Davila v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(5:22-cv-00297)
District Court, W.D. Texas
MAR 25, 2022 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAR 26, 2022
The Sanctioned Lawyer Greg Van Cleave and His Attorney Father Abandoned Davila And Judges Chestney and Pulliam Are Fine With That
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney’s Report and Recommendation in which she recommends this case be dismissed for want of prosecution. ECF No. 12.
No party filed any objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the time for doing so expired. For the following reasons, the Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Chestney’s Report and Recommendation. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Laura Lee Davila sues Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Juan Fernandez (Wells Fargo) alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to preclude Wells Fargo’s foreclosure sale of her property.
Davila proceeds in this matter with counsel, Albert Van Cleave and Gregory Van Cleave.
Magistrate Judge Chestney set the case for an initial pretrial conference and ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit their proposed scheduling recommendations and Rule 26(f) Report.
Davila’s counsel were notified of this Order through the Court’s electronic filing system.
Wells Fargo submitted these filings but indicated it was unsuccessful in reaching Davila’s counsel to confer on proposed deadlines and other initial matters.
The Court held its pretrial conference on June 7, 2022, as ordered.
Only Wells Fargo appeared at the conference. Neither Davila nor her counsel appeared.
Neither Albert Van Cleave nor Gregory Van Cleave contacted the Court to explain their absence from a court-ordered proceeding.
After Davila and her counsel failed to appear at the initial pretrial conference, the Court issued a Show Cause Order, ordering Davila to show cause for her absence at the conference and her failure to file the ordered pre-conference documents.
Magistrate Judge Chestney required Davila to file an advisory by June 21, 2022.
The Order also warned Davila that failure to respond to the order could result in the dismissal of her lawsuit for want of prosecution.
Davila’s counsel were notified of this Order through the Court’s electronic filing system and by mail.
Davila failed to respond to the Show Cause Order.
Magistrate Judge Chestney issued a Report and Recommendation recommending this case be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution based upon Davila’s failure to comply with the Show Cause Order.
In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Chestney provided instructions for service and notified all parties of their right to object. The notice informed the parties that any objection must be specific, written, and filed within fourteen days.
It further warned that a failure to object “shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court.”
No party filed any objection to the Report and Recommendation, and the time for doing so expired.
Davila and her counsel were notified of the Report and Recommendation through the Court’s electronic filing system and by mail.
Legal Standard
Any party who seeks review of all or a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation must serve and file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
If a party does not timely object to all or a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the District Court will review the unobjected-to proposed findings and recommendations to determine whether they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Johnson v. Sw. Research Inst., 210 F. Supp.3d 863, 864 (W.D. Tex. 2016)(citing U.S. v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).1
Consistent with § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), the Court reviews Magistrate Judge Chestney’s Report and Recommendation.
Discussion
A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with any order of the court.
McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Davila’s failure to comply with Magistrate Judge Chestney’s Court’s Show Cause Order and her complete inaction in this case indicate she does not intend to prosecute this case.
Consequently, Magistrate Judge Chestney’s Recommendation is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
The case shall be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Federal Rule 41(b).
Conclusion
Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation for clear error on the face of the rec- ord, this Court finds no such error.
Accordingly, the Court ACCEPTS Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney’s findings and recommendation and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation.
As recommended, the Court DISMISSES this action without prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The Clerk of Court shall enter an appropriate Clerk’s judgment.
SIGNED this 11th day of July, 2022.
1 While Federal Rule 72(b) does not facially require any review in the absence of a specific objection, the advisory committee notes following its adoption in 1983 state: “When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Further, failure to object shall also bar appellate review of those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that were ultimately accepted by the district court, unless the party demonstrates plain error. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150–53 (1985); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d at 1221.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Jason K. Pulliam:
This Report and Recommendation concerns the above-styled cause of action, which was referred to the undersigned for all non-dispositive pretrial proceedings on April 6, 2022 [#5]. The undersigned has authority to enter this recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case be DISMISSED for want of prosecution.
I. Background
Plaintiff Laura Lee Davila originally filed this action in the 438th Judicial District of Bexar County, Texas on February 28, 2022.
(Orig. Pet. [#1-1] at 1.)
Plaintiff’s Original Petition sues Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Juan Fernandez alleging breach of contract and seeking both declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
(Id. at 9, 12.)
The claims arise out of Defendant’s attempt to conduct a foreclosure sale of Plaintiff’s property.
(See id. at 11.)
Defendant Wells Fargo removed the lawsuit to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction on March 25, 2022.
(Notice of Removal [#1].)
After the District Court referred this case to the undersigned, the Court set the case for an initial pretrial conference and ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit their proposed scheduling recommendations and Rule 26(f) report [#6].
Defendant submitted these filings but indicated that it was unsuccessful in reaching Plaintiff to confer with her on proposed deadlines and other initial matters.
The Court held its pretrial conference on June 7, 2022, as ordered.
Only Defendant appeared at the conference.
After Plaintiff failed to appear at the initial pretrial conference, the Court issued a show cause order, ordering Plaintiff to show cause for her absence at the conference and her failure to file the ordered pre-conference documents by filing an advisory with the Court on or before June 21, 2022 [#11].
The Order also warned Plaintiff that failure to respond to the order could result in the dismissal of her lawsuit for want of prosecution. Plaintiff failed to respond to the show cause order by the deadline provided.
A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with any order of the court.
McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
In light of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s Show Cause Order, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having considered the record in this case, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of prosecution.
III. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal.
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either
(1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court,
or
(2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
The party shall file the objections with the clerk of the court, and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985); Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000).
Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court.
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED this 23rd day of June, 2022.
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446, Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) hereby removes this action from the 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, and as grounds for removal state as follows:
I. STATE COURT ACTION
1. On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff Laura Lee Davila (“Plaintiff”) filed Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order (the “Complaint”) in the 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, styled Laura Lee Davila vs. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al., Cause No. 2022CI03647 (the “State Court Action”).
2. In the State Court Action, Plaintiff seeks to prevent the foreclosure sale of the real property located at 9002 Timber Park St., San Antonio TX 78250 (the “Property”).
See Compl. at ⁋10.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant scheduled a foreclosure sale for March 1, 2022, despite there being no default to justify foreclosure.
Id. at ⁋12.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant charged Plaintiff an unconscionable rate of interest.
See Compl. at ⁋ 9.
On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims of breach of contract against Defendant, and seeks a declaration that the notice of acceleration is problematic and defective under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act.
See Compl. at ⁋⁋ 16-22.
Plaintiff also seeks a temporary injunction enjoining Defendant from foreclosing on the Property, actual damages, attorneys’ fees and court costs.
3. With this Notice of Removal, Defendant removes the State Court Action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, as more fully described below.
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
4. This action is properly removed to this Court, as the lawsuit is pending within this district and division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; 28 U.S.C. § 124(d)(4).
5. This removal is timely. Defendant is removing this case within thirty days of being properly served or otherwise appearing in the State Court Action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the file from the State Court Action at the time of this removal.
7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Defendant is, simultaneously with the filing of this Notice of Removal,
(1) serving Plaintiff with a copy of the Notice of Removal,
and
(2) filing a copy of the Notice of Removal in the 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas.
III. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
8. Where there is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, an action may be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1441(a).
Complete diversity exists in this case because no properly joined defendant is a citizen of Texas or of the same state as Plaintiff.
As set forth below, the amount in controversy requirement is also satisfied.
A. Diversity of Citizenship
9. Plaintiff is a natural person, so her citizenship for diversity purposes is determined by “where [she is] domiciled, that is, where [she is] a fixed resident with the intent to remain there indefinitely.”
Margetis v. Ray, No. 3:08-CV-958-L, 2009 WL 464962, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiff is domiciled in Bexar County, Texas.
See Compl. at 2.
Therefore, Plaintiff is a citizen of Texas for diversity purposes.
10. Wells Fargo is a national banking association. Accordingly, its citizenship is determined solely by the location of its main office, as designated in its articles of association. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348. Wells Fargo’s main office is located in South Dakota. Therefore, Wells Fargo is a citizen of South Dakota for diversity purposes.
11. Juan Fernandez (“Fernandez”) has also been named as a defendant in this case; however, his citizenship should be disregarded because he was improperly joined.
The Fifth Circuit has established that improper joinder exists if there is:
(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts;
or
(2) no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action in state court against the defendant whose citizenship prevents removal.
Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Cantor v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, 641 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (N.D. Tex. 2009);
Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
A “mere theoretical possibility of recovery under local law” is insufficient and will not preclude a finding of improper joinder.
Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573 n.9; see also Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 328 (5th Cir. 2002).
12. The Complaint fails to assert any claims against Fernandez or allege any facts or conduct which would give rise to a cause of action against Fernandez.
(See generally, the Complaint).
Nowhere in the Petition does Plaintiff make any allegations against, or seek recovery from, Fernandez. Plaintiff makes no allegation, moreover, that Fernandez retains any interest in the subject property.
13. Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts or conduct which would give rise to a claim or cause of action against Fernandez. Plaintiff does not even raise the “theoretical possibility” that any such claim could be maintained against Fernandez. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not raised a reasonable possibility that any claim could be maintained against Fernandez, and Fernandez has been improperly joined.
14. Moreover, even if Plaintiff could establish a cause of action against Fernandez, Fernandez’s citizenship should be disregarded because he is, at most, a nominal party. Removal is proper if there is diversity of citizenship among the parties in interest properly joined.
Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Mirador Consulting Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1132-K, 2011 WL 3703229, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011).
“’Parties in interest’ do not include formal or unnecessary parties, thus a plaintiff’s joinder of such parties . . . cannot prevent the removal of an action to federal court.”
Id.
“Whether a party is ‘nominal’ for removal purposes depends on ‘whether, in the absence of the [defendant], the Court can enter a final judgment consistent with equity and good conscience which would not be in any way unfair or inequitable to the plaintiff.’”
Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr., Inc., 452 F.3d 373, 379 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities P.P. & A. Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1970) (alterations in original)).
Here, Fernandez’s presence as a party is not necessary.
The Court will be able to enter a fair and equitable final judgment regarding the Property in the absence of Fernandez.
See Acosta, 452 F.3d at 379.
Accordingly, Fernandez is a nominal party.
15. Because Plaintiff and Wells Fargo are citizens of different states, and because Fernandez’s citizenship should be disregarded for the reasons set forth herein, there is complete diversity in this case.
B. Amount in Controversy is also satisfied.
16. The amount-in-controversy element is also satisfied.
Where a defendant can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount, removal is proper.
See White v. FCI U.S.A., Inc., 319 F.3d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 2003);
see also St. Paul Reins. Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“The test is whether it is more likely than not that the amount of the claim will exceed [the jurisdictional minimum].”).
The defendant can meet its burden if it is apparent from the face of the petition that the claims are likely to exceed $75,000 or, alternatively, if the defendant introduces other evidence to show that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000.
E.g., Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002); Greenberg, 134 F.3d at 1253.
“The amount in controversy is determined from the perspective of the plaintiff, and the proper measure is the benefit to the plaintiff, not the cost to the defendant.”
Berry v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C-09-116, 2009 WL 2868224, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2009).
To determine the amount in controversy, a court may consider actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney fees.
White, 319 F.3d at 675–76.
17. “In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.”
Farkas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 737 F.3d 338, 341(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977));
Martinez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 777 F. Supp. 2d. 1039, 1044 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
Specifically, the Farkas Court held that: “[i]n actions enjoining a lender from transferring property and preserving an individual’s ownership interest, it is the property itself that is the object of the litigation; the value of that property represents the amount in controversy.”
Id. (citing Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973)). Thus, “‘when . . . a right to property is called into question in its entirety, the value of the property controls the amount in controversy.’“
Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Knox, No. 08-60887, 351 Fed. App’x 844, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Waller v. Prof’l Ins. Corp., 296 F.2d 545, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1961));
see also Alsobrook v. GMAC Mortg., L.L.C., 541 Fed. App’x. 340, 342 n.2, (5th Cir. 2013);
Copeland v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-51206, 485 Fed. App’x 8, 9 (5th Cir. 2012)
(relying on the value of the property to satisfy the amount in controversy in exercising diversity jurisdiction over appeal of foreclosure-related claims).
18. Because Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, the amount in controversy is determined by the value of the Property.
See Knox, 351 Fed. App’x at 848; Turner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-CV-2701-M (BF), 2013 WL 2896883, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 2013)
(using current market value of property from the Dallas Central Appraisal District in finding amount in controversy satisfied where plaintiff sought to prevent foreclosure) (citing Copeland, 485 Fed. App’x at 9 (“[T]he amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 due to the value of the subject property . . . .”)).
According to the Bexar County Appraisal District, the current value of the Property is $211,230. A true and correct copy of the Bexar County Appraisal District property information is attached hereto as Exhibit B.1
Thus, the value of the Property alone satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.
19. Although Defendant vehemently denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any injunctive relief or damages, once the value of the Property and damages sought are included in the amount
in controversy calculus, it is clear that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
20. Because there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and removal is proper.
IV. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Defendant removes this action from the 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, so that this Court may assume jurisdiction over the cause as provided by law.
Respectfully submitted,
LOCKE LORD LLP
/s/Camille Griffith
Robert T. Mowrey
State Bar No. 14607500
rmowrey@lockelord.com
Arthur E. Anthony
State Bar No. 24001661
aanthony@lockelord.com
Camille Griffith
State Bar No. 24034761
camille.griffith@lockelord.com
2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800
Dallas, Texas 75201-2750
(214) 740-8000
(214) 740-8800 (facsimile)
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served as indicated on this 25th day of March, 2022, to the following:
VIA U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 9214 7969 0099 9790 1642 3803 76
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Gregory T. Van Cleave
Albert W. Van Cleave, III
PLLC 1520 W. Hildebrand
San Antonio, TX 78201
Greg_v@vancleavelegal.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
/s/ Camille Griffith
Camille Griffith
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U.S. District Court [LIVE]
Western District of Texas (San Antonio)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:22-cv-00297
Create an Alert for This Case on RECAP
| Davila v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al Assigned to: Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal |
Date Filed: 03/25/2022 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Plaintiff | ||
| Laura Lee Davila | represented by | Laura Lee Davila PRO SE |
| V. | ||
| Defendant | ||
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | represented by | Camille Denise Griffith Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201 214-740-8490 Fax: 214-740-8800 Email: camille.griffith@lockelord.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
| Defendant | ||
| Juan Fernandez | ||
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 03/25/2022 | 1 | NOTICE OF REMOVAL by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Filing fee $402 receipt number 0542-15857481), filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A – State Court File, # 2 Exhibit B – Bexar CAD Property Details, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet)(Griffith, Camille) (Entered: 03/25/2022) |
| 03/25/2022 | 2 | Certificate of Interested Parties by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Griffith, Camille) (Entered: 03/25/2022) |
| 03/25/2022 | 3 | RULE 7 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. identifying Corporate Parent Wells Fargo & Company for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Griffith, Camille) (Entered: 03/25/2022) |
U.S. District Court [LIVE]
Western District of Texas (San Antonio)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:22-cv-00297-JKP-ESC
| Davila v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al Assigned to: Judge Jason K. Pulliam Referred to: Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney Cause: 28:1441 Petition for Removal – Foreclosure |
Date Filed: 03/25/2022 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 03/29/2022 | 4 | SUPPLEMENT to 1 Notice of Removal, by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Griffith, Camille) (Entered: 03/29/2022) |
| 04/06/2022 | 5 | ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney. Signed by Judge Jason K. Pulliam. (wg) (Entered: 04/07/2022) |
| 04/13/2022 | 6 | ORDER SETTING INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE, ( Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order due by 6/3/2022,, Initial Pretrial Conference set Via Zoom for 6/7/2022 12:00 PM before Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney,). Signed by Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney. (wg) (Entered: 04/13/2022) |
