Dianne Dorman versus Deep Pockets PHH, The Nazi Funding Bank, The Catholic Bandit and The New Lords

11.

A.  Summary of Facts

12.              On or about September 8, 2006, Plaintiff executed certain Texas Home Equity Note (Fixed Rate – First Lien) originally payable to New Century Mortgage Corporation, in the principal amount of $190,000.00 and bearing an interest rate of 7.975 per annum (the “Note”). A true and correct copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

13.              Concurrently with the execution of the Note, Plaintiff executed a Texas Home Equity Security Instrument (First Lien) (“Security Instrument” and together with the Note, the “Loan Agreement”) as grantors, granting Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (“MERS”), solely as nominee for New Century Mortgage Corporation, its successors and assigns, with a security interest in the real property located at 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”), and legally described as:

LOT 1, BLOCK 2, OF CHAPEL DOWNS, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN CABINET A, SLIDE 386, OF THE PLAT RECORDS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS.

14.              The Security Instrument was recorded in the Official Public Records of Tarrant County, Texas as Instrument No. D206296193 on September 21, 2006. A true and correct copy of the Security Instrument is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

15.              Subsequently, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as Holder of the Note and Lien for New Century Mortgage Corporation then assigned and transferred the Loan Agreement to Plaintiff as per certain Transfer of Lien recorded in the Official Property Record of Tarrant County, Texas as Instrument No. D210209405 on August 27, 2010. A true and correct copy of the Transfer of Lien is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

38.              Deutsche Bank is the current holder of the Note, endorsed in blank, and the beneficiary of the Security Instrument and mortgagee as that term is defined in Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code. Defendant PHH services the loan for Deutsche Bank.

LIT: PHH/Ocwen purchased charged off non-performing loans (NPL)  for cents on the dollar around 2013/14…we have doubts about the truthfulness of this statement and Deutsche Bank’s current role, apart from being the holder of legal records for all mortgages in the USA.

39.              Under the terms of the Loan Agreement, the Borrower was required to pay when due the principal and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note, as well as any applicable charges and fees due under the Note.

40.              The Loan Agreement further provides that should Borrower fail to make payments on the Note as they became due and payable, or fail to comply with any or all of the covenants and conditions of the Security Instrument, that the lender may enforce the Security Instrument by selling the Property according to law and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Loan Agreement.

41.              The Loan Agreement is currently due for November 1, 2010, payment and all subsequent monthly payments.

On June 13, 2023, a Notice of Default was sent to the Borrower in accordance with the Loan Agreement and the Texas Property Code. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Default attached hereto as Exhibit D.

LIT: Records show that Dorman was in Bankruptcy until dismissed on August 3, 2023.

42.              The default was not cured, and the maturity of the debt was accelerated on July 19, 2023, when a Notice of Acceleration of Loan Maturity was sent via certified mail to the Borrower in accordance with the Loan Agreement and the Texas Property Code.

A true and correct copy of the Notice of Acceleration of Loan Maturity is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

43.               In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred for Defendants to enforce their security interest against the Property.

Defendants bring this counterclaim for foreclosure so they may enforce their security interest in the Property.

B.  CAUSE OF ACTION – NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

44.               Defendants assert a counterclaim for non-judicial foreclosure against Plaintiff.

Defendants have fully performed their obligations under the Loan Agreement, however Plaintiff has failed to make the required payments under the Loan Agreement. which constitutes an event of default.

45.               The Security Instrument permits Defendants to foreclose on the Property should there be an event of default of the Loan Agreement. Accordingly, Defendants seek judgment in their favor and an order allowing foreclosure in accordance with the Security Instrument and Texas Property Code section 51.002, or alternatively, a judgment for judicial foreclosure.

46.               Defendants have been forced to hire the undersigned attorneys to pursue this claim; Defendants are therefore entitled to and seek judgment against Plaintiff for their reasonable attorney’s fees in this action, both through trial and in the event of a subsequent appeal, as provided by the Loan Agreement. Defendants seek an award of attorney’s fees as a further obligation on the Note and not as a money judgment against Plaintiff, personally.

47.              All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.

C.  CAUSE OF ACTION – JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

48.              The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference for all purposes.

49.              In the alternative, for failure to cure the default of the Loan, Defendants seek to enforce their security interest against the Property in an amount equal to the payoff at the time of judgment.

50.              As the current legal owners and holders of the Note and the mortgagees of record who have the right to enforce the Note and Security Instrument, Defendants seek a judgment for judicial foreclosure together with an order of sale issued to the sheriff or constable of Tarrant County—the county where the Property is located—directing the sheriff or constable to seize and sell the Property in satisfaction of the Loan Agreement debt.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants pray the Court declare that Defendants are authorized to enforce the power of sale in the Security Instrument through foreclosure of the Property pursuant to Texas Property Code section 51.002, the Note and Security Instrument, or alternatively, a judgment foreclosing their lien and order of sale. Defendants further ask to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs as pled above. Defendants also pray that Plaintiff takes nothing on her claims. Defendants seek all other relief to which they may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

By:  /s/ Mark D. Cronenwett

MARK D. CRONENWETT
Texas Bar No. 00787303
mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com

MACKIE WOLF ZIENTZ & MANN, P.C.
14160 N. Dallas Parkway, Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75254
214-635-2650 (Phone)
214-635-2686 (Fax)

Attorneys for Defendants

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Dianne Dorman brought this action to stop foreclosure.

Dorman failed to make her April 2010 mortgage payment, and over the last decade, has still not made it.

Instead, Dorman filed for bankruptcy three times and, after all were dismissed, sued her mortgagee and mortgage servicers, Defendants, to further delay.

After more than 18 months of pre-trial proceedings, Defendants filed a summary-judgment motion, seeking to dismiss Dorman’s claims and foreclose on the house. ECF No. 72.

Having now considered both parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that Dorman’s claims are devoid of merit and that Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, Dorman bought the house at 100 Ascot Drive, Southlake, Texas.

Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t at ¶¶ 6, 7, ECF No. 40.

She purchased the house with a note and deed of trust. Id.

About a year after buying the house, she refinanced her house with New Century Mortgage Corporation. Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 1.

In 2009, MERS, on behalf of New Century, transferred the lien to defendant Deutsche Bank, as the trustee for a securitized asset- backed receivable.

Id. at 130.

Ocwen Loan Servicing had serviced the mortgage, but beginning in 2019, PHH MC, Ocwen’s successor in interest, has been the servicer.

Id. at 24.

Despite living in the house continuously since 2005, Dorman last paid Defendants a full mortgage payment in March 2010.

Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 31.

Although she has paid Defendants over the past decade, she is well behind on her note and owes Defendants additional money for advancing her property taxes.

Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 24.

Dorman has spent considerable time and money delaying foreclosure.

In 2013, she filed for bankruptcy; it was dismissed.

Defs.’ MSJ Supp. App’x at 2.

She filed again in 2014; it too was dismissed.

Id. at 4.

And showing persistence, she tried again in 2016.

Like the other filings, it was dismissed.

Id. at 6.

Following the dismissal, the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, Texas ordered that Defendants could proceed with foreclosure.

Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 164–65.

But before the scheduled foreclosure, Dorman filed this suit in Texas state court.

Defs.’ Notice of Removal, Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-3.

Defendants removed the case to this Court.1

Dorman’s complaint has been amended twice and survived a motion to dismiss.

It makes two claims.

First, Dorman claims the refinance note violates the Texas Constitution’s requirement that loan close at least a day after the borrower receives the loan documents.

Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t, at ¶ 22–23.

Second, although couched in different legal garb, she claims Defendants breached a bankruptcy settlement’s terms.

Id. at ¶¶ 29–38.

Defendants counterclaimed for non-payment and foreclosure.

After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment.

ECF No. 72.

The Court has considered the motion, Dorman’s response, and all related briefs and appendixes.

The motion is now ripe.

SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

1 Although this case was lawfully removed to federal court, the Court must seriously question the wisdom of it being litigated in federal court versus state court.

This is a simple mortgage dispute; it does not involve any weighty issue of federal law mandating that it be settled in the clogged dockets of this division.

Having been a state trial judge in Tarrant County, Texas and an appellate justice on the Second Texas Court of Appeals in Fort Worth, the undersigned is exceedingly confident that this case would have been resolved much more quickly and efficiently and to the benefit of all parties had it merely remained to be decided by our good state judges and juries in Tarrant County.

See FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing as “Publius”) (stating that “the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” would be left to the states under our Constitution);

see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 n. 32 (1984)

(When federal courts must rule on state claims, their construction of state law can be “uncertain and ephemeral.”).

“Justice delayed . . . is often justice denied.”

Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The movant makes a showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988).

The court cannot make a credibility determination in light of conflicting evidence or competing inferences.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 250.

ANALYSIS

Defendants’ motion argues two points. First, Dorman’s claims are without merit and should be dismissed.

And second, Defendants have shown as a matter of law their entitlement to foreclosure.

The Court addresses both points.

A.                Dorman’s claims are meritless and dismissed.

Dorman’s Second Amended Complaint contains five claims.

Her first two claims arise from an alleged violation of the Texas Constitution.

But Dorman cites no evidence supporting this claim and, at the relevant time, the allegedly violated section wasn’t even law.

Her next two claims arise from an alleged settlement agreement from Dorman’s third bankruptcy.

But binding precedent precludes enforcing agreements from a dismissed bankruptcy.

Finally, since Dorman’s claims all fail, her attorneys’ fees claim likewise fails.

1.      The Texas Constitution was not violated.

Dorman claims the underlying note and lien are void ab initio because New Century violated the Texas Constitution by closing her loan the same day she received certain disclosures.

Pl.’s 2nd Amend. Comp’t at ¶¶ 22–23.

The Texas Constitution requires a mortgage to close at least “one business day after the date that the owner of the homestead receives a copy of the loan application if not previously provided and a final itemized disclosure of the [closing costs].”

TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).

The evidence, however, undisputedly shows otherwise.

While Dorman cites no evidence supporting her bald allegation, Defendants cite numerous examples of Dorman acknowledging that she received the disclosure the day before closing.

See e.g. Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 137, 138.

The Court also judicially notices Dorman’s Texas Home Equity Affidavit filed in the Tarrant County Real Property Records, document number D206296194, which explicitly states that her “Note and Security Instrument have not been signed before one business day after the date that [Dorman] received a final itemized disclosure of the [closing costs].”

Moreover, this requirement was added to the Texas Constitution in 2007—one year after Dorman closed on her note.

“As a general rule, changes in the Texas Constitution do not have retroactive effect.”

Leopold & Breyer, 39 TEX. PRAC., MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 25.8 (Nov. 2020 update) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16).

Thus, this whole argument rest on a flawed foundation.

Consequently, Dorman’s argument is meritless.

This argument supported her claims to quiet title and for declaratory relief.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these two claims is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED.

2.      The Court cannot enforce the bankruptcy agreement.

Dorman next asserts claims for negligent accounting and equitable estoppel, but both depend on an alleged agreement made during Dorman’s third Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.

In that proceeding, Deutsche Bank filed a Notice of Agreed Resolution of Objection to Confirmation.

Pl.’s MSJ App’x at 115, ECF No. 81-1.

This and later filings appear to show an agreed settlement between the parties for $85,000.

But that Chapter 13 bankruptcy was not confirmed.

The bankruptcy court later dismissed it without prejudice, ordering that “all debts due and owing to creditors as of this date are NOT DISCHARED or affected in any manner by this Order.”

Id. at 128 (emphasis in original).

The bankruptcy court’s dismissal dissolved all agreements from the bankruptcy.

See In re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2012).

“Under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b), the pre- discharge dismissal of a bankruptcy case returns the parties to the positions they were in before the case was initiated.”

Id. (cleaned up).

According to the Fifth Circuit, “a Chapter 13 plan [is] an exchanged for bargain between the debtor and the debtor’s creditors.”

Id. at 238 (cleaned up).

A dismissal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy without a discharge evidences that that debtor broke his agreement.

Id.

Thus, he cannot later enforce agreements made within the bankruptcy and “cannot convincingly argue that equity is on his side.”

Id.

As a result, the Court will not enforce the alleged agreement.

Without that agreement, Dorman’s negligent-accounting and equitable-estoppel claims fail.

Moreover, the economic-loss rule bars these claims too.

See Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014).

The “economic loss rule generally precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from a party’s failure to perform under a contract when the harm consists only of the economic loss of a contractual expectancy.”

Id.

That rule knocks out both of Dorman’s claims, which essentially seek to enforce the bankruptcy agreement’s expected deal.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Dorman’s claims for negligent accounting and equitable estoppel are GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED.

3.      Attorney’s Fees

Since all her claims have been dismissed, Dorman’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

B.                Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.

Defendants counterclaimed that Dorman’s missed payments constitute a breach of the note that entitles them to foreclosure.

Defs.’ Ans. & CC at ¶¶ 73–78, ECF No. 55.

To obtain an order for foreclosure, a security interest holder must demonstrate that:

“(1) a debt exists;

(2) the debt is secured by a lien created under Art. 16, § 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution;

(3) [the borrowers] are in default under the note and security instrument;

and

(4) [the borrowers] received notice of default and acceleration.”

Weeks v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 4:15-CV-00588-O-BP, 2017 WL 4325797, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2017) (quoting Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 583 F. App’x 306 (5th Cir. 2014)).

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants detail Dorman’s missed payments and their compliance with applicable foreclosure procedures.

Dorman’s summary-judgment response fails to address or dispute any of these facts or arguments.

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)

(“We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.”) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, Texas has already determined that the Defendants are entitled to foreclosure.

Defs.’ MSJ App’x at 164–65. As a result, Defendants counterclaim for foreclosure is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 72) should be and hereby is GRANTED.

Accordingly, Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Further, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on its claim for foreclosure is GRANTED.

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants submit a proposed final judgment consistent with this Order by April 14, 2021. Plaintiff may file any objections to Defendants’ proposed final judgment by April 21, 2021.

SO ORDERED on this 31st day of March, 2021.

Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

Defendants PHH Mortgage Corporation and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, solely in its capacity as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 file this Motion to Correct Judgment and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Brief in Support, and respectfully show the Court as follows:

I.    INTRODUCTION

The Court entered its April 21, 2021 Final Judgment (ECF No. 89) after granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

While the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims, and the Court’s March 31, 2021 Order (ECF No. 88) provided that Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, the Final Judgment provides that her claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Defendants request that the Court correct this clerical error or oversight by amending the judgment to provide that dismissal is with prejudice as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

Further, the judgment taxes costs and expenses against the party incurring the same, despite Rule 59(d)’s language providing that costs should be allowed to the prevailing party.

Defendants request that the Court correct this clerical error or oversight by amending the judgment to provide that costs shall be taxed against Plaintiff.

Finally, Defendants request that the Court amend the judgment to include the declarations they had requested in the proposed judgment they submitted, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. Defendants acknowledge that the Court need not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law where it resolves a case by summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3), but

an expanded declaration by the Court will provide additional clarity should Plaintiff again challenge Defendants’ right to foreclose.

II.    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A.                 The Judgment should be with prejudice and tax costs against Plaintiff.

Rule 60 provides that a court may correct a “clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). In Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the district court was authorized under Rule 60(a) to enter a corrected judgment where, as here, the judgment provided for dismissal without prejudice, because the district court’s grant of summary judgment necessarily resulted in a dismissal with prejudice. 647 F. 3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is a ruling that one party prevails as a matter of law. It is inevitably with prejudice, as Article III courts cannot offer advisory opinions.” Id. at 197-99. It appears that a clerical error or an oversight resulted in the Court’s judgment providing that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims was without prejudice. The Court’s summary-judgment order had stated that the dismissal was with prejudice. See Order at 8 (ECF No. 88).

In addition, Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action. Rule 54(d) provides that unless a statute or rule provides otherwise, “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The judgment’s taxation of costs and expenses against the party incurring the same is contrary to this rule and appears to be the result of a clerical error or an oversight.

Defendants request that the Court correct its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to provide that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims is with prejudice, and that all costs and expenses are taxed against Plaintiff. Defendants alternatively request this relief by way of amendment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or, in the further alternative, under Rule 60(b), because the terms of the judgment are contrary to Fifth Circuit authority and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as described above. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b).

B.                 The Judgment should more specifically declare Defendants’ rights relating to foreclosure.

Defendants further request that the Court alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) to provide more specific declaratory relief to Defendants under their declaratory-judgment claim.

Defendants request that the judgment expressly provide

(1) that Plaintiff is in default under the note,

(2) that Defendant Deutsche Bank as Trustee has an enforceable security interest in the property at issue under the deed of trust,

(3) that the deed of trust secures repayment of all amounts owed by Plaintiff under the loan documents,

and

(4) that Defendants may foreclose upon the lien created by the deed of trust.

The judgment provides for this final item, but not the others.

Defendants respectfully request that the Court alter or amend the judgment to include the specific declarations previously proposed by Defendants at Exhibit 1.

Defendants alternatively request this relief under Rule 60(a) should it be the result of an oversight or clerical error or, in the further alternative, under Rule 60(b).

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter a corrected and amended Final Judgment as proposed herein, and grant them such other relief to which they may be justly entitled.

Dated: May 7, 2021                                                    /s/ Kyle A. Owens

Kyle A. Owens

Attorney in Charge

Texas State Bar No. 24046573
kowens@dykema.com

Amelia H. Marquis
Texas State Bar No. 24097512
amarquis@dykema.com
Dykema Gossett PLLC

1717 Main Street, Suite 4200
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 462-6453
(855) 256-1482 FAX

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I certify that on May 6, 2021, I conferred with counsel for Plaintiff Joshua Gordon regarding the relief requested herein. Mr. Gordon stated that while Plaintiff disagreed with the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and did not believe judgment should be awarded to Defendants, he takes no position regarding the specific relief requested by Defendants herein.

/s/ Kyle A. Owens

Kyle A. Owens

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 7, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Kyle A. Owens

Kyle A. Owens

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Final Judgment is issued pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 58, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In accordance with the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88):

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s claims are DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that an event of default has occurred on that certain Texas Home Equity Note executed by Plaintiff on or about September 8, 2006, in the original principal amount of $190,000.00 payable to the order of New Century Mortgage Corporation (the “Note”). Plaintiff has failed to make payments required under the Note, is in breach of the Note and the Deed of Trust, as defined below, and remains in default.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that that certain Texas Home Security Instrument, dated September 8, 2006, signed by Dianne Dorman and recorded as document number D206296193 in the real-property records of Tarrant County, Texas (the “Deed of Trust”), secures to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007- NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”), as the current holder of the Note and mortgagee of the Deed of Trust, repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note and the other loan documents, through a first-lien security interest in and power of sale of that certain real property commonly known as 100 Ascot Dr., Southlake, Texas 76092 (the “Property”), and more particularly described as follows:

LOT 1, BLOCK 2, OF CHAPEL DOWNS, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN CABINET A, SLIDE 386, OF THE PLAT RECORDS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Deed of Trust secures repayment of all advances by Defendants Deutsche Bank and PHH Mortgage Corporation and their predecessors in interest on Plaintiff’s loan, whether for insurance, property taxes, or otherwise, as well as their costs and expenses incurred enforcing the Note, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys’ fees.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that due to Plaintiff’s default under the Note, Defendants, or their successors or assigns, may foreclose upon the lien created by the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust against the Property through non-judicial foreclosure as provided in the Deed of Trust and section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code, or, alternatively, through judicial foreclosure, and recover from the proceeds of sale the full amount of the debt outstanding under the Note, Deed of Trust, and the other loan documents.

Defendants may recover their costs of suit as taxed in this matter from Plaintiff. The Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Final Judgment to the parties.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE BLANK – SIGNATURE FOLLOWS]

SO ORDERED on this         day of                             , 2021.

Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE