202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM (Court 152)
DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
FILED: JAN 30, 2025 | REPUBLISHED: FEB 16, 2025
This LIT published article has become an active lawsuit in Harris County District Court. The case continues despite lack of jurisdiction for the reasons provided in this motion.
The Timeline and Key Events in Courts 234 and 152
Returning to the timeline of events in these proceedings, it appears the email thread with Bob garnered an immediate reaction by the court, with an impromptu joint ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER signed Feb. 8 by Judge Reeder and on Feb. 9, 2024 by Judge Palmer, transferring the case to this court (152), which is discussed in more detail further into this motion.
Thereafter, key events and dates include ORDER SIGNED [by Judge Schaffer] COMPELLING ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES on Mar. 8, 2024;
ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED by Judge Schaffer on Aug. 6, 2024;
A revised and erroneous DOCKET CONTROL ORDER on Aug. 14, 2024;
and finally,
Bob sent Mark a Notice of Service on Dec. 16, 2024, which comprises of an untimely Expert Report of Richard A. Jones, CPA which is automatically excluded per 193.6.
See: Rule 193.6(a) exclusion applies when a party “fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response, including a required disclosure, in a timely manner . . . .” Id.
Rule 195.5(4)(A), in turn, mandates that an expert designation include the production of a report.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.5(a)(4)(A)
(“[A] party must provide . . . all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations . . . prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony”).
Accordingly, Bob’s failure to timely produce the Report triggers the application of Rule 193.6(a), (b).
See Int. of A. N.C. , No. 04-23-00497-CV, 2023 WL 7134865, at *4 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.)
(holding that a failure to timely disclose information required by Rule 195.5 triggers the exclusion under Rule 193.6(a)).
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction.”
See Wheeler v. Law Office of Frank Powell, No. 01-22-00479-CV, 2023 WL 5535670, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Texas Lawyer “Andy Taylor is a real clown and I will forever recuse myself from ALL cases that he files…He’s a disgrace to the entire Bar”
– Judge Tami Craft
When a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge, the responding judge, regardless of whether the motion complies with the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, must, within three business days after the motion is filed
(1) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal
or
(2) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).
Failure to comply with the rule renders void any actions taken subsequent to the violation.
In re A.R., 236 S.W.3d 460, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). Barnhill v. Agnew, No. 12-12-00080-CV, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2013).
PREAMBLE
Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion
Congratulations Judge Francis on your appointment from Harris County DON to the bench after a controversial and contested election by long-time incumbent and now former Judge Robert Schaffer.
This purported defamation case mirrors those controversies.
Judicial Transfer Orders: In particular, the ultimate transfer of these proceedings to this court (152) after Judge Craft of the original district court (189) recused.
It would initially be transferred to Judge Reeder’s court (234) before transferring to this court (152).
However, these purported transfers were without proper judicial authority, without substantive, procedural and constitutionally mandated due process, and as such this case lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to continue to trial for the reasons explained herein and confirmed by legal authorities.
Legal Authority: A trial court abuses its discretion when it errs in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts.
In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1998).
It is mandatory that this case be dismissed when a judge acts outside of his or her court’s jurisdiction, i.e., when the judicial act is void.
In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 nn. 1, 2 (Tex. 1998);
In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).
The case mandates dismissal with prejudice as the allegations of defamation in the complaint are time-barred.
The court lost jurisdiction on entry of the first void judgment on Jan 23, 2024 and more than a year has passed since that time.
See; Hernandez v. Axtell, No. 13-23-00225-CV, at *8-9 (Tex. App. May 2, 2024).
The Supreme Court has made clear that a challenge to the jurisdiction can be raised by several procedural vehicles, including a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment.
See Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).
While Section 51.014(a)(8) and (c) utilize the phrase “plea to the jurisdiction,” it is well established that the statute is not restricted to rulings on a pleading titled “plea to the jurisdiction.”
The proper focus is on the substance of the pleading, not its title.”
Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006).
FACTS
Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion
The timeline of events and facts after the Defendants Motion to Disqualify are critical to the mandatory disposition of this case.
“Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” [Judge Craft] was docketed on Monday, Dec. 11, 2023.
Within three days, Judge Craft had to act on the Defendant’s motion, with two options available.
Judge Craft failed to act timely upon either Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (f)(1) or (2) as detailed in the opening citation above.
When Judge Craft finally responded, she did so some 44 days after the motion was filed or 41 days after the three business days expired.
This establishes her subsequent order is void.
Additionally, the wording of her order fails to meet the required statutory language associated with (A) and (B) above, where she writes in a two-part order:-
*ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER: “I am ORDERED to recuse myself and refer this case to the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division for Transfer to another court. – Signed on January 23, 2024.
*This is a court template, usually signed when a new case is generally transferred, for example, upon litigants returning with a case which was previously decided by a specific district court.
The Joint Transfer Order’s Critical Error
The very same Order is also signed by the Administrative [District] Judge, transferring the case to another District Court, namely Judge Lauren Reeder’s (234).
However, the wording of Rule 18 is clear; “…referring the motion to the regional presiding judge”, e.g. Susan Brown – not the Administrative (Civil District) Judge, namely Elaine Palmer.
The KPH Case Study (Judge Reeder)
Defendant Mark Burke became very familiar with this administrative judicial process in Judge Reeder’s court – Burke v. KPH-Consolidation Inc., No. 202268307.
See Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration on March 17, 2023, and where Judge Reeder duly complied with the 3-day timeline by ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on March 20, 2023.
What transpired thereafter was alarming, including Judge Susan Brown hand-selecting the judge in a severed case – a proceeding where Judge Brown and Judge Reeder were the only named defendants.
See; 202268307A – BURKE, MARK vs. REEDER, LAUREN HONORABLE (234).
The Choudri Case Study (Judge Craft)
Compare Defendants cases with Ali Choudri’s case before Judge Craft – 202310986 – ABDULLATIF, OSAMA vs. CHOUDHRI, ALI (133) – and before transfer, due to her ethical and constitutional violations:
Defendant Ali Choudhri’s Motion for Recusal on Wednesday, Aug. 23, 2023, wherein there’s an ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on Monday, Aug. 28, 2028, complying with the 3-day mandatory timeline.
This court is prevented from taking judicial notice of the well-documented and shocking acts by Judge Craft which made local news headlines along with her unethical behavior in the Choudri case.
See, Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(“However, one trial court generally lacks the power to take judicial notice of the records or documents that might be on file in another trial court.”)
That stated, these facts were detailed in Defendants pleadings in this case which the court can take notice of, including the verified motion to disqualify Judge Craft, arguing she was constitutionally disqualified by her outrageous behavior, including unassailable written statements of fact.
Lack of Jurisdiction Equals Void (a Nullity in Law)
A court cannot act if it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, and if it does, any action taken is void.
H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 124 (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)).
When the joint order was signed by Judge Craft, the order was void because it did not follow the implemented rules and denied substantive due process to Defendants, who were not afforded the opportunity for a hearing before the sua sponte recusal and transfer of the case per Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (6)(A-C).
Additionally, the fact Judge Palmer signed the order on the same day transferring the case to another district court was procedurally improper as the Regional Presiding Judge is Susan Brown.
Email Communications
When Plaintiff (Bob) notified Defendant (Mark) that he was proceeding with discovery requests and hearings, Mark objected.
The first email, on February 5, 2024, at 10.16 am stated:
Mr. Burke, Attached is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests. For the purposes of satisfying the requirement for a certificate of conference, please advise me by 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 7, 2024, whether Blogger is opposed to the Motion. If I don’t receive a response by that date and time I will advise the court that you are opposed to the Motion.
The second email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.14 pm stated:
Mr. Burke, As you know, the above-referenced case has been transferred to the 234th Judicial District Court. Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures require litigants to have person-to-person communication regarding discovery motions to compel. I called you moments ago and left you a voice mail requesting that you return my call at 713-600-3473 so that we could discuss the Motion to Compel that I sent to you via email on Monday, February 5, 2024, and to satisfy Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures regarding certificates of conference. Please return my call as soon as possible.
Mark responded to Bob’s email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.55 pm:
There’s nothing to compel or discuss Bob. See; O’Connor v. Trish Ho, No. 07-23-00172-CV, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2023) (“”[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). An order entered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). ”).
Three minutes later, at 3.58 pm, Bob writes;
We will let the Court decide whether there is anything to compel or discuss. Please respond whether you are opposed or unopposed to the Motion to Compel that I sent you on Monday, February 5, 2024.
The final response was sent a 4.03 pm on February 7, 2024:
Court 189’s Judge, Tami Craft, had 3 days to enter an order regarding my motion to disqualify. She failed to do so. Anything after that time is void and the orders of recusal/transfer are void.
The Timeline and Key Events in Courts 234 and 152
Returning to the timeline of events in these proceedings, it appears the email thread with Bob garnered an immediate reaction by the court, with an impromptu joint ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER signed Feb. 8 by Judge Reeder and on Feb. 9, 2024 by Judge Palmer, transferring the case to this court (152), which is discussed in more detail further into this motion.
Thereafter, key events and dates include ORDER SIGNED [by Judge Schaffer] COMPELLING ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES on Mar. 8, 2024;
ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED by Judge Schaffer on Aug. 6, 2024;
A revised and erroneous DOCKET CONTROL ORDER on Aug. 14, 2024;
and finally,
Bob sent Mark a Notice of Service on Dec. 16, 2024, which comprises of an untimely Expert Report of Richard A. Jones, CPA which is automatically excluded per 193.6.
See: Rule 193.6(a) exclusion applies when a party “fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response, including a required disclosure, in a timely manner . . . .” Id.
Rule 195.5(4)(A), in turn, mandates that an expert designation include the production of a report.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.5(a)(4)(A)
(“[A] party must provide . . . all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations . . . prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony”).
Accordingly, Bob’s failure to timely produce the Report triggers the application of Rule 193.6(a), (b).
See Int. of A. N.C. , No. 04-23-00497-CV, 2023 WL 7134865, at *4 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.)
(holding that a failure to timely disclose information required by Rule 195.5 triggers the exclusion under Rule 193.6(a)).
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
“No [wo]man is allowed to be a judge in [her] own cause, because [her] interest would certainly bias [her] judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt [her] integrity.”
The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison), cited by then Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, in Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015),
currently a sitting 5th Circuit Judge.
Above is the opening of DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE TAMI CRAFT AKA TAMIKA CRAFT-DEMMING, docketed on Dec. 11, 2023 along with supporting exhibits.
Defendants respectfully request the court take judicial notice of the docket and these pleading(s), e.g. the entire docket for these proceedings.
See; Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(“a trial court may take judicial notice of its own orders, records, and judgments rendered in cases involving the same subject matter and between practically the same parties.”).
All Docket Entries After Dec. 11, 2023 are Without Authority
This Verified Motion to Dismiss is premised on the application of Texas laws and’ Rules, including the plain reading of the same.
The court’s docket entry system was recently discussed in Vetri Ventures, LLC v. Westridge Eagles Nest Owners Ass’n, No. 05-21-01172-CV at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2024)
(“When a judge has no authority to render an order or judgment, that order or judgment is void.”).
Generally, a void order does not end a case.
However, applying Texas law requires mandatory dismissal of this case.
See; Mapco Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)
(A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.
Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 362 (Tex. 1985)).
As discussed in more detail below, only the regional presiding judge had authority to address the disqualification motion.
Regional presiding judge Susan Brown was never included in the subsequent order transferring the case to Judge Reeder in Court 234.
Then, defying Rule 18 once more, Judge Reeder immediately recused, and once more without involvement of the regional presiding judge, the case was transferred to former Judge Schaffer in Court 152 again by the civil division administrative judge Elaine Palmer.
All the checkboxes from Mapco are ticked in these proceedings, as the transfer orders by Judge Palmer effectively dissolved the judicial capacity to act as a court, and for every act thereafter “it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had
(i) no jurisdiction of the parties,
(ii) no jurisdiction of the subject matter,
(iii) no jurisdiction to enter the judgment,
[and]/or (iv) no capacity to act as a court”.
Only the Regional Presiding Judge Had Authority
The referral for the Verified Motion to Disqualify any judge should be directed to the “Regional Presiding” judge, rather than the Administrative judge for the civil division.
This situation is similar to when Defendants attempted to substitute Attorney General Ken Paxton in order to effect process of service, but the request was denied by the court.
The denial was based on the fact that the complaint correctly listed the Acting Attorney General, who was in place during Paxton’s impeachment proceedings when the lawsuit was filed.
The court refused to issue the citation in an email from Monica Jackson (DCO), on Nov. 27, 2023 at 11.08 am, stating:
“The service request for Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr cannot be processed because they are not a party to the case.”.
Essentially, Texas laws and rules apply equally in both directions.
Judge Elaine Palmer is not Judge Susan Brown.
The Texas Government Code provides that a District Court Judge [Craft] shall request the Regional Presiding Judge to assign another judge to hear a motion relating to the recusal of the judge of the case pending in his court.
The duty to make the request of the Regional Presiding Judge is a mandatory duty.
Any order, other than an order of recusal or referral, entered by a court after a proper motion to recuse is entered is void.
See, In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P., 4 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Tex. App. 1999)
(“The mandatory provisions of rule 18a are rendered meaningless if, following recusal and assignment by the regional presiding judge, a local administrative judge may simply override the presiding judge’s orders by transferring the case to a court (and judge) of his own choosing. Under such circumstances, transfer effectively nullifies the mandatory recusal procedures in rule 18a”).
Procedural and substantive due process has been denied to Defendants in these civil proceedings, with particular focus on the events after the Defendants Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Craft was docketed.
See, e.g., Mabee v. McDonald, 107 Tex. 139, 175 S.W. 676, 680 (1915)
(“‘Due process of law,’ as used in the fourteenth amendment, and ‘due course of the law of the land,’ as used in Article I, § 19, of the Constitution of Texas, … according to the great weight of authority, are, in nearly if not all respects, practically synonymous.”).
The judge(s) and court actions cannot overcome the appearance of impropriety.
See, e.g. Ex parte Sanchez, WR-84,588-03, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2024)
(“The Court received this writ application on October 3, 2023. Applicant alleges that prosecutor Ralph Petty was working both as a prosecutor on his case and as a judicial legal clerk at the time of his trial and habeas application. On December 6, 2023, this Court denied the application without a written order. However, the Court has since decided that the appearance of impropriety entitled applicants in this situation to relief. Ex parte Lewis, 688 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).”).
This Court Must Dismiss the Case
Texas law is certain:
“If the court has no jurisdiction, it should proceed no further with the case other than to dismiss it for want of power to hear and determine the controversy. In such a case, any order or decree entered, other than one of dismissal is void.”
Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1046 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1931), affirmed 55 S.W.2d 797.
Void and Time-Barred: Interlocutory Order re Three Article on LIT
When Bob approached Defendants, he did so by leaving a comment on the only article he objected to on LIT.
The original petition filed by Bob as docketed on Feb. 21, 2023 was based upon the same article on LIT.
Bob’s complaint in these proceedings has now expanded, seeking new relief regarding 3 articles, and Judge Schaffer’s Order grants this sweeping request.
However, setting aside the improvident grant of this relief, the fact remains uncontestable, namely
(a) the court acted in all absence of jurisdiction and thus the order void,
and;
(b) over a year has passed since the Jan. 23, 2024 void order of transfer was signed by Judge Palmer, and as such more than a year has passed.
In short, any dispute over LIT’s articles is now time-barred.
VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]
In closing, I, Mark Stephen Burke, …, do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. This verified declaration includes and applies to the named exhibits, and is made under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which holds significant weight in legal precedent, as evident in ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020), McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, at *15-17 (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021), and In re Whitfield, No. 03-21-00170-CR, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2021).
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has provided full reasoning in this verified motion with relevant authority provided. The Defendant prays the Court, which has plenary power, GRANTS the Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and for such other and further relief at law or in equity to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of January, 2025.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
THE KRUCKEMEYER BROMANCES
DEC 23, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: DEC 23, 2024
The mandatory provisions of rule 18a are rendered meaningless if, following recusal … a local administrative judge may simply override the [presiding judge’s orders – N/A HERE, THE PRESIDING JUDGE WAS SKIPPED] by transferring the case to a court (and judge) of his own choosing. pic.twitter.com/GD8iax7FNx
— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) February 18, 2025
There’s a sham trial set for March 3, 2025.
There is no legitimate trial going to happen, for the reasons provided on LIT.
Let the anti anti-defamation league play their shenanigans with President Bush’s wingman at the helm.
In sha’Allah.
In Gregg v. State, No. 12-24-00132-CR, at *8-9 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 2025)
“A Texas judge may be removed from presiding over a case for one of three reasons:
[s]he is constitutionally disqualified;
[s]he is subject to a statutory strike;
or,
[s]he is subject to statutory disqualification or recusal under Texas Supreme Court rules.”
Gaal v. State,332 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 11
(constitutional disqualification);
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 30.01 (West 2006)
(statutory disqualification in criminal cases);
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053 (West 2023)
(statutory strike);
Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(a)
(Texas Supreme Court rules for disqualification),
18b(b)(1)-(2)
(Texas Supreme Court rules for recusal including lack of impartiality and personal bias or prejudice against a party).
The grounds and procedures for disqualification and recusal are fundamentally different, as are the appellate remedies.
See In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
“We have said that the word ‘must’ is given a mandatory meaning when followed by a noncompliance penalty but this does not suggest that when no penalty is prescribed, ‘must’ is non-mandatory.””
– Image API, LLC v. Young, 691 S.W.3d 831, 841 n.54 (Tex. 2024)
This applies to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a:
Timeline in Kruckemeyer case:
Blogger filed “Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” on Monday, Dec. 11, 2023.
Within 3 days, Craft had to act on the Defendant’s motion, with two options available – she failed to do either, see;
(f) Duties of the Respondent Judge; Failure to Comply.
(1) Responding to the Motion. Regardless of whether the motion complies with this rule, the respondent judge, within three business days after the motion is filed, must either:
(A) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal or disqualification;
or
(B) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.
When Craft did tardily respond, she did so some 44 days after the motion was filed or 41 days after the 3 days expired, this in turn made her order void for failing to meet the 3-day time limit.
Additionally, the wording of her order fails to meet the required textual language associated with (A) and (B) above, where she writes in a two-part order;
“I am ORDERED to recuse myself and refer this case to the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division for Transfer to another court.
Signed on January 23, 2024.
As a sub-note; the same Order is signed by the Admin Judge transferring the case to another District Court, but the wording of Rule 18 is clear; “…referring the motion to the regional presiding judge”, e.g. Susan Brown – not the Administrative Judge (Elaine Palmer).
Compare with:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration on March 17, 2023,
and where;
Judge Reeder complied with the 3-day timeline by ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on March 20, 2023.
and compare with:
Ali Choudri case (, Defendant, Ali Choudhri’s Motion for Recusal on Wednesday, Aug. 23, 2023
ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on Monday, Aug. 28, 2028, complying with the 3-day mandatory timeline.
Note: The events thereafter in the Choudri case were shocking and confirm Craft is constitutionally disqualified.
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