The U.S. Government Have Decided to Blitz LIT
JUN 4, 2023
This article will be updated frequently during the 72 hr window. Above is the date LIT Last updated this article.
LIT’s legal blog fits the statutory meaning of “exercise of the right of free speech” and is therefore the type of protected communications and/or is clearly related to matters of public concern, as LIT serves it’s blog to the public community.
However, when LIT’s legal blog investigates and writes negatively about the 3 Branches of Government, especially the judiciary, then this immunity is apparently rescinded. The following judges have endorsed LIT’s statement in their signed Power of Attorney letters to the third party vendor responsible for transmitting the invalid removal requests.
Abine Inc
DBA DeleteMe
P.O Box 55
Somerville, MA 02143
June 02, 2023
LawsInTexas.com
Dear Legal Representative:
Please be advised that Abine, Inc. dba DeleteMe, is an authorized agent through the Administrative Office of the US Courts to act on behalf of the Honorable (Andrew Oldham, Don Willett, John DeGravelles, Mark Lane Hornsby, Matthew Kacsmaryk, Stephen Higginson, Sul Ozerden, Taylor McNeel). We are requesting that the following information be removed from LawsInTexas.com:
Andrew Oldham 845 Bell Springs Rd, Dripping Springs, TX – 78620
Don Willett
John DeGravelles 632 Stanford Avenue, Baton Rouge, LA – 70808
Mark Lane Hornsby 4270 McKneely Rd, Shreveport, LA – 71107
Matthew Kacsmaryk 8007 Valcour Dr, Amarillo, TX – 79119
Stephen Higginson 639 Broadway St, New Orleans, LA – 70118
Sul Ozerden 385 Fly-Away Ct, Biloxi, MS – 39531
Taylor McNeel
A new bill was recently passed and now has been enacted in Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023, named Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2022 (H.R. 7776, Sec. 5931 – the “Act”).
This Act prohibits individuals and businesses from disclosing covered information of at-risk individuals, who are defined as federal judges and their immediate families, as publicly available content, and upon written request from the federal judge affected or their authorized agent, requires their covered information to be removed from any publicly available content within 72 hours of the request for removal.
The Act defines a data broker as “a commercial entity engaged in collecting, assembling, or maintaining personal information concerning an individual who is not a customer, client, or an employee of that entity in order to sell the information or otherwise profit from providing third-party access to the information”.
Further, the Act sets forth that “It shall be unlawful for a data broker to knowingly sell, license, trade for consideration, transfer, or purchase covered information for an at-risk individual or immediate family member.”
LawsInTexas.com is a data broker website
which collects and shares name, address, relatives, and age online, therefore, LawsInTexas.com is a data broker under the Act. The information LawsInTexas.com discloses is publicly available content because the name, address, relatives, and age, that may include covered information of at-risk individuals, are shared on the public internet (“online”).
Therefore, this letter (the “Removal Request”) serves as a formal written request, on behalf of the Honorable (Andrew Oldham, Don Willett, John DeGravelles, Mark Lane Hornsby, Matthew Kacsmaryk, Stephen Higginson, Sul Ozerden, Taylor McNeel), for LawsInTexas.com to remove all of their covered information and any included immediate family member’s covered information from LawsInTexas.com and any affiliate database sites, as defined under the Act.
Please be advised that this Removal Request will not be one in a series of Removal Request letters and that under the Act receipt of this Removal Request obligates LawsInTexas.com to abide by this Removal Request within 72 hours of receipt of this letter.
Likewise, any failure to remove the covered information from LawsInTexas.com and any affiliate database sites within 72 hours of receipt of this Removal Request is a violation of the Act whereby the federal judge, including any of their immediate family members, “may bring an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in any court of competent jurisdiction” against LawsInTexas.com.
Should you have any questions, please send your inquiry to policycompliance@joindeleteme.com.
Regards,
Judge Oldham
Main page:
Meet Judge Andrew Oldham of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (5th Cir.)
Vanity URL
Abine provides consumers with online privacy solutions that are innovative, easy to use, and work for everyday web users. With proven tools, Abine enables people to both benefit from the web and retain control over their personal information.
Millions of consumers have used Abine’s privacy solutions.
Abine: online privacy starts here. Abine’s flagship product, Blur, is a free browser add-on that is a secure password manager which also blocks online tracking by hundreds of advertising companies and social networks.
Additionally, Blur’s masking tools allow consumers to used “Masked” identities, helping them control the amount of personal information that they’re giving away online.
Abine’s DeleteMe is a premium service that removes consumers’ personal information listings from the largest data collection websites.
Abine has partnered with global security companies, including Check Point and Avira, to power the Do Not Track technology in their security offerings.
Abine is also partnered with numerous organizations to deliver its DeleteMe service, including
the National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV),
the California Judges Association (CJA)
and
The Boston Area Rape Crisis Center (BARCC).
Abine is backed by premier venture capital firms Accomplice Venture and General Catalyst Partners.
Website
https://www.abine.com/
Revenue
$6 million
Funding
$5.00 Million
Employees
81(36 on RocketReach)
Founded
2008
Address
Boston, Massachusetts, MA, United States, US
Phone
(800) 928-1987
Technologies
JavaScript, HTML, PHP +65 more (view full list)
Category
Business Services, Software Development, Network Management Software, Ad Network, Internet privacy software, Software Development & Design, Application Software, Advertising, Browser add-ons, E-Commerce, Extensions, Software, Commerce and Shopping, Privacy, Tracker blocking, FinTech, Privacy protection and management, Financial Services, Information Technology, Online Privacy, Internet, Internet Privacy, Internet Services, Privacy and Security
Web Rank
42802
Web Visits
1 Million
Keywords
blur, blur abine, abine, deleteme, delete me
Competitors
disconnect.me, ghostery.com, adblockplus.org, mybrowseraddon.com, add0n.com
SIC
73, 7371
NAICS
5112, 511210
Judge Willett taking his own family security seriously on Social Media
This was tweeted on May 26. The removal request on June 2. That’s only a week later.
5-year Twitter silence broken!
Jacob—the firstborn wee Willett—graduates HS tonight!
CONGRATS, Jake! 🥳
🦅 Eagle Scout
🥋 black belt
🏀 baller
🐻 bound 4 @Baylor Honors CollegeGod has planted greatness in you, Jacob!
We couldn’t be prouder.
Welcome to what’s next! #LetsGo pic.twitter.com/vvgoDTzXXX
— Judge Don Willett (@JusticeWillett) May 26, 2023
LIT is neither a “Data Broker”, nor a “Commercial Entity”
JUN 2, 2023 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: JUN 3, 2023
JUN 4, 2023
Above is the date LIT Last updated this article.
Can a non-profit be called a ‘commercial entity’?
No, a non-profit organization cannot be called a commercial entity. Non-profit organizations, also known as not-for-profit organizations, are established with the primary goal of furthering a particular social cause or providing a public benefit. They are typically exempt from certain taxes because their profits are not distributed to owners or shareholders but are reinvested into the organization to support its mission.
On the other hand, a commercial entity, such as a corporation or a business, is established with the intention of making a profit for its owners or shareholders. Commercial entities engage in activities and transactions primarily for financial gain.
While both non-profit organizations and commercial entities operate in the realm of business and can have revenue streams, their fundamental purposes and structures are different. Non-profits are focused on fulfilling a social mission, while commercial entities are primarily concerned with generating profits.
– ChatGPT
“To curb the rise in threats and harassment against federal judges, the Threat Management Branch of the AO’s Judiciary Security Division has recently instituted various initiatives to identify, remove, and monitor judges’ PII including email addresses which appear in;
data-broker websites,
state and local public records,
social media,
and
the dark web.
A public filing which republishes federal judges’ email addresses undermines these efforts. ”
Several states have enacted legislation to help keep PII of judges and public officials confidential, see e.g. , Nev. Rev. Stat . §§ 247.500 -600, 250.100-230, 293.900-920; Ill. Comp. Stat . §§ 90/1, 90/2, 90/3, 90/4; Va. Code Ann . § 18.2-186.4:1 ; Utah Code Ann . § 63G-2-303 ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann . 66 § 10B, and there is promising proposed federal legislation which would also protect judges’ PII. See Madison Alder, Judicial Security Measure Added to Must-Pass Senate Defense Bill , Bloomberg Law , Oct. 11, 2022 (reporting that the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2021 – a bill that would protect federal judges’ PII online – has been added to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023).
“The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion for recusal links my spouse to me and discloses certain information about my spouse (through their linkage to me) that likely would be considered “covered information” in the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2021. S. 2340, 117th Cong. (2021). The motion for recusal gratuitously paid lip service to the notion of privacy by redacting only a picture of Dr. SL, while leaving repeated instances of “covered information” intact in the filing.”
Download the Overview (2020 Edition) (PDF)
PREFACE
The “Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974,” prepared by the Department of Justice’s Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL), constitutes a discussion of various provisions of the Privacy Act, as addressed by court decisions in cases involving the Act’s disclosure prohibition, its access and amendment provisions, and its agency recordkeeping requirements.
Tracking the provisions of the Act itself, the Overview provides reference to and legal analysis of court decisions interpreting the Act. It is a comprehensive — but not exhaustive — resource that describes the current state of the law.
The Overview is not intended to provide policy guidance or create policy, as that role statutorily rests with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and where OMB has issued policy guidance on particular provisions of the Act, citation to such guidance is provided in the Overview. The 2020 edition of the Overview includes cases through April of 2020. It was published electronically in October 2020 and sent for print publication in November 2020. The online version will be a living document, and updated by OPCL in its discretion as appropriate.
OPCL is very pleased to provide this updated revision of the Overview, and could not have done so without the commitment of OPCL’s dedicated staff and the interagency Overview Working Group, who are recognized individually on the accompanying masthead. The organization and development of legal materials are the work product of OPCL, which is responsible for the Overview’s content.
Peter A. Winn
Acting Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer
United States Department of Justice
INTRODUCTION
A. Legislative History
B. Privacy Protection Study Commission
C. Office of Management and Budget Guidance
D. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
JUDICIAL REDRESS ACT
A. Extension of Privacy Act Remedies to Citizens of Designated Countries
B. Attorney General Designations Related to the U.S.-EU Data Protection and Privacy Agreement
1. Covered Countries under the DPPA
2. Designated Federal Agency or Component under the DPPA
DEFINITIONS
A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) – Agency
B. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) – Individual
C. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3) – Maintain
D. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) – Record
E. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) – System of Records
CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES
A. The “No Disclosure without Consent” Rule
B. Twelve Exceptions to the “No Disclosure without Consent” Rule
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1) – Need to Know within Agency
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) – Required FOIA Disclosure
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) – Routine Uses
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(4) – Bureau of the Census
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(5) – Statistical Research
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(6) – National Archives
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) – Law Enforcement Request
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(8) – Health or Safety of an Individual
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(9) – Congress
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(10) – Government Accountability Office
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11) – Court Order
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(12) – Debt Collection Act
ACCOUNTING OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES
INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. The Privacy Act and the FOIA
B. FOIA/Privacy Act Interface Examples: Access
C. Records Requests and Searches
D. Third Party Interests
INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT OF AMENDMENT
AGENCY REQUIREMENTS
A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) – Maintain Only Relevant and Necessary Information
B. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) – Collect Information, to the Greatest Extent Practicable, Directly from the Individual
C. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) – Inform Individuals when Asking to Collect Information
D. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) – Publish System of Records Notice
E. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) – Maintain Accurate, Relevant, Timely, and Complete Records
F. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(6) – Review Records Prior to Dissemination
G. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) – Record Describing The Exercise of Rights Guaranteed by the First Amendment
H. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8) – Notice of Court Disclosure
I. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(9) – Rules of Conduct
J. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) Establish Safeguards
K. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(11) Publish New or Intended Use
AGENCY RULES
A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(1) – Establish Notification Procedures
B. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(2) – Define Time, Place, and Requirements for Identifying Individuals
C. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(3) – Establish Procedures for Disclosure of Records to Individuals
D. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(4) – Establish Procedures for Requests and Appeals
E. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f)(5) – Establish Copying Fees
CIVIL REMEDIES
A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) – Amendment Lawsuits
B. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B) – Access Lawsuits
C. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C) – Damages Lawsuits for Failure to Assure Fairness in Agency Determination
D. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) – Damages Lawsuits For Failure to Comply with Other Privacy Act Provisions
E. Principles Applicable to Damages Lawsuits
1. Intentional or Willful Standard
2. Actual Damages
3. Limits on Injunctive Relief for Damages Claims
4. Additional Considerations for Damages Claims
F. Principles Applicable to All Privacy Act Civil Actions
1. Attorney Fees and Costs
2. Jurisdiction and Venue
3. Statute of Limitations
4. Jury Trial
CRIMINAL PENALTIES
TEN EXEMPTIONS
A. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(5) – Special Exemption for Information Compiled for Civil Action
B. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) – Two General Exemptions for Central Intelligence Agency and Criminal Law Enforcement
C. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) – Seven Specific Exemption Rules Agencies May Promulgate
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) – FOIA Exemption 1, Classified Information
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) – Investigative Law Enforcement Materials
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(3) – Secret Service Records
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(4) – Statistical Records
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) – Source-Identifying Investigatory Material Compiled for Determining Suitability, Eligibility, or Other Qualification
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(6) – Testing or Examination Materials
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(7) – Source-Identifying Armed Services Promotion Material
DISCLOSURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
A. Exception for Disclosures Required by Federal Statute
B. Exception for Laws and Regulations in Effect before January 1, 1975
C. Federal, State, and Local Government Notice Requirements
D. Causes of Action
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
MAILING LISTS
ARCHIVAL RECORDS AND NEW SYSTEMS AND MATCHING PROVISIONS
Overview of the Privacy Act, 2020 Edition References
Updated October 12, 2022
View PDF (41 Pages)
Student Loan Servicing Alliance v. Dist. of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 60 (D.D.C. 2018)
“The Privacy Act governs the disclosure of individuals’ personal information by federal government departments and agencies.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 ;
see also Alexander v. FBI, 971 F.Supp. 603, 605-06 (D.D.C. 1997).” – “Filegate”, Hillary Clinton.
Hiding Public Records Starts at the Highest Court
The Judiciary Cannot “Police Themselves”. However, the Ochlocracy Continues while Citizens and Journalists Access to view Public Records regarding Real Property transactions by Judges and Justices is Extinguished. Watch MSNBC’s video below and read our articles on LIT for proof. We’ve amassed a substantial dossier of the corruption.
The Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2022 Does not Apply to LawsInTexas.com, a Legal Blog providing commentary and news which is a matter of public concern
Courts have held articles reporting on an attorney’s legal services and practice of law, legal misconduct, judicial corruption, and public corruption is a matter of public concern, thus LIT is exercising the right to free speech.
Who introduced Bill S2340? A Senator Under Investigation. And look at the related articles in the search results below.
Federal investigators leading an inquiry into Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the powerful Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, subpoenaed records this week from at least one longtime New Jersey mayor and state senator, Nicholas Sacco, several officials said.
The subpoena was delivered at about 6:30 a.m. on Wednesday, the day after a momentous election in Hudson County, a famously sharp-elbowed political proving ground in northern New Jersey where Mr. Menendez cut his teeth as a lawmaker.
The request for the documents made clear that Mr. Sacco, a Democrat who has served in the State Senate for 30 years and on Tuesday was re-elected to his ninth term as mayor of North Bergen, N.J., was not a target of the inquiry, according to his spokesman, Phil Swibinski.
Mr. Sacco will “cooperate fully and provide any requested information, as he would with any law enforcement inquiry,” Mr. Swibinski said in an email.
“Mayor Sacco has been assured that he is not a target of the investigation and was approached only as a potential witness,” added Mr. Swibinski, whose public relations firm also does work for the state’s Democratic Party.
Nicholas Sacco has served in the New Jersey Senate for 30 years and is also the mayor of North Bergen, N.J.
There have been few outward signs of movement in the federal investigation of Mr. Menendez since an initial blitz of subpoenas became public in October. And Mr. Menendez, 69, has continued to raise funds at a brisk clip for his expected run next year for a fourth term in the United States Senate.
But even while amassing more than $1 million in donations during the first quarter of the year, Mr. Menendez was also paying large bills related to the investigation, according to Federal Election Commission records filed last month.
Michael Soliman, a spokesman and close political adviser to Mr. Menendez, has said that the senator planned to create a legal-defense fund to pay for costs associated with the investigation, which is being led by prosecutors in the United States attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York.
“Senator Menendez is confident that this official inquiry will be successfully closed,”
Mr. Soliman said last month.
“But as it is still unresolved, he will be opening a separate legal-defense fund so as not to drain any further campaign funds.”
The nature and extent of the investigation into Mr. Menendez is unclear, but it is related at least in part to a New Jersey start-up company, IS EG Halal, which over the course of a year became the sole entity authorized to certify that halal meat imported into Egypt from anywhere in the world was prepared according to Islamic law.
Wednesday’s subpoena seeks records related to the halal enterprise as well as information about a bill that Mr. Sacco has twice sponsored in Trenton with Senator Brian Stack, according to a person familiar with the details of the subpoena, who requested anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the document publicly.
The subpoena specifically asked for any correspondence about the bill from Mr. Menendez; his wife, Nadine Arslanian Menendez; or Fred Daibes, one of the region’s most prominent developers, who pleaded guilty last year to a federal banking crime, the person said.
Mr. Soliman declined to comment on the subpoena. Mr. Stack, who is also the mayor of Union City, N.J., a job Mr. Menendez held in the 1980s and early ’90s, did not return calls.
The bill, the Palisades Cliffs Protection and Planning Act, has not advanced in the Legislature but would limit the height of development projects near the Palisades, along the Hudson River. The legislation faced opposition from construction trade unions and some developers.
Mr. Daibes’s negotiated plea agreement required no prison time. And this month, Mr. Daibes, an Edgewater, N.J.-based builder whose projects transformed the Hudson River waterfront, was the subject of a scathing 83-page report from New Jersey’s Commission of Investigation.
The commission found that Mr. Daibes had provided direct and indirect financial benefits to elected leaders in Edgewater, and that he held outsize influence on policy decisions in the borough. Neither he nor his lawyer could be immediately reached for comment.
Mr. Menendez has maintained from the start that he would cooperate fully with any investigation. And F.E.C. reports indicate that his lawyers have been doing so.
Since January, his campaign committee has paid $127,000 to Winston & Strawn, a law firm led by Abbe Lowell, who represented Mr. Menendez during a two-month bribery trial in 2017, the records show. The case ended in a mistrial after jurors could not reach a unanimous verdict, and prosecutors declined to retry Mr. Menendez after a judge dismissed many of the charges.
Mr. Menendez’s campaign committee also paid $48,000 to Schertler Onorato Mead & Sears, a Washington law firm, and $55,000 to Haystack ID, a company enlisted last year by the Trump Organization to respond to subpoenas from New York’s attorney general after former President Donald J. Trump was held in contempt of court for failing to do so.
Representatives from Haystack and the two law firms did not reply to calls or emails.
This Act may be cited as the “Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2021”.
(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Members of the Federal judiciary perform the important function of interpreting the Constitution of the United States and administering justice in a fair and impartial manner.
(2) In recent years, partially as a result of the rise in the use of social media and online access to information, members of the Federal judiciary have been exposed to an increased number of personal threats in connection to their role. The ease of access to free or inexpensive sources of covered information has considerably lowered the effort required for malicious actors to discover where individuals live and where they spend leisure hours and to find information about their family members. Such threats have included calling a judge a traitor with references to mass shootings and serial killings, calling for an “angry mob” to gather outside a home of a judge and, in reference to a judge on the court of appeals of the United States, stating how easy it would be to “get them”.
(3) Between 2015 and 2019, threats and other inappropriate communications against Federal judges and other judiciary personnel increased from 926 in 2015 to approximately 4,449 in 2019.
(4) Over the past decade, several members of the Federal judiciary have experienced acts of violence against themselves or a family member in connection to their Federal judiciary role, including the murder in 2005 of the family of Joan Lefkow, a judge for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
(5) On Sunday July 19, 2020, an assailant went to the home of Esther Salas, a judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, impersonating a package delivery driver, opening fire upon arrival, and killing Daniel Anderl, the 20-year-old only son of Judge Salas, and seriously wounding Mark Anderl, her husband.
(6) In the aftermath of the recent tragedy that occurred to Judge Salas and in response to the continuous rise of threats against members of the Federal judiciary, there is an immediate need for enhanced security procedures and increased availability of tools to protect Federal judges and their families.
(b) Purpose.—The purpose of this Act is to improve the safety and security of Federal judges, including senior, recalled, or retired Federal judges, and their immediate family to ensure Federal judges are able to administer justice fairly without fear of personal reprisal from individuals affected by the decisions they make in the course of carrying out their public duties.
In this Act:
(1) AT-RISK INDIVIDUAL.—The term “at-risk individual” means—
(A) a Federal judge; or
(B) a senior, recalled, or retired Federal judge.
(2) COVERED INFORMATION.—The term “covered information” means—
(A) a home address, including primary residence or secondary residences;
(B) a home or personal mobile telephone number, or the direct telephone number of a Government-issued cell phone or private extension in the chambers of an at-risk individual;
(C) a personal email address;
(D) the social security number, driver’s license number, or home address displayed on voter registration information;
(E) a bank account or credit or debit card information;
(F) the home or other address displayed on property tax records or held by a Federal, State, or local government agency of an at-risk individual, including a secondary residence and any investment property at which an at-risk individual resides for part of a year;
(G) a license plate number or home address displayed on vehicle registration information;
(H) the identification of children of an at-risk individual under the age of 18;
(I) the full date of birth;
(J) a photograph of any vehicle that legibly displays the license plate or a photograph of a residence that legibly displays the address of the residence;
(K) the name and address of a school or day care facility attended by immediate family; or
(L) the name and address of an employer of immediate family.
(3) DATA BROKER.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term “data broker” means a commercial entity engaged in collecting, assembling, or maintaining personal information concerning an individual who is not a customer, client, or an employee of that entity in order to sell the information or otherwise profit from providing third-party access to the information.
(B) EXCLUSION.—The term “data broker” does not include a commercial entity engaged in the following activities:
(i) Engaging in reporting, news-gathering, speaking, or other activities intended to inform the public on matters of public interest or public concern.
(ii) Providing 411 directory assistance or directory information services, including name, address, and telephone number, on behalf of or as a function of a telecommunications carrier.
(iii) Using personal information internally, providing access to businesses under common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, or selling or providing data for a transaction or service requested by or concerning the individual whose personal information is being transferred.
(iv) Providing publicly available information via real-time or near-real-time alert services for health or safety purposes.
(v) A consumer reporting agency subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).
(vi) A financial institution to subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Public Law 106–102) and regulations implementing that Act.
(vii) A covered entity for purposes of the privacy regulations promulgated under section 264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note).
(viii) The collection and sale or licensing of covered information incidental to conducting the activities described in clauses (i) through (vii).
(4) FEDERAL JUDGE.—The term “Federal judge” means—
(A) a justice of the United States or a judge of the United States, as those terms are defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code;
(B) a bankruptcy judge appointed under section 152 of title 28, United States Code;
(C) a United States magistrate judge appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code;
(D) a judge confirmed by the United States Senate and empowered by statute in any commonwealth, territory, or possession to perform the duties of a Federal judge;
(E) a judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims appointed under section 171 of title 28, United States Code;
(F) a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims appointed under section 7253 of title 38, United States Code;
(G) a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces appointed under section 942 of title 10, United States Code;
(H) a judge of the United States Tax Court appointed under section 7443 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
(I) a special trial judge of the United States Tax Court appointed under section 7443A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(5) GOVERNMENT AGENCY.—The term “Government agency” includes—
(A) an Executive agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code; and
(B) any agency in the judicial branch or legislative branch.
(6) IMMEDIATE FAMILY.—The term “immediate family” means a spouse, child, or parent of an at-risk individual or any other familial relative of an at-risk individual whose permanent residence is the same as the at-risk individual.
(7) SOCIAL MEDIA.—The term “social media” means any online electronic medium, a live-chat system, or an electronic dating service—
(A) that primarily serves as a medium for users to interact with content generated by other third-party users of the medium;
(B) that enables users to create accounts or profiles specific to the medium or to import profiles from another medium; and
(C) that enables one or more users to generate content that can be viewed by other third-party users of the medium.
(8) TRANSFER.—The term “transfer” means to sell, license, trade, or exchange for consideration the covered information of an at-risk individual or immediate family.
SEC. 4. PROTECTING COVERED INFORMATION IN PUBLIC RECORDS.
(a) Government Agencies.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each at-risk individual may—
(A) file written notice of the status of the individual as an at-risk individual, for themselves and immediate family, with each Government agency that includes information necessary to ensure compliance with this section, as determined by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts; and
(B) request that each Government agency described in subparagraph (A) mark as private their covered information and that of their immediate family.
(2) NO PUBLIC POSTING.—Government agencies shall not publicly post or display publicly available content that includes covered information of an at-risk individual or immediate family. Government agencies, upon receipt of a written request under paragraph (1)(A), shall remove the covered information of the at-risk individual or immediate family from publicly available content not later than 72 hours after such receipt.
(3) EXCEPTIONS.—Nothing in this section shall prohibit a Government agency from providing access to records containing the covered information of a Federal judge to a third party if the third party—
(A) possesses a signed release from the Federal judge or a court order;
(B) is subject to the requirements of title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.); or
(C) executes a confidentiality agreement with the Government agency.
(b) Delegation Of Authority.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—
(A) ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS.—Upon written request of an at-risk individual, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is authorized to make any notice or request required or authorized by this section on behalf of the at-risk individual. The notice or request shall include information necessary to ensure compliance with this section, as determined by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The Director may delegate this authority under section 602(d) of title 28, United States Code. Any notice or request made under this subsection shall be deemed to have been made by the at-risk individual and comply with the notice and request requirements of this section.
(B) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS.—Upon written request of an at-risk individual described in section 3(4)(F), the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is authorized to make any notice or request required or authorized by this section on behalf of the at-risk individual. Any notice or request made under this subsection shall be deemed to have been made by the at-risk individual and comply with the notice and request requirements of this section.
(C) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES.—Upon written request of an at-risk individual described in section 3(4)(G), the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is authorized to make any notice or request required or authorized by this section on behalf of the at-risk individual. Any notice or request made under this subsection shall be deemed to have been made by the at-risk individual and comply with the notice and request requirements of this section.
(D) UNITED STATES TAX COURT.—Upon written request of an at-risk individual described in subparagraph (H) or (I) of section 3(4), the chief judge of the United States Tax Court is authorized to make any notice or request required or authorized by this section on behalf of the at-risk individual. Any notice or request made under this subsection shall be deemed to have been made by the at-risk individual and comply with the notice and request requirements of this section.
(2) LIST.—In lieu of individual notices or requests, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, or a Federal judge described in subparagraph (F), (G), (H), or (I) of section 3(4), as applicable, may provide Government agencies, State and local governments, data brokers, persons, businesses, or associations with a list of at-risk individuals and their immediate family that includes information necessary to ensure compliance with this section, as determined by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the purpose of maintaining compliance with this section. Such list shall be deemed to comply with individual notice and request requirements of this section.
(c) State And Local Governments.—
(1) GRANT PROGRAM TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION OF AT-RISK INDIVIDUALS OR IMMEDIATE FAMILY.—
(A) AUTHORIZATION.—The Attorney General may make grants to prevent the release of covered information of at-risk individuals and immediate family (in this subsection referred to as “judges’ covered information”) to the detriment of such individuals or their families to an entity that—
(i) is—
(I) a State or unit of local government, as defined in section 901 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (34 U.S.C. 10251); or
(II) an agency of a State or unit of local government; and
(ii) operates a State or local database or registry that contains covered information.
(B) APPLICATION.—An entity seeking a grant under this section shall submit to the Attorney General an application at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Attorney General may reasonably require.
(2) SCOPE OF GRANTS.—Grants made under this subsection may be used to create or expand programs designed to protect judges’ covered information, including through—
(A) the creation of programs to redact or remove judges’ covered information, upon the request of an at-risk individual, from public records in State agencies, including hiring a third party to redact or remove judges’ covered information from public records;
(B) the expansion of existing programs that the State may have enacted in an effort to protect judges’ covered information;
(C) the development or improvement of protocols, procedures, and policies to prevent the release of judges’ covered information;
(D) the defrayment of costs of modifying or improving existing databases and registries to ensure that judges’ covered information is covered from release; and
(E) the development of confidential opt out systems that will enable at-risk individuals to make a single request to keep judges’ covered information out of multiple databases or registries.
(3) REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives an annual report that includes—
(i) a detailed amount spent by States and local governments on protecting judges’ covered information;
(ii) where the judges’ covered information was found; and
(iii) the collection of any new types of personal data found to be used to identify judges who have received threats, including prior home addresses, employers, and institutional affiliations such as nonprofit boards.
(B) STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—States and local governments that receive funds under this section shall submit to the Comptroller General of the United States a report on data described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) to be included in the report required under that subparagraph.
(d) Data Brokers And Other Businesses.—
(1) PROHIBITIONS.—
(A) DATA BROKERS.—It shall be unlawful for a data broker to knowingly sell, license, trade for consideration, or purchase covered information of an at-risk individual or immediate family.
(B) OTHER BUSINESSES.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), no person, business, or association shall publicly post or publicly display on the internet covered information of an at-risk individual or immediate family if the at-risk individual has made a written request to that person, business, or association to not disclose the covered information of the at-risk individual or immediate family.
(ii) EXCEPTIONS.—Clause (i) shall not apply to—
(I) the display on the internet of the covered information of an at-risk individual or immediate family if the information is relevant to and displayed as part of a news story, commentary, editorial, or other speech on a matter of public concern;
(II) covered information that the at-risk individual voluntarily publishes on the internet after the date of enactment of this Act; or
(III) covered information received from a Federal Government source (or from an employee or agent of the Federal Government).
(2) REQUIRED CONDUCT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—After receiving a written request under paragraph (1)(B), the person, business, or association shall—
(i) remove within 72 hours the covered information from the internet and ensure that the information is not made available on any website or subsidiary website controlled by that person, business, or association; and
(ii) ensure that the covered information of the at-risk individual or immediate family is not made available on any website or subsidiary website controlled by that person, business, or association.
(B) TRANSFER.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), after receiving a written request under paragraph (1)(B), the person, business, or association shall not transfer the covered information of the at-risk individual or immediate family to any other person, business, or association through any medium.
(ii) EXCEPTIONS.—Clause (i) shall not apply to—
(I) the transfer of the covered information of the at-risk individual or immediate family if the information is relevant to and displayed as part of a news story, commentary, editorial, or other speech on a matter of public concern;
(II) covered information that the at-risk individual or immediate family voluntarily publishes on the internet after the date of enactment of this Act; or
(III) a transfer made at the request of the at-risk individual or that is necessary to effectuate a request to the person, business, or association from the at-risk individual.
(e) Redress And Penalties.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—An at-risk individual or their immediate family whose covered information is made public as a result of a violation of this Act may bring an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in any court of competent jurisdiction. If the court grants injunctive or declaratory relief, the person, business, or association responsible for the violation shall be required to pay the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the at-risk individual or immediate family, as applicable.
(2) PENALTIES AND DAMAGES.—If a person, business, or association knowingly violates an order granting injunctive or declarative relief under paragraph (1), the court issuing such order may—
(A) if the person, business, or association is a government agency—
(i) impose a fine not greater than $4,000; and
(ii) award to the at-risk individual or their immediate family, as applicable, court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
(B) if the person, business, or association is not a government agency, award to the at-risk individual or their immediate family, as applicable—
(i) an amount equal to the actual damages sustained by the at-risk individual or their immediate family; and
(ii) court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
SEC. 5. TRAINING AND EDUCATION.
Amounts appropriated to the Federal judiciary for fiscal year 2022, and each fiscal year thereafter, may be used for biannual judicial security training for active, senior, or recalled Federal judges described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 3(4) and their immediate family, including—
(1) best practices for using social media and other forms of online engagement and for maintaining online privacy;
(2) home security program and maintenance;
(3) understanding removal programs and requirements for covered information; and
(4) any other judicial security training that the United States Marshals Services and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts determines is relevant.
SEC. 6. VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY.
(a) Authorization.—
(1) VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY.—The Federal judiciary is authorized to perform all necessary functions consistent with the provisions of this Act and to support existing threat management capabilities within the United States Marshals Service and other relevant Federal law enforcement and security agencies for Federal judges described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) of section 3(4), including—
(A) monitoring the protection of at-risk individuals and judiciary assets;
(B) managing the monitoring of websites for covered information of at-risk individuals or immediate family and remove or limit the publication of such information;
(C) receiving, reviewing, and analyzing complaints by at-risk individuals of threats, whether direct or indirect, and report such threats to law enforcement partners; and
(D) providing training described in section 5.
(2) VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT FOR CERTAIN ARTICLE I COURTS.—The functions and support authorized in paragraph (1) shall be authorized as follows:
(A) The chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is authorized to perform such functions and support for the Federal judges described in section 3(4)(F).
(B) The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is authorized to perform such functions and support for the Federal judges described in section 3(4)(G).
(C) The United States Tax Court is authorized to perform such functions and support for the Federal judges described in subparagraphs (H) and (I) of section 3(4).
(3) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 604(a) of title 28, United States Code is amended—
(A) in paragraph (23), by striking “and” at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (24) as paragraph (25); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (23) the following:
“(24) Establish and administer a vulnerability management program in the judicial branch; and”.
(b) Expansion Of Capabilities Of Office Of Protective Intelligence.—The United States Marshals Service is authorized to expand the current capabilities of the Office of Protective Intelligence of the Judicial Security Division to increase the workforce of the Office of Protective Intelligence to include additional intelligence analysts, United States deputy marshals, and any other relevant personnel to ensure that the Office of Protective Intelligence is ready and able to perform all necessary functions, consistent with the provisions of this Act, in order to anticipate and deter threats to the judiciary, including—
(1) assigning personnel to State and major urban area fusion and intelligence centers for the specific purpose of identifying potential threats against the judiciary and coordinating responses to such potential threats;
(2) expanding the use of investigative analysts, physical security specialists, and intelligence analysts at the 94 judicial districts and territories to enhance the management of local and distant threats and investigations; and
(3) increasing the number of United States Marshal Service personnel for the protection of the judicial function and assigned to protective operations and details for the judiciary.
(c) Report.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the United States Tax Court, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the security of Federal judges arising from Federal prosecutions and civil litigation.
(2) DESCRIPTION.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall describe—
(A) the number and nature of threats and assaults against at-risk individuals handling prosecutions and other matters described in paragraph (1) and the reporting requirements and methods;
(B) the security measures that are in place to protect at-risk individuals handling prosecutions described in paragraph (1), including threat assessments, response procedures, the availability of security systems and other devices, firearms licensing such as deputations, and other measures designed to protect the at-risk individuals and their immediate family; and
(C) for each requirement, measure, or policy described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), when the requirement, measure, or policy was developed and who was responsible for developing and implementing the requirement, measure, or policy.
SEC. 7. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) In General.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed—
(1) to prohibit, restrain, or limit—
(A) the lawful investigation or reporting by the press of any unlawful activity or misconduct alleged to have been committed by an at-risk individual or their immediate family; or
(B) the reporting on an at-risk individual or their immediate family regarding matters of public concern;
(2) to impair access to decisions and opinions from a Federal judge in the course of carrying out their public functions;
(3) to limit the publication or transfer of covered information that the at-risk individual or their immediate family member voluntarily publishes on the internet after the date of enactment of this Act; or
(4) to prohibit information sharing by a data broker to a Federal, State, Tribal, or local government, or any unit thereof.
(b) Protection Of Covered Information.—This Act shall be broadly construed to favor the protection of the covered information of at-risk individuals and their immediate family.
If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the remaining provisions of this Act and amendments to any person or circumstance shall not be affected.
(a) In General.—Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Exception.—Subsections (c)(1), (d), and (e) of section 4 shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
|
Calendar No. 190 |
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|||||
|
A BILL
|
|||||
|
To improve the safety and security of the Federal judiciary.
|
|||||
|
December 16, 2021
|
|||||
|
Reported with an amendment
|
LIT’s Still Lighting Up Unlawful versus Lawful Debt Collectin’ Law Firms in Texas – Laws In Texas, No Bull. Just the Truth. https://t.co/v1TCsoHuq1 @LewisBrisbois @SecJaneNelson @merissahansen17 @hollyshansen @DonHuffines @KingsleyCortes @LCDLAW1 @RobertTGarrett @tomgglass @ABC pic.twitter.com/0koYvHyW3e
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) June 1, 2023
Mark Lane Hornsby
LIT Audit Results: LIT holds ZERO data on Magistrate Judge Mark L Hornsby
The following page has references to Hornsby, a case citation to a plaintiff of same surname.
Matthew Kacsmaryk
LIT Audit Results: LIT holds ZERO data on Federal Judge Kacsmaryk.
The following page has three references to Kacsmaryk
The reference is from a republished “Dallas Morning News” article, which is still active (paywalled).
The following page has two references to Kacsmaryk
The reference is from a republished “Rollcall.com” article, which is still active.
There’s also a link to the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire and a web archive page about the judge from NDTX US Courts website.
John DeGravelles
LIT Audit Results: LIT holds ZERO data on Federal Judge DeGravelles.
The following page has two references to John DeGravelles
The reference is from a republished “The Advocate” article, which is still active.
Sul Ozerden
LIT Audit Results: LIT holds ZERO data on Federal Judge Ozerden.
The following page has two references to Sul Ozerden
The following page republishes active Politico article(s) regarding Sul Ozerden
The following page republishes active Politico article(s) regarding Sul Ozerden
Taylor McNeel
LIT Audit Results: LIT holds ZERO data on Federal Judge McNeel.
“We need to hide personal information which can be used against us by LIT to show how corrupt our gov. and judiciary has become” Ain’t that the real facts behind this direct retaliation and unconstitutional privacy act? @CoryBooker @SenatorMenendez @DickDurbin @LindseyGrahamSC pic.twitter.com/L07bzSNCvA
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) June 4, 2023
The Greatest Theft of Housing Is Executed by the Judicial Branch Acting Maliciously and Corruptly
This hard won Equitable Subrogation case is another Twist on Real Estate Loans and Lien Laws and which the Courts tried to apply as a Sword.
Texas Supreme Court Affirms Time-Barred Foreclosure Decision in Landmark Bank Loss
Bandit Appellate Lawyer Mark Hopkins was relegated to second chair at Supreme Court oral argument as his case crumbled before the court.
A Federal Notice of Appeal is Not Limited to 30 Days, that’s a Judicial Rule Subordinate to Statute
Re: timeliness of appeals in federal civil cases: Section 2107 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code (a federal statute) v FRAP 4 (a court-made rule).
