, Sabal contends that ADL coordinated with PayPal to cancel services with Sabal, which prevented the selling of tickets for events.43

Separate from the reputational harm caused by any defamation, these allegations are sufficient to survive early dismissal at this stage.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a plausible injurious falsehood claim.

Sabal pleads that ADL made false statements about him, with the intent to harm his organizational work, and succeeded when he was forced to cancel several events.44

Taking those allegations as true at this stage, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with regard to injurious falsehood.

IV.             CONCLUSION

Accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED only as it relates to defamation claim arising out of Congressional testimony.

However, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED for all other claims of defamation and injurious falsehood.

SO ORDERED on this 30th day of April, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REED O’CONNOR

42 Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 39, ECF No. 1.

43 Id.

44 Id. ¶¶ 37–39.

I am running for re-election as Judge of the 152nd District Court.

I was honored to have been elected to preside over this court in 2008. Since that time, I have taken great pride in striving to be fair to everyone with business in this court and to treating everyone with courtesy, dignity and respect.

In 2012, in addition to presiding over the 152nd District Court, the twenty-four Civil District Judges selected me to serve as the Administrative Judge of the Civil Trial Division.

This is a great honor.

In 2013, the sixty District Judges chose me to serve as the Administrative Judge of all the District Courts of Harris County.

Also, a great honor.

I was also honored to be selected Judge of the Year by the Texas Association of Civil Trial and Appellate Specialist and Distinguished Alum by the South Texas College of Law Alumni Association.

Over the next several months I will be campaigning for re-election to the 152nd Civil District bench.

It is my hope that the citizens of Harris County will honor me with another term so I may continue to serve as your Judge.

“One of the most pleasant experiences that I have had for jury service. Thank You for the extra effort that you and your bailiff made to help make everything go so smoothly and quickly. A very well run courtroom without being heavy handed.”

-Juror, 152nd Civil District Court

Judge Robert Schaffer, a native Houstonian, has been Judge of the 152nd Civil District Court since January 1, 2009.

Prior to assuming the bench Judge Schaffer practiced law in the Houston metropolitan area for 24 years representing individuals in many areas of civil disputes.  He also served as a mediator for 16 years.

During his time on the bench, Judge Schaffer has served the citizens of Harris County in many capacities.

In October of 2013, he was elected by the Harris County District Court judges to serve as Local Administrative Judge for the Harris County District Courts and served in that position until 2021.

Prior to serving as Local Administrative Judge, he served as the Administrative Judge for the Civil Trial division from 2012 to 2013.

In 2010 he served as a Justice on the 14th Court of Appeals by special assignment.

The State Multidistrict Litigation Panel selected him to serve as the statewide pretrial judge for the Toyota Unintended Acceleration Multidistrict Litigation in 2010, for the General Motors Ignition Switch Multidistrict Litigation in 2015 and Opioid Multidistrict Litigation in 2017.

He has also served as a member of the Harris County Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee.  In 2013 and 2019 Judge Schaffer was selected as the Trial Judge of the Year by the Texas Association of Civil Trial and Appellate Specialists and Distinguished Alum by the South Texas College of Law Alumni Association in 2014.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas appointed him to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee in 2021 and the Judicial Administration Specialization Task Force in 2023.

Judge Schaffer earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Arizona in 1974.

Following his graduation from college he worked in local and state government in Austin before attending law school at South Texas College of Law Houston.

He received his law degree in 1984 and began his legal career as an associate with a small Houston law firm before opening his own law office in 1990 as a sole practitioner.

Soon after he opened his law office, he received mediation training and expanded his practice to include mediation services in civil disputes.

He continued in that practice until he became a judge in 2009.

Judge Schaffer was elected to serve as President of the Houston Trial Lawyers Association (1998-1999), Houston Trial Lawyers Foundation (1999-2000) and the South Texas College of Law Alumni Association (1991-1993).

He has served on various committees of the State Bar of Texas, including chairing a local grievance committee, and the Houston Bar Association.

He presently serves on the Southwest Regional Board of the Anti-Defamation League and on the Board of Trustees of Congregation Emanu El.

Judge Schaffer has been married to Jo Ann Weiss Schaffer (also a local attorney) for 36 years and they have three adult children.