Appellate Circuit

CFPB Respond to PHH Ocwen’s Claims

Ocwens’ Consent Judgment had two sets of obligations: complying with federal and state law, and complying with the fencing-in provisions.

Reply Brief by the Anti-Consumer Watchdog (CFPB)

AUG 26, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: AUG 26, 2021

INTRODUCTION

The issue in this case is the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment that the Bureau and Ocwen entered into in December 2013. The Consent Judgment stated that, going forward, Ocwen was required to comply with state and federal law. It also included a Release, through which the Bureau and Ocwen agreed that the only claims that were released as a result of the Consent Judgment were those that arose from conduct that had “taken place as of 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on December 18, 2013.”

In addition, the Consent Judgment included new obligations for Ocwen: For three years – while the Consent Judgment was in effect – Ocwen was required to comply with fencing-in injunctive provisions designed to add an additional layer of consumer protection. The Consent Judgment also included an enforcement mechanism that applied if Ocwen failed to comply with the fencing-in provisions.

As a result, Ocwen had two sets of obligations while the Consent Judgment was in effect: complying with federal and state law, and complying with the fencing-in provisions.

The Bureau’s authority to enforce these two sets of obligations was distinct.

In Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004), this Court explained how to assess the res judicata effect of a consent judgment: Look to the intent of the parties as expressed in the judgment itself. But that is not what the district court did in this case.

Instead of evaluating the parties’ intent as expressed in the Release, it applied the traditional four-part res judicata test, a test that is appropriate for a litigated judgment, but inappropriate for a judgment that is entered with the consent of the parties.

And when it applied the four-part test, the district court got it wrong. Instead of assessing whether this case and the Consent Judgment stem from the same nucleus of facts, the court compared the allegations in this case to the injunctive fencing-in relief included in the Consent Judgment.

There is no support for that approach.

In its brief, Ocwen purports to base its arguments on Norfolk Southern. But when it describes the parties’ intent, it pays little more than lip service to the Release, the section of the Consent Judgment that specifically addresses res judicata. The Release describes, down to the minute, the claims that are released and those that are not.

Instead, Ocwen focuses on the Consent Judgment’s fencing-in provisions.

Those provisions do not address the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment, and most certainly do not countermand the express provisions of the Release.

I. THE CONSENT JUDGMENT REFLECTS THE PARTIES’ INTENT THAT THE CLAIMS IN THIS CASE ARE NOT PRECLUDED

A. Norfolk Southern dictates that the parties’ intent establishes the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment

Norfolk Southern controls this case. In that case, this Court explained that it is the “expressed intent of the parties” that is “the determining factor in whether a consent-based judgment is given collateral estoppel effect.”

371 F.3d at 1288.

And “[t]he best evidence of that intent is, of course, the settlement agreement itself.”

Id. at 1289.

Moreover, “

[w]here the plain meaning of an agreement is clear, we may not go beyond the four corners of the document to look for additional evidence of the drafters’ intentions.”

Id. at 1290.

Finally, this Court explained that there are two ways parties can express their intent. They can “list the types of suits that may be brought in the future,” or they can “agree to an exclusive list of the suits that are subject to preclusion.”

Id. at 1289.

When they specify which suits are subject to preclusion, they “thereby implicitly allow[] all other claims to be brought in the future.” Id. Whichever approach they take, courts must “enforce the parties’ intent.”

Id.

Ocwen agrees that the intent of the Bureau and Ocwen – the parties to the 2013 Consent Judgment – controls the Consent Judgment’s res judicata effect.1

See Br. of Defendants-Appellees (Ocwen Br.) at 25, 26, 29, 32, 39, 40, 50.

But when it comes to assessing that intent, Ocwen goes astray.

B. The Consent Judgment preserves the Bureau’s authority to bring this law enforcement action

1. When the Bureau entered into the Consent Judgment,2 it did not thereby abdicate its statutory obligation going forward to enforce the law with respect to Ocwen’s conduct.

See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (“The Bureau shall seek to … enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently ….”).

This is because the Consent Judgment includes a Release that specifically preserves the Bureau’s authority to enforce the law with respect to violations committed by Ocwen after December 18, 2013 – the day the Bureau and Ocwen entered into the Consent Judgment.

The Release was attached to the Consent Judgment as Consent Exhibit E. Doc. 32-1 at 160-63. It sets forth the Bureau’s and Ocwen’s intent with respect to the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment. The Release shows that it was not the parties’ intent to preclude this law enforcement action.

The Consent Judgment settled charges that, in connection with Ocwen’s mortgage servicing business, it had engaged in a variety of unfair and deceptive practices relating to foreclosures stemming from the 2008 mortgage crisis.

These practices included assessing unauthorized fees, charging consumers for insurance that they did not need, and engaging in illegal practices such as robo-signing foreclosure documents and filing unverified affidavits.

Doc. 32-1.

The Consent Judgment required Ocwen to pay $127 million for the benefit of consumers whose homes were sold in foreclosure sales between 2009 and 2012.

Id. at 10.

It also required Ocwen to provide $2 billion in loan modification relief to consumers who, the Bureau alleged, had been harmed by Ocwen’s practices.

Id. at 11.

(Ocwen did not have to pay the $2 billion as cash out of pocket because that relief took the form of modifications to mortgage loans. Id. at 118.)

The Consent Judgment also included fencing-in injunctive relief in the form of “Servicing Standards” – detailed procedures for Ocwen to follow in connection with certain aspects of its mortgage servicing business.

Id. at 67-113 (Consent Exhibit A).

To make sure that Ocwen complied with these injunctive provisions, the Consent Judgment provided for appointment of a Monitor.

Id. at 122.

The Monitor’s job was to measure Ocwen’s compliance with some, but not all, of the more than 300 Servicing Standards. The Monitor measured Ocwen’s compliance using specified Metrics, which were set forth in Consent Exhibit D.

Id. 122-58.

Particularly important for this case, Section VI of the Consent Judgment provided that [t]he CFPB and [Ocwen] have agreed, in consideration for the terms provided herein, for the release of certain claims and remedies as provided in the CFPB Release, attached hereto as Exhibit E. CFPB and [Ocwen] have also agreed that certain claims and remedies are not released, as provided in Paragraph C of Exhibit E.

Id. at 11-12. (Consent Exhibit E was the Release.)

Paragraph B of the Release provided that the CFPB fully and finally releases [Ocwen] from all potential liability that has been or might have been asserted by the CFPB relating to mortgage servicing practices described in the complaint (the “Mortgage Servicing Practices”) that have taken place as of 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on December 18, 2013.

Id. at 162.

This alone was enough to make clear that entry of the Consent Judgment did not release claims based on practices that had occurred after 11:59 p.m. on December 18, 2013.

See Norfolk S., 371 F.3d at 1289 (if parties “agree to an exclusive list of the suits that are subject to preclusion,” this “implicitly allow[s] all other claims to be brought in the future”).

But even beyond that, Paragraph C of the Release expressly confirms that claims post-dating December 18, 2013, are not released:

Notwithstanding any other term of this Release, the CFPB specifically reserves and does not release any liability for conduct other than conduct related to the Mortgage Servicing Practices asserted or that might have been asserted in the complaint.

Id.

The Bureau could not have “asserted in the complaint” the conduct challenged in this case, all of which occurred after the D.C. Complaint had been filed. Moreover, there is nothing in the Consent Judgment or in the Release itself that releases any claims that arose after December 18, 2013, even if those claims overlap with the Servicing Standards.

Nor is there anything in the Servicing Standards overriding the limitations on the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment as set forth in the Release.

2. When Ocwen attempts to assess the parties’ intent with respect to the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment as to claims that arose after December 18, 2013, it effectively ignores the Release. Instead, it attempts to find the parties’ intent with respect to those claims in the Servicing Standards.

See Ocwen Br. at 7-11, 12-16, 32-37.

But there is nothing in the Servicing Standards reflecting any agreement by the parties that those standards would be the exclusive requirements for Ocwen’s mortgage servicing business over the three- year term of the Consent Judgment.

What Ocwen’s analysis misses is that the Servicing Standards represent the injunctive relief that Ocwen accepted as one of the costs of settling the claims in the D.C. action, not an expression of the parties’ intent with respect to res judicata.

To the contrary, the Consent Judgment specifically provided that “[n]othing in this Consent Judgment shall relieve [Ocwen] of its obligation to comply with applicable state and federal law.”

Doc. 32-1 at 13.

Rather than reflecting the intent of the parties with respect to res judicata, the Servicing Standards were fencing-in provisions, provisions that went above and beyond the requirements of the law, but did not replace the laws that govern Ocwen’s mortgage servicing practices.

Indeed, the Servicing Standards did not encompass every aspect of Ocwen’s loan servicing business. And when it comes to the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment, there is nothing in the Servicing Standards suggesting that those standards were intended to countermand the specific res judicata provisions of the Release.

Ocwen’s theory is that the Release was solely backward-looking, expressing the parties’ intent with respect to the release of claims that might have arisen on or before December 18, 2013.

Ocwen Br. at 46 (“the Release exclusively applies to conduct before the filing [of the D.C. Complaint].”)

As to claims that arose after that date, including all the claims in this case, Ocwen repeatedly contends that the Bureau was limited to pursuing those claims as violations of the Servicing Standards.

See Ocwen Br. at 1, 3, 4, 10, 24, 26, 31-33, 38-39, 40, 42, 43, 46.

But this argument is inconsistent with the Release. Paragraph B of the Release limits the extent of the claims released to those that occurred no later than 11:59 p.m. on December 18, 2013. And Paragraph C confirms that the only claims released are those that were, or might have been, asserted in the D.C. Complaint, which was filed on December 19, 2013. Indeed, Paragraph C is separately mentioned in the Consent Judgment itself:

“CFPB and [Ocwen] have also agreed that certain claims and remedies are not released, as provided in Paragraph C of Exhibit E.” Doc. 32-1 at 11-12. Violations that Ocwen committed after the filing of the D.C. Complaint on December 19, 2013, could not possibly “have been asserted in the complaint.”

The district court purported to consider Paragraph C of the Release, but concluded that “this contractual reservation does not operate as an exception to the principle of res judicata.”

Doc. 764 at 23.

Indeed, the district court believed that Norfolk Southern was “inapposite.” Id. at 25. Instead, the court applied the traditional four-part test for res judicata.

Doc. 764 at 13-22.

And in applying the test, the district court held that the Bureau was precluded from bringing claims that could have been pursued as violations of the Servicing Standards using the Consent Judgment’s enforcement mechanism.

Doc. 764 at 22.

But again, this ignores – indeed, goes contrary to – the Release, which ties the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment not to its enforcement mechanism for its injunctive provisions, but to claims that had been asserted or might have been asserted in the D.C. Complaint.

Ocwen’s discussion of Paragraph C of the Release is even more meager. Ocwen refers to Paragraph C only once in its argument, and then ignores it altogether.

See Ocwen Br. at 46; see also id. at 20 (claims arising after the filing of the D.C. Complaint are “outside the scope of the Release”).

Instead, Ocwen focuses on the Servicing Standards and, just like the district court, contends that, because the Consent Judgment included a mechanism for enforcing those Standards, that mechanism provided the only option for challenging Ocwen’s conduct during the three-year period that the Consent Judgment was in effect.3

As Ocwen notes, see Ocwen Br. at 6, 9, 17, 23, 26, 32, 38, 55, the exclusive mechanism for enforcing the Servicing Standards was set forth in Consent Exhibit D. Doc. 32-1 at 122-58. But Consent Exhibit D imposed a limit only on the authority of the Bureau (and the other plaintiffs) to enforce the Servicing Standards.

That is, in response to a violation of the Servicing Standards, the plaintiffs could not have pursued a motion for contempt, but were limited to the procedures set forth in Consent Exhibit D.

However, there is nothing in Consent Exhibit D that imposes any restriction on the Bureau’s authority going forward to enforce any of the federal consumer financial laws that the Bureau is charged with enforcing.4

Indeed, the only mention of federal law in the Consent Judgment is in Paragraph 17, which provides that “[n]othing in this Consent Judgment shall relieve [Ocwen] of its obligation to comply with applicable state and federal law.”

Doc. 32-1 at 13.

Although Ocwen concedes that this provision confirmed its obligation to comply with the law, it contends that the Bureau “conflates Ocwen’s obligation to comply with the law with the scope of the CFPB’s ability to enforce the law.”

Ocwen Br. at 27.

But the conflating is on Ocwen’s side. It conflates its obligation under the Consent Judgment to comply with the additional protections of the Servicing Standards with its obligation to comply with the law.

The two are separate – the Consent Judgment’s enforcement mechanism applied only to the Servicing Standards, not to the Bureau’s authority to enforce the consumer financial laws that Ocwen remained obligated to follow.5

Ocwen’s analysis is completely at odds with this Court’s decision in Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern explains that parties may express their intent with respect to the res judicata effect of a consent judgment by including an “express description of claims subject to res judicata” or an “express description of claims excepted from res judicata.”

371 F.3d at 1289.

The Consent Judgment here does both and does so explicitly. Paragraph B of the Release describes those claims that the Bureau released and that are therefore “subject to res judicata” – claims based on conduct that had occurred as of 11:59 p.m. on December 18, 2013. Under Norfolk Southern, that alone “implicitly allow[s] all other claims to be brought in the future.”

371 F.3d at 1289.

And the forward-looking provision of the Release, Paragraph C, describes those claims that are “specifically reserve[d]” and “not release[d]” – claims that could not have been asserted in the D.C. Complaint, including any claims based on conduct that post-dates the filing of the Consent Judgment.

It is hard to imagine how the parties’ intent with respect to future claims could have been more explicitly expressed. This intent is “the determining factor” in assessing the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment.6

See Norfolk S., 371 F.3d at 1288.

II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA DO NOT DICTATE DISMISSAL

Traditional principles of res judicata do not apply here because the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment is controlled by the intent of the parties.

See Norfolk S., 371 F.3d at 1288-89.

But it is those traditional principles that form the basis of the district court’s decision.

See Doc. 764 at 14 (“[i]n the Eleventh Circuit, a defendant asserting res judicata must establish four elements …”).

And although the district court should not have applied those traditional principles, when it did so, it did so incorrectly.
In applying the traditional test, the district court focused on the final element of res judicata: whether the claims arise out of the “same operative nucleus of fact.”

See Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1998).

In evaluating that element, “[a] court … must examine the factual issues that must be resolved in the second suit and compare them with the issues explored in the first case.” Id. Thus, the district court should have assessed whether the issues in the present case arise from the same facts that would have been relevant had the D.C. Complaint been litigated. That is not what the district court did. Had it done so, it would have realized that the bases of the two cases are completely different. The D.C. Complaint was based on Ocwen’s “premature and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of homeowners’ rights and protections, and the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents.”

Doc. 731-2 at 9.

The basis of this case is quite different. This case is based on the consequences of Ocwen’s maintenance of a system of record described as a “train wreck.” See Doc. 481 at 14. Instead of making that comparison, the district court derived the Consent Judgment’s res judicata effect from the Servicing Standards, from what the Monitor oversaw, and also from what the Monitor would have overseen had the Bureau sought modifications to both the Servicing Standards and the Monitor’s authority to enforce the Servicing Standards.

See Doc. 764 at 21-22, 26 n.14.

This approach, which in no way focuses on issues underlying the two cases, has no limit and goes far beyond traditional principles of res judicata.

See June 1, 2021, Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant CFPB at 39.

In defense of the district court, Ocwen relies on TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020); see Ocwen Br. at 52.

In fact, that case emphasizes why the district court’s analysis was wrong.

TVPX ARS alleged that Genworth’s calculation of applicable rates violated the terms of a universal life insurance policy it sold.

The district court enjoined TVPX ARS’s suit based on the res judicata effect of a class action settlement that had been entered14 years earlier and that also involved the calculation of rates for Genworth’s universal life insurance policies. That class action settlement, unlike the Consent Judgment that Ocwen and the Bureau entered into, included a broad release that released, among other things, “past, present, and future causes of action,” including causes of action that were directly or indirectly related to “the allegations, facts, subjects or issues” raised in the class action case.

TVPX ARS, 959 F.3d at 1322.

Despite the broad release, this Court vacated the district court’s decision.

Id. at 1329.

It held that “a class release may not preclude a subsequent action unless the released conduct arises out of the identical factual predicate as the claims at issue in the case.”

Id. at 1326 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, “[t]he plaintiff must have also been capable of bringing the same claims in the first action.” Id.

Here, the Consent Judgment and the Bureau’s current law enforcement action arise from different factual predicates – the Consent Judgment settled charges based on Ocwen’s practices in connection with foreclosure, whereas this case focuses on Ocwen’s use of inaccurate information in its day-to-day operations, and how, as a result of using that information, Ocwen made misrepresentations regarding loan terms, borrowers’ payments, payoff amounts, escrow analysis and payments, and insurance coverage.

Compare D.C. Compl. (Doc. 731-2) at 11-13, with the Bureau’s First Am. Compl. (Doc. 481) at 7-63.7

Further, the Bureau was not capable of bringing all of its claims in the D.C. Complaint because four of the counts of the FAC allege violations of regulations that had not taken effect at the time the D.C. Complaint was filed.8

Ocwen notes that in TVPX ARS, this Court “looked to both the factual allegations in the complaint and the terms of the settlement agreement as part of the traditional res judicata analysis.”

Ocwen Br. at 52 (emphasis in original) (citing TVPX ARS, 959 F.3d at 1326).

But what this Court considered in TVPX ARS were the allegations in the class action complaint, the description of those allegations in the class
action notice, and the release in the settlement agreement.9

Id.

Here, the district court ignored the D.C. Complaint, ignored the Release, and focused instead on the fencing-in relief. Ocwen has not identified any case in which the res judicata effect of a prior settlement was based on the scope of fencing-in relief included in a consent.10 Accordingly, even if it were appropriate for the district court to apply traditional res judicata principles, it misapplied those principles.

III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE SERVICING STANDARDS, AS ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE METRICS, DID NOT SATISFY OCWEN’S OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW

As explained, the Release unambiguously preserves the Bureau’s authority to enforce the federal consumer financial laws with respect to Ocwen’s conduct occurring after December 18, 2013. The res judicata analysis in this case should end there.

But even if a court were to apply traditional principles of res judicata, the court’s assessment of whether the same operative nucleus of fact is involved should be based on the factual issues underlying the cases, not on an examination of the fencing-in relief the party has agreed to. And in any event, Ocwen’s obligation to comply with the Servicing Standards, as enforced in accordance with the Metrics, did not satisfy its obligation to comply with law.

1. The Servicing Standards – As a general matter, the Servicing Standards, which were fencing-in requirements, were not congruent with Ocwen’s obligations under the law. Indeed, many of the Servicing Standards were merely general requirements addressing procedures that Ocwen had to implement so that the sorts of violations alleged in the D.C. Complaint would be less likely.11

Others were more specific.12 But it would have been impossible for the Servicing Standards to address every potential violation of law that Ocwen might commit in connection with its mortgage servicing business. And indeed, they did not.

Ocwen argues that each of the nine counts of the FAC challenges conduct that was “addressed” by the Servicing Standards.

Ocwen Br. at 12; see also id. at 13-16, 33-37.

In fact, the Servicing Standards did not require compliance with the statutes and regulations the Bureau is seeking to enforce.

As one example, Count VII of the FAC alleges that Ocwen violated 12 C.F.R. § 1024.17, a provision of Regulation X, which is the regulation that implements the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).

That provision requires Ocwen to conduct annual escrow analyses for borrowers that have escrow accounts, and provide those borrowers with an annual escrow statement disclosing amounts paid for taxes, insurance, and other charges; the total paid into the escrow account during the previous year; and an explanation of how any surplus in the account is handled.

Ocwen contends that Count VII was “addressed” by Servicing Standards I.B.1, I.B.5, and VII.A.1. Ocwen Br. at 13, 35-36.

Ocwen is wrong.

Servicing Standard I.B.1 merely required Ocwen to maintain procedures to ensure accurate account information for borrowers, Doc. 32-1 at 71;

Servicing Standard I.B.5 required Ocwen to provide borrowers with monthly billing statements that showed the balance of the borrower’s escrow account, id. at 73; and Servicing Standard VII.A.1 addressed Ocwen’s obligation to make hazard insurance payments.

None of these Servicing Standards came anywhere close to requiring Ocwen to conduct annual escrow analyses or to satisfy the other requirements of § 1024.17.13

Moreover, it is Ocwen’s failure to conduct these annual analyses that led to the overcharges it imposed on borrowers. It is not surprising that the Servicing Standards did not specifically address the conduct challenged by Count VII of the FAC because the Consent Judgment settled charges stemming from Ocwen’s foreclosure practices resulting from the 2008 mortgage crisis, not the sorts of practices challenged in this case.

Another example: Four counts of the FAC – Counts I, II, V, and VI – allege that Ocwen used inaccurate or incomplete information derived from its system of record in connection with various aspects of servicing borrowers’ loans. As the Bureau alleged in the FAC, Ocwen’s head of servicing referred to its system of record as “[a]n absolute train wreck.”

Doc. 481 at 14. Ocwen (and the district court) contend that this problem was addressed by Servicing Standard I.B.9.

See Ocwen Br. at 13, 33-34; Doc. 764 at 18.

But Servicing Standard I.B.9 merely required Ocwen to have its system of record periodically reviewed for accuracy and completeness by an independent reviewer, not by the Monitor.

Doc. 32-1 at 74.

Although the independent reviewer did report to the Monitor, the Monitor had no responsibility to assess whether those reviews were adequate, or whether Ocwen implemented any changes that the independent reviewer might have suggested.

Doc. 764 at 17-18.

Further, when assessing Ocwen’s performance under the Servicing Standards, the Monitor stated that he assumed the accuracy of Ocwen’s system of record.

Doc. 731-24 at 7 & n.4.

That is, the Monitor assumed away the very violations alleged by the Bureau. Thus, the Servicing Standards did not address a central flaw in Ocwen’s loan servicing, a flaw that is a central basis of this case.14

2. The Metrics – Ocwen also focuses on the Metrics set forth in Consent Exhibit D. See Ocwen

Br. at 16 (allegations in the Complaint were regulated by Servicing Standards, and compliance with the Servicing Standards was “governed by the Metrics”).

Although the Metrics governed compliance with some of the Servicing Standards, they did not govern compliance with the law. Again, consider Count VII, which alleges that Ocwen violated RESPA and Regulation X by failing to conduct annual escrow analyses. Ocwen claims that there were two relevant Metrics:

Metrics 4.B and 33. Metric 4.B addressed Ocwen’s payment processing, see Doc. 32-1 at 143, and Metric 33 addressed whether Ocwen’s billing statements reflected information in its system of record, id. at 157.

Neither of those Metrics had anything to do with assessing whether Ocwen was conducting the annual escrow analyses mandated by RESPA.

See Doc. 32-1 at 143, 157.15

There is another reason why the Metrics could not measure

Ocwen’s compliance with RESPA, Regulation X, or any of the other legal requirements that the Bureau alleges that Ocwen violated.

Every Metric had both a Loan Level Tolerance for Error, as well as a Threshold Error Rate. See Doc. 32-1 at 137-51.

The Loan Level Tolerance for Error “represents a threshold beyond which the variance between the actual outcome and the expected outcome on a single test case is deemed reportable.”

Id. at 157.

For example, Metric 33 assessed, inter alia, whether Ocwen’s monthly billing statements accurately stated the borrower’s principal balance, as that amount was reflected in Ocwen’s system of record.

Id. at 157.

The Tolerance for Error for that Metric was the greater of $99 or 1% of the correct unpaid principal balance. That means that if Ocwen’s system of record reflected that the balance of a borrower’s mortgage was $100,000, Ocwen could have overstated the amount in the borrower’s monthly billing statement by $1000 without violating the Servicing Standard.

The Threshold Error Rate meant that “[f]or each metric or outcome tested[,] if the total number of reportable errors as a percentage of the total number of cases tested exceeds this limit[,] then [Ocwen] will be determined to have failed that metric for the reported period.”

Doc. 32-1 at 158.

For Metric 33, the threshold error rate was 5%.

Id. at 157.

This meant that, in testing a representative sample of loans serviced by Ocwen to assess compliance with Metric 33, Ocwen could have failed (i.e., it could exceed the Loan Level Tolerance for Error) on 5% of the loans being tested without violating the Metric.

None of the laws at issue in this case includes this sort of tolerance for error. According to the district court, this is nothing more than “a limitation in the negotiated settlement between the parties.”

Doc. 764 at 20-21.

To the contrary, the error tolerance was merely a limitation on the ability of the Bureau and the other plaintiffs in the D.C. action to enforce the injunctive relief embodied in the Servicing Standards – not on the Bureau’s ability to enforce the law.

The Consent Judgment, which expressly provided that nothing in it “relieve[d] [Ocwen] of its obligation to comply with applicable state and federal law,” released only claims based on certain conduct occurring before December 19, 2013.

It also expressly reserved the Bureau’s right to enforce the law with respect to later conduct.

This ensured that the Bureau retained its full authority to enforce the consumer financial laws going forward independent of its contractual rights to pursue Ocwen’s violations of the Servicing Standards.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and in the Bureau’s June 1, 2021, Brief, the judgment of the district court should be reversed.16

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen Van Meter
Acting General Counsel
Steven Y. Bressler
Acting Deputy General Counsel
Kristin Bateman
Acting Assistant General Counsel

s/Lawrence DeMille-Wagman
Lawrence DeMille-Wagman
Senior Litigation Counsel
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
1700 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20552
(202) 435-7957
lawrence.demille-wagman@cfpb.gov

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the length limits permitted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B).

The brief is 6113 words, excluding the portions exempted by 11th Circuit Rule 32-4.

The brief’s typeface and type style comply with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6).

August 26, 2021 /s/ Lawrence DeMille-Wagman

Lawrence DeMille-Wagman
Senior Litigation Counsel
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
1700 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20552
(202) 435-7957
lawrence.demille-wagman@cfpb.gov

1 The 2013 Consent Judgment is composed of a 65-page Consent Judgment (the caption and the signatures comprising all but six of those pages) as well as six Exhibits, designated Exhibits A-F. The Exhibits are hereinafter referred to as “Consent Exhibit xx.”

2 The Bureau and Ocwen entered into the Consent Judgment on December 18, 2013. The Consent Judgment, and a complaint (D.C. Complaint), were filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia the following day. The district court entered the Consent Judgment on February 26, 2014. Pursuant to its terms, the Consent Judgment expired three years after the date it was entered.

3 Ocwen repeats the district court’s erroneous statement that the Bureau had conceded that the Servicing Standards and the allegations in this case “overlap.” See Ocwen Br. at 37. In fact, the Bureau said exactly the opposite, and provided the district court with a chart illustrating why none of the violations alleged in the Complaint in this case were encompassed by the Monitor’s testing for compliance with the Servicing Standards. See Doc. 740 at 12-13. In any event, even if there were “overlap,” this would not preclude the Bureau’s claims here because the Servicing Standards were injunctive relief imposed as a consequence of Ocwen’s pre-December 18, 2013, violations. They were not a license for Ocwen to ignore its obligations under the federal consumer financial laws going forward.

4 Ocwen mistakenly contends that the Consent Judgment’s enforcement mechanism applied to “categories of conduct governed by the Servicing Standards.” See Ocwen Br. at 32. In fact, the enforcement mechanism applied only to “uncured Potential Violations,” which were defined to occur only when Ocwen had “exceeded the Threshold Error Rate set for a Metric in a given Quarter.” Doc. 32-1 at 131, 135. Further, before enforcement action could be taken, Ocwen had to be given an opportunity to cure. Id. at 132. Thus, the Consent Judgment’s enforcement authority did not apply to “categories of conduct,” but to specific uncured violations of the Servicing Standards.

5 Ocwen contends that “[n]o rational company” would agree to comply with the Consent Judgment’s Servicing Standards if it were also subject to an enforcement action for violating the law. Ocwen Br. at 43-44. But by agreeing to the injunctive relief embodied in the Servicing Standards, along with other relief in the Consent Judgment, Ocwen gained a release from liability under the claims that the Bureau,
49 states, and the District of Columbia had asserted against it. In any event, “the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682
(1971). As explained above, although the Consent Judgment releases claims for violations of the law that Ocwen may have committed on or before December 18, 2013, it did not release – indeed, it preserved – the Bureau’s statutory authority to enforce the law by pursuing claims that occurred after that date.

6 Ocwen concedes that when interpreting the Consent Judgment, specific provisions should control more general ones. Ocwen Br. at 46. It argues, however, that this rule does not apply because “[t]here is no conflict here.” Id. The Bureau agrees. Paragraphs B and C of the Release speak to the res judicata effect of the Consent Judgment going forward. The Servicing Standards do not.

7 The Bureau filed its Complaint in this case in April 2017, but that Complaint was supplanted in 2019 by the Bureau’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 481) (FAC), and then in 2021 by the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 775). The district court’s Order addressing the parties’ motions for summary judgment relates to the counts in the FAC.

8 Ocwen argues that when the D.C. Complaint was filed, the Bureau knew that these regulations would soon be taking effect, and that the Servicing Standards “encompass the categories of conduct underlying those counts.” Ocwen Br. at 54. But the principle established by this Court requires a determination of whether the Bureau was capable of bringing the claims in the first action (it was not), see TVPX ARS, 959 F.3d at 1326, not whether fencing-in relief encompassed the same “categories of conduct.”

9 Adams v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., 493 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2007), does not help Ocwen, see Ocwen Br. at 52, because this Court performed the same sort of analysis that it later performed in
TVPX ARS.

10 Ocwen cites United States v. Paccione, 948 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1991), but that case has nothing to do with res judicata and is irrelevant here. See Ocwen Br. at 40-42. In that case, the United States entered into a settlement that provided a specific mechanism for enforcing a
$22 million judgment against the defendants. The Second Circuit held that the United States could not invoke an alternate enforcement mechanism that was inconsistent with the agreed-to procedures. Id. at 857-58. Paccione might be relevant if the Bureau had challenged Ocwen’s failure to comply with the Servicing Standards using an enforcement mechanism other than the one provided in Consent Exhibit D. But just as there is nothing in Paccione that would have precluded the United States from prosecuting the defendants for violations occurring after the settlement, there is nothing in the Consent Judgment that precludes the Bureau from challenging Ocwen’s conduct post-dating the D.C. Complaint.

11 See, e.g., Servicing Standard I.A.9, which required Ocwen to “assess and ensure that it has an adequate number of employees and that employees have a reasonable time to prepare, verify, and execute pleadings, POCs [proofs of claim], motions for relief from stay (‘MRS’), affidavits, sworn statements and Declarations.” Doc. 32-1 at 69.

12 See, e.g., Servicing Standard VI.B.4.b.ii, which provided that Ocwen “shall not collect late fees … from the escrow account or from escrow surplus without the approval of the borrower.” Doc. 32-1 at 107.

13 Indeed, Ocwen’s failure to conduct escrow analyses has nothing to do with the foreclosure-related misconduct that formed the basis of the
D.C. Complaint.

14 Ocwen was also permitted to phase-in its compliance with the Servicing Standards over a 180-day period. See Doc. 32-1 at 122.

15 Ocwen also claims that these same two Metrics, 4.B and 33, governed compliance with Servicing Standards that, in Ocwen’s view, applied to Counts I, IV, and V of the FAC. Ocwen Br. at 13. Counts I and V allege that Ocwen used inaccurate information when servicing loans and collecting debts from borrowers. Count IV alleges that Ocwen’s monthly billing statements do not accurately convey the information required by the Truth in Lending Act. Again, Metric 4.B assessed whether Ocwen posted payments timely and accurately; Metric 33 assessed whether Ocwen’s billing statements accurately reflected information in its system of record. Given the alleged flaws in Ocwen’s system of record, neither of those Metrics ensured Ocwen’s compliance with the laws that Counts I, IV, and V seek to enforce.

16 Ocwen raises a series of arguments that were not addressed by the district court, and it recognizes that those arguments should be addressed in the first instance by that court. Ocwen Br. at 55-57. The Bureau agrees. “‘It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.’” Mamani v.Sanchez Bustamante, 968 F.3d 1216, 1240 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 609 (11th Cir. 1991)).

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General Docket
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals Docket #: 19-13015 Docketed: 08/05/2019
Termed: 11/02/2020
Nature of Suit: 2890 Other Statutory Actions
Joanna Burke, et al v. OCWEN Financial Corp., et al
Appeal From: Southern District of Florida
Fee Status: Fee Paid
Case Type Information:
     1) U.S. Civil
     2) U.S. Defendant – Non PLRA
     3) –
Originating Court Information:
     District: 113C-9 : 9:17-cv-80495-KAM
     Civil Proceeding: Kenneth A. Marra, Senior U.S. District Court Judge
     Secondary Judge: William Donald Matthewman, U.S. Magistrate Judge
     Date Filed: 04/20/2017
     Date NOA Filed:
     08/02/2019

08/11/2020 Notice of deficient Brief filed by John Burke. The required paper copies have not been received. Please promptly submit the paper copies OR file with this court a Notice of Inability to Submit Paper Copies due to COVID-19. [Entered: 08/11/2020 12:35 PM]
08/19/2020 Open Document Notice of inability to comply with the paper copy requirement due to COVID-19 filed by Appellant John Burke. [19-13015]–[Edited 08/20/2020 by BWH] (ECF: John Burke) [Entered: 08/19/2020 02:38 PM]
09/02/2020 Open Document MOTION to take judicial notice filed by John Burke. Motion is Opposed. [9178765-1] [19-13015] (ECF: John Burke) [Entered: 09/02/2020 01:32 PM]
09/02/2020 Open Document MOTION Answers to pending motions. filed by John Burke. Motion is Opposed. [9178771-1] [19-13015] (ECF: John Burke) [Entered: 09/02/2020 01:36 PM]
11/02/2020 Open Document ORDER: Motion for recusal filed by Appellant John Burke is DENIED as MOOT. [9088536-2]; Motion to take judicial notice filed by Appellant John Burke is DENIED. [9178765-2]; Motion for clarification filed by Appellant John Burke is DENIED. [9154698-2]; Motion filed by Appellant John Burke is DENIED as MOOT. [9178771-2] KCN, BCG and BL [Entered: 11/02/2020 01:06 PM]
11/02/2020 Open Document Opinion issued by court as to Appellants Joanna Burke and John Burke. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court’s Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [Entered: 11/02/2020 01:17 PM]
11/02/2020 Open Document Judgment entered as to Appellants Joanna Burke and John Burke. [Entered: 11/02/2020 01:24 PM]
11/23/2020 Open Document Petition for rehearing en banc (with panel rehearing) filed by Appellant John Burke. [19-13015] (ECF: John Burke) [Entered: 11/22/2020 08:51 PM]
01/05/2021 Open Document ORDER: The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled, the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc filed by Appellant John Burke are DENIED. [9274910-1] [Entered: 01/05/2021 03:29 PM]
01/13/2021 Open Document Mandate issued as to Appellants Joanna Burke and John Burke. [Entered: 01/13/2021 03:56 PM]
General Docket
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals Docket #: 21-11314 Docketed: 04/21/2021
Nature of Suit: 1890 Other Statutory Actions
Consumer Financial Protection v. Ocwen Financial Corporation, et al
Appeal From: Southern District of Florida
Fee Status: Fee Not Required
Case Type Information:
     1) U.S. Civil
     2) U.S. Plaintiff
     3) –
Originating Court Information:
     District: 113C-9 : 9:17-cv-80495-KAM
     Court Reporter: Stephen Franklin
     Civil Proceeding: Kenneth A. Marra, Senior U.S. District Court Judge
     Date Filed: 04/20/2017
     Date NOA Filed:
     04/21/2021
Prior Cases:
     19-13015     Date Filed: 08/05/2019     Date Disposed: 11/02/2020     Disposition: Affirmed
Current Cases:
Lead Member Start End
     Related
21-11314 21-12160 06/25/2021

 

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Plaintiff – Appellant
Lawrence DeMille-Wagman
Direct: 202-435-7957
[COR LD NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Tianna Elise Baez
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Legal Division
1625 I ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20006Stephanie C. Brenowitz
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Shirley T. Chiu
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Atur Ravi Desai
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Jean Marie Healey
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Erin Mary Kelly
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Gregory Ryan Nodler
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Michael Posner
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552Amanda Christine Roberson
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552James Joseph Savage
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Firm: 212-328-7007
140 E 45TH ST FL 4
NEW YORK, NY 10017Jack Douglas Wilson
[NTC U.S. Government]
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Office of the General Counsel
1700 G ST NW STE 509-B
WASHINGTON, DC 20552
versus
OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Florida corporation
Defendant – Appellee
William M. Jay
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR LD NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Catalina E. Azuero
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 617-570-1000
100 NORTHERN AVE
BOSTON, MA 02210Bridget Ann Berry
Direct: 561-650-7912
[COR NTC Retained]
Greenberg Traurig, PA
Firm: 561-650-7900
777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300E
WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401Laura S. Craven
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 617-570-1000
100 NORTHERN AVE
BOSTON, MA 02210Benjamin Timothy Hayes
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Thomas Hefferon
Direct: 617-570-1000
[COR NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Matthew P. Previn
[NTC Retained]
Buckley, LLP
1133 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS STE 3100
NEW YORK, NY 10036Matthew L. Riffee
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Sabrina M. Rose-Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Matthew S. Sheldon
Direct: 202-346-4000
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Tierney E. Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Laura A. Stoll
Direct: 213-426-2500
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
601 S FIGUEROA ST 41ST FL
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017W. Kyle Tayman
[NTC Retained]
Goodwin Procter, LLP
Firm: 202-346-4000
1900 N ST NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036Andrew Wein
Direct: 561-650-7977
[COR NTC Retained]
Greenberg Traurig, PA
Firm: 561-650-7900
777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300E
WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
Defendant – Appellee
William M. Jay
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)Catalina E. Azuero
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Bridget Ann Berry
Direct: 561-650-7912
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Laura S. Craven
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Benjamin Timothy Hayes
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Thomas Hefferon
Direct: 617-570-1000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew P. Previn
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew L. Riffee
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Sabrina M. Rose-Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew S. Sheldon
Direct: 202-346-4000
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Tierney E. Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Laura A. Stoll
Direct: 213-426-2500
[NTC Retained]
(see above)W. Kyle Tayman
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Andrew Wein
Direct: 561-650-7977
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)
OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING INC., a U. S. Virgin Islands corporation
Defendant – Appellee
William M. Jay
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)Catalina E. Azuero
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Bridget Ann Berry
Direct: 561-650-7912
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Laura S. Craven
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Benjamin Timothy Hayes
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Thomas Hefferon
Direct: 617-570-1000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew P. Previn
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew L. Riffee
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Sabrina M. Rose-Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Matthew S. Sheldon
Direct: 202-346-4000
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Tierney E. Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Laura A. Stoll
Direct: 213-426-2500
[NTC Retained]
(see above)W. Kyle Tayman
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Andrew Wein
Direct: 561-650-7977
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION
Defendant – Appellee
William M. Jay
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR LD NTC Retained]
(see above)Catalina E. Azuero
[NTC Retained]
(see above)Bridget Ann Berry
Direct: 561-650-7912
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Benjamin Timothy Hayes
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Thomas Hefferon
Direct: 617-570-1000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Sabrina M. Rose-Smith
Direct: 202-346-4000
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)Andrew Wein
Direct: 561-650-7977
[COR NTC Retained]
(see above)
——————————
SERVICE Joaquin Alvarez
[NTC Not Applicable]
Florida Office of Financial Regulation
Firm: 504-922-3135
200 E GAINES ST STE 118
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-6502Florida Attorney General Service
[NTC Not Applicable]
Office of the Attorney General
Firm: 850-414-3300
PL-01 The Capitol
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050Scott Ray Fransen
[NTC Not Applicable]
Office of Financial Regulation
Firm: 813-218-5364
1313 N TAMPA ST STE 615
TAMPA, FL 33602

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
a Florida corporation,
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company,
OCWEN MORTGAGE SERVICING INC.,
a U. S. Virgin Islands corporation,
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendants – Appellees.

04/21/2021  Open Document
40 pg, 724.28 KB
CIVIL APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu on 04/21/2021. Fee Status: Fee Not Required. Awaiting Appellant’s Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 05/05/2021 as to Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. Awaiting Appellee’s Certificate of Interested Persons due on or before 05/19/2021 as to Appellee Ocwen Financial Corporation [Entered: 04/22/2021 12:43 PM]
04/26/2021  Open Document
4 pg, 558.85 KB
TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION form filed by Attorney Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. No hearings. [Entered: 04/30/2021 07:48 AM]
04/26/2021  Open Document
5 pg, 650.15 KB
Notice of Mandatory ECF sent to Lawrence DeMille-Wagman. [Entered: 04/30/2021 07:49 AM]
05/03/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 99.11 KB
Briefing Notice issued to Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. The appellant’s brief is due on or before 06/01/2021. The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of the appellant’s brief. [Entered: 05/03/2021 08:44 AM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 52.83 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. [21-11314] (ECF: Lawrence DeMille-Wagman) [Entered: 05/04/2021 10:43 AM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 56.27 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Andrew Wein for OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. [21-11314] (ECF: Andrew Wein) [Entered: 05/04/2021 12:37 PM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 848.26 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by William M. Jay for Ocwen Financial Corporation, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc., and PHH Mortgage Corporation [21-11314] (ECF: William Jay) [Entered: 05/04/2021 04:26 PM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 858.7 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Sabrina M. Rose-Smith for OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC and Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc.. [21-11314] (ECF: Sabrina Rose-Smith) [Entered: 05/04/2021 04:30 PM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 851.59 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Thomas Hefferon for OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC and Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc.. [21-11314] (ECF: Thomas Hefferon) [Entered: 05/04/2021 04:32 PM]
05/04/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 65.83 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Bridget Ann Berry for OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. [21-11314] (ECF: Bridget Berry) [Entered: 05/04/2021 05:46 PM]
05/05/2021  Open Document
3 pg, 155.59 KB
Civil Appeal Statement filed by Attorney Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. [21-11314] (ECF: Lawrence DeMille-Wagman) [Entered: 05/05/2021 10:34 AM]
05/05/2021  Open Document
7 pg, 80.62 KB
Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Attorney Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. On the same day the CIP is served, any filer represented by counsel must also complete the court’s web-based stock ticker symbol certificate at the link here http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/web-based-cip or on the court’s website. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1(b). [21-11314] (ECF: Lawrence DeMille-Wagman) [Entered: 05/05/2021 11:01 AM]
05/11/2021  Open Restricted Document
0 pg, 0 KB
Notice to Counsel of Record. Counsel of Record must be logged in to CM/ECF and Pacer to access this document. This is the only notice you will receive regarding this matter. Please print a copy for your file. [Entered: 05/11/2021 01:54 PM]
05/11/2021  Open Document
6 pg, 1.55 MB
Returned Mail was received for Attorney Tianna Elise Baez for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. IN RE: Docketing Letter [Entered: 05/13/2021 10:12 AM]
05/19/2021  Open Document
4 pg, 141.54 KB
Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Attorney William M. Jay for Appellees OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. On the same day the CIP is served, any filer represented by counsel must also complete the court’s web-based stock ticker symbol certificate at the link here http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/web-based-cip or on the court’s website. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1(b). [21-11314] (ECF: William Jay) [Entered: 05/19/2021 11:36 AM]
06/01/2021  Open Document
57 pg, 233.21 KB
Appellant’s brief filed by Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. [21-11314] (ECF: Lawrence DeMille-Wagman) [Entered: 06/01/2021 03:53 PM]
06/03/2021 Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. [Entered: 06/04/2021 03:38 PM]
06/07/2021  Open Document
669 pg, 24.47 MB
Appendix filed [1 VOLUMES] by Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. [21-11314] (ECF: Lawrence DeMille-Wagman) [Entered: 06/07/2021 09:14 AM]
06/07/2021 Received paper copies of EAppendix filed by Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Burearu. 2 VOLUMES – 2 COPIES –[Edited 06/09/2021 by GAF] [Entered: 06/08/2021 10:24 AM]
06/15/2021  Open Document
11 pg, 126.52 KB
MOTION for extension of time to file appellee’s brief to 07/22/2021 filed by OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. Motion is Unopposed. [9411782-1] [21-11314] (ECF: William Jay) [Entered: 06/15/2021 03:34 PM]
06/15/2021 ORDER: Motion for extension to file appellee brief filed by Appellees Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, PHH Mortgage Corporation, OCN and Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. is GRANTED by clerk. [9411782-2] Appellees’ brief due on 07/22/2021. [Entered: 06/15/2021 03:43 PM]
07/21/2021  Open Document
1 pg, 867.35 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Benjamin Hayes for Ocwen Financial Corporation, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc., and PHH Mortgage Corporation [21-11314] (ECF: Benjamin Hayes) [Entered: 07/21/2021 01:08 PM]
07/22/2021  Open Document
72 pg, 342.38 KB
Appellee’s Brief filed by Appellees OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. [21-11314] (ECF: William Jay) [Entered: 07/22/2021 04:52 PM]
07/23/2021 Received paper copies of EBrief filed by Appellees OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. [Entered: 07/26/2021 09:45 AM]
07/29/2021  Open Document
162 pg, 1.46 MB
Supplemental Appendix [1 VOLUMES] filed by Appellees OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. [21-11314] (ECF: William Jay) [Entered: 07/29/2021 03:33 PM]
07/30/2021 Received paper copies of EAppendix filed by Appellees OCN, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Ocwen Mortgage Servicing Inc. and PHH Mortgage Corporation. 1 VOLUMES – 2 COPIES [Entered: 08/02/2021 11:05 AM]
08/03/2021 Over the phone extension granted by clerk as to Attorney Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Updated Reply Brief. Due on 08/26/2021 as to Appellant Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Any request for a second or subsequent extension of time shall be subject to 11th Cir. R. 31-2(d). [Entered: 08/03/2021 10:39 AM]
08/23/2021  Open Document
6 pg, 4.87 MB
Returned Mail was received for Attorney Lawrence DeMille-Wagman for Appellant Consumer Financial Protection. IN RE: Docketing Letter [Entered: 08/25/2021 10:39 AM]
CFPB Respond to PHH Ocwen’s Claims
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