202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM (Court 152)
DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
FILED: JAN 30, 2025 | REPUBLISHED: FEB 16, 2025
This LIT published article has become an active lawsuit in Harris County District Court. The case continues despite lack of jurisdiction for the reasons provided in this motion.
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction.”
See Wheeler v. Law Office of Frank Powell, No. 01-22-00479-CV, 2023 WL 5535670, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Texas Lawyer “Andy Taylor is a real clown and I will forever recuse myself from ALL cases that he files…He’s a disgrace to the entire Bar”
– Judge Tami Craft
When a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge, the responding judge, regardless of whether the motion complies with the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, must, within three business days after the motion is filed
(1) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal
or
(2) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).
Failure to comply with the rule renders void any actions taken subsequent to the violation.
In re A.R., 236 S.W.3d 460, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). Barnhill v. Agnew, No. 12-12-00080-CV, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2013).
PREAMBLE
Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion
Congratulations Judge Francis on your appointment from Harris County DON to the bench after a controversial and contested election by long-time incumbent and now former Judge Robert Schaffer.
This purported defamation case mirrors those controversies.
Judicial Transfer Orders: In particular, the ultimate transfer of these proceedings to this court (152) after Judge Craft of the original district court (189) recused.
It would initially be transferred to Judge Reeder’s court (234) before transferring to this court (152).
However, these purported transfers were without proper judicial authority, without substantive, procedural and constitutionally mandated due process, and as such this case lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to continue to trial for the reasons explained herein and confirmed by legal authorities.
Legal Authority: A trial court abuses its discretion when it errs in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts.
In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1998).
It is mandatory that this case be dismissed when a judge acts outside of his or her court’s jurisdiction, i.e., when the judicial act is void.
In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 nn. 1, 2 (Tex. 1998);
In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).
The case mandates dismissal with prejudice as the allegations of defamation in the complaint are time-barred.
The court lost jurisdiction on entry of the first void judgment on Jan 23, 2024 and more than a year has passed since that time.
See; Hernandez v. Axtell, No. 13-23-00225-CV, at *8-9 (Tex. App. May 2, 2024).
The Supreme Court has made clear that a challenge to the jurisdiction can be raised by several procedural vehicles, including a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment.
See Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).
While Section 51.014(a)(8) and (c) utilize the phrase “plea to the jurisdiction,” it is well established that the statute is not restricted to rulings on a pleading titled “plea to the jurisdiction.”
The proper focus is on the substance of the pleading, not its title.”
Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006).
FACTS
Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion
The timeline of events and facts after the Defendants Motion to Disqualify are critical to the mandatory disposition of this case.
“Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” [Judge Craft] was docketed on Monday, Dec. 11, 2023.
Within three days, Judge Craft had to act on the Defendant’s motion, with two options available.
Judge Craft failed to act timely upon either Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (f)(1) or (2) as detailed in the opening citation above.
When Judge Craft finally responded, she did so some 44 days after the motion was filed or 41 days after the three business days expired.
This establishes her subsequent order is void.
Additionally, the wording of her order fails to meet the required statutory language associated with (A) and (B) above, where she writes in a two-part order:-
*ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER: “I am ORDERED to recuse myself and refer this case to the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division for Transfer to another court. – Signed on January 23, 2024.
*This is a court template, usually signed when a new case is generally transferred, for example, upon litigants returning with a case which was previously decided by a specific district court.
The Joint Transfer Order’s Critical Error
The very same Order is also signed by the Administrative [District] Judge, transferring the case to another District Court, namely Judge Lauren Reeder’s (234).
However, the wording of Rule 18 is clear; “…referring the motion to the regional presiding judge”, e.g. Susan Brown – not the Administrative (Civil District) Judge, namely Elaine Palmer.
The KPH Case Study (Judge Reeder)
Defendant Mark Burke became very familiar with this administrative judicial process in Judge Reeder’s court – Burke v. KPH-Consolidation Inc., No. 202268307.
See Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration on March 17, 2023, and where Judge Reeder duly complied with the 3-day timeline by ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on March 20, 2023.
What transpired thereafter was alarming, including Judge Susan Brown hand-selecting the judge in a severed case – a proceeding where Judge Brown and Judge Reeder were the only named defendants.
See; 202268307A – BURKE, MARK vs. REEDER, LAUREN HONORABLE (234).
The Choudri Case Study (Judge Craft)
Compare Defendants cases with Ali Choudri’s case before Judge Craft – 202310986 – ABDULLATIF, OSAMA vs. CHOUDHRI, ALI (133) – and before transfer, due to her ethical and constitutional violations:
Defendant Ali Choudhri’s Motion for Recusal on Wednesday, Aug. 23, 2023, wherein there’s an ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on Monday, Aug. 28, 2028, complying with the 3-day mandatory timeline.
This court is prevented from taking judicial notice of the well-documented and shocking acts by Judge Craft which made local news headlines along with her unethical behavior in the Choudri case.
See, Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(“However, one trial court generally lacks the power to take judicial notice of the records or documents that might be on file in another trial court.”)
That stated, these facts were detailed in Defendants pleadings in this case which the court can take notice of, including the verified motion to disqualify Judge Craft, arguing she was constitutionally disqualified by her outrageous behavior, including unassailable written statements of fact.
Lack of Jurisdiction Equals Void (a Nullity in Law)
A court cannot act if it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, and if it does, any action taken is void.
H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 124 (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)).
When the joint order was signed by Judge Craft, the order was void because it did not follow the implemented rules and denied substantive due process to Defendants, who were not afforded the opportunity for a hearing before the sua sponte recusal and transfer of the case per Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (6)(A-C).
Additionally, the fact Judge Palmer signed the order on the same day transferring the case to another district court was procedurally improper as the Regional Presiding Judge is Susan Brown.
Email Communications
When Plaintiff (Bob) notified Defendant (Mark) that he was proceeding with discovery requests and hearings, Mark objected.
The first email, on February 5, 2024, at 10.16 am stated:
Mr. Burke, Attached is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests. For the purposes of satisfying the requirement for a certificate of conference, please advise me by 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 7, 2024, whether Blogger is opposed to the Motion. If I don’t receive a response by that date and time I will advise the court that you are opposed to the Motion.
The second email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.14 pm stated:
Mr. Burke, As you know, the above-referenced case has been transferred to the 234th Judicial District Court. Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures require litigants to have person-to-person communication regarding discovery motions to compel. I called you moments ago and left you a voice mail requesting that you return my call at 713-600-3473 so that we could discuss the Motion to Compel that I sent to you via email on Monday, February 5, 2024, and to satisfy Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures regarding certificates of conference. Please return my call as soon as possible.
Mark responded to Bob’s email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.55 pm:
There’s nothing to compel or discuss Bob. See; O’Connor v. Trish Ho, No. 07-23-00172-CV, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2023) (“”[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). An order entered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). ”).
Three minutes later, at 3.58 pm, Bob writes;
We will let the Court decide whether there is anything to compel or discuss. Please respond whether you are opposed or unopposed to the Motion to Compel that I sent you on Monday, February 5, 2024.
The final response was sent a 4.03 pm on February 7, 2024:
Court 189’s Judge, Tami Craft, had 3 days to enter an order regarding my motion to disqualify. She failed to do so. Anything after that time is void and the orders of recusal/transfer are void.
The Timeline and Key Events in Courts 234 and 152
Returning to the timeline of events in these proceedings, it appears the email thread with Bob garnered an immediate reaction by the court, with an impromptu joint ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER signed Feb. 8 by Judge Reeder and on Feb. 9, 2024 by Judge Palmer, transferring the case to this court (152), which is discussed in more detail further into this motion.
Thereafter, key events and dates include ORDER SIGNED [by Judge Schaffer] COMPELLING ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES on Mar. 8, 2024;
ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED by Judge Schaffer on Aug. 6, 2024;
A revised and erroneous DOCKET CONTROL ORDER on Aug. 14, 2024;
and finally,
Bob sent Mark a Notice of Service on Dec. 16, 2024, which comprises of an untimely Expert Report of Richard A. Jones, CPA which is automatically excluded per 193.6.
See: Rule 193.6(a) exclusion applies when a party “fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response, including a required disclosure, in a timely manner . . . .” Id.
Rule 195.5(4)(A), in turn, mandates that an expert designation include the production of a report.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.5(a)(4)(A)
(“[A] party must provide . . . all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations . . . prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony”).
Accordingly, Bob’s failure to timely produce the Report triggers the application of Rule 193.6(a), (b).
See Int. of A. N.C. , No. 04-23-00497-CV, 2023 WL 7134865, at *4 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.)
(holding that a failure to timely disclose information required by Rule 195.5 triggers the exclusion under Rule 193.6(a)).
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
“No [wo]man is allowed to be a judge in [her] own cause, because [her] interest would certainly bias [her] judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt [her] integrity.”
The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison), cited by then Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, in Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015),
currently a sitting 5th Circuit Judge.
Above is the opening of DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE TAMI CRAFT AKA TAMIKA CRAFT-DEMMING, docketed on Dec. 11, 2023 along with supporting exhibits.
Defendants respectfully request the court take judicial notice of the docket and these pleading(s), e.g. the entire docket for these proceedings.
See; Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(“a trial court may take judicial notice of its own orders, records, and judgments rendered in cases involving the same subject matter and between practically the same parties.”).
All Docket Entries After Dec. 11, 2023 are Without Authority
This Verified Motion to Dismiss is premised on the application of Texas laws and’ Rules, including the plain reading of the same.
The court’s docket entry system was recently discussed in Vetri Ventures, LLC v. Westridge Eagles Nest Owners Ass’n, No. 05-21-01172-CV at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2024)
(“When a judge has no authority to render an order or judgment, that order or judgment is void.”).
Generally, a void order does not end a case.
However, applying Texas law requires mandatory dismissal of this case.
See; Mapco Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)
(A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.
Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 362 (Tex. 1985)).
As discussed in more detail below, only the regional presiding judge had authority to address the disqualification motion.
Regional presiding judge Susan Brown was never included in the subsequent order transferring the case to Judge Reeder in Court 234.
Then, defying Rule 18 once more, Judge Reeder immediately recused, and once more without involvement of the regional presiding judge, the case was transferred to former Judge Schaffer in Court 152 again by the civil division administrative judge Elaine Palmer.
All the checkboxes from Mapco are ticked in these proceedings, as the transfer orders by Judge Palmer effectively dissolved the judicial capacity to act as a court, and for every act thereafter “it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had
(i) no jurisdiction of the parties,
(ii) no jurisdiction of the subject matter,
(iii) no jurisdiction to enter the judgment,
[and]/or (iv) no capacity to act as a court”.
Only the Regional Presiding Judge Had Authority
The referral for the Verified Motion to Disqualify any judge should be directed to the “Regional Presiding” judge, rather than the Administrative judge for the civil division.
This situation is similar to when Defendants attempted to substitute Attorney General Ken Paxton in order to effect process of service, but the request was denied by the court.
The denial was based on the fact that the complaint correctly listed the Acting Attorney General, who was in place during Paxton’s impeachment proceedings when the lawsuit was filed.
The court refused to issue the citation in an email from Monica Jackson (DCO), on Nov. 27, 2023 at 11.08 am, stating:
“The service request for Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr cannot be processed because they are not a party to the case.”.
Essentially, Texas laws and rules apply equally in both directions.
Judge Elaine Palmer is not Judge Susan Brown.
The Texas Government Code provides that a District Court Judge [Craft] shall request the Regional Presiding Judge to assign another judge to hear a motion relating to the recusal of the judge of the case pending in his court.
The duty to make the request of the Regional Presiding Judge is a mandatory duty.
Any order, other than an order of recusal or referral, entered by a court after a proper motion to recuse is entered is void.
See, In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P., 4 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Tex. App. 1999)
(“The mandatory provisions of rule 18a are rendered meaningless if, following recusal and assignment by the regional presiding judge, a local administrative judge may simply override the presiding judge’s orders by transferring the case to a court (and judge) of his own choosing. Under such circumstances, transfer effectively nullifies the mandatory recusal procedures in rule 18a”).
Procedural and substantive due process has been denied to Defendants in these civil proceedings, with particular focus on the events after the Defendants Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Craft was docketed.
See, e.g., Mabee v. McDonald, 107 Tex. 139, 175 S.W. 676, 680 (1915)
(“‘Due process of law,’ as used in the fourteenth amendment, and ‘due course of the law of the land,’ as used in Article I, § 19, of the Constitution of Texas, … according to the great weight of authority, are, in nearly if not all respects, practically synonymous.”).
The judge(s) and court actions cannot overcome the appearance of impropriety.
See, e.g. Ex parte Sanchez, WR-84,588-03, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2024)
(“The Court received this writ application on October 3, 2023. Applicant alleges that prosecutor Ralph Petty was working both as a prosecutor on his case and as a judicial legal clerk at the time of his trial and habeas application. On December 6, 2023, this Court denied the application without a written order. However, the Court has since decided that the appearance of impropriety entitled applicants in this situation to relief. Ex parte Lewis, 688 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).”).
This Court Must Dismiss the Case
Texas law is certain:
“If the court has no jurisdiction, it should proceed no further with the case other than to dismiss it for want of power to hear and determine the controversy. In such a case, any order or decree entered, other than one of dismissal is void.”
Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1046 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1931), affirmed 55 S.W.2d 797.
Void and Time-Barred: Interlocutory Order re Three Article on LIT
When Bob approached Defendants, he did so by leaving a comment on the only article he objected to on LIT.
The original petition filed by Bob as docketed on Feb. 21, 2023 was based upon the same article on LIT.
Bob’s complaint in these proceedings has now expanded, seeking new relief regarding 3 articles, and Judge Schaffer’s Order grants this sweeping request.
However, setting aside the improvident grant of this relief, the fact remains uncontestable, namely
(a) the court acted in all absence of jurisdiction and thus the order void,
and;
(b) over a year has passed since the Jan. 23, 2024 void order of transfer was signed by Judge Palmer, and as such more than a year has passed.
In short, any dispute over LIT’s articles is now time-barred.
VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]
In closing, I, Mark Stephen Burke, …, do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. This verified declaration includes and applies to the named exhibits, and is made under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which holds significant weight in legal precedent, as evident in ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020), McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, at *15-17 (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021), and In re Whitfield, No. 03-21-00170-CR, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2021).
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has provided full reasoning in this verified motion with relevant authority provided. The Defendant prays the Court, which has plenary power, GRANTS the Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and for such other and further relief at law or in equity to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of January, 2025.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
LIT UPDATE
OCT 12, 23 25 2023
This LIT published article has become an active lawsuit in Harris County District Court. We’re providing an update on the untimely dismissal of the original Harris County District Court debt collection lawsuit, along with relevant snippets from the ongoing litigation pertaining to this article.
Sec. 392.304 [of the Texas Finance Code] prohibits debt collectors from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading practices, including the use of a name other than their true business or professional name while conducting debt collection activities.
Bob’s unincorporated business was not registered until May 11, 2023, and prior to that date, it did not legally exist.
However, Bob has promoted this unincorporated entity’s name on his website and in Harris County Court Civil Action proceedings related to his admitted debt collection activities.
The original article on LIT, which Bob is complaining about, was published on Jun. 22, 2022.
Based on these indisputable facts alone, Bob’s lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice. His continuous presentation of fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations to the court and defendants further supports this stance, as evident in the legal precedent of Ponce v. Comm’n For Lawyer Discipline, No. 04-20-00267-CV.
Bob’s attempt to rectify the situation through his May 11, 2023 application for a DBA (Doing Business As) does not absolve him of the fraud, deception, and misleading representations he has made. Even filing an amended petition would not address these issues, as established in United States ex rel. Solomon v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-4495-D.
Given these decisive facts, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, safeguarding the integrity of the legal process and upholding the principles of justice.
Extract from litigation 202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM [sic] (Court 189, Judge Tami Craft aka Tamika Craft-Demming);
Plaintiff Robert Kruckemeyer of The Kruckemeyer Law Firm (“Bob”) alleges violations of free speech, but his claims fail to hold up under scrutiny.
Firstly, a similar claim by HCA Healthcare, its lawyers, and family members was defeated earlier this year by Mark Burke. In that case, the law firm of Serpe Andrews, PLLC attempted to disguise their defamation claim as harassment, stalking, and tortious interference with contracts. See; Original Counterclaim and Application for Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction, Image No. 105260883, 11/23/2022 and Plaintiffs Plea in Abatement, Image No. 105473353, 12/08/2022. However, the court recognized that Mark Burke’s actions, which involved republishing content on the gripe site KingwoodDr.com, were protected under the constitutional right to free speech.
This precedent should apply to the current case, wherein Bob also seeks injunctive relief. Therefore, the arguments and case citations related to free speech rights under both state and federal constitutions are incorporated herein. See; 202268307 – BURKE, MARK vs. KPH-CONSOLIDATION INC (DBA HCA HOUSTON HEALTHCARE (Court 234), including ORDER SIGNED DENYING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, Image No. 105941882, docketed Jan. 10, 2023. This court may take judicial notice of this case, see; Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. App. 1989).
Secondly, Bob’s lawsuit appears to be a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP), aimed at punishing a private citizen and media defendant (Blogger Inc.) for engaging in protected speech. Such punitive litigation goes against the spirit of the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Civil Practice & Remedies Code chapter 27, which was enacted to prevent these types of cases. As per State v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App. 2014), Bob’s case is a quintessential example of a SLAPP suit.
Thirdly, Bob’s dissatisfaction with the media defendant’s published article on LawsInTexas.com concerns a matter of public concern, as established in Better Business Bureau of Metro. Dall., Inc. v. Ward, 401 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Tex. App. 2013). However, Bob has not presented clear and specific evidence to establish a prima facie case for each essential element of his claims, as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 27.005(c). Consequently, his claims in this regard are unfounded.
Fourthly, the article on LIT, which is the subject of this civil proceeding (202151467A – ASSOCIATED ENERGY GROUP, LLC vs. MASTERCARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Court 189), is related to a previous case (202151467 – ASSOCIATED ENERGY GROUP LLC vs. CONGO AIRWAYS, Court 189). Evidence and federal case law presented on LIT indicate that the original lawsuit by AEG, represented by Bob, may have obtained a judgment against Congo Airways, a foreign entity, without proper jurisdiction. See; Associated Energy Group, LLC v. Air Cargo Germany GMBH (4:13-cv-02019), District Court, S.D. Texas, Doc. 31, Jun. 4, 2014.
In conclusion, Bob’s attacks on free speech rights in this case are baseless and meritless. The earlier case involving Mark Burke provides a precedent for the protection of free speech, and Bob’s lawsuit appears to be a SLAPP suit, contravening the Texas Citizens Participation Act. Additionally, his claims regarding the media defendant’s article lack sufficient evidence. Moreover, related cases raise concerns about the jurisdiction of Bob’s previous representation. Therefore, these arguments and case citations collectively demonstrate the invalidity of Bob’s claims concerning free speech rights of Texas citizens and media defendants.
Addressing Indiscriminate Dismissals for Want of Prosecution (“DWOP”)
It is essential to highlight the concerning disparity in the treatment of case 202151467A, which was listed as ‘active’ for over 15 months despite being dormant since the letter from Lorraine Bunting, docketed on Jun 6, 2022. The letter clarifies that Bob’s attempt to garnish a third-party payment processor, Mastercard, is legally untenable since Mastercard is not a bank where the debtor’s money is held. This contrasts with another Garnishment After Judgment case before this court, 202252461A – KNIGHTSBRIDGE FUNDING LLC vs. GOLDEN BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (Court 189).
In the Knightsbridge garnishment proceeding, the case was DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION (“DWOP’d”) on Jul. 7, 2023, after remaining dormant for 9 months since the ‘rush’ service of citation was docketed on Sep. 30, 2022. The court’s decision to dismiss the case is in accordance with the principle established in Walker v. Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. 1980), wherein it was ruled that the time limits provided in rule 165a are mandatory and jurisdictional. Additionally, GANTT v. GETZ, No. 14-10-00003-CV (Tex. App. May 12, 2011), supports the notion that adherence to these time limits is crucial.
However, Bob’s case, despite remaining dormant for over 15 months, has not been subjected to similar action. Only after Defendants notice in an earlier filing on this docket would this case be dismissed for want of prosecution on Sep. 26, 2023, image no. 110466918, in an order signed by Judge Tami Craft.
This inconsistency is perplexing, especially considering that the defendant, Mastercard, cannot be legally garnished. The situation seems absurd, as the case has been inactive and lacks a valid legal basis for continuing against Mastercard.
It is imperative for the court to address this discrepancy promptly and take appropriate action in line with the principles of fairness and justice. Bob’s case should be treated consistently with the Knightsbridge case and be subjected to the same procedural rules and time limits. Any case which remains dormant for an extended period, particularly when pursuing an unattainable legal action, should not be allowed to continue indefinitely. To maintain the integrity of the judicial system and protect the rights of all parties involved, indiscriminate dismissals for want of prosecution should be applied consistently and diligently. This did not occur in the aforementioned Associated Energy Group proceeding.
SETTINGS RE 202311266 – KRUCKEMEYER, ROBERT J vs. BLOGGER INC D/B/A LAWIN TEXAS.COM
Good morning,
MOTION TO STRIKE
I have reviewed the online settings tab/page for the above case and note that my Motion to Strike Plaintiffs First Amended Petition which included a Proposed Order (image no. 109076997) , has not been scheduled for Oct 31, 2023 oral hearing with a line comment “PASSED – NO ORDER ON FILE 10/18” which is clearly an error.
Please advise why it was shown as passed when there is clearly a [proposed] order on file and in compliance with https://www.justex.net/section/1447
“Motions: ALL Motions and Responses filed with the Court must have a Proposed Order filed with the Court before the hearing or the hearing will automatically be passed.”
MOTION TO TRANSFER-COMPLETE
Still on the settings page, there is a note on hearing reset dated Oct. 24 that this was reset per notice on Sep. 29, but now it shows “re-set N/A” and there is no setting time for Oct. 31 hearing and no Order or notice updating the Sep. 29 notice. What’s the position of the court?
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
On the settings page, the hearing time appears to have been unilaterally changed from 10.40 am to 10.05 am, is that correct? Plaintiff’s notice (image no. 110723498) states 10.40 am and there is no notice otherwise on the docket?
VERIFIED MOTION TO DISMISS [TCPA]
Do you have an oral hearing date within the 60 days, per my Motion request for an emergency hearing (image no. 110937593)?
Cheers,Mark Burke
Blogger Inc.
Tue 10/24/2023 9:12 AM
Good morning Mr. Burke,
I reviewed the case filing and see the order filed 7/10/2023. In between the original date you filed and now the court did have to change the oral hearing date which is now October 31st, 2023 . You will need to file an amended notice for this motion to be heard.
In the notice please include what will be heard which should only be what was previously filed, the date the motion was filed, and the zoom link.
October 31st, 2023 at 10:25 a.m.
https://justex.zoom.us/j/87080423085
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Thank you,
Tue 10/24/2023 9:20 AM
Good morning Ms. Lopez,
Thank you for the response.
Are you referring to the Motion to Strike?
What about the other motions and questions I raised, does the court wish to answer those, namely; MOTION TO TRANSFER-COMPLETE; TEMPORARY INJUNCTION and VERIFIED MOTION TO DISMISS [TCPA]?
Cheers
Mark Burke
Tue 10/24/2023 10.11 AM
Mr. Burke,
I am going over the docket for the 189th including October 31st, 2023 due to the Lead Clerk being out for 2 weeks.
And yes, you are correct the date of opposing counsel’s notice of hearing says 10:40 am in which I will reach out to them to ask them to amended their notice.
The court had to make time changes for all cases set. But the T.I. will start at 10:05 am. If no notice is filed prior then the T.I. will not get heard.
As for the other the recently filed Motion to Dismiss did you want to set this for submission or oral docket?
Thank you,
Tue 10/24/2023 10:19 AM
Re MTD [emergency] hearing: Oral within 60 days please Ms. Lopez as it’s TCPA (statutory timeline). Thanks.
Tue 10/24/2023 10.53 AM
December 12th, 2023 at 9am.
The time will change as the hearing date gets closer which we will notify you and all other parties of any changes.
Also, Mr. Burke do you still get emails for browserweb@gmail.com ? I am asking because since you are emailing the court staff with a different email we will need both to be on file. Ms. Mosley had previously emailed all parties on 9/29/2023 stating that the court had to reset all case hearings that was set today from 10/24 to 10/31 with no response from you.
Thank you,
Tue 10/24/2023 11:07 AM
Understood re time change for upcoming MTD e.g. I don’t need to file a notice of this hearing until you advise the zoom link etc nearer the time.
Can the court please confirm that this terminates all but the anticipated TI hearing on Oct. 31, 2023, e.g. until TCPA MTD is heard per statute?
I utilize both emails, that is correct. Adding both would be beneficial. Thanks,
Mark Burke
Tue 10/24/2023 11:17 AM
Oh no sir, you will need to file a notice with the December 12, 2023 date at 9 am via zoom with the zoom link also to reserve that date as it is a first come, first serve basis for our hearing dates.
But once we give you an updated time which will be prior to the hearing date then you will file an amended notice with the new time.
Also, I am unsure what the hearing will terminate as I am not a lawyer and do not practice law to know exactly what you are referring to. I believe you can ask the Judge that on Tuesday at your hearing but that’s up to her.
Thank you,
Tue 10/24/2023 11:20 AM
I would like to reserve a zoom link for the Dec 12, 2023 date you provided. Please advise.
Tue 10/24/2023 12:13 PM
If you haven’t done so already please file notice of hearing for that date.
Thank you,
Tue 10/24/2023 3:10 PM
Yes, I have. Can I receive the zoom details now please?
Tue 10/25/2023 8:25 AM
Good morning Ms Lopez,
Can you explain why N/A is present as a comment on the 3 entries on the settings page, which I assume means “not applicable”.
What is “not applicable” about the submission and the 2 motion hearings?
See link to screenshot with marked entries for your perusal and comment.
Thanks,
Mark Burke
MESSAGE TO BOB: GAG ORDERS
“If they think they have such a solid case, let them bring it to the court and go to a trial now, instead of trying to short circuit the process by shutting the website down first then holding a trial at their convenience only.” https://t.co/YrAHyu8znF— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) October 23, 2023
Prior Restraint
Texas judge denies 2nd request for injunction against blog
APR 21, 2011 | Republished: Oct 23, 2023
A Dallas judge found earlier this week that a plaintiff who tried to silence a blogger through a temporary injunction in a defamation suit did not meet the burden for the injunction.
Judge Mark Greenberg of Dallas County Court at Law #5 denied on Wednesday the request of Fernando Rosales, who filed a defamation suit against Avi Adelman and his blog BarkingDogs.org in December. Rosales, the owner of a Dallas bar called Lost Society, filed a request in March for a temporary injunction against the website asking that the judge shut down the blog and prevent Adelman from printing anything about Rosales in future posts.
It also called for Adelman to remove content discussing the restaurant or Rosales, who alleges that Adelman made false statements about the bar on the blog and claimed that the statements have resulted in “damages and loss of business dealings.”
In the plaintiff’s brief in support of the application for injunction, Rosales’ attorney notes: “Movant requests a[n] evidentiary hearing to allow the court to determine whether these statements oublished [sic] y Defendant are defamatory and whethere [sic] to issue a limited temporay [sic] injunction, that includes a time. place and manner, ordering only defendants not to repeat these defamatory statements.”
In a brief opposing the plaintiff’s order, the defense said granting the request “would constitute a prior restraint on speech, which is unconstitutional under the Texas and United States Constitutions.”
In Wednesday’s ruling, the judge noted in his decision that “[a]fter considering the parties’ briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of establishing entitlement to a temporary injunction.” He did not elaborate.
The decision marked Rosales’ second failed attempt to have the posts removed. In December, his attorney filed a request for a temporary restraining order on the blog. That request said: “The Court should order that the Defendants, Avia Aderman [sic] and Barkingdog.org [sic] be restrained from publishing defamatory statements concerning plaintiffs, Fernado [sic] Rosales, Lost Society and Initiatve [sic] Partners, LLC.”
Adelman noted that Rosales is simply trying to shut down the website before going to trial.
“This was the second attempt by the plaintiff Fernando Rosales to close down my website, remove previously published content, and place a prior restraint on future posts he believes are defamatory,” Adelman said in an email message.
“If they think they have such a solid case, let them bring it to the court and go to a trial now, instead of trying to short circuit the process by shutting the website down first then holding a trial at their convenience only.”
Adelman added that this second failed attempt by the plaintiff should make Rosales reconsider his efforts: “And instead of taking me to court, he should change the business practices at the so-called neighborhood bar he owns in order to stop drawing the attention of the local authorities, neighborhood residents and my blog.”
202151467A
ASSOCIATED ENERGY GROUP, LLC vs. MASTERCARD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
APR 28, 2022 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: JUN 22, 2022
Another Rogue Debt Collection Law Firm in Houston, Texas
The Lawyer filed for the Writ of Garnishment on Apr. 28, 2022, and the very next day, Judge Scot Dollinger Granted that request, but the near 4 decade ‘business’ attorney has requested the writ from Mastercard, who confirmed by letter to the court, y’all cannot garnish any money – as they are not a bank.
Seriously, you only get this type of comedy on LIT.
Zions Bancorporation and Cenlar FSB Dash to Foreclose on Thrash’s $9M Dollar Residential Estate
Dr John Thrash has owned the property since 1994. He’s been litigating this dispute in a few proceedings this year about the same property.
Banditville Showdown: Ali Choudri sues Christopher “Chris” Wyatt
Choudri avers that Wyatt has multiple arrests and convictions for high misdemeanors and felonies, even using the alias Jonathan Sanders.
Texas Appellate Court Wields Legal Sword to Gut Consumer Protections
Sword of Justice or Shield for Wall Street Debt Collectin’ Lawyers? Texas Court’s Absurd Ruling by Outlaw Gina Palafox Sparks Outrage.
Robert Kruckemeyer
August 24, 2022 at 11:12 am
This is Robert Kruckemeyer. I am not required by the Texas Finance Code Section 392.101 et seq. to file a surety bond. Accordingly, your suggestion that I must do so, and that I am in violation of the law for not doing so, is factually incorrect. The Mastercard entity that was garnished answered that it is not in possession of any funds belonging to the debtor. The basis for its answer was not that “it is not a bank.” It is not necessary that the entity being garnished be a bank, it is only necessary that the garnishee have funds belonging to the debtor. Your article is defamatory in 2 respects: 1) It states that I violate Texas laws and then cites to a Debt Collector database in which I am not found leaving the reader with the impression that I am required to register as a debt collector and have failed to do so in violation of the law; and 2) It states that I “unlawfully” filed for a garnishment without a factual basis for making the claim. Please retract this article. This email is sent pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.055.
justicefortexas
August 24, 2022 at 11:53 am
This is LIT. We refer to your comment above. The facts are true and you are a debt collector subject to Texas Finance Code laws.
In relation to your false claim of defamation, we respond to your points as follows:
1. You are violatin’ Texas laws as you do not hold on file an active surety bond with the Texas Secretary of State, and you are operating as a debt collector;
2. You did unlawfully file for garnishment as you are in violation of 1.
Furthermore, if you read the mastercard letter referenced and linked in our article, it is clear from Mastercard’s own words, you garnished the wrong entity.
A review of Harris County Court’s historical archives confirms you have been actively collecting debts unlawfully for years.
We suggest you start redirecting your efforts to acting lawfully and obtain a surety bond and file it with the Secretary of State.
Mr. Robert Kruckemeyer
August 28, 2022 at 2:54 pm
I invite you to read the definitions contained in Texas Finance Code Section 392.001. I am not a “Credit bureau.” I am not a “Third-party debt collector.” Accordingly, I am not required by Finance Code Section 392.101 to post a surety bond. As I am not required to post a surety bond, I am not in violation of Texas law for the failure to post a surety bond and accordingly, I am not in violation of Texas law in filing the garnishment action you reference. Garnishing the wrong entity is not a violation of Texas law. I note that you claim to not be attorneys. I suggest you consult an attorney. Failure to do so will be used as evidence of your actual malice. I reiterate my demand that you retract the defamatory statements pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.055.
justicefortexas
September 8, 2022 at 2:37 pm
We invite you to type “garnishment” in the search box on this website and reconsider your own flawed legal stance. We will not retract the truth and this thread ends here.
Laws In Texas – No BS. Just the Truth.
Mr. Robert Kruckemeyer
February 21, 2023 at 5:01 pm
You have been sued. Cause No. 2023-11266; Robert J. Kruckemeyer v. Blogger Inc. d/b/a LawIn Texas; In the 189th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.