LIT COMMENTARY
ORDER:
The Court ORDERS the following:
(1) Mr. Ryan A. Daniel is hereby SANCTIONED in the amount of $1,000 payable to the Clerk of this Court no later than December 24, 2024;
(2) Mr. Ryan A. Daniel must file the appearance of local counsel, certify in writing to the Court that he resides within the Northern District in compliance with Local Rule 83.10(a), or move to withdraw as counsel of record for Plaintiff no later than December 17, 2024;
(3) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaims (ECF No. 33 ) is GRANTED;
Plaintiff’s 30 answer to Defendants’ counterclaims is hereby STRICKEN from the record.
(Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 12/13/2024) (saw)
(Entered: 12/13/2024)
ADR |
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
11/18/2024 | 35 | MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 11/18/2024) |
11/18/2024 | 36 | Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation re 35 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 11/18/2024) |
11/18/2024 | 37 | Appendix in Support filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation re 36 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) / Appendix) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 11/18/2024) |
11/19/2024 | 38 | ORDER:It is therefore ORDERED that the Court’s previous 2 referral of this matter to Judge Cureton is RESCINDED. Thus, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to return this case to the docket of the undersigned. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 11/19/2024) (saw) (Entered: 11/19/2024) |
12/03/2024 | 39 | ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: the parties are ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE explaining their noncompliance with the Courts Scheduling Order on or before December 9, 2024. In the alternative, the parties may obviate their need to show cause by filing the required mediation report by that same date. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 12/3/2024) (wxc) (Entered: 12/03/2024) |
12/09/2024 | 40 | ORDER: Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 35 . Having considered the filing, the Court hereby REFERS this Motion and related filings to the same to United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cureton. Motion referred to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 12/9/2024) (saw) (Entered: 12/09/2024) |
12/09/2024 | 41 | RESPONSE filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation re: 39 Order to Show Cause/Order to Answer, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) A-1, # 3 Exhibit(s) A-2, # 4 Exhibit(s) A-3, # 5 Exhibit(s) A-4) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 12/09/2024) |
12/11/2024 | 42 | ORDER: The Court SETS a hearing on the Show Cause Order for 2:00 p.m. tomorrow, Thursday, December 12, 2024, in the FourthFloor Courtroom of the Eldon B. Mahon United States Courthouse, 501 W. 10th St., Fort Worth, Texas, 76102. Failure of Plaintiff to appear at the hearing will result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice for want of prosecution without further notice. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 12/11/2024) (saw) (Entered: 12/11/2024) |
12/12/2024 | 43 | ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Mark Pittman: Show Cause Hearing held on 12/12/2024. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff – N/A; Defense – Matthew Hansen. (Court Reporter: Monica Guzman) (No exhibits) Time in Court – :15. (chmb) (Entered: 12/12/2024) |
12/13/2024 | 44 | MOTION to Strike 30 Amended Complaint filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (See 33 for Image.) (saw) (Entered: 12/13/2024) |
12/13/2024 | 45 | ORDER: The Court ORDERS the following: (1) Mr. Ryan A. Daniel is hereby SANCTIONED in the amount of $1,000 payable to the Clerk of this Court no later than December 24, 2024; (2) Mr. Ryan A. Daniel must file the appearance of local counsel, certify in writing to the Court that he resides within the Northern District in compliance with Local Rule 83.10(a), or move to withdraw as counsel of record for Plaintiff no later than December 17, 2024; (3) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaims (ECF No. 33 ) is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s 30 answer to Defendants’ counterclaims is hereby STRICKEN from the record. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 12/13/2024) (saw) (Entered: 12/13/2024) |
12/13/2024 | 46 | ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS to 36 Brief/Memorandum in Support of Motion, 35 Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 12/13/2024) |
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12/13/2024 15:16:48 |
ORDER
This case was filed on January 8, 2024. ECF No. 1. At the time of filing Plaintiff was proceeding pro se. Id. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton. ECF No. 2.
Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained counsel and is thus no longer proceeding pro se in this matter.
See ECF No. 9.
Consequently, the undersigned finds it prudent to withdraw the pretrial referral and return this case to the Court’s docket.
It is therefore ORDERED that the Court’s previous referral of this matter to Judge Cureton is RESCINDED.
Thus, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to return this case to the docket of the undersigned.
MARK T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SPOT THE ADR - TOP RIGHT...
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
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07/05/2024 | 34 | Designation of Experts by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 07/05/2024) |
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10/29/2024 18:28:51 |
The mock pre-trial play continues in Fort Worth Judicial Arts District.
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
07/05/2024 | 34 | Designation of Experts by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 07/05/2024) |
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08/21/2024 11:06:05 |
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
There are proceedings for case 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ but none satisfy the selection criteria.
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08/03/2024 14:37:49 |
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
05/29/2024 | 33 | ANSWER to 30 Amended Complaint,, filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. Attorneys are further reminded that, if necessary, they must comply with Local Rule 83.10(a) within 14 days or risk the possible dismissal of this case without prejudice or without further notice. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendants’ 12(F) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaims) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 05/29/2024) |
07/05/2024 | 34 | Designation of Experts by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 07/05/2024) |
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07/23/2024 19:22:09 |
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
There are proceedings for case 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ but none satisfy the selection criteria.
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06/23/2024 09:05:20 |
Answer to Amended Complaint (Transcribed by LIT further in this article)
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
05/01/2024 | 30 | AMENDED COMPLAINT and ANSWER TO COUNTERLAIMS against All Defendants filed by Dianne Dorman. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Daniel, Ryan) (Entered: 05/01/2024) |
05/14/2024 | 31 | Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 05/14/2024) |
05/15/2024 | 32 | ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 31 Defendants’ Opposed Motion to Extend Time to File Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Defendants shall file their answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint no later than 05/29/2024. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 5/15/2024) (chmb) (Entered: 05/15/2024) |
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05/24/2024 09:30:27 |
AMENDED COMPLAINT and ANSWER TO COUNTERLAIMS against All Defendants filed by Dianne Dorman.
Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here:
Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge.
(Daniel, Ryan) (Entered: 05/01/2024)
Totally expected response when obtaining docket update today. Y’all couldn’t have telegraphed your intentions any more clearly.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME and FOR CLARIFICATION
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant asks the Court to extend the time to file its amended petition, as authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), and to clarify or expand upon its January 10th, 2024 order requiring Plaintiff to re-plead.
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiff is Dianne Dorman; defendants are Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 and PHH Mortgage Corporation.
2. Plaintiff sued defendant for attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s homestead without following the requirements set out by the Texas Property Code, for violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act, and for violations of Federal Regulation X.
3. The Court ordered Plaintiff to re-plead on January 10th, 2024, however, counsel for Plaintiff miss- read/miss-understood the order and did not realize that it was an order to replead, but instead thought that it was an order stating that if re-pleading is necessary, it must be done by the date stated in that order.
Once the second order to re-plead by April 15th, 2024 was served on Plaintiff’s counsel, it was then apparent that the court saw a defect in Plaintiff’s petition and was ordering Plaintiff to re-plead.
4. Plaintiff must re-plead its petition by April 15th 2024.
5. Plaintiff began drafting and then filed this motion to extend time as soon as she became aware of the need for additional time and before the deadline, which was approximately 4:00p.m. on April 15th, 2024.
This was after a week of researching the issues brought up by the court in the order, off and on, and comparing them to Plaintiff’s petition to see what needed to be amended.
Then, after spending most of the day on this again on April 15th, 2024, it became apparent to Plaintiff at approximately 4:00p.m. that it was unclear as to what the court saw was wrong with Plaintiff’s petition, and Plaintiff therefore decided the best course of action would be to file this motion to extend time in order seek clarification from the court as to what needs to be amended.
B. ARGUMENT
6. A court may grant a request to extend time for good cause.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A); Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394–95 (10th Cir. 2016); Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2010).
7. Plaintiff requests an extension of time to file its amended petition because after a week of researching the issues brought up by the court in the order to amend plaintiff’s petition, off and on, and comparing them to Plaintiff’s petition to see what needed to be amended.
And after spending most of the day on this again on April 15th, 2024, it became apparent to Plaintiff at approximately 4:00p.m. that it was unclear as to what the court saw was wrong with Plaintiff’s petition, and Plaintiff therefore decided the best course of action would be to file this motion to extend time in order seek clarification from the court as to what needs to be amended.
8. Plaintiff asks the Court to extend the deadline until two weeks after the court provides guidance to Plaintiff’s counsel as to what is deficient in Plaintiff’s petition.
9. Plaintiff’s request to extend time is for good cause and is not intended to delay these proceedings.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A).
10. Defendants will not be prejudiced by the extension of time.
Rachel, 820 F.3d at 394–95; Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1259–60.
C. CONCLUSION
11. For these reasons, Plaintiff asks the Court to extend the time to file its amended petition until 2 weeks after the court provides guidance as to what is deficient in Plaintiff’s petition.
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICES OF Ryan Daniel
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
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04/09/2024 | 24 | ELECTRONIC ORDER denying 13 Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff and Memorandum of Law in Support for the reasons stated in Defendants’ response. See also Burke v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 4:21-CV-2591, 2022 WL 4597975, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2022). The Court notes that a motion to intervene is a non-dispositive, pretrial matter. See, e.g., MT223, LLC, v. Depositors Ins. Co., No. MO:21-CV-00044-DC-RCG, 2022 WL 20507651, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2022). (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/9/2024) (Entered: 04/09/2024) |
04/11/2024 | 25 | Mark Stephen Burke’s as Proposed Intervenor’s Reply to Defendant’s Response and Objection to Timely Intervention filed by Mark Stephen Burke re: 15 Response (wxc) (Entered: 04/12/2024) |
04/15/2024 | 26 | First MOTION to Extend Time to re-plead filed by Dianne Dorman (Daniel, Ryan) (Entered: 04/15/2024) |
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04/16/2024 21:10:04 |
On Friday, Feb. 9, 2024, LIT released a tweet which states; Coming up on LIT: Shocking facts and case studies on the current criminal activity endorsed by the US Gov for implementation by Federal Judges and Wall Street’s Creditor Rights lawyers. Truth that will shake American homeowners to the core. Stay tuned. #TruthRevealed #USJustice
This published foreclosure case is part of the live reporting and investigation, which is explained, in part, below:
LIT’s inquiry delves into the prevailing standards governing foreclosures, Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs), Injunctions, evictions, and appeals. Drawing from rigorous analysis of factual case studies and a wealth of data amassed over years of investigation, LIT’s insights are prominently featured on this legal blog, LawsInTexas.com.
The initial confusion stemming from the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, wherein the US Government, hand in hand with the judiciary, orchestrated the mass seizure of millions of homes, is a focal point of LIT’s examination.
LIT refrains from extensively elaborating on the myriad frauds that transpired initially, such as lender application fraud and predatory lending which resulted in the financial crisis, and thus leading to counterfeit assignments, robo-signing, document falsification, perjury, and the unlawful actions of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) in foreclosing on homesteads.
Instead, LIT steers the discussion toward the avarice evident within the legal profession and the complicit role of the judiciary in perpetuating fraud in real estate and title deed matters, beyond the scandals within their own administration.
LIT’s live reporting and investigation is published in real-time, as it probes into the motivations driving the US Government’s directive for the judiciary to adopt predatory practices in the latter part of 2023 and throughout 2024—an inquiry to which LIT claims to hold the key answers.
Returning to this published foreclosure case, the controlling question raised is how many orders of foreclosure are required in Texas law?
THE MAY 2021 FEDERAL COURT ORDER OF FORECLOSURE
For example, after removal in a 2020, Judge Pittman issued an amended order of foreclosure in compliance with Dykema’s request on May 31, 2021. Allegedly, this should satisfy all the necessary requirements to effect foreclosure, but that didn’t happen.
THE SEPTEMBER 2023 STATE LAWSUIT BY DEUTSCHE BANK, ET AL
Why Deutsche Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation felt it necessary to sue Dorman in state court on Sep. 8, 2023 for an expedited foreclosure (Rule 736), and after she exited her latest dismissed bankruptcy is nonsensical. (CASE No. 153-345587-23).
There’s now a second order of foreclosure dated Nov. 15, 2023, this time in state court at the request of the Catholic Bandit and the Wolves of Texas, aka foreclosure mill Mackie Wolf, and which appears to mirror the Dykema/Pittman order of foreclosure issued in May of 2021.
You’d think that would be enough?
DORMAN SUES DEUTSCHE BANK IN STATE COURT TO STOP JAN. 2, 2024 FORECLOSURE SALE
Not so, as on Dec. 28, 2023, just prior to the Jan. 2, 2024 scheduled foreclosure, Dorman filed to stop the auction, correctly relying upon Rule 736 and naming the mortgage servicer, PHH Mortgage Corporation as a party.
(DIANNE DORMAN VS. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES, 048-349030-23).
That stated, that was only part one of foreclosure defense lawyer Ryan Daniel’s required acts to reverse the 736 Order of foreclosure. In order to complete the task at hand, he would have to file a motion to vacate, which was not present on the docket prior to the Jan. 2, 2024 sale, nor was there a TRO/bond (as the Petition requested in the alternative).
See; In re Priester, No. 05-16-00965-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 21, 2016)
(“Rule 736 also provides the respondent with the means to abate and vacate a foreclosure order issued under these rules by
(1) timely filing a separate, original proceeding putting in issue any matter related to the origination, servicing, or enforcement of the loan agreement, contract, or lien sought to be foreclosed,
and
(2) timely-filing a motion to vacate the foreclosure order. TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.11(a)”)
The docket in the Dorman case does not show a motion to vacate was ever filed.*
*LIT does see in the Prayer section (Page 14 of Dorman’s petition) a discussion about filing the motion to vacate with a proposed order – none was filed – but LIT avers based on In re Priester was necessary to stop the foreclosure and reverse the judgment.
Dorman’s attorney did not file the motion to vacate within the ten days of filing the petition. See; In re Breitling, No. 05-17-00043-CV, at *4 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 2017) (“it was not filed within ten days of filing the independent lawsuit”).
However, the Wolves of Texas arrived on the tenth day via the Catholic Bandit and removed the case to federal court, having stopped the foreclosure sale rather than continue with the sale (as happened in the Breitling case).
In short, LIT avers as non-lawyers, non-prisoners, the foreclosure sale could have proceeded.
JUDGE PITTMAN RECEIVES THE REMOVAL NEWS ON JAN. 8, 2024
This case has been removed back to federal court in 2024, and notably, back to Judge Mark Pittman, who really isn’t happy about foreclosure mills bringing state court federal cases into federal court.
LIT’s sure he’ll be even more disgruntled that he wrote an order of foreclosure nearly 2 years ago which has not even been considered in the subsequent litigation.
Alas, we know how Judge Pittman feels, we’ve witnessed similar acts in our cases where controlling facts are discounted to allow for manipulated opinions. This time, the homeowner has obtained this benefit.
CONCLUSION
LIT suggests, based on prior case studies in Texas courts, that because Dorman was represented by counsel, this materially influenced Mackie Wolf’s decision to cancel the foreclosure auction for her homestead.
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
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04/03/2024 | 20 | SECOND ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiff, no later than April 15, 2024, shall file an Amended Complaint that complies with the Court’s January 10, 2024 Order. Failure to timely file an amended complaint could result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice for lack of prosecution without further notice. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/3/2024) (saw) (Entered: 04/03/2024) |
04/05/2024 | 21 | ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS to 15 Response/Objection by Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 04/05/2024) |
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04/07/2024 13:46:14 |
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(4:24-cv-00024)
District Court, N.D. Texas
JAN 8, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: FEB 8, 2024
Judge Pittman previously questioned removal of the prior Dorman case, where he stated, in part, “the Court must seriously question the wisdom of it being litigated in federal court versus state court…it does not involve any weighty issue of federal law”. It returns once more. pic.twitter.com/qDIo9tlZiw
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 8, 2024
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”) and PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH,” collectively “Defendants”) file this Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition Subject to Defendants’ 12(f) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaims (the “Complaint”) (Doc. 30) and respectfully shows the following:
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS
1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Defendants hereby move the Court to strike Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s Answer to Defendants’ Original Counterclaim filed on May 1, 2024, because it was untimely filed.
Defendants respectfully show the Court as follows:
2. Under Rule 12(f), the Court may “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
The Fifth Circuit has stated that motions to strike are generally disfavored.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1058 (5th Cir.1982).
Although motions to strike are generally disfavored, a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is proper when the defense is insufficient as a matter of law.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 677 F.2d at 1057; see also Berry v. Lee, 428 F.Supp.2d 546, 563 (N.D.Tex.2006).
“Rule 12(f) motions require a showing of prejudice.”
Landmark Graphics Corp. v. Paradigm Geophysical Corp., 2007 WL 189333, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2007) (Rosenthal, J.).
The Court possesses considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to strike.
FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F.Supp. 441, 449 (N.D.Tex.1993).
3. Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 28, 2023, in the 48th Judicial District Court for Tarrant County, Texas, Cause No. 048-349030-23. (Doc. No. 1-1).
4. Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 8, 2024. (Doc. No. 1).
5. Defendants filed their Original Answer and Counterclaim against Plaintiff on January 12, 2024. (Doc. No. 6).
Defendants asserted a counterclaim for non-judicial foreclosure and judicial foreclosure based on their authority to foreclose on the subject Property pursuant to the Security Instrument, as owners and holders of the Note, and as mortgagees of record.
Id. at ¶¶ 28-50.
6. Plaintiff was served a copy of Defendants’ Original Answer and Counterclaim through her attorney of record, Ryan Daniel, via the federal electronic court filing system on January 12, 2024.
7. Plaintiff was required to file an answer or other responsive pleading to Defendants’ counterclaim within 21 days of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(B).
Thus, Plaintiff’s answer or other responsive pleading was due on or around February 2, 2024.
8. Plaintiff filed an untimely Answer to Defendants’ Original Counterclaim on May 1, 2024, as part of her First Amended Complaint.
(Doc. No. 30 at ¶¶ 46-54).
9. The defenses asserted in Plaintiff’s answer fail as a matter of law because they are untimely filed according to the federal rules.
Moreover, this is not the first time that Plaintiff has disregarded clear pleading deadlines and Orders of this Court.
(See generally, Doc. Nos. 5, 20, 26).
The Court should not reward such behavior which prejudices Defendants by unduly delaying this proceeding.
Defendants are further prejudiced because the deadline to amend pleadings, including their counterclaim, has already passed on April 1, 2024.
(Doc. No. 10).
10. Based on the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendants’ Original Counterclaim at paragraphs 46-54 of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be stricken in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, Defendants request that the Court grant this 12(f) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendants’ Original Counterclaim filed on May 1, 2024, and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER
1. The allegations in paragraph 1 are of no effect and require no response as this matter has been removed to federal court.
2. The allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 2 state a legal conclusion to which no response is required. The allegations in the second sentence of paragraph 2 are not factual allegations requiring a response. To the extent a response is required to any of the allegations in paragraph 2, Defendants deny the allegations.
3. The allegations in paragraph 3 require no response because Defendant Deutsche Bank has appeared in this action and does not contest in personam jurisdiction.
4. The allegations in paragraph 4 require no response because Defendant PHH has appeared in this action and does not contest in personam jurisdiction.
5. The allegations in paragraph 5 are of no effect and require no response because this matter has been removed to federal court. Defendants do not contest venue.
6. The allegations in paragraph 6 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 6.
7. Defendants lack knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 7. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7.
8. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 8, Defendants admit only that the pertinent loan documents speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations in paragraph 8.
9. Defendants lack knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 9. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 9.
10. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 10.
11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11.
12. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 12.
13. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 13.
14. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 14.
15. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 15.
16. The allegations in paragraph 16 require no response.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.
17. The allegations in paragraph 17 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
18. The allegations in paragraph 18 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited statute speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
19. The allegations in paragraph 19 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
20. The allegations in paragraph 20 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
21. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21.
22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22.
Defendants further deny Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 22 or any other relief.
23. The allegations in paragraph 23 require no response.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.
24. The allegations in paragraph 24 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited statutes speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
25. The allegations in paragraph 25 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
26. The allegations in paragraph 26 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only that the cited statute speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
27. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27.
28. The allegations in paragraph 28 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
29. The allegations in paragraph 29 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited statute speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
30. The allegations in paragraph 30 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited statute and case law speak for themselves and deny the remaining allegations.
31. Defendants deny the allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 31.
The remaining allegations in paragraph 31 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited statutes speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
32. The allegations in paragraph 32 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
33. The allegations in paragraph 33 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
34. The allegations in paragraph 34 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law and statute speak for themselves and deny any remaining allegations.
35. The allegations in paragraph 35 state legal conclusions to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
36. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36.
37. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37, including each of its subparts (a.- d.).
38. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 38. Defendants further deny Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 38 or any other relief.
39. The allegations in paragraph 39 require no response. To the extent a response is required, Defendants incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.
40. The allegations in paragraph 40 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited regulation speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
41. The allegations in paragraph 41 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited regulation speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
42. The allegations in paragraph 42, including each of its subparts (a.-c.), state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited regulation speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
43. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 43.
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44.
45. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 45. Defendants further deny Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 45 or any other relief.
46. Paragraph 46 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 46. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.1
47. Paragraph 47 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 47. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein
1 Defendants’ answer and responses to Paragraphs 46-54 of the Complaint are asserted subject to and without waiving the Defendants’ 12(f) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaims plead herein.
all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
48. Paragraph 48 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 48. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
49. Paragraph 49 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 49. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
50. Paragraph 50 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 50. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
51. Paragraph 51 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 51. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
52. Paragraph 52 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 52. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
53. Paragraph 53 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 53. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
54. Paragraph 54 contains Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, no response from Defendants is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 54. Defendants incorporate by reference and reallege herein all allegations, requests for relief, and any other statements in their counterclaim. Defendants further state they are entitled to all relief sought by their counterclaims.
55. The allegations in paragraph 55 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit only the cited case law speaks for itself and deny any remaining allegations.
56. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 56, Defendants admit only that Plaintiff seeks such relief and otherwise denies any remaining allegations. Defendants further deny Plaintiff is entitled to such relief or any other relief.
57. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 57, Defendants admit only that Plaintiff seeks such relief and otherwise denies any remaining allegations. Defendants further deny Plaintiff
is entitled to such relief or any other relief. Defendants further state Plaintiff’s attorney fees are neither reasonable nor necessary.
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58.
Defendants deny that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief sought in the Prayer of the Complaint or any other relief.
Defendants further seek all relief sought by the counterclaims and incorporate all allegations and requests for relief contained in their counterclaims herein by reference, including but not limited to a declaration from the Court that
(1) Defendants are authorized to enforce the power of sale in the Security Instrument through foreclosure of the subject Property pursuant to Texas Property Code section 51.002, the Note and Security Instrument;
or
(2) alternatively, a judgment foreclosing Defendants’ lien and order of sale.
Defendants further seek to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs.
Except as expressly admitted, qualified, or otherwise pleaded, Defendants deny all allegations contained in the Complaint.2
DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES
Without conceding the burden of proof, Defendants assert the following affirmative defenses:
1. Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and therefore, each of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.
2. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by doctrines of unclean hands, laches, and/or other equitable doctrines.
3. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the statute of frauds.
2 Plaintiff’s “Prayer” was not numbered in the First Amended Complaint.
4. Plaintiff’s claims and damages, if any, are subject to and/or barred by the terms of any relevant and applicable contracts or agreements.
5. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the economic loss doctrine.
6. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of estoppel, in all of its forms, quasi-estoppel, waiver, ratification, release, and/or other equitable doctrines.
7. Plaintiff’s damages are barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.
8. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by set-off, off-set, and recoupment, and PHH and Deutsche Bank claim all credits available to them.
9. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of judicial estoppel, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
10. Plaintiff’s claims are barred or limited, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of proportionate responsibility. Any loss or damage allegedly suffered by Plaintiff was caused by the conduct of Plaintiff or other parties.
11. Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, reasonable, or necessary and are barred, in whole or in part, by failing to present a demand or making an excessive demand.
12. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff failed to allege and prove facts sufficient to support a right to relief.
13. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because one or more of the material obligations of the Note and Security Instrument has not been satisfied by Plaintiff.
14. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.
15. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent.
16. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the release provisions contained in the subject loan modification agreement(s).
17. Any alleged wrongful acts or omissions of Defendants, if and to the extent such acts or omissions occurred, were legally excused or justified and were not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
18. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by Defendants’ compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.
19. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by rescission and/or waiver.
20. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by subrogation in all of its forms, including equitable or contractual.
21. PHH and Deutsche Bank reserve the right to plead such other and/or affirmative defenses which cannot be anticipated at this time, but which may become apparent and applicable during the pendency of this lawsuit, by reason of future discovery.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, PHH and Deutsche Bank request that the Court, upon final hearing hereof, render a judgment that Plaintiff take nothing by way of her claims against Defendants, that this action be dismissed with prejudice, and that Defendants recover their attorneys’ fees and costs and have all other relief, at law or in equity, to which they may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Dianne Dorman, (“Plaintiff(s)”), and serves this, Plaintiff’s Original Petition against Defendants, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2007-NCI, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-NCI and PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION (“Defendant(s)”), and in support thereof, would respectfully show the Court as follows:
I.
Discovery Level
1. Discovery of this matter shall be conducted pursuant to Level 3 pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.
Parties
2. Plaintiff, Dianne Dorman is the owner of the residence located at 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the Residence). Plaintiffs may receive all correspondence and filings via their attorney of record herein.
3. Defendant, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC TRUST 2007-NCI, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-NCI is a trust for holding mortgage- backed securities for which U.S. Bank National Association is the Trustee and conducts business in Tarrant County, Texas and is the current mortgagee per Defendant’s publicly filed foreclosure notice.
Defendant does not have a registered agent listed and therefore may be served through the secretary of state.
4. Defendant, PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION is a mortgage servicer located at 1661 WORTHINGTON RD STE 100 C/O MAIL STO WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33409-6493 and conducts business in Tarrant County, Texas. Defendant may be SERVED through its registered agent, CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY DBA CSC – LAWYERS INCO at 211 E. 7TH STREET SUITE 620 AUSTIN, TX 78701.
III.
Venue
5. Venue is proper in Tarrant County, Texas, as that all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Tarrant County, Texas and it involves real property located in Tarrant County, Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §15.002(a) and §15.011.
IV.
Facts
6. Dianne Dorman, Plaintiff, is the owner of the Residence located at 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092, which is also plaintiff’s homestead. (the “Residence”).
7. Ms. Dorman bought this house in 2005 with mostly cash for $345,000.00, but only needed a loan of $70,000.00. It is now worth about $980,000.00, conservatively.
8. She did complete a Texas Home Equity Loan refinance a year later, raising her mortgage from $70,000.00 to $190,000.00. She has not done another refinance or equity loan since.
9. Up until earlier this year, Ms. Dorman was a corporate executive making very good money, but got into a tragic car accident that caused a brain injury, and she hasn’t been able to get back to her previous job yet. She is currently making about $80,000.00 per year on disability.
10. Ms. Dorman has been fighting with her lender for some time now. Specifically, payments were sent in back in 2014 and 2015 that have never been applied to her loan.
There are also inconsistencies between what the Defendants reported to the IRS as being paid by Plaintiff and what Defendants have advised Plaintiff that she has paid.
Specifically, Defendants have reported payments being made to the IRS but then claim that Plaintiff has not made those very same payments to Plaintiff.
11. Additionally, the lender placed insurance on her mortgage when she was already paying for her homeowner’s insurance and taxes, per her contract with the lender.
She never received any notice that this was going to happen before it had already turned into a big problem for her.
12. Defendants are also now claiming that she owes them $700,000.00, which is impossible by Plaintiff’s calculations, and which is why Plaintiff is requesting that an accounting be ordered.
This is especially concerning since in 2016, after winning an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy against her lender at the time, she was advised she owed $185,000.00.
13. Ms. Dorman never received a 20-Day Notice to Cure, nor did she received a Notice of Acceleration advising her of the January 2nd, 2024 foreclosure date. She only found out about it because of Investors wanting to buy her home.
14. Ms. Dorman should owe approximately $180,000.00, despite Defendant’s claim that she owes $700,000.00.
Since her home is worth approximately $980,000.00, she has approximately $800,000.00 in equity that she could lose if her home is allowed to go to foreclosure.
15. All facts stated herein are verified under penalty of perjury per the signed unsworn verification block below.
V.
Causes of Action
A. 20-Day Notice to Cure AND Notice of Acceleration Not Sent to Plaintiff
16. All facts and allegations set forth above are incorporated by reference herein for all purposes.
17. The power of acceleration is a harsh remedy and calls for close scrutiny.
See Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing & Sewer Serv., Inc., 523 S.W. 2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The exercise of the right of acceleration requires two acts:
(1) notice of intent to accelerate,
and
(2) notice of acceleration.
Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1991); and see Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 569–570 (Tex. 2001).
Both notices must be “clear and unequivocal”. Id. at 893 and 566.
Finally, whether the right of acceleration was exercised is a fact question.
Holy Cross Church of God v. Wolf at 568.
18. Under Texas Property Code Chapter 51 any debtor who, according to the records of the mortgage servicer, is obligated to pay the debt must be served with a valid and correct written notice to cure and notice of the trustee’s sale by certified mail.
See Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002.
19. Failure to give the required notices is sufficient to cause a court to set aside the foreclosure sale.
See Bauder v. Alegria, 480 S.W.3d 92, 98 & n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
20. In the case of a contractual lien on real property used as the debtor’s residence, the debtor is entitled to a 20-day window of opportunity to cure any default before the mortgage servicer may provide notice of sale of the residence.
Tex. Prop. Code Sect. 51.002.
Accordingly, the mortgage servicer must provide written notice by certified mail stating that the debtor is in default under the deed of trust or other contract lien, and must give the debtor at least 20 days to cure the default before a subsequent notice of sale can be given [Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d);
Bauder v. Alegria, 480 S.W.3d 92, 97–98 & n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)
(when notice to cure and notice of foreclosure were sent to wrong address, trial court properly set aside foreclosure sale).
21. As attested to in the sworn facts herein, Plaintiff never received anything resembling a 20-day notice to cure, nor did Plaintiff receive the Notice of Substitute Trustee Sale.
Because they were not received by Plaintiff, it is likely true that they were not sent by the Defendant, and Defendant should be required to provide proof that they were in fact sent, according to the requirements under the Texas Property Code, as outlined above.
22. Therefore, because the 20-day notice to cure NOR the 21-day notice of acceleration were not received by Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that they was not sent, according to the Plaintiff’s sworn testimony herein, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that Defendant/Lender is not entitled to foreclose and requests that this court grant the request for a Temporary Restraining Order.
B. TDCA Violations
23. All facts and allegations set forth above are incorporated by reference herein for all purposes.
24. The Texas Debt Collection Act (the “TDCA”) is the Texas counterpart to the Federal Debt Collect Practices Act (the “FDCPA”) and is found at TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.001 et. Seq.
25. The TDCA provides remedies for wrongful debt collection practices used by a debt collector in debt collection.
See Tex. Fin. Code§§ 392.001-.404; see also Ford v. City State Bank of Palacios, 44 S.W.3d 121, 135 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
26. “Debt collection” is defined as the act or practice “in collecting, or in soliciting for collection, consumer debts that are due or alleged to be due a creditor.” Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5).
27. Defendants violated the TDCA. See Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001 et seq.
28. To state a claim for a TDCA violation, the plaintiff is required to show that the defendant: (1) is a debt collector; (2) committed a wrongful act in violation of Tex. Fin. Code § 392.01 et seq.; (3) against the plaintiff; and (4) as a result, the plaintiff was injured.
See McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), NA., 788 F.3d 463, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“[t]he statutory text [of the TDCA] contains no intent requirement . . . as suggested by the statute’s plain text, district courts have recognized that facially innocuous misrepresentations made in the course of an attempt to collect a debt constitute a violation of [the TDCA ].”);
see also Catherman v. First State Bank, 796 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
29. The debt in question relating to Plaintiffs’ home is a “consumer debt” within the meaning of such statute because the debt is an obligation for personal, family, or household purposes.
Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(1), (2).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs are “consumers” within the meaning of Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001.
30. A “debt collector” is “a person who directly or indirectly engages in debt collection.” Id. § 392.001(6). This definition also includes a mortgage servicer.
See Miller v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 726 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2013).
Defendants, therefore, are debt collectors.
31. Defendants’ acts and omissions as alleged supra constitute TDCA violations. The TDCA provides that, in debt collection or obtaining information concerning a consumer, a debt collector may not use a fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representation that employs the following practices:
a. (8) misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount of a consumer debt, or misrepresenting the consumer debt’s status in a judicial or governmental proceeding. Tex. Fin. Code Ann.§ 392.304(a)(8).
b. (19) using any other false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer. Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(19).
32. Section 392.304(a)(19) is a catch-all provision that prohibits debt collectors from “using any other false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer.”
Birchler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 4:14-CV-81-ALM, 2015 WL 1939438, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2015).
33. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged that even if a loan is in default, a lender may still violate § 392.301.
“In determining whether foreclosure would be prohibited by law, however, what matters is whether the mortgagor has a right to foreclose, not whether the debt is considered in default.”
McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), NA., 788 F.3d 463, 478 (5th Cir. 2015).
34. The Supreme Court of Texas has also opined that a party can recover injunctive relief and actual damages that are a “reasonably foreseeable result of the wrongdoer’s conduct.”
Brown v. Oaklawn Bank, 718 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. 1986).
The Northern District has noted “that Brown suggests that the harm claimed must have been merely a ‘reasonably foreseeable result’ of alleged misconduct under the TDCA [but] it does not require that the harm be the sole result of a defendant’s acts.”
Clark v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 3:14-CV-3590-B, 2016 WL 931216, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016)(emphasis added).
Thus, the causation standard for a TDCA violation is akin to the “producing cause” standard set forth in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.S0(a); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
35. Actual damages recoverable under the TDCA include damages for mental anguish and do not first require a showing of physical injury.
Ledisco Fin. Servs. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ.); Monroe v. Frank, 936 S.W.2d 654, 661 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1996, writ dism’d).
36. Also, pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees reasonably related to the amount of work performed and costs for all actions in the trial court and on appeal.
37. Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants violated § 392.304(a) subsections (8) and (19) when:
a. It attempted to foreclose without having sent out the required notices;
b. It did not, and still has not, applied payments made to it in 2014 and 2015;
c. It reported to the IRS different payments and interest paid than what it represented to the Plaintiff had been paid;
d. It assessed forced placed insurance in violation of federal law and when Plaintiff had her own property insurance already in place.
38. As a result of Defendants’ TDCA violations, Plaintiff suffered severe mental anguish and emotional distress. Plaintiff is constantly worried and confused about the status of the loan.
They also lost time away from work and suffered the inconvenience of having to resolve the matter.
Therefore the court should order that Defendants violated the TDCA through their servicing of the loan and their attempted wrongful foreclosure and should be restrained from proceeding with foreclosure.
C. Violation of RESPA Regulation X – Sec. 1024.37 Force-placed insurance
39. All facts and allegations set forth above are incorporated by reference herein for all purposes.
40. Regulation X – Section 1024.37 regulates when and how a lender or servicer may obtain hazard insurance on behalf of the borrower.
41. Section (b) states: “A servicer may not assess on a borrower a premium charge or fee related to force-placed insurance unless the servicer has a reasonable basis to believe that the borrower has failed to comply with the mortgage loan contract’s requirement to maintain hazard insurance.”
42. Further, under section (c)(1), the servicer or lender must:
a. “(i) Deliver to a borrower or place in the mail a written notice containing the information required by paragraph (c)(2) of this section at least 45 days before a servicer assesses on a borrower such charge or fee;
b. (ii) Deliver to the borrower or place in the mail a written notice in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section; and
c. (iii) By the end of the 15-day period beginning on the date the written notice described in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section was delivered to the borrower or placed in the mail, not have received, from the borrower or otherwise, evidence demonstrating that the borrower has had in place, continuously, hazard insurance coverage that complies with the loan contract’s requirements to maintain hazard insurance.”
43. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated this section of the federal code by not depositing the required notices into the mail because she does not remember ever receiving any such notices.
Then, after the insurance was placed, and Plaintiff advised Defendant of the error, and fought with them to correct it, for many years now, Defendant still has not corrected the error.
This illegally force placed insurance is the only reason Plaintiff ever fell behind on her payments and has been the issue she has been trying to get the Defendant to acknowledge and correct all this time.
44. Therefore, as alleged herein, the Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the above noted section by providing Plaintiff with any of the required notices or reminders. In fact, had they, they would have been advised that Plaintiff already had insurance on the property.
45. Because this force-placed insurance is a major contributing factor to Plaintiff’s default, Plaintiff humbly requests that Defendant be required to pay all damages and provide all remedied available to Plaintiff under the violated regulation.
VI.
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s ANSWER to Defendants/Counter-Plaintiff’s Original Counterclaim
46. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 41.
Specifically, per the tracking number provided in Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs exhibits, the Notice of Default was “returned to sender” the day after it arrived at the distribution facility, indicating there was some type of error caused by the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs that kept it from ever being delivered to Diane Dorman. Furthermore Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs have stated in a recent bankruptcy filing a completely different amount past due and current due date for the loan, and based on that, the allegation that the loan is currently due for November 1, 2010 is denied.
47. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 42.
Specifically, as far as Plaintiff can tell from the documents served on her, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs attached only the cover letter for the Notice of Acceleration and Maturity to their Answer and did not include any tracking information.
48. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 43 because Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs have NOT complied with all requirements to enforce their security agreement.
Specifically, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs either sent a deficient notice of default, or did not sent one at all, and they also have not provided evidence that they sent the Notice of Acceleration of Loan Maturity to Diane Dorman.
49. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 44.
50. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 45.
51. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 46.
52. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 47.
53. Paragraphs 48 and 49 are not claims and therefore cannot be denied or admitted.
54. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant denies the allegations in Defendants Counterclaim paragraph 50 because they do not currently have the legal right to enforce the Note and Security Instrument due to their failure to comply with Texas and Federal law.
VII.
Remedies and Damages
Accounting
55. A request for an accounting is an equitable remedy used to determine the amount of damages.
See Hutchings v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 862 S.W.2d 752, 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied). It is a flexible, equitable remedy that may apply in various scenarios according to
the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Gifford v. Gabbard, 305 S.W.2d. 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, no writ); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co., 884 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
56. Plaintiff requests an Order for an accounting of all transactions on the mortgage loan.
Attorney’s Fees
57. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff requests recovery from Defendants, pursuant to Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as well as pursuant to several laws cited and quoted above, for all costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees incurred herein, including all fees necessary in the event of an appeal of this cause to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas, as the Court deems necessary and just.
VIII.
Conditions Precedent
58. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff’s recovery on all claims and damages have been performed or have occurred.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff requests that:
a. Compensatory damages be awarded within the jurisdictional limits of the Court;
b. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law;
c. Exemplary damages as requested herein or as determined by the Court; and
d. Such other and further relief, both general and special, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled, whether at law or in equity.
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICES OF Ryan Daniel
SCHEDULING ORDER:
(This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025.
Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.),
MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024.
(Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024)
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Thursday 15th that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is constitutionally funded, rejecting a payday lender-backed challenge that threatened to incapacitate the agency and throw a wrench in the Biden administration’s financial regulatory agenda.
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 16, 2024
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(4:24-cv-00024)
District Court, N.D. Texas
JAN 8, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: FEB 8, 2024
11.
A. Summary of Facts
12. On or about September 8, 2006, Plaintiff executed certain Texas Home Equity Note (Fixed Rate – First Lien) originally payable to New Century Mortgage Corporation, in the principal amount of $190,000.00 and bearing an interest rate of 7.975 per annum (the “Note”). A true and correct copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
13. Concurrently with the execution of the Note, Plaintiff executed a Texas Home Equity Security Instrument (First Lien) (“Security Instrument” and together with the Note, the “Loan Agreement”) as grantors, granting Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (“MERS”), solely as nominee for New Century Mortgage Corporation, its successors and assigns, with a security interest in the real property located at 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”), and legally described as:
LOT 1, BLOCK 2, OF CHAPEL DOWNS, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN CABINET A, SLIDE 386, OF THE PLAT RECORDS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS.
14. The Security Instrument was recorded in the Official Public Records of Tarrant County, Texas as Instrument No. D206296193 on September 21, 2006. A true and correct copy of the Security Instrument is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
15. Subsequently, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as Holder of the Note and Lien for New Century Mortgage Corporation then assigned and transferred the Loan Agreement to Plaintiff as per certain Transfer of Lien recorded in the Official Property Record of Tarrant County, Texas as Instrument No. D210209405 on August 27, 2010. A true and correct copy of the Transfer of Lien is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
38. Deutsche Bank is the current holder of the Note, endorsed in blank, and the beneficiary of the Security Instrument and mortgagee as that term is defined in Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code. Defendant PHH services the loan for Deutsche Bank.
LIT: PHH/Ocwen purchased charged off non-performing loans (NPL) for cents on the dollar around 2013/14…we have doubts about the truthfulness of this statement and Deutsche Bank’s current role, apart from being the holder of legal records for all mortgages in the USA.
39. Under the terms of the Loan Agreement, the Borrower was required to pay when due the principal and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note, as well as any applicable charges and fees due under the Note.
40. The Loan Agreement further provides that should Borrower fail to make payments on the Note as they became due and payable, or fail to comply with any or all of the covenants and conditions of the Security Instrument, that the lender may enforce the Security Instrument by selling the Property according to law and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Loan Agreement.
41. The Loan Agreement is currently due for November 1, 2010, payment and all subsequent monthly payments.
On June 13, 2023, a Notice of Default was sent to the Borrower in accordance with the Loan Agreement and the Texas Property Code. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Default attached hereto as Exhibit D.
LIT: Records show that Dorman was in Bankruptcy until dismissed on August 3, 2023.
42. The default was not cured, and the maturity of the debt was accelerated on July 19, 2023, when a Notice of Acceleration of Loan Maturity was sent via certified mail to the Borrower in accordance with the Loan Agreement and the Texas Property Code.
A true and correct copy of the Notice of Acceleration of Loan Maturity is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
43. In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred for Defendants to enforce their security interest against the Property.
Defendants bring this counterclaim for foreclosure so they may enforce their security interest in the Property.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION – NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
44. Defendants assert a counterclaim for non-judicial foreclosure against Plaintiff.
Defendants have fully performed their obligations under the Loan Agreement, however Plaintiff has failed to make the required payments under the Loan Agreement. which constitutes an event of default.
45. The Security Instrument permits Defendants to foreclose on the Property should there be an event of default of the Loan Agreement. Accordingly, Defendants seek judgment in their favor and an order allowing foreclosure in accordance with the Security Instrument and Texas Property Code section 51.002, or alternatively, a judgment for judicial foreclosure.
46. Defendants have been forced to hire the undersigned attorneys to pursue this claim; Defendants are therefore entitled to and seek judgment against Plaintiff for their reasonable attorney’s fees in this action, both through trial and in the event of a subsequent appeal, as provided by the Loan Agreement. Defendants seek an award of attorney’s fees as a further obligation on the Note and not as a money judgment against Plaintiff, personally.
47. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.
C. CAUSE OF ACTION – JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
48. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference for all purposes.
49. In the alternative, for failure to cure the default of the Loan, Defendants seek to enforce their security interest against the Property in an amount equal to the payoff at the time of judgment.
50. As the current legal owners and holders of the Note and the mortgagees of record who have the right to enforce the Note and Security Instrument, Defendants seek a judgment for judicial foreclosure together with an order of sale issued to the sheriff or constable of Tarrant County—the county where the Property is located—directing the sheriff or constable to seize and sell the Property in satisfaction of the Loan Agreement debt.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants pray the Court declare that Defendants are authorized to enforce the power of sale in the Security Instrument through foreclosure of the Property pursuant to Texas Property Code section 51.002, the Note and Security Instrument, or alternatively, a judgment foreclosing their lien and order of sale. Defendants further ask to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs as pled above. Defendants also pray that Plaintiff takes nothing on her claims. Defendants seek all other relief to which they may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Mark D. Cronenwett
MARK D. CRONENWETT
Texas Bar No. 00787303
mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com
MACKIE WOLF ZIENTZ & MANN, P.C.
14160 N. Dallas Parkway, Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75254
214-635-2650 (Phone)
214-635-2686 (Fax)
Attorneys for Defendants
Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”) and PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”, collectively “Defendants”) file this Unopposed Motion to Substitute Counsel
and respectfully requests the withdrawal of Mark D. Cronenwett of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P.C.,
and the substitution of Robert T. Mowrey, Matthew K. Hansen, and Taneska L. Jones of Locke Lord LLP as its counsel of record.
In support of this Motion, Deutsche Bank and PHH show the Court the following:
1. Deutsche Bank and PHH are represented by Mark D. Cronenwett of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P.C. His address is Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P.C., 14160 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75254.
Deutsche Bank and PHH have retained new counsel to represent its interests in this case— Robert T. Mowrey, Matthew K. Hansen, and Taneska L. Jones. Mr. Mowrey, Mr. Hansen, and Ms. Jones are admitted to practice law in the State of Texas and in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, and they have consented to serve as counsel for Deutsche Bank and PHH in this proceeding.
Their contact information is below.
2. Plaintiff Dianne Dorman is unopposed to the relief requested in this Motion.
3. This Motion is not sought for delay, but so that justice may be served.
For these reasons, Deutsche Bank and PHH request that the Court grant this Motion, permit the substitution of Robert T. Mowrey, Matthew K. Hansen, and Taneska L. Jones of Locke Lord LLP as its counsel of record and the withdrawal of Mark D. Cronenwett of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P.C., and grant Deutsche Bank and PHH such other and further relief to which they may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
02/01/2024 | 10 | SCHEDULING ORDER: (This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025. Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.), MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024) |
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U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Plaintiff | ||
Dianne Dorman | represented by | Ryan Aaron Daniel Ryan Daniel Attorney at Law PLLC 1525 US Hwy 380 Suite 500 #102 Frisco, TX 75033 469-688-0621 Email: ryan@ryandaniellaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
V. | ||
Defendant | ||
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company As Trustee For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NCI, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NCI |
represented by | Taneska L Jones Locke Lord LLP 600 Travis Street Suite 2800 Houston, TX 77002 713-226-1563 Fax: 713-229-2563 Email: taneska.jones@lockelord.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann PC 14160 N Dallas Parkway, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75254 214-635-2650 Fax: 214-635-2686 Email: mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201 214-740-8496 Fax: 214-756-8496 Email: mkhansen@lockelord.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201-6776 214-740-8000 Fax: 214-740-8800 Email: rmowrey@lockelord.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Defendant | ||
PHH Mortgage Corporation | represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Mediator | ||
ADR Provider | represented by | Bryan D Bruner Bruner & Pappas LLP 3700 W 7th Street Fort Worth, TX 76107 817-332-6633 Fax: 817-332-6617 FAX Email: bbruner@bjplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Counter Claimant | ||
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company As Trustee For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NCI, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NCI |
represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Counter Claimant | ||
PHH Mortgage Corporation | represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
V. | ||
Counter Defendant | ||
Dianne Dorman | represented by | Ryan Aaron Daniel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
01/08/2024 | 1 | NOTICE OF REMOVAL filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Filing fee $405; receipt number ATXNDC-14295314) In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements and Judge Specific Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms and Instructions found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Cover Sheet, # 3 Cover Sheet Supplement) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/08/2024) |
01/08/2024 | 2 | CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Clerk QC note: No affiliate entered in ECF). (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/08/2024) |
01/08/2024 | 3 | New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. File to: Judge Pittman. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge. Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. Attorneys are further reminded that, if necessary, they must comply with Local Rule 83.10(a) within 14 days or risk the possible dismissal of this case without prejudice or without further notice. (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/10/2024 | 4 | ORDER: Lead counsel for each party or designee attorney with appropriate authority and any unrepresented party must confer (“Scheduling Conference”) in an in-person, face-to-face conference as soon as practicable. As a result of the Scheduling Conference, counsel must prepare and submit a Report Regarding Contents of Scheduling Order (“Joint Report”) by January 31, 2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/10/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/10/2024 | 5 | ORDER: The Court ORDERS that (1) by January 31, 2024, Plaintiff(s) file an amended complaint and (2) within 14 days after Plaintiff(s) file an amended complaint, but no later than February 14, 2024, Defendant(s) file an answer or other response to the amended complaint. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/10/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/12/2024 | 6 | Defendant’s ANSWER to Complaint (Notice of Removal) filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation Attorneys are further reminded that, if necessary, they must comply with Local Rule 83.10(a) within 14 days or risk the possible dismissal of this case without prejudice or without further notice., COUNTERCLAIM against Dianne Dorman filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/12/2024) |
01/26/2024 | 7 | Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Mark D. Cronenwett added attorney Taneska L Jones,Taneska L Jones,Robert T Mowrey,Matthew K Hansen for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,Taneska L Jones,Robert T Mowrey,Matthew K Hansen for PHH Mortgage Corporation. Motion filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Substitute Counsel)Attorney Taneska L Jones added to party Deutsche Bank National Trust Company(pty:dft), Attorney Taneska L Jones added to party PHH Mortgage Corporation(pty:dft) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 01/26/2024) |
01/29/2024 | 8 | ORDER: Before the Court is Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Substitute Counsel. ECF No. 7 . Having considered the Motion, the Court concludes that the Motion should be and is hereby GRANTED. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/29/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/29/2024) |
01/31/2024 | 9 | Joint STATUS REPORT / RULE 26(f) JOINT REPORT filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 01/31/2024) |
02/01/2024 | 10 | SCHEDULING ORDER: (This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025. Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.), MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024) |
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Ryan Daniel, founder of Ryan Daniel Attorney of Law PLLC, is a skilled and experienced construction lawyer based in Texas. Ryan graduated from the SMU Dedman School of Law in 2015 and received his pre-law degree from the University of Central Florida in 2009. After graduation, Ryan worked as an associate attorney with Javitch and Block from 2015 to 2016, where he honed his legal skills and gained valuable experience in the court room.
In 2016, Ryan founded Ryan Daniel Attorney of Law PLLC to provide comprehensive legal services to clients in the construction and real estate industries. Ryan’s extensive experience and knowledge of these industries is further demonstrated by his successful track record in purchasing, renovating, and selling multiple properties from 2016 to 2020.
At Ryan Daniel Attorney of Law PLLC, Ryan and his team are dedicated to providing clients with exceptional legal representation and guidance. They care about you and your problems and work closely with clients to understand their unique needs and goals. With Ryan’s background and experience, clients can trust that their legal matter is in compassionate hands.
Southlake resident Dianne Dorman filed for election to Place 6 on the Southlake City Council on March 14.
Dorman joined incumbent Pamela Muller and businessman Mike Tilbury in the race for Place 6.
Dorman said she was motivated to run for election by concerns about governing practices and decisions in the city.
“Over the past few years, between volunteering, public information act requests and through attending various meetings, I have noticed, in my opinion, what appears to be questionable activities as well as decisions made by city staff, administration and council,” she said.
“The qualities that once were the reason my family and I chose Southlake as our new home, in my opinion, have gone by the wayside. Again, it’s my opinion that our community now appears to be greatly divided by some decisions made by our elected officials. Why decisions that are made behind closed doors and what appears to be against overwhelming opposition of the citizens, I feel throws doubt into the ‘transparency; they wish to portray.”
Dorman said she thinks her career in transportation and logistics would serve her well if she were elected.
“Again, through prior volunteer activities with the DPS, numerous public information act requests which lead to further research into documents received, this administration and staff – all [of these things] I feel has helped provide myself with a better understanding of some of the true issues. My determination to see things get done right, to follow things through as well as stand up for what I believe in and to represent the citizens of Southlake.
“I’ve been in the transportation and logistics industry for almost 17 years where I’ve negotiated national contracts, corporate pricing and procurement as well as compliance with various Federal Regulations. If one person can comply with all of the regulations day in and day out, certainly one would think that I could help ensure the city staff and administration stays not only in compliance but also equally applies them in all decisions.”
Dorman said her main concentration, if elected, would be to focus on accountability.
“We need the administration that will not only hold our citizens and employees accountable but also to hold themselves accountable, which would include equally applying the rules, regulations, policies, ordinances, standards and remain in accordance with local, state and federal laws,” she said. “All of which, in my opinion, could help return Southlake back to the ‘great place to live and work’ for ALL.”
CITIZENS NEW AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM IN 2024
If you’re a liar and a thief who steals homes, you are protected by US Gov.Dave’s Statements Admitted as Evidence: https://t.co/cUwjRnBEJB
The DOJ Complicit in Texas Legal Conspiracy and Mortgage Fraud:https://t.co/NRWcQgtT4w pic.twitter.com/HIm4YdjILJ
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) January 31, 2024
Deutsche Bank v Dorman
(Expedited Foreclosure)
153-345587-23
SEP 8, 2023 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: FEB 8, 2024
FEB 5, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: FEB 5, 2024
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Dianne Dorman brought this action to stop foreclosure.
Dorman failed to make her April 2010 mortgage payment, and over the last decade, has still not made it.
Instead, Dorman filed for bankruptcy three times and, after all were dismissed, sued her mortgagee and mortgage servicers, Defendants, to further delay.
After more than 18 months of pre-trial proceedings, Defendants filed a summary-judgment motion, seeking to dismiss Dorman’s claims and foreclose on the house. ECF No. 72.
Having now considered both parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that Dorman’s claims are devoid of merit and that Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Dorman bought the house at 100 Ascot Drive, Southlake, Texas.
Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t at ¶¶ 6, 7, ECF No. 40.
She purchased the house with a note and deed of trust. Id.
About a year after buying the house, she refinanced her house with New Century Mortgage Corporation. Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 1.
In 2009, MERS, on behalf of New Century, transferred the lien to defendant Deutsche Bank, as the trustee for a securitized asset- backed receivable.
Id. at 130.
Ocwen Loan Servicing had serviced the mortgage, but beginning in 2019, PHH MC, Ocwen’s successor in interest, has been the servicer.
Id. at 24.
Despite living in the house continuously since 2005, Dorman last paid Defendants a full mortgage payment in March 2010.
Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 31.
Although she has paid Defendants over the past decade, she is well behind on her note and owes Defendants additional money for advancing her property taxes.
Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 24.
Dorman has spent considerable time and money delaying foreclosure.
In 2013, she filed for bankruptcy; it was dismissed.
Defs.’ MSJ Supp. App’x at 2.
She filed again in 2014; it too was dismissed.
Id. at 4.
And showing persistence, she tried again in 2016.
Like the other filings, it was dismissed.
Id. at 6.
Following the dismissal, the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, Texas ordered that Defendants could proceed with foreclosure.
Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 164–65.
But before the scheduled foreclosure, Dorman filed this suit in Texas state court.
Defs.’ Notice of Removal, Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-3.
Defendants removed the case to this Court.1
Dorman’s complaint has been amended twice and survived a motion to dismiss.
It makes two claims.
First, Dorman claims the refinance note violates the Texas Constitution’s requirement that loan close at least a day after the borrower receives the loan documents.
Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t, at ¶ 22–23.
Second, although couched in different legal garb, she claims Defendants breached a bankruptcy settlement’s terms.
Id. at ¶¶ 29–38.
Defendants counterclaimed for non-payment and foreclosure.
After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment.
ECF No. 72.
The Court has considered the motion, Dorman’s response, and all related briefs and appendixes.
The motion is now ripe.
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
1 Although this case was lawfully removed to federal court, the Court must seriously question the wisdom of it being litigated in federal court versus state court.
This is a simple mortgage dispute; it does not involve any weighty issue of federal law mandating that it be settled in the clogged dockets of this division.
Having been a state trial judge in Tarrant County, Texas and an appellate justice on the Second Texas Court of Appeals in Fort Worth, the undersigned is exceedingly confident that this case would have been resolved much more quickly and efficiently and to the benefit of all parties had it merely remained to be decided by our good state judges and juries in Tarrant County.
See FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing as “Publius”) (stating that “the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” would be left to the states under our Constitution);
see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 n. 32 (1984)
(When federal courts must rule on state claims, their construction of state law can be “uncertain and ephemeral.”).
“Justice delayed . . . is often justice denied.”
Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The movant makes a showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988).
The court cannot make a credibility determination in light of conflicting evidence or competing inferences.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 250.
ANALYSIS
Defendants’ motion argues two points. First, Dorman’s claims are without merit and should be dismissed.
And second, Defendants have shown as a matter of law their entitlement to foreclosure.
The Court addresses both points.
A. Dorman’s claims are meritless and dismissed.
Dorman’s Second Amended Complaint contains five claims.
Her first two claims arise from an alleged violation of the Texas Constitution.
But Dorman cites no evidence supporting this claim and, at the relevant time, the allegedly violated section wasn’t even law.
Her next two claims arise from an alleged settlement agreement from Dorman’s third bankruptcy.
But binding precedent precludes enforcing agreements from a dismissed bankruptcy.
Finally, since Dorman’s claims all fail, her attorneys’ fees claim likewise fails.
1. The Texas Constitution was not violated.
Dorman claims the underlying note and lien are void ab initio because New Century violated the Texas Constitution by closing her loan the same day she received certain disclosures.
Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t at ¶¶ 22–23.
The Texas Constitution requires a mortgage to close at least “one business day after the date that the owner of the homestead receives a copy of the loan application if not previously provided and a final itemized disclosure of the [closing costs].”
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).
The evidence, however, undisputedly shows otherwise.
While Dorman cites no evidence supporting her bald allegation, Defendants cite numerous examples of Dorman acknowledging that she received the disclosure the day before closing.
See e.g. Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 137, 138.
The Court also judicially notices Dorman’s Texas Home Equity Affidavit filed in the Tarrant County Real Property Records, document number D206296194, which explicitly states that her “Note and Security Instrument have not been signed before one business day after the date that [Dorman] received a final itemized disclosure of the [closing costs].”
Moreover, this requirement was added to the Texas Constitution in 2007—one year after Dorman closed on her note.
“As a general rule, changes in the Texas Constitution do not have retroactive effect.”
Leopold & Breyer, 39 TEX. PRAC., MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 25.8 (Nov. 2020 update) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16).
Thus, this whole argument rest on a flawed foundation.
Consequently, Dorman’s argument is meritless.
This argument supported her claims to quiet title and for declaratory relief.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these two claims is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED.
2. The Court cannot enforce the bankruptcy agreement.
Dorman next asserts claims for negligent accounting and equitable estoppel, but both depend on an alleged agreement made during Dorman’s third Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.
In that proceeding, Deutsche Bank filed a Notice of Agreed Resolution of Objection to Confirmation.
Pl.’s MSJ App’x at 115, ECF No. 81-1.
This and later filings appear to show an agreed settlement between the parties for $85,000.
But that Chapter 13 bankruptcy was not confirmed.
The bankruptcy court later dismissed it without prejudice, ordering that “all debts due and owing to creditors as of this date are NOT DISCHARED or affected in any manner by this Order.”
Id. at 128 (emphasis in original).
The bankruptcy court’s dismissal dissolved all agreements from the bankruptcy.
See In re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2012).
“Under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b), the pre- discharge dismissal of a bankruptcy case returns the parties to the positions they were in before the case was initiated.”
Id. (cleaned up).
According to the Fifth Circuit, “a Chapter 13 plan [is] an exchanged for bargain between the debtor and the debtor’s creditors.”
Id. at 238 (cleaned up).
A dismissal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy without a discharge evidences that that debtor broke his agreement.
Id.
Thus, he cannot later enforce agreements made within the bankruptcy and “cannot convincingly argue that equity is on his side.”
Id.
As a result, the Court will not enforce the alleged agreement.
Without that agreement, Dorman’s negligent-accounting and equitable-estoppel claims fail.
Moreover, the economic-loss rule bars these claims too.
See Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014).
The “economic loss rule generally precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from a party’s failure to perform under a contract when the harm consists only of the economic loss of a contractual expectancy.”
Id.
That rule knocks out both of Dorman’s claims, which essentially seek to enforce the bankruptcy agreement’s expected deal.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Dorman’s claims for negligent accounting and equitable estoppel are GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED.
3. Attorney’s Fees
Since all her claims have been dismissed, Dorman’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.
B. Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.
Defendants counterclaimed that Dorman’s missed payments constitute a breach of the note that entitles them to foreclosure.
Defs.’ Ans. & CC at ¶¶ 73–78, ECF No. 55.
To obtain an order for foreclosure, a security interest holder must demonstrate that:
“(1) a debt exists;
(2) the debt is secured by a lien created under Art. 16, § 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution;
(3) [the borrowers] are in default under the note and security instrument;
and
(4) [the borrowers] received notice of default and acceleration.”
Weeks v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 4:15-CV-00588-O-BP, 2017 WL 4325797, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2017) (quoting Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 583 F. App’x 306 (5th Cir. 2014)).
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants detail Dorman’s missed payments and their compliance with applicable foreclosure procedures.
Dorman’s summary-judgment response fails to address or dispute any of these facts or arguments.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, Texas has already determined that the Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.
Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 164–65. As a result, Defendants counterclaim for foreclosure is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 72) should be and hereby is GRANTED.
Accordingly, Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
Further, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on its claim for foreclosure is GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants submit a proposed final judgment consistent with this Order by April 14, 2021. Plaintiff may file any objections to Defendants’ proposed final judgment by April 21, 2021.
SO ORDERED on this 31st day of March, 2021.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DID YOU KNOW
During his 6 years as @SupremeCourt_TX Justice, John Cornyn introduced the Anti-Sodomy Law (later ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS).
That’s good news for The Catholic Bandit, Mark Cronenwett, who’s running around sodomizing the laws for @DeutscheBank, PHH et al. pic.twitter.com/BxnL8OVfGa
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 8, 2024
Docket Pleadings
(Leading up to final order above)
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Dianne Dorman (“Plaintiff”) to submit this Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”) and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DBNTC”), as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 (the “2007-NC1 Trust”) (collectively, “Defendants”) and would show the Court as follows:
I. SUMMARY
Defendants seek to foreclose on Plaintiff. However, Defendants’ accounting of Plaintiff’s mortgage payments inaccurately reflects amount due. As a result, Defendants are not entitled to foreclose.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and evidence it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). For claims on which the non-movant bears the burden of proof, the movant must only show the absence of evidence to support a claim on which the non- movant bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once presented, a court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences from such evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Impossible Elecs. Techniques v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982). However, “when opposing parties tell two different stories, but one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007).
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Defendants essentially argue that a lender has no duty to properly apply payments received from homeowners.
In 2005, Plaintiff purchased the property at 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”).
This Property has continuously been her homestead since 2005.
On September 8, 2006 Plaintiff, refinanced by obtaining a Texas Home Equity Loan.
See Appx, Exhibit 1.
In 2009, New Century escrowed the monthly mortgage payments on the Loan for property taxes, however, property taxes assessed for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 were not paid until the 2014 calendar year.
On September 28, 2015, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 at c/o Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC began servicing the Loan.1
On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas, Case No. 16-40061-RFN13, which was ultimately dismissed without prejudice (MTD-IRS Tax Return) on July 11, 2017 for Plaintiff not delivering 2016 tax returns to the trustee timely.
On May 10, 2016, during Plaintiff’s ongoing Chapter 13, Plaintiff filed an adversary case (Adv. No. 16-04072-RFN) against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, as servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Ocwen”) to establish the validity, priority, or extent of the lien on her Property, and to address the differing pre-petition arrearages claimed by both parties.
Plaintiff filed her proof of claim alleging $85,000.00 in pre-petition arrearages while Ocwen alleged $266,098.70 in pre-petition arrearages.
See Appx, Exhibit 2.
On August 4, 2016, Ocwen conceded Plaintiff’s pre-petition arrearages were in fact $85,000.00 as Plaintiff contested, and filed a “Notice of Agreed Resolution of Objection to Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan,” (“Agreement”) which stated “[i]t is expressly agreed that the Plan will cure Creditor’s pre-petition arrearage claim and that the amount of the mortgage arrearage claim to be paid through the Plan will be the amount of the Mortgage Creditor’s allowed proof of claim unless a different amount is established by a court order as set forth above” in the original proceeding.
See Notice of Agreed Resolution, See Appx, Exhibit 3, at ¶ 3.
Shortly thereafter, on August 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding because the “parties have entered into an agreement in the Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Case
1 PHH Mortgage Corporation is the successor to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.
… titled, ‘Notice of Agreed Resolution of Objection to Confirmation’ [Doc 52] and entered with the Court which resolves immediate issues between the parties concerning Defendant’s claim.
There is no opposition to the relief sought in this Motion.”
See Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, See Appx, Exhibit 4.
On May 4, 2017, the trustee issued its Modification of Chapter 13 Plan After Confirmation which stated “The SECURED claim of OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC (Court Claim No. 5 and Trustee Claim No. 2) in the allowed amount of $85,000.00 shall be ‘PAID DIRECT’ by the Debtor.”
See Appx, Exhibit 5.
On June 13, 2017, the Trustee’s Modification of Chapter 13 Plan After Confirmation was approved. See Order Approving Modified Plan, Exhibit 6.
Unfortunately, after over a year of successfully defending her home against Defendants’ inaccurate and negligent accounting, Plaintiff’s entire case was dismissed less than 30 days after approval for not submitting her 2016 tax return in time.
See Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, Exhibit 7.
Plaintiff has continuously fought to retain her home from Defendants’ numerous attempts to foreclose without any explanation or justification for the accounting errors or misrepresentations during, and after, the bankruptcy.
Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for negligent accounting for dishonoring the parties’ Agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Defendants agreed during the proceeding that Plaintiff’s account was only $85,000.00 in pre-petition arrearage, and not $266,098.70 as Defendants originally claimed.
The parties agreed that $85,000.00 in pre-petition arrearage was accurate because Defendants couldn’t provide the proper information to support their hyper-inflated amount.
Plaintiff is damaged by Defendants because the charges, interest, fees, and costs, when multiplied with an inaccurate and sizeable amount such as $550,000.00, creates unconscionable penalties compared to applying those charges to $85,000.00.
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an accurate accounting from Defendant from the agreed-to $85,000.00 pre-petition arrearage.
Defendants are not entitled to foreclose on the claimed hyper-inflated amount due.
Estoppel prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.
Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 486 (Tex. 2017).
The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts;
(2) made with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts;
(3) with the intention that that it should be acted on;
(4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts;
(5) who detrimentally relies on the representations. Id.
Here, Defendants refuse to acknowledge or honor the agreement made in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Plaintiff relied on the pre-petition arrearage amount agreed to with Defendants and approved by the Court which would have resulting in affordable payments to reinstate as well as significantly less taxes, fees, charges, and unnecessary foreclosure costs.
Defendants now demand an absurd unpaid balance amount of over $550,000.00.
Defendants cannot restore the parties’ statuses to the pre-petition status quo citing the Court’s dismissal rather than discharge, because the Court approved the Plan and Agreement.
Therefore, Defendants must be estopped from dishonoring the parties’ Court-approved Agreement and Plaintiff is entitled to the pre-petition arrearage amount, or an amount close to it.
IV. PRAYER
Plaintiff Dianne Dorman respectfully requests the Court to deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment:
Respectfully submitted this 12 of February, 2021,
By: /s/ Joshua D. Gordon
Robert “Chip” C. Lane
State Bar No. 24046263
notifications@lanelaw.com
Joshua D. Gordon
State Bar No. 24091592
joshua.gordon@lanelaw.com
THE LANE LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C.
6200 Savoy Drive, Suite 1150
Houston, Texas 77036
Telephone: (713) 595-8200
Facsimile: (713) 595-8201
Preston J. Dugas, III
State Bar No. 24050189
preston@pjdlawfirm.com
Preston Dougas Law Firm, Pllc
1701 River Run, Suite 703
Fort Worth, TX 76107
Telephone: (817) 945-3061
Facsimile: (682) 219-0761
Attorneys For Plaintiff
On March 3, 2021, the Parties attempted settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Hal Ray via telephone.
I. Present at the attempted settlement conference were:
1. Dianne Dorman, Plaintiff;
2. Joshua D. Gordon, Plaintiff’s counsel;
3. Kyle A. Owens, Defendants’ counsel; and
4. Benjamin Verdooren, Defendants’ representative.
II. Plaintiff, although present on the phone, was ill and under medication.
Due to her medical condition (including heavy and constant coughing in what Plaintiff describes as Covid-pneumonia) and medication, Plaintiff informed her counsel that she was unable to proceed with the settlement conference.
III. Plaintiff was unable to provide her counsel with an estimated timeline for her recovery and may be unable to participate in a settlement conference for the foreseeable future.
IV. The Parties unsuccessfully mediated this case on December 3, 2020.
Since that mediation, the Parties have had numerous informal settlement discussions. While it is possible that a settlement conference could be helpful where mediation and informal efforts have failed, that is questionable and it appears that the Parties will be unable to convene for a settlement conference anytime soon due to Plaintiff’s status.
V. In light of the foregoing, the Parties would respectfully request that the Court rule upon Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:19-cv-00592-P
Dorman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman Referred to: Magistrate Judge Hal R. Ray, Jr (Settlement)
Cause: 28:1441 Notice of Removal |
Date Filed: 07/26/2019 Date Terminated: 04/21/2021 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
02/12/2021 | 81 | Appendix in Support filed by Dianne Dorman re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1-7) (Lane, Robert) (link to 80 Brief in Support) Modified on 2/16/2021 (mmw). (Entered: 02/12/2021) |
02/19/2021 | 82 | ORDER: Pursuant to the agreement of counsel for the parties, the Court cancelled the settlement conference scheduled yesterday, February 18, 2021. To reschedule the settlement conference, the Court hereby sets a Status Conference, via telephone, on Monday, February 22, 2021, at 2:00 p.m. C.S.T. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Hal R. Ray, Jr on 2/19/2021) (mmw) (Entered: 02/19/2021) |
02/22/2021 | 83 | ORDER RESETTING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: The telephonic settlement conference previously set for Thursday, February 18, 2021, at 1:30 p.m., is hereby RESET for Wednesday, March 3, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Except as modified by this Order, the Order Setting Settlement Conference entered on January 26, 2021 (ECF No. 71 ) remains in full force and effect. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Hal R. Ray, Jr on 2/22/2021) (mmw) (Entered: 02/22/2021) |
02/22/2021 | 84 | ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Hal R. Ray, Jr: Status Conference held on 2/22/2021. Settlement conference to be set by telephone on Wednesday, 3/3/2021, at 9:30 a.m. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff – Josh Gordon; Defense – Kyle Owens. (Court Reporter: Not Recorded) (No exhibits) Time in Court – 00:06. (plp) (Entered: 02/22/2021) |
02/25/2021 | 85 | REPLY filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corp re: 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Owens, Kyle) (Entered: 02/25/2021) |
02/25/2021 | 86 | Appendix in Support filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corp re 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Third Supplemental Appendix ISO MSJ) (Owens, Kyle) (Entered: 02/25/2021) |
03/03/2021 | 87 | SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT filed by Dianne Dorman. (Lane, Robert) (Entered: 03/03/2021) |
03/31/2021 | 88 | ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The Court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 72 ) should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Further, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on its claim for foreclosure is GRANTED. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants submit a proposed final judgment consistent with this Order by April 14, 2021. Plaintiff may file any objections to Defendants’ proposed final judgment by April 21, 2021. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 3/31/2021) (mmw) (Entered: 03/31/2021) |
04/21/2021 | 89 | FINAL JUDGMENT: It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants may proceed with foreclosure in accordance with the Loan Agreement and Texas Property Code Chapter 51, or, alternatively, judicial foreclosure. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all costs and expenses are taxed against the party incurring the same. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 4/21/2021) (mmw) (Entered: 04/21/2021) |
05/07/2021 | 90 | MOTION to Amend/Correct 89 Judgment,, filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corp with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) proposed Final Judgment) (Owens, Kyle) (Entered: 05/07/2021) |
05/07/2021 | 91 | AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT: In accordance with the Court’s March 31, 2021 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88 ): It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 5/7/2021) (mmw) (Entered: 05/07/2021) |
05/18/2021 | 92 | BILL OF COSTS by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, PHH Mortgage Corp. (Owens, Kyle) (Entered: 05/18/2021) |
06/02/2021 | 93 | Costs Taxed in amount of $1522.95 against Plaintiff Dianne Dorman. (sre) (Entered: 06/02/2021) |
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02/08/2024 08:46:52 |
U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P
Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment |
Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property Jurisdiction: Diversity |
Plaintiff | ||
Dianne Dorman | represented by | Ryan Aaron Daniel Ryan Daniel Attorney at Law PLLC 1525 US Hwy 380 Suite 500 #102 Frisco, TX 75033 469-688-0621 Email: ryan@ryandaniellaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
V. | ||
Defendant | ||
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company As Trustee For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NCI, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NCI |
represented by | Taneska L Jones Locke Lord LLP 600 Travis Street Suite 2800 Houston, TX 77002 713-226-1563 Fax: 713-229-2563 Email: taneska.jones@lockelord.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann PC 14160 N Dallas Parkway, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75254 214-635-2650 Fax: 214-635-2686 Email: mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201 214-740-8496 Fax: 214-756-8496 Email: mkhansen@lockelord.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201-6776 214-740-8000 Fax: 214-740-8800 Email: rmowrey@lockelord.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Defendant | ||
PHH Mortgage Corporation | represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Mediator | ||
ADR Provider | represented by | Bryan D Bruner Bruner & Pappas LLP 3700 W 7th Street Fort Worth, TX 76107 817-332-6633 Fax: 817-332-6617 FAX Email: bbruner@bjplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Counter Claimant | ||
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company As Trustee For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NCI, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NCI |
represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Counter Claimant | ||
PHH Mortgage Corporation | represented by | Taneska L Jones (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDMark D Cronenwett (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2024Matthew K Hansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDRobert T Mowrey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
V. | ||
Counter Defendant | ||
Dianne Dorman | represented by | Ryan Aaron Daniel (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
---|---|---|
01/08/2024 | 1 | NOTICE OF REMOVAL filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Filing fee $405; receipt number ATXNDC-14295314) In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements and Judge Specific Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms and Instructions found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information – Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Cover Sheet, # 3 Cover Sheet Supplement) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/08/2024) |
01/08/2024 | 2 | CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Clerk QC note: No affiliate entered in ECF). (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/08/2024) |
01/08/2024 | 3 | New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. File to: Judge Pittman. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge. Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. Attorneys are further reminded that, if necessary, they must comply with Local Rule 83.10(a) within 14 days or risk the possible dismissal of this case without prejudice or without further notice. (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/10/2024 | 4 | ORDER: Lead counsel for each party or designee attorney with appropriate authority and any unrepresented party must confer (“Scheduling Conference”) in an in-person, face-to-face conference as soon as practicable. As a result of the Scheduling Conference, counsel must prepare and submit a Report Regarding Contents of Scheduling Order (“Joint Report”) by January 31, 2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/10/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/10/2024 | 5 | ORDER: The Court ORDERS that (1) by January 31, 2024, Plaintiff(s) file an amended complaint and (2) within 14 days after Plaintiff(s) file an amended complaint, but no later than February 14, 2024, Defendant(s) file an answer or other response to the amended complaint. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/10/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/10/2024) |
01/12/2024 | 6 | Defendant’s ANSWER to Complaint (Notice of Removal) filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation Attorneys are further reminded that, if necessary, they must comply with Local Rule 83.10(a) within 14 days or risk the possible dismissal of this case without prejudice or without further notice., COUNTERCLAIM against Dianne Dorman filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 01/12/2024) |
01/26/2024 | 7 | Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Mark D. Cronenwett added attorney Taneska L Jones,Taneska L Jones,Robert T Mowrey,Matthew K Hansen for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,Taneska L Jones,Robert T Mowrey,Matthew K Hansen for PHH Mortgage Corporation. Motion filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Substitute Counsel)Attorney Taneska L Jones added to party Deutsche Bank National Trust Company(pty:dft), Attorney Taneska L Jones added to party PHH Mortgage Corporation(pty:dft) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 01/26/2024) |
01/29/2024 | 8 | ORDER: Before the Court is Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Substitute Counsel. ECF No. 7 . Having considered the Motion, the Court concludes that the Motion should be and is hereby GRANTED. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 1/29/2024) (saw) (Entered: 01/29/2024) |
01/31/2024 | 9 | Joint STATUS REPORT / RULE 26(f) JOINT REPORT filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 01/31/2024) |
02/01/2024 | 10 | SCHEDULING ORDER: (This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025. Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.), MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024) |
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02/08/2024 01:40:14 |
Judge Sim Lake ain’t hangin’ around.
Ochlocracy spreads to US Gov.https://t.co/MtHnJjg3LR@USAO_DC @USAO_SDTX @USAO_EDOK @USAttorneys @uscourts @publicjustice @ADFLegal @10DowningStreet @WSJ @nytimes @DailyMail @propublica @washingtonpost @UCLA @UniofOxford @Cambridge_Uni #TWO pic.twitter.com/nmPZRktaPh— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) January 31, 2024
The Insufficient Order of Foreclosure by Judge Pittman
FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Court’s March 31, 2021 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88):
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants may proceed with foreclosure in accordance with the Loan Agreement and Texas Property Code Chapter 51, or, alternatively, judicial foreclosure.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all costs and expenses are taxed against the party incurring the same.
The Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Final Judgment to the parties.
SO ORDERED on this 21st day of April, 2021.
Please offer Sunday Prayers for a Distressed and Harassed Widow as the Catholic Bandit goes Judge Shoppin’ in Texas. https://t.co/ggDGDIdR4u @cnalive @CatholicNewsSvc @CatholicRelief @USCCB @catholiccom @NCRegister @CatholicVote @DallasCath @SecretService @USMarshalsHQ #TWO #NMA pic.twitter.com/RSpIICXp45
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 4, 2024
Dykema Tells the Federal Judge All How to Write an Order of Foreclosure, with a Template Provided
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Defendants PHH Mortgage Corporation and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, solely in its capacity as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 file this Motion to Correct Judgment and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Brief in Support, and respectfully show the Court as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court entered its April 21, 2021 Final Judgment (ECF No. 89) after granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
While the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims, and the Court’s March 31, 2021 Order (ECF No. 88) provided that Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, the Final Judgment provides that her claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants request that the Court correct this clerical error or oversight by amending the judgment to provide that dismissal is with prejudice as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.
Further, the judgment taxes costs and expenses against the party incurring the same, despite Rule 59(d)’s language providing that costs should be allowed to the prevailing party.
Defendants request that the Court correct this clerical error or oversight by amending the judgment to provide that costs shall be taxed against Plaintiff.
Finally, Defendants request that the Court amend the judgment to include the declarations they had requested in the proposed judgment they submitted, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. Defendants acknowledge that the Court need not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law where it resolves a case by summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3), but
an expanded declaration by the Court will provide additional clarity should Plaintiff again challenge Defendants’ right to foreclose.
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. The Judgment should be with prejudice and tax costs against Plaintiff.
Rule 60 provides that a court may correct a “clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). In Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the district court was authorized under Rule 60(a) to enter a corrected judgment where, as here, the judgment provided for dismissal without prejudice, because the district court’s grant of summary judgment necessarily resulted in a dismissal with prejudice. 647 F. 3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is a ruling that one party prevails as a matter of law. It is inevitably with prejudice, as Article III courts cannot offer advisory opinions.” Id. at 197-99. It appears that a clerical error or an oversight resulted in the Court’s judgment providing that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims was without prejudice. The Court’s summary-judgment order had stated that the dismissal was with prejudice. See Order at 8 (ECF No. 88).
In addition, Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action. Rule 54(d) provides that unless a statute or rule provides otherwise, “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The judgment’s taxation of costs and expenses against the party incurring the same is contrary to this rule and appears to be the result of a clerical error or an oversight.
Defendants request that the Court correct its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to provide that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims is with prejudice, and that all costs and expenses are taxed against Plaintiff. Defendants alternatively request this relief by way of amendment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or, in the further alternative, under Rule 60(b), because the terms of the judgment are contrary to Fifth Circuit authority and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as described above. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b).
B. The Judgment should more specifically declare Defendants’ rights relating to foreclosure.
Defendants further request that the Court alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) to provide more specific declaratory relief to Defendants under their declaratory-judgment claim.
Defendants request that the judgment expressly provide
(1) that Plaintiff is in default under the note,
(2) that Defendant Deutsche Bank as Trustee has an enforceable security interest in the property at issue under the deed of trust,
(3) that the deed of trust secures repayment of all amounts owed by Plaintiff under the loan documents,
and
(4) that Defendants may foreclose upon the lien created by the deed of trust.
The judgment provides for this final item, but not the others.
Defendants respectfully request that the Court alter or amend the judgment to include the specific declarations previously proposed by Defendants at Exhibit 1.
Defendants alternatively request this relief under Rule 60(a) should it be the result of an oversight or clerical error or, in the further alternative, under Rule 60(b).
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter a corrected and amended Final Judgment as proposed herein, and grant them such other relief to which they may be justly entitled.
Dated: May 7, 2021 /s/ Kyle A. Owens
Kyle A. Owens
Attorney in Charge
Texas State Bar No. 24046573
kowens@dykema.com
Amelia H. Marquis
Texas State Bar No. 24097512
amarquis@dykema.com
Dykema Gossett PLLC
1717 Main Street, Suite 4200
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 462-6453
(855) 256-1482 FAX
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I certify that on May 6, 2021, I conferred with counsel for Plaintiff Joshua Gordon regarding the relief requested herein. Mr. Gordon stated that while Plaintiff disagreed with the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and did not believe judgment should be awarded to Defendants, he takes no position regarding the specific relief requested by Defendants herein.
/s/ Kyle A. Owens
Kyle A. Owens
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 7, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
/s/ Kyle A. Owens
Kyle A. Owens
This is not new, citizens. The Catholic Bandit, lawyer Mark Cronenwett, who attends St Thomas More Society of the Diocese in Dallas pretending to hold Christian values, is actually a liar, thief and despicable human who has repeatedly acted in bad faith. https://t.co/voH0S6e4Fe pic.twitter.com/cFKbVjvTrK
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 4, 2024
FINAL JUDGMENT
This Final Judgment is issued pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 58, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In accordance with the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88):
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that an event of default has occurred on that certain Texas Home Equity Note executed by Plaintiff on or about September 8, 2006, in the original principal amount of $190,000.00 payable to the order of New Century Mortgage Corporation (the “Note”). Plaintiff has failed to make payments required under the Note, is in breach of the Note and the Deed of Trust, as defined below, and remains in default.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that that certain Texas Home Security Instrument, dated September 8, 2006, signed by Dianne Dorman and recorded as document number D206296193 in the real-property records of Tarrant County, Texas (the “Deed of Trust”), secures to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007- NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”), as the current holder of the Note and mortgagee of the Deed of Trust, repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note and the other loan documents, through a first-lien security interest in and power of sale of that certain real property commonly known as 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”), and more particularly described as follows:
LOT 1, BLOCK 2, OF CHAPEL DOWNS, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN CABINET A, SLIDE 386, OF THE PLAT RECORDS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Deed of Trust secures repayment of all advances by Defendants Deutsche Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation and their predecessors in interest on Plaintiff’s loan, whether for insurance, property taxes, or otherwise, as well as their costs and expenses incurred enforcing the Note, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that due to Plaintiff’s default under the Note, Defendants, or their successors or assigns, may foreclose upon the lien created by the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust against the Property through non-judicial foreclosure as provided in the Deed of Trust and section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code, or, alternatively, through judicial foreclosure, and recover from the proceeds of sale the full amount of the debt outstanding under the Note, Deed of Trust, and the other loan documents.
Defendants may recover their costs of suit as taxed in this matter from Plaintiff. The Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Final Judgment to the parties.
[REMAINDER OF PAGE BLANK – SIGNATURE FOLLOWS]
SO ORDERED on this day of , 2021.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cronyism: Roman Catholic Widow Martha Stolowski’s Home Foreclosure Saved by the Catholic Bandit: In a perplexing legal development, the dismissal of a lawsuit against decedent’s estate has caught LIT’s attention. https://t.co/C7tqS5ct7r@KofC @USCCB @BishopBarron @ChrisStefanick pic.twitter.com/MbPU91wfic
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 5, 2024
The Amended Order of Foreclosure by Judge Pittman at request of The Catholic Bandit
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Court’s March 31, 2021 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88):
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that an event of default has occurred on that certain Texas Home Equity Note executed by Plaintiff on or about September 8, 2006, in the original principal amount of $190,000.00 payable to the order of New Century Mortgage Corporation (the “Note”). Plaintiff has failed to make payments required under the Note, is in breach of the Note and the Deed of Trust, as defined below, and remains in default.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that that certain Texas Home Security Instrument, dated September 8, 2006, signed by Dianne Dorman and recorded as document number D206296193 in the real-property records of Tarrant County, Texas (the “Deed of Trust”), secures to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”), as the current holder of the Note and mortgagee of the Deed of Trust, repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note and the other loan documents, through a first-lien security interest in and power of sale of that certain real property commonly known as 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”), and more particularly described as follows:
LOT 1, BLOCK 2, OF CHAPEL DOWNS, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN CABINET A, SLIDE 386, OF THE PLAT RECORDS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Deed of Trust secures repayment of all advances by Defendants Deutsche Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation and their predecessors in interest on Plaintiff’s loan, whether for insurance, property taxes, or otherwise, as well as their costs and expenses incurred enforcing the Note, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that due to Plaintiff’s default under the Note, Defendants, or their successors or assigns, may foreclose upon the lien created by the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust against the Property through non-judicial foreclosure as provided in the Deed of Trust and section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code, or, alternatively, through judicial foreclosure, and recover from the proceeds of sale the full amount of the debt outstanding under the Note, Deed of Trust, and the other loan documents.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants may recover their costs of suit as taxed in this matter from Plaintiff.
The Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Final Judgment to the parties.
SO ORDERED on this 7th day of May, 2021.
Here’s where you find out Texas lawyers and judges socialize together inside and outside of the workplace, including having their own Knights-styled Catholic society. Check it out; https://t.co/qdm3SAzQSB
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 4, 2024
Six BK Filings by Dianne Dorman
Dianne Louise Dorman (22-40421)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Dianne Louise Dorman (17-44574)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Dianne Dorman (16-40061)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Dianne Dorman – Adversary Proceeding (16-04072)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Dianne Louise Dorman (14-40994)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Dianne Louise Dorman (10-45884)
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas