LIT REMAINS RESOLUTE: WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPOSE THE 15 YEAR FIGHT AGAINST OCHLOCRACY AND ELDER ABUSE IN FEDERAL COURTS
#WeThePeople
MAR 14, 2025
As expected. The anticipated and duly received rubber stamp of judicial ochlocracy and corruption in the lawless courts of Texas, endorsed by the United States Government, and which continues under Trump 47.
We’ll be checkin’ in frequently to see when his multi-million dollar Wells Fargo home loans are paid off (think Justices Brett Kavanaugh, Clarence Thomas, at the Supreme Court citizens) as a thank you from Wall St., that NAZI-funding German Bank and the most fined nonbank in American History, ONITY, et al.
DISHONORABLE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
Plaintiff Joanna Burke initiated this lawsuit in state court against several defendants as a pro se litigant.
All defendants other than PHH Mortgage Corporation were dismissed after removal to this Court.
Dkt 23.
The matter was then referred for pretrial management to Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan.
Dkt 26.
Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation filed motions for summary judgment and to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.
Dkts 27 & 28.
Plaintiff filed her own motion to dismiss.
Dkt 33.
Pending are several Orders and Memoranda and Recommendations from Judge Bryan dated January 23, 2025.
In sum, these rulings:
o Deny a motion by Plaintiff (Dkt 51) for leave to supplement her response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion;
o Deny as moot her motion (Dkt 45) for leave to file a surreply to Defendant’s summary judgment motion;
o Deny her motion (Dkt 53) for leave to file a surreply to Defendant’s motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant;
o Recommend denying Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt 33) to dismiss;
o Recommend granting Defendant’s motion (Dkt 27) for summary judgment;
and
o Recommend granting Defendant’s motion (Dkt 28) to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.
Dkts 54–59.
Also pending are objections by Plaintiff to each of the above.
Dkts 64–69.
And pending is an Order of the Magistrate Judge on February 20, 2025, denying Plaintiff’s motions to stay or to certify questions to the Fifth Circuit for review.
Dkt 70 (order); see Dkts 61 & 62 (motions).
Also pending is an objection and request for reconsideration by Plaintiff.
Dkt 72.
Although unclear, it may also request reconsideration of certain of the Orders noted above.
See id at 5.
As to the Orders, a district court will set aside a non- dispositive order of a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically objected only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
See FRCP 72(a) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A);
see also Castillo v. Frank, 70 F3d 382, 385 (5th Cir 1995).
The objections by Plaintiff to the Orders of Judge Bryan from January 2025 are substantially identical despite addressing different rulings.
The objections lack merit.
The Orders clearly detail the pertinent facts and correctly apply controlling law.
As such, the objections will be overruled.
Dkts 67, 68 & 69.
And the Orders of the Magistrate Judge will be adopted as the Orders of this Court.
Dkts 54, 55 & 56.
The objection and request for reconsideration of the Order from February 2025 has been reviewed de novo.
It contains no specifics, and indeed, no arguments.
As such the objection will be overruled and the request for reconsideration denied, inclusive of any underlying motion referenced by citation.
Dkt 72.
And the subject Order will be adopted as the Order of this Court.
Dkt 70.
As to the Memoranda and Recommendations, a district court reviews de novo those conclusions of a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically objected.
See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C);
see also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir 1989, per curiam).
The district court may accept any other portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no clear error appears on the face of the record.
See Guillory v PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc);
see also FRCP 72(b) advisory committee note (1983).
Plaintiff has filed substantially identical objections to the three separate Memoranda and Recommendations by Judge Bryan.
Dkts 64, 65 & 66.
Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to file “specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”
By this standard, it is legally insufficient to present the district court with a broad assortment of issues accompanied by little more than a directive to resolve them.
But that, in the main, is all that’s been done here.
Certain standards from the Fifth Circuit are clear in this regard.
For instance, the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge needn’t be reiterated on review.
See Keotting v Thompson, 995 F2d 37, 40 (5th Cir 1993). Likewise, objections that are frivolous, conclusory, or general in nature needn’t be considered.
See Battle v United States Parole Commission, 834 F2d 419, 421 (5th Cir 1987);
United States v Ervin, 2015 WL 13375626, at *2 (WD Tex), quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Association v County of Albany, 281 FSupp2d 436, 439 (NDNY 2003).
And de novo review isn’t invoked by simply re-urging arguments contained in the underlying motion.
Edmond v Collins, 8 F3d 290, 293 n7 (5th Cir 1993);
see also Smith v Collins, 964 F2d 483, 485 (5th Cir 1992)
(finding no error in failure to consider objections because plaintiff “merely reurged the legal arguments he raised in his original petition”);
Williams v Woodhull Medical & Mental Health Center, 891 F Supp 2d 301, 310–11 (EDNY 2012)
(de novo review not warranted for conclusory or general objections or which merely reiterate original arguments).
Simply put, where the objecting party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates original arguments, review of the memorandum and recommendation may permissibly be for clear error only.
That’s the situation here.
Reasonable depth and explanation were needed to properly present any one of these issues if de novo review was intended.
No clear error appears upon review and consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendations, the record, and the applicable law.
Even though that’s all of the review required, the Court has nevertheless also examined the objections de novo and finds that they lack merit for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge.
The objections by Plaintiff will be overruled.
Dkts 64, 65 & 66.
And the Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be adopted as the Memoranda and Orders of this Court.
Dkts 57, 58 & 59.
* * *
The objections by Plaintiff Joanna Burke to the Orders of the Magistrate Judge of January 23, 2025, are OVERRULED.
Dkts 67, 68 & 69.
The Orders of the Magistrate Judge are ADOPTED as the Orders of this Court.
Dkts 54,
55 & 56.
As such, the related motions by Plaintiff are DENIED.
Dkts 45, 51 & 53.
The objection by Plaintiff Joanna Burke to the further Order of the Magistrate Judge of February 20, 2025, is OVERRULED, and the included motion for reconsideration is further DENIED upon de novo review.
Dkt 72.
The Order of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Order of this Court.
Dkt 70.
As such, the related motions by Plaintiff are DENIED.
Dkts 61 & 62.
The objections by Plaintiff to the Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkts 64, 65 & 66.
The Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge are ADOPTED as the Memoranda and Orders of this Court.
Dkts 57, 58 & 59.
As such, the related motions by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation are GRANTED
Dkts 27 & 28.
And the related motion by Plaintiff is DENIED.
Dkt 33.
Any other pending motion, if any, is DENIED AS MOOT.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff is hereby declared to be a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT.
A FINAL JUDGMENT and a PRE-FILING INJUNCTION ORDER will both enter separately.
So ordered.
Signed on March 14, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
FEB 20, 2025
“To achieve this end result, pro se Plaintiff believes that there are two methods, either by
granting Plaintiff an interlocutory appeal,
or
by the District Court certifying a question to the Fifth Circuit asking them to initiate the Certified Question(s) to the state’s highest court, whilst this court abates the proceedings herein.
Hence, this motion.”
On January 23, 2025, the Court issued three Orders regarding Plaintiff’s requests to file supplemental materials (ECF 54, 55, 56)
and
three Memoranda and Recommendations, recommending the Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss be denied (ECF 57), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted (ECF 58), and Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (ECF 59).
Prior to the expiration of the 14-day objection period, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay or in the Alternative for an Extension of Time Re ECF Entries 51-60.”
ECF 61.
She also filed “Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Questions to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”
ECF 62.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to each January 23, 2025 Order and Memorandum and Recommendation.
The Court finds no good cause for issuing a stay and an extension of time to file objections.
Further, the Court has no authority to “certify” a question to the Fifth Circuit.
Plaintiff’s recourse is an appeal from a final judgment in this case to the Fifth Circuit.
It is therefore
ORDERED that “Plaintiffs Motion to Stay of in the Alternative for an Extension of Time Re ECF Entries 51-60” (ECF 61)
and
“Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Questions to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit” (ECF 62) are DENIED.
Signed on Febmary 20, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
CHRISTINA ‘CHRIS’ BRYAN
United States Magistrate Judge
U.S. v. Calverley, 11 F.3d 505, 514 n.20 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“”If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.”); id. comment. (n. 3(f))
(stating that obstruction of justice enhancement is imposed for “providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate””)
Wall Street Witch Hunt: From Cape Cod to California. The LA Judge Selected to Take Down LIT’s Non-Profit Entity
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Gail Killefer’s father and family heritage are part of America’s One Percenters Who Control America. https://t.co/rTDbnaMbyA
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) March 14, 2025
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
FEB 3, 2025
POSTED BY USPS EXPRESS MAIL ON FEB 3, 2025,
SIGNED FOR BY COURT FEB 4, 2025,
HAND-DELIVERED IN PERSON ON FEB 6, 2025,
STILL NOTHING ON THE DOCKET
ALL POSTED ONTO DOCKET AFTER LIT’S X POST, INCLUDING @USCOURTS
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE, AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, Magistrate Judge Bryan issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].
The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].
In a nutshell, the orders and M&R’s issued by Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan disposed of Joanna Burke’s proceedings with prejudice, recommending Plaintiff be labeled a vexatious litigant with prefiling restrictions.
In her “rush to judgment”, due process along with court procedures, rules, and laws were trampled upon.
However, the main purpose of this motion is to obtain a decision from the Texas Supreme Court as to the underlying dispute about Texas laws and statutory interpretation of the same leading to erroneous Erie guesses in both state and federal courts.
To achieve this end result, pro se Plaintiff believes that there are two methods, either by granting Plaintiff an interlocutory appeal, or by the District Court certifying a question to the Fifth Circuit asking them to initiate the Certified Question(s) to the state’s highest court, whilst this court abates the proceedings herein.
Hence, this motion.
KEY ISSUES
Joanna Burke assumes the court is familiar with the summary of the case as provided throughout these proceedings and therefore it does not require repetition here, as the court can take judicial notice of the docket.
The key issues are;
(1) Whether there is a valid judgment of foreclosure;
(2) Whether the statute of limitations to foreclose is determined as four years or ten years;
(3) Whether an interlocutory appeal is merited to obtain Fifth Circuit approval and certification of question(s) to the Texas Supreme Court, or alternatively;
(4) Whether the District Court would prefer to present a Certified Question to the Fifth Circuit concerning this Motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Fifth Circuit’s History of Incorrect Erie Guesses Costs Texas Citizens their Homes
Texas Supreme Court: The Rivera Rush is Regrettable
“Don’t mess with Texas homesteads” has been a clear message to lenders since the very early days of Texas.
The prohibition is so unequivocal that any lien purporting to encumber homestead property is, and for 166 years has continuously been, beyond the reach of creditors for forced sale absent compliance with rigid constitutional requirements.
– Smith v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass’n, 825 F. Supp. 2d 859, 861 (S.D. Tex. 2011)).
Fourteen years ago, sitting US District Judge Nelva G. Ramos correctly interpreted a statute of limitations question, and directly confronted case law which could have been applicable:
“Under Texas law, the four–year statute of limitations—on its face—does not apply to Smith’s claim that the lien is void.
Equitable claims to recover property based upon liens that are constitutionally void are not barred by limitations.
Following Rivera would be to grant amnesty to errant lenders as a result of the passage of time, alone.
A noncompliant mortgage lien against a homestead is thus void ab initio.”
She denied JPMC’s motion to dismiss.
However, in the words of the Texas Supreme Court in Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 548, including n.2 (Tex. 2016), both state and federal courts failed to analyze Rivera properly, which resulted in an erroneous Erie guess in Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 708 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.2013) authored by Judge Jerry Smith, and which in turn overruled Smith.
The opinion in Wood lists some of the carnage resulting from erroneous decisions, which irrefutably impacted Texas homeowners and their families negatively, and which most likely caused them to be evicted from their homesteads.
There have been many other erroneous Erie guesses related to Texas homestead laws protected by TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (a)(6)(A)-(Q).
As detailed in Plaintiff’s operative complaint [ECF 1-4, p.569+] these erroneous decisions undoubtedly include the Fifth Circuit’s opinions in the underlying proceedings in the Deutsche Bank case involving John and Joanna Burke, and where Hon. Stephen Wm. Smith twice challenged the Fifth Circuit, the last one being his 2017 opinion [ECF 1-4, p.570]:-
“Respectfully, this court concludes that the panel decision regarding the validity of the 2011 assignment is clearly erroneous.
It contradicts binding authority from the Texas Supreme Court in violation of Erie, and disregards previous Fifth Circuit decisions, in violation of the circuit’s rule of orderliness…and would work a manifest injustice to the Burkes and other Texas homeowners.”
Despite having the formidable legal representation of Steve Berman from Hagens Berman [ECF 1-4, p.572] during DBNTCO’s second appeal, and in conjunction with the transcribed hearing [ECF 1-4, p.572] before Hon. Stephen Smith and Mark Hopkins, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of DBNTCO Appeal I was deemed erroneous by Burke’s counsel on remand, a Supreme Court advocate who successfully argued Wood, Constance “Connie” Pfeiffer, then a partner at Beck Redden. [ECF 1-4, p.571]
Nonetheless, a hurried opinion in DBNTCO Appeal II was issued without certifying the controlling question(s) to the Texas Supreme Court.
Indeed, Hagens Berman was astounded that the Fifth Circuit denied oral argument [ECF 1-4, p.572].
Joanna Burke recognizes she is not alone, with the Texas Supreme Court constantly correcting the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous Erie guesses.
In support of this argument, the United States Supreme Court has also reversed an inordinate number of decisions by the Fifth Circuit.
For the most part, Plaintiff focuses on cases and the erroneous Erie guesses which impact[ed] her own home and which involve issues, parties and counsel related to her proceedings.
That said, the sheer devastation of citizens protected legal rights at the hands of judges and justices past and present Erie errors resulted in untold hardship and loss of “protected homesteads”, a manifest injustice to those who were and may be impacted by these fateful orders and final judgments.
The Magistrate Judge’s M&R [58] seeks to maintain the “Rivera Doctrine” of relying upon erroneous legal authorities by failing to independently analyze prior case law, correctly interpret and apply the true and correct meaning to statutes, resulting in the error-laden conclusions and recommendation before the court.
The M&R, along with the related Orders are “clearly erroneous and contrary to law”.
To adopt the M&R would be “a manifest injustice”.
Hence, this motion.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Justice Requires Full Argument and Fairness to All
In reversing this court, Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho recently stated:
“Our adversarial system of justice requires that we give both sides full and fair opportunity to present their strongest possible arguments to the court. It is through that clash of ideas that we ensure that justice is done pursuant to the laws that govern the dispute in question.”
– Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.).
The Magistrate Judge’s M&R [ECF 58] is Another Rivera: An Erie Error
Plaintiff acknowledges the District Court Judge does not have the jurisdiction to address prior erroneous decisions within the restricted context of this formal objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (M&R).
Nevertheless, the court has the authority to prevent history from repeating itself by ensuring the Texas Supreme Court is involved in resolving the controlling, certifiable questions presented here.
Questions Which Impact the Proposed Certified Question[s] (Excluding Jurisdiction)
1. Whether November 29, 2018’s Order and purported “valid judgment” issued by Judge Hittner on mandate from the Fifth Circuit in Deutsche Bank Appeal II is invalid and void.
2. Whether the statute of limitations for foreclosure of a home equity lien is four years, as argued by the Plaintiff, or ten years, as suggested by Magistrate Judge Bryan’s M&R by incorrectly following erroneous Erie guesses and opinions discussed herein.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Certification to Texas Supreme Court (via Fifth Circuit)
Butler v. Collins, No. 23-10072, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024)
(“Certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to the Supreme Court of Texas, Pursuant to Article V, § 3-C of the Texas Constitution and Rule 58 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure”);
Am. Pearl Grp. v. Nat’l Payment Sys., No. 23-10804, at *15 (5th Cir. Sep. 10, 2024)
(“”When adjudicating claims for which state law provides the rules of decision, we are bound to apply the law as interpreted by the [relevant] state’s highest court.””).
Statutory Interpretation (Not applying the full statutory text to your analysis)
“The district court considered the first half of this definition – whether Texas Truck brought the tires to the United States—but, without explanation, failed to consider the second half” …
“Where possible, we should interpret a regulation’s language plainly. However, we must consider the regulation in its entirety. The district court’s failure to analyze the entire definition, therefore, was in error.”
Tex. Truck Parts & Tire v. United States, 118 F.4th 687, 691, 697 (5th Cir. 2024).
The “missing” @usps express mail items delivered to SDTX Court and signed for on Tuesday still not on the docket today, at the time of this X post.
Plaintiff decided to intervene by ensuring it was delivered today, in-person. We’ll see how long it takes @uscourts to docket. pic.twitter.com/ImWGLwXAyC
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 6, 2025
ARGUMENT
(1) There is No Valid Judgment Ordering Foreclosure
Eleven unintelligible words by Judge David Hittner cannot create a valid judgment and order of foreclosure.
“ORDERS that foreclosure shall occur to effectuate the Fifth Circuit’s judgment” is not a valid judgment, it is void.
See; Witherspoon v. White, 111 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“Merely labeling a judgment as final does not make it so. The order must adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all parties properly before the court.).
(2) The Statute of Limitations is Four Years Which Has Expired
The contrived decade-long, renewable statute of limitations argument presented by Magistrate Judge Bryan mirrors Rivera,
(as discussed in Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016)).
In short form, the basis of her decision to erroneously rely upon 34.001 [ECF 52-1, p.4-5] is not only a square-peg-round-hole argument, but another example of her willfully snubbing Plaintiff’s legal arguments which nullifies her frivolous claims.
(3) Certification to Texas Supreme Court is Mandatory on State Law Disputes
Plaintiff’s argument is constitutionally protected, and a certified question to the state’s highest court is compulsory
“as we have more fully explained in prior decisions, because of Texas’ strong, historic protection of the homestead, home equity loans are regulated, not by statute as one might suppose, but by the “elaborate, detailed provisions” of Article XVI, Section 50 of the Texas Constitution.”
– former Chief Justice Hecht in Sims v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., L.L.C., 440 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2014)”,
answering an important certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;
Zepeda v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 960 F.3d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 2020);
and;
Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 867 F.3d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2017).
In summary, given the alarming number of cases referenced in M&R [58], and including the District Judge’s own opinion in Strange, which also adopted the Rivera Doctrine of erroneous Erie guesses, certification of the current dispute concerning the statute of limitations period should be mandatory, especially considering the risk to life, liberty and property rights of homeowners in Texas, including the extremely at-risk Plaintiff, an elder, law-abiding, widow, free-thinker and Texas citizen.
See; Sanders v. The Boeing Co., 68 F.4th 977, 979 (5th Cir. 2023)
(“We cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law.”).
2018: A Catastrophic Year of Erie Guesses, Judicial Changes and Void Orders
In a whirlwind and catastrophic year, 2018 witnessed Hon. Stephen Wm. Smith resign shortly after his [second] opinion on remand was released, rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the law and reaffirming his post 2015 bench trial decision in favor of John and Joanna Burke’s position that DBNTCO had no legal interest in her homestead.
On Nov. 29, 2018, the deficient [ECF 1-4, p. 414] and void Order [ECF 1-4, p. 515; ECF 52-1, p.2] was entered by US District Judge David Hittner because of the Fifth Circuit’s Erie guess and defiance of centuries old Texas laws and legally binding precedent.
2025: An Opportunity to Correct a Manifest Injustice from Recurring
Fast forward to 2025 and history is repeating itself, with curt Orders by a Magistrate Judge who was appointed at the start of that whirlwind year of 2018 and who would be familiar with these events, along with her M&R’s which defies both common sense and Texas law.
As such, a certified question to the Texas Supreme Court is enforceable as it affects not only Plaintiff’s liberty and property rights specifically protected by the Texas Constitution, but any other affected homeowner.
“The Texas Constitution gives our Court jurisdiction to answer certified questions of state law.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3–c (a);
see Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 597 S.W.3d 492, 497 n.6 (Tex. 2020)
(describing the answer to a certified question as “a constitutionally permissible advisory opinion”).”
Paxton v. Longoria, 646 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. 2022).
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recognized this need in recent years, submitting more and more certified questions to the state’s highest court, who provided this opinion to the certified question:
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Zepeda, 601 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020), and which was cited at *5 in the original April 7, 2022 opinion by the Fifth Circuit in the Lamell case [EXHIBIT 1].
However, the original opinion which would have allowed PNC the relief it sought was hurriedly deleted from the database
(U.S. Bank v. Lamell, No. 21-20326, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022)
(“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USBNA and PHH with respect to their request for a declaration on each of the foregoing grounds, and Mr. Lamell timely appealed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.”)
and superseded (U.S. Bank v. Lamell, No. 21-20326, at *2 (5th Cir. June 2, 2022)
(“The district court granted summary judgment in the Appellees’ favor, and Mr. Lamell timely appealed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.”)
in anticipation of PNC Mortg. v. Howard, 668 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2023).
Judge David Hittner’s Six-Year-Old Order and Judgment is Void
Magistrate Judge Bryan double downs that Judge Hittner’s 2018 Order is a “valid judgment”.
The order is not a valid judgment, it is void for the reasons asserted both here and argued by Plaintiff per the court docket.
Magistrate Judge M&R 58 Errs in Claiming PHH’s Foreclosure Efforts Are Timely
“Plaintiff misunderstands PHH’s position.
PHH is not attempting to foreclose under a real property lien;
the lien has already been foreclosed.
PHH is attempting to execute on a judicial foreclosure order.
PHH’s statute of limitations to execute on the foreclosure judgment is governed by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 34.001.”
Magistrate Judge Bryan cites to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion for this proposition.
However, on inspection, this opinion is contradictory.
Specifically, the 5th Circuit answers two questions, and the second states in Texas, it is well-settled that possession and title are not obtained by the lender until the sale has been conducted:
Couch v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 24-10297, at *3-4 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024),
disavowing the claim that “the lien has already been foreclosed”.
This aligns with the standard practice that after a nonjudicial foreclosure auction, a [Substitute] Trustee Deed is generally filed in the real property records, affirming the sale to the lender, or to a third-party.
See; Gapasin v. Sand Canyon Corp., 4:23-cv-02866, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2024).
Statute of Limitations and Judge Hittner’s 2018 Order
Statutory Interpretation: Magistrate Judge Excludes Controlling Text: “may be”
The M&R [58, p.5] “Claim A.” discusses the statute of limitations and evades any mention of Plaintiff’s argument about Judge Hittner’s void Order, which Magistrate Judge Bryan claims is “a valid judgment”.
First, the M&R’s statutory interpretation excludes the all-important text: “is secured by a lien that may be foreclosed upon only by a court order.”
See; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Poston, Civil Action H-23-2017, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2024) (Deutsche Bank “may”).
This is confirmed by another case involving sanctioned Texas attorney Jerry Schutza, who prevailed in his case and confirms that the lien is not foreclosed by the court, the order merely authorizes foreclosure, see:
Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Cochran Invs., 602 S.W.3d 895,898 (Tex.2020)
(“In December 2010, EMC Mortgage foreclosed its lien on the property [via nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Dec. 7, 2010 see p.14 Chi brief], which Cochran Investments, Inc. subsequently purchased at a foreclosure sale.”;
citing to William R. England, Jr. (09-39736) United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas;
William R. England, Jr. – Adversary Proceeding (11-03295) United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas,
accord;
Morris v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 528 S.W.3d 187,197 (Tex.App. 2017)
(“In Texas, a home-equity lien may be foreclosed upon only by a court order. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, §50(a)(6)(D);
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d 590,593 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).”),
accord;
Muir v. U.S. Bank Tr., No. 14-22-00596-CV, at*2 (Tex. App. June 8, 2023)
(“The Deed of Trust provided that the “lien evidenced by [the Deed of Trust] may be foreclosed upon only by a court order.””, at*5:
“The final judgment also includes an order authorizing foreclosure of the Property.
The final judgment further provides that it “serves as an in rem Judgment and Declaration of this Court Authorizing Foreclosure of the subject Texas Home Equity Lien in accordance with TEX. CONST. ART. XVI §50(a)(6)(D).””).
Intervening Foreclosure Order: “A Valid” Judgment released on January 29, 2025
The high-profile U.S. Bank v. Lamell, Civil Action H-19-2402 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025) proceeding is an example of a valid judgment.
“ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that PHH is the mortgage servicer for U.S. Bank and thus has standing to foreclose pursuant to Texas Property Code Section 51.0025;
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs or their successors or assigns, may proceed with foreclosure on the Property as provided in the Deed of Trust and Texas Property Code §51.002.” (describing nonjudicial foreclosure).”.
Magistrate Judge Bryan’s interpretation of the law is completely erroneous, as well as the opinions she relies upon.
Plaintiff addressed this misapplication of Texas laws, and particularly Texas Code § 34.001 with specificity, but her memorandum “skipped” Plaintiff’s arguments, which is a recurring theme in her omnibus of Orders and M&R’s released on Jan. 23, 2025.
Terminally, she fails to address Plaintiff’s arguments and objections to Judge David Hittner’s 2018 “judicial” order of foreclosure, which is not a valid judgment.
It is void as it fails to detail the necessary elements required for such an order, as provided in Lamell by Judge Lake, and with Judge Hittner’s own past Order in Maldonado [ECF 52-1, p.6].
Again, Plaintiff addressed this with specificity, but the M&R refused to acknowledge the arguments with case law or engage in any discussion.
Furthermore, if the foreclosure judgment is governed by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 34.001, then it was never mentioned in DBNTCO’s complaint.
After exhaustive searches, Plaintiff could not locate court orders “foreclosing the real property lien” for that matter.
Excluding Magistrate Judge Bryan’s Erie guesses in her M&R which PHH also relies upon, Plaintiff could not locate any legal authority to support her argument, because it is absurd.
Plaintiff maintains these cases are incorrectly analyzed and unreliable Erie guesses which should not be allowed to bypass inspection by the Texas Supreme Court, who have never determined the monumental question(s) presented here, which if remain citable law, would be a manifest injustice.
“Statutes of limitations have long been an important feature “in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence.”
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135,139,25 L.Ed. 807 (1879).
They “are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law” because they “promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.””
– Ferrer v. Almanza, 667 S.W.3d 735,737 (Tex.2023).
DECLARATION
Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna …and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons and relief requested here and in the proposed order, the court should GRANT Plaintiff’s requests, and for any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of February, 2025.
No Bull. Just the Truth. https://t.co/Rj5dIRYeAn pic.twitter.com/WtnkmYwEQB
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) January 29, 2025
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60
FEB 3, 2025
POSTED BY USPS EXPRESS MAIL ON FEB 3, 2025,
SIGNED FOR BY COURT FEB 4, 2025,
HAND-DELIVERED IN PERSON ON FEB 6, 2025,
STILL NOTHING ON THE DOCKET
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE, AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, Magistrate Judge Bryan issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].
The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].
In a nutshell, the orders and M&R’s issued by Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan disposed of Joanna Burke’s proceedings with prejudice, recommending Plaintiff be labeled a vexatious litigant with prefiling restrictions.
In her “rush to judgment”, due process along with court procedures, rules, and laws were trampled upon.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff is simultaneously filing PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT and PROPOSED ORDER.
Should the court GRANT the motion, this request should be moot, however, if the court DENIES the motion, then the Plaintiff respectfully requests an extension of 28 days to legally respond to ECF’s 51-60, considering (with the exception of ECF 60) they were all released together late on Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, and the constitutional issues raised by the these Orders and M&R’s.
GRANTING THE MOTION TO STAY
Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 867 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 2017) (“”In Texas, ‘the homestead has always been protected from forced sale, not merely by statute as in most states, but by the Constitution.’ It was not until 1997 that Texas created exceptions to the constitutional ban on foreclosure for reverse mortgages and other home equity loans. [B]ut, consistent with Texas’s long tradition of protecting the homestead, the amendments clearly prescribed very specific and extensive limitations on those encumbrances.”).
Upon review of the PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, and in conjunction with the Magistrate Judge’s Orders and M&R’s, the US District Court Judge should be able to determine:-
(a) Plaintiff’s argument and Motion to Stay is meritorious;
(b) the questions raised necessitate intervention by the Texas Supreme Court by way of Certified Questions, and
(c) the Motion to Stay should be GRANTED.
DENYING THE MOTION TO STAY
Smith v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass’n, 825 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“If property be homestead in fact and law, lenders must understand that liens cannot be fixed upon it”).
If, however, the STAY is DENIED by this Court, the Plaintiff respectfully requests an extension of 28 days to respond to ECF’s 51-60, which includes three Orders and three M&R’s which impact, life, liberty and property rights.
In support, the Plaintiff requests the US District Judge once more take due consideration of the PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
That motion presents many of the constitutional violations which have resulted during the Magistrate Judge’s “rush to judgment”.
The effect of releasing the omnibus of orders and M&R’s results in a 14-day window of opportunity for Plaintiff to object and seek relief by way of formal reconsideration.
This is no small task, when considering the fact Magistrate Judge Bryan has refused to even acknowledge or discuss the Plaintiff’s well-researched and detailed motions, responses, replies and supplemental pleadings, especially when it is neither the Magistrate Judge nor the court’s first rodeo in being reversed by the Fifth Circuit for the same issues.
These violations have been categorized by the Fifth Circuit as legal error, an abuse of discretion (power) and due process violations,
for example, when considering
Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692 (5th Cir. 2024);
Kennard Law P.C. v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 23-20430 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2024);
Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.).
In summary, the Plaintiff is confident that this court will recognize the Plaintiff’s Motion is meritorious and will GRANT the necessary relief.
DECLARATION
Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna …, and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons and relief requested here and in the proposed order, the court should
GRANT Plaintiff’s STAY while the Certified Question(s) are on appeal,
or in the alternative
GRANT the 28-Day EXTENSION OF TIME,
and for any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of February, 2025.
We’re waiting for all the “lost” and “missing” filings in these proceedings.
| DOCSENT,MAG |
U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897
| Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief |
Date Filed: 03/12/2024 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 11/15/2024 | 51 | MOTION for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary JudgmentMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement to Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 11/15/2024 | 52 | MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary JudgmentMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 11/15/2024 | 53 | MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious LitigantMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 54 | ORDER DENYING 51 Motion for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 55 | ORDER DENYING 45 Motion for Leave; DENYING AS MOOT 50 Motion to Exceed Word Count; DENYING 52 Motion for Leave.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 56 | ORDER DENYING 53 Motion for Leave to File Verified Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 57 | MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 33 Verified MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction- The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s “Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” (ECF 33) be DENIED. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025 (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 58 | MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment – The Court RECOMMENDS that PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 27) be GRANTED and all of Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025 (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| 01/23/2025 | 59 | MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 28 MOTION Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant- The Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion (ECF 28) be GRANTED and Plaintiff Joanna Burke be declared a vexatious litigant and that she be enjoined from filing any further pleadings in the Southern District of Texas without first seeking, in writing, permission from the Miscellaneous District Judge on duty for the moth in which the filing would be made. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025) |
| PACER Service Center | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Receipt | |||
| 01/23/2025 17:05:49 |
CLERKGATE III
NOV 21, 2024
Despite two USPS Express Mail Packages being sent to the same court address, and both delivered with signature receipts recorded, only the later of the two deliveries has made it onto the court docket.
USPS Express Contents Delivered Nov. 21, 2024:
The November 20, 2024 combined filing.
USPS Express Contents Delivered Nov. 14, signed for Nov. 15, 2024:
The November 13, 2024 combined filing.
and
The November 11, 2024 combined filing.
Hello Joanna Burke,
Your item was picked up at postal facility at
9:47 am on November 21, 2024 in HOUSTON, TX 77208.
The item was signed for by B LACEY.
Tracking Number: 9481730109355000162426
Package Shipped from: HQ – ECNS
Delivered, Individual Picked Up at Postal Facility
Hello Joanna Burke,
Your item was picked up at postal facility at
9:06 am on November 15, 2024 in HOUSTON, TX 77208.
The item was signed for by H LERMA.
Tracking Number: 9481730109355000137813
Package Shipped from: HQ – ECNS
Delivered, Individual Picked Up at Postal Facility
| DOCSENT,MAG |
U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897
| Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief |
Date Filed: 03/12/2024 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 11/10/2024 | 42 | RESPONSE in Opposition to 33 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 11/10/2024) |
| 11/21/2024 | 43 | PLAINTIFF’S REPLY to 42 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Joanna Burke. (cng4) (Entered: 11/21/2024) |
| 11/21/2024 | 44 | SURREPLY to 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by Joanna Burke. (cng4) (Entered: 11/21/2024) |
| PACER Service Center | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Receipt | |||
| 11/21/2024 17:26:47 |
LIT COMMENTARY & UPDATES
NOV 14, 2024
A Big Ole Hat tip from LIThttps://t.co/3UUR07vjax pic.twitter.com/h1UNv1Wv0R
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) November 4, 2024
The high-profile scandals in the media spotlight this year from the third branch of the federal judiciary is Texas is indicative of past and ongoing bad faith and biased behavior by both federal judges and officers of the court.
Judge Edith Jones re Judge Lynn Hughes a decade earlier: “However, a recording of the proceedings indicates that Judge Hughes was extremely solicitous toward them, suggested at the outset that they should retain counsel, and did not ridicule them or their claims in any way.” pic.twitter.com/Dyt2RT6RXy
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) October 10, 2024
Team Texas: The Judicial Anthem Blares Out as the Federalists Replace the Old Guard of Ochlocracy, still housed in Scandal-soaked Houston’s Rusk Street Federal Courthouse. pic.twitter.com/jud2ROuR6q
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) October 10, 2024
“You’ve Won the Battle; Don’t Lose the War”,
Lynn Liberato, Hittner, Haynes & Boone, LLP, former President of State Bar of Texas, and co-Author with Judge David Hittner on the “pocket-book” on Summary Judgment in Texas, was counsel in trial before Hittner worth $$$ in fees. pic.twitter.com/2VgRGx4A6N— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) October 10, 2024
| DOCSENT,MAG |
U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897
| Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief |
Date Filed: 03/12/2024 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 07/23/2024 | 26 | ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan.(Signed by Judge Charles Eskridge) Parties notified. (jmg4) (Entered: 07/23/2024) |
| 08/05/2024 | 27 | MOTION for Summary Judgment Motions referred to Christina A Bryan. by PHH Mortgage Corporation, filed. Motion Docket Date 8/26/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I) (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 08/05/2024) |
| 08/05/2024 | 28 | MOTION Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious LitigantMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by PHH Mortgage Corporation, filed. Motion Docket Date 8/26/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 08/05/2024) |
| 08/27/2024 | 29 | MOTION for Extension of Time Motions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 9/17/2024. (bmn4) (Entered: 08/29/2024) |
| 09/03/2024 | 30 | RESPONSE in Opposition to 29 MOTION for Extension of Time, filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 09/03/2024) |
| 09/18/2024 | 31 | ORDER granting in part and denying in part 29 Motion for Extension of Time; It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Responses to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 27) and Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (ECF 28) are due on or before October 7, 2024. Replies will be due 14 days after Responses are filed. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 09/18/2024) |
| PACER Service Center | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Receipt | |||
| 09/18/2024 18:46:16 |
| DOCSENT,MAG |
U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897
| Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief |
Date Filed: 03/12/2024 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 09/25/2024 | 32 | REPLY to Response to 29 MOTION for Extension of Time, filed by Joanna Burke. (dah4) (Entered: 09/25/2024) |
| 10/07/2024 | 33 | MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Motions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 10/28/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Supplement Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit) (abb4) (Entered: 10/07/2024) |
| 10/07/2024 | 34 | RESPONSE to 28 MOTION Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Supplement Cover Sheet) (abb4) (Entered: 10/07/2024) |
| 10/07/2024 | 35 | RESPONSE to 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Supplement Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit) (abb4) (Entered: 10/07/2024) |
| 10/15/2024 | 36 | MOTION for Extension of Time Replies to ResponsesMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by PHH Mortgage Corporation, filed. Motion Docket Date 11/5/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 10/15/2024) |
| 10/16/2024 | 37 | ORDER granting : 36 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Replies. It is further ORDERED that PHH may file its Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 34 ) and its Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Second Motion to Declare Plaintiff Joanna Burke as a Vexatious Litigant (ECF 35 ) on or before November 4, 2024. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 10/16/2024) |
| 10/18/2024 | 38 | MOTION for Extension of Time to File ResponseMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by PHH Mortgage Corporation, filed. Motion Docket Date 11/8/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hopkins, Shelley) (Entered: 10/18/2024) |
| 10/23/2024 | 39 | ORDER granting 38 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response. PHH may file its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF 33 ) on or before November 11, 2024.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 10/23/2024) |
| 11/04/2024 | 40 | REPLY to Response to 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 11/04/2024) |
| 11/04/2024 | 41 | REPLY to Response to 28 MOTION Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant, filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 11/04/2024) |
| PACER Service Center | |||
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| Transaction Receipt | |||
| 11/10/2024 09:37:23 |
Stitched-Up Justice: Sarah Sewing’s Family Foreclosure Avoidance Scheme Points to Harris County Corruption
Despite orders of foreclosure in 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2022 and another suit in 2023, Sewing avoids foreclosure auctions continually.
Priority Mail: USPS Consistently Loses Time Sensitive Federal Court Filings for Weeks, Not Days
The excessive delays are when legal mailings are sent from Kingwood to the federal court mailing address in Houston, Texas from Joanna Burke.
Operation Elder Abuse: PHH Mortgage Corporation and Deutsche Bank Judge Shopping Continues
Forum Shopping aka Judge Shopping is a disease in Texas courts says Congress, demanding this form of case assignment be outlawed.
