Criminal Acts: Outlaw Federal Judges Lawless Orders to Seize Homes Contrary to Texas Laws

This case now revolves around erroneous Erie Guesses.

Here, two key questions of Texas law are being incorrectly answered by Federal Judges, applying what Plaintiff refers to as the “Rivera Doctrine”, which is where judges and justices blindly follow related opinions without analysis.

The third, res judicata, relies upon the first two so this commentary only focuses on those two questions, which are:

(i) Is the six year old order of foreclosure by the federal judge void?,

and

(ii) is the statute of limitations to foreclose on the home four years or ten years?

The federal court in these proceedings answer

(i) yes, the order is valid,

and

(ii) ten years, relying upon 34.001, which can be renewed in perpetuity, as necessary.

In response, the Plaintiff finds that assessment to be absurd, for the following reasons;

(i) no, the order is void because 11 unintelligible words do not comply with the specificity required for an order of foreclosure, e.g. no secured mortgage debt amount shown, nor legal address of property, etc.

and;

(ii) four years applies, in keeping with Texas law 16.035, 16.036 as confirmed by lenders when requesting judicial foreclosure.

With Plaintiff’s summary in hand, we believe that;

(i) is answered in favor of the Plaintiff by both the federal courts judges orders themselves.

Good examples were identified by Plaintiff, including Maldonado and most recently in the high-profile Lamell case.

It does not require further discussion.

The federal judge’s order is invalid and void, as well [as time-barred, which is discussed in (ii)].

Moving onto (ii);

The Plaintiff’s responses and objections assumes the judges and readers are familiar with her earlier arguments which provided the background to Texas property laws, and in particular, how the Texas Supreme Court went further to protect Texas homes from unscrupulous lenders by incorporating a “home equity mortgage or loan” (applicable here) into the Texas Constitution.

Section 16.035 controls in both state and federal courts, and always has, which upon reading requires foreclosure within 4 years.

The lender has added protection that it may extend that period, with or without the homeowners’ consent, as allowed under Section 16.036, which requires filing an “extension of time” affidavit, in this case by filing the notarized affidavit with the Harris County Real Property Records Department.

Returning to Section 16.035, when lenders have run out of time – the 4 years has expired in law – judges have made statements to the effect that lenders, nonbanks and their lawyers are prevented from requesting more time than allowed under the statute of limitations. The cases in the image gallery below are on point.

However, in recent decisions, federal judges are stating that 16.035 only requires that a lawsuit be filed seeking judicial foreclosure within the 4 year statute of limitations period, and once a judicial order is obtained, 34.001 kicks into play.

In effect, this [proposed] judicial order – which erroneously claims “the lien has already been foreclosed” – would allow the lender a minimum of 10 years to seize the home by foreclosure, and can quite easily be extended in perpetuity, as necessary.

That is the unbelievable argument Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan has presented in Joanna Burke’s case, and relying upon other “recent” federal judicial opinions.

She does so seemingly with a straight face, and not a red face which is warranted.

As the Plaintiff explains, 34.001 is for debt judgments “other” than the protected homestead, and furthermore, a [judgment] lien cannot attach to a primary residence in Texas.

In short, the ten year statute of limitations period which graces regular debt judgments does not apply to the homestead.

As the judges and state justices have stated in their opinions, “no one should have to endure more than 4 years without diligent prosecution when a property is at stake” and the foreclosing lender “doesn’t get to sleep on its rights”.

Quite clearly, these statements reject the ten-year argument, and rightly so.

As a result, the Plaintiff is asking that this court certify the questions to the Texas Supreme Court to resolve the clear and obvious misapplication of Texas laws, which staunchly protect the homestead from a premeditated and predatory proposed judgment like this one, targeting an elder, law-abiding citizen and homeowner.

It’s criminal, and elder abuse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, MJCAB issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].

The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].

Relatedly, ECF 60 was not considered in the M&R.

Court Order 55 Denies Plaintiff’s ‘First Amended’ Surreply: Distinguishing 16.036

Although it was hard to discern due to the incorrect docket numbering in Order 55, as the court appears to get caught out by its own manipulated and back-dated court docket, the MJCAB is supposedly denying Plaintiff’s “First Amended Surreply” ECF 44 (incorrectly referencing to ECF 52 in the Order), which merely distinguishes Texas Civil Properties and Remedies Code § 16.036 from 16.035.

Court Order 54 Denies Plaintiff’s Supplement: The ‘Who’ in her Fraud Claim

Addressing court Order 54, MJCAB denies Plaintiff’s Supplement, which addresses the mistakenly deleted “Who” in her Fraud claim due to word-limits in answering PHH’s non-compliant, supersized 7,330-word motion.

Her filings correctly followed court procedures.

However, compliance with the court allowance proved difficult.

It is a minor-sized correction, but important when responding to the fraud claim with specificity, as PHH demanded. MJCAB provides a three-sentence curt response:

“(1) Plaintiff presents no good cause for granting leave to file a supplement to her Response.

(2) The proposed Supplement offers no arguments that could not have been  raised in the Surreply.

(3) Further, the Court has reviewed the proposed Supplement and determined that it raises no meritorious arguments.”.

These Orders have been addressed separately for the court’s reconsideration as they have a major impact on the disposition of the collective M&R’s and Plaintiff’s due process and constitutionally protected rights to a fair and impartial tribunal.

The Plaintiff now addresses M&R 58 directly.

Justice Requires Full Argument and Fairness to All

In reversing this court, Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho recently stated:

“Our adversarial system of justice requires that we give both sides full and fair opportunity to present their strongest possible arguments to the court.

It is through that clash of ideas that we ensure that justice is done pursuant to the laws that govern the dispute in question.”

-Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.).

MJCAB has repeatedly rejected this notion by once more denying the Plaintiff’s amended surreply and supplement, in violation of Fifth Circuit precedent.

The opinion states unequivocally:

“The district court therefore abused its discretion by denying Anadarko leave to file a sur-reply.”

(at 774).

Plaintiff avers this statement, which includes the adjectives “full”, “fair” and “strongest” [possible arguments], encompasses both a Surreply and an amended Surreply and would also include the “Supplement” in this case.

Additionally, one cannot ignore MJCAD flat-out denied Plaintiff’s Surreply pertaining to the Vexatious Litigant motion, when considering the constitutional implications, but would allow the original Surreply and PHH response because Plaintiff alerted to the fact that PHH were addressing issues for the first time.

Flat-out denying the Surreply here would negatively impact PHH, something which she clearly wished to avoid.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Disclaimer: The Plaintiff submitted her timely objection(s) by ensuring they were filed directly with the clerk in compliance with the 14-day rule, confident that this court would not decide any pending motions prior to the expiration of this deadline, or before receipt of the objection(s).

1.         Whether the court should entirely reject the Magistrate Judge’s M&R [58], and/or stay these proceedings considering PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60.

2.         Whether MJCAB’s abrupt M&R and related Orders, which failed to address Plaintiff’s well-reasoned arguments, nor provide reasons with supporting legal authority is sufficient to deny Plaintiff’s response, motion for leave and amended surreply.

3.         Whether MJCAB should have addressed the merits of the response and [denied] surreply, applying the same standard the Fifth Circuit held when eviscerating this court in Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692, 697 (5th Cir. 2024), and considering the severity of the M&R’s final recommendation and the implications to the Plaintiff’s liberty and protected property rights.

4.         Whether the court agrees with Plaintiff insofar as the Magistrate Judge’s M&R and related Orders constitutes an abuse of discretion, because she has willfully and knowingly defied the Fifth Circuit’s very recent admonishment by replicating the same conduct in this case, see:

Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.),

reversing this court for the same issue less than nine months ago.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Objections, Timeliness and Standard of Review

U.S. v. Rodriguez, Criminal No. G-04-01, Civil Action No. G-06-458, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2006)

(“Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report within the allowed time SHALL bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”).

Reconsideration

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (2017).

A district court may reconsider an order “for any reason [a court] deems sufficient,” id., “even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,”

Pfeiffer v. Ajamie PLLC, No. 4:19-cv-02760, 2020 WL 13420831, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020).

Moreover, the “[c]lassic reasons for granting reconsideration” include that the order rests upon an erroneous factual basis.

Shih v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. Inc., No. 4:21-CV-01530, 2022 WL 444476, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022)

(noting that reconsideration is appropriate if “the judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law”).

Docket Filings Should Never be Backdated

Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1988)

(“the judgment, signed December 24, 1987, was apparently entered on the docket sheet at the district court clerk’s office on December 29, and the defendants’ notice of appeal, filed January 27, 1988, was entered on the docket sheet on January 28…

The district court’s docket sheet in this case reveals that the order appealed from was not docketed until December 29, 1987, and the filing of the notice of appeal on January 27, 1988 was, therefore, within the 30-day requirement of F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1).”).

Judicial Integrity and Impartiality

Federal judges should always seek to promote confidence that they will dispense evenhanded justice.

See Canon 2(A), Code of Conduct for United States Judges (requiring judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”).

At its core, this judicial impartiality is “the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,” which “assures equal application of the law.”

Repub. Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (1992) (cleaned up);

see also, e.g., Buntion v. Quarterman , 524 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that defendants’ “right to a fair trial” is in part “fulfilled by a judicial officer who impartially presides over the trial”)

(citing Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904–05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) )

…the court may unintentionally convey its tacit approval of the litigant’s underlying legal position.

See , e.g. , United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez , 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977)

(observing that a trial judge “must make every effort to preserve the appearance of strict impartiality,” including by “exhibit[ing] neutrality in his language”).

Even this appearance of bias, whether real or not, should be avoided.

– United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2020).

ARGUMENT

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

“Plaintiff, a veteran litigant proceeding pro se, initiated this case in state court on December 21, 2023, as part of her approximately 14-year effort to thwart foreclosure on residential property located in Kingwood, Texas (Property).”

As recently as December 20, 2024, and in a published opinion, the Fifth Circuit remanded the “veteran litigant(s) [the Walden’s] proceeding pro se, opposed “U.S. Banks latest suit, filed on December 31, 2021, arguing that it had a right to foreclose pursuant to the final judgment the district court issued ” as part of [their] approximately 14-year effort to thwart foreclosure on residential property located in [San Marcos, Texas (Property).”,

and where

“in 2008, the Waldens executed a Texas Home Equity Note (“Note”) and Security Instrument (“Security Instrument”) in the amount of $316,800, and where it is undisputed that “the Waldens have been in default on the Loan Agreement since July 15, 2011.”

-MTGLQ Inv’rs v. Walden, A-19-CV-0992 RP, at *1-2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2020).

See; U.S. Bank Tr. v. Walden, No. 23-50662, at *13 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2024)

(“Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment is contrary to controlling circuit precedent, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment, VACATE the judgment it entered, and REMAND the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Boren.”).

The Plaintiff has listed many more examples during these proceedings, all blanked by Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan.

She has also refused to acknowledge or discuss the millions of dollars in judgments, sanctions, fines and misconduct by PHH and their counsel in Texas, as well as former judges and clerks of this courthouse. Prejudging the outcome of this case was clear upon reassignment and referral commencing with MJCAB’s first Order [31] released on September 18, 2024.

These facts are well-documented in Plaintiff’s pleadings relating to this motion but avoided in the purported M&R and Order(s), which at first blush could be confused with a filing by PHH.

In support, Plaintiff incorporates her “Certified Questions” Motions referenced repeatedly herein.

In short, Plaintiff objects to the entire memorandum’s and its one-sided [III.] Analysis:

A.    PHH’s Foreclosure Efforts are Timely.

Plaintiff denies and objects to A. in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as presented in all of Plaintiff’s pleadings (including those unlawfully denied) and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60, incorporated herein.

B.    Plaintiff’s Attempts to Prevent Foreclosure are Barred by Res Judicata.

Plaintiff denies and objects to B. in its entirety for the exact same reasons provided in A.

C.    No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exist for Trial on Claim.

Plaintiff denies and objects to C. and which includes 1. Violation of the Texas Constitution, 2. Malicious Abuse of Process, 3. Conspiracy, 4. Fraud, 5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish, 6. Texas Debt Collection Act, 7. Quiet Title, 8. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in its entirety for the exact same reasons provided in A.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff denies and objects to IV. in its entirety for the exact same reasons provided in A.

The recommendation should be fully rejected as due process, the law and the Fifth Circuit demands.

As Plaintiff has discussed throughout these proceedings, including the objections by Plaintiff to these omnibus M&R’s and Orders, MJCAB’s reliance upon this court having jurisdiction is flawed, res judicata is inapplicable, and Judge Hittner’s 2018 order is invalid, void and time-barred as PHH “slept on [its] rights”

-Pie Dev. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., No. 24-60155, at *7 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).

MJCAB’s assertions otherwise are without merit and baseless.

See; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60.

(These latest motions with exhibit, proposed orders and cover letter were delivered by USPS Express Mail on Tuesday, Feb. 4, 2025 at 10.17 am and signed for by “T Hannibal” at 3.42 pm.).

As with all MJCAB’s Orders and M&R’s, the procedural due process violations are clear and obvious.

The Fifth Circuit has admonished this court and Magistrate Judge for the very acts repeated here.

In short, this litigation is meritorious, and PHH’s deficient, Motion should be rejected.

DECLARATION

Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna…, and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff requests that if the District Court believes it has jurisdiction in these proceedings, to;

(i) reject MJCAB’s M&R 58, and/or

(ii) stay the proceedings based on Plaintiff’s “Certified Questions” Motion(s), or

(iii) remand for reevaluation based on the evidence and argument presented by Plaintiff, or

(iv) deny or strike  PHH’s deficient Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Plaintiff’s related objections and motions pertaining to Magistrate Judge Bryan’s M&R’s and Orders, and

(v) for any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 6th day of February, 2025.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

“A district court judge may reconsider a magistrate judge’s order on pretrial matters “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). ” – United States v. Davis, No. 23-50797, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2024)

Court Procedures and Local Rules are Cancelled

Plaintiff and nonprisoner Joanna Burke wishes to notify the District Court Judge that the court’s local rules and his own court procedures have been completely cancelled by veteran Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan (“MJCAB”).

This is clearly erroneous, contrary to the law and the court’s own rules, all to circumvent due process and Plaintiff’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal.

This is a manifest error of law, “that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law” (United States v. Newton, CRIMINAL H-19-816-01, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2024) supported by irrefutable evidence, as discussed herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, MJCAB issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].

The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].

Relevant here: Plaintiff’s Nov. 15 Motion for Leave [51] and Supplement [51-1], court Order 54 which cites to the M&R 58.

The Order recorded as ECF 54 provides a three-sentence curt response in relation to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s (“PHH”) deficient Second Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant, and the Plaintiff’s opposition:

“Plaintiff presents no good cause for granting leave to file a supplement to her Response. The proposed Supplement offers no arguments that could not have been raised in the Surreply. Further, the Court has reviewed the proposed Supplement and determined that it raises no meritorious arguments.”.

As a result, this leaves the operative pleadings which were considered in her M&R as ECF 27 [PHH Motion]; ECF 35 [Plaintiff Response]; ECF 40[PHH Reply], ECF 44 [Plaintiff’s Surreply]; (and resulting pleadings by both sides objecting and responding).

Notably, this Order’s denial now excludes ECF 51[Leave to file Supplement and Supplement] as well as ECF 52 [Leave to file amended Surreply and amended Surreply] and ECF 53. All three filings have been in the court’s possession since Nov. 15, 2024, but only docketed [backdated] on Jan. 23, 2025, the very same day as the omnibus of Orders and M&R’s were released.

The reasons are discussed in the three related Objections to the M&R’s, concerning the “lost” USPS Express Mail which contained these pleadings.

Justice Requires Full Argument and Fairness to All

In reversing this court, Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho recently stated:

“Our adversarial system of justice requires that we give both sides full and fair opportunity to present their strongest possible arguments to the court.

It is through that clash of ideas that we ensure that justice is done pursuant to the laws that govern the dispute in question.”.

Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.).

MJCAB has rejected this notion once more by denying the combined Motion for Leave with Supplement [51], in violation of Fifth Circuit precedent and where the opinion states unequivocally (at 774):

“The district court therefore abused its discretion by denying Anadarko leave to file a sur-reply.”

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.         Whether the Court should reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s Order 54, which materially affects the disposition of the case in MJCAB’s M&R 58.

2.         Whether the Magistrate Judge’s three sentences without properly addressing the specific arguments, and without legal authority is sufficient to deny the motion and supplement, considering the severity of the M&R’s final recommendation and the implications to the Plaintiff’s liberty and property rights.

4.         Whether an Order should specifically address the merits of the supplement, applying the same rationale the Fifth Circuit held when eviscerating this court in Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692, 697 (5th Cir. 2024):

“The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s M&R without assigning reasons, analysis, or any change, over Sharnez’s objection, in a three-sentence-long order.”

5.         Whether the Court should sua sponte (a) issue a stay, and/or (b) reject the M&R(s) if the court agrees that 1 constitutes an abuse of discretion by MJCAB, considering the Fifth Circuit’s precedential published opinion in Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.), reversing this court for the same issue less than 9 month ago.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Objections, Timeliness and Standard of Review

U.S. v. Rodriguez, Criminal No. G-04-01, Civil Action No. G-06-458, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2006) (“Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report within the allowed time SHALL bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”).

Reconsideration

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (2017).  A district court may reconsider an order “for any reason [a court] deems sufficient,” id., “even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,” Pfeiffer v. Ajamie PLLC, No. 4:19-cv-02760, 2020 WL 13420831, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020).  Moreover, the “[c]lassic reasons for granting reconsideration” include that the order rests upon an erroneous factual basis.  Shih v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. Inc., No. 4:21-CV-01530, 2022 WL 444476, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022) (noting that reconsideration is appropriate if “the judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law”).

Docket Filings Should Never be Backdated

Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1988) (“the judgment, signed December 24, 1987, was apparently entered on the docket sheet at the district court clerk’s office on December 29, and the defendants’ notice of appeal, filed January 27, 1988, was entered on the docket sheet on January 28… The district court’s docket sheet in this case reveals that the order appealed from was not docketed until December 29, 1987, and the filing of the notice of appeal on January 27, 1988 was, therefore, within the 30-day requirement of F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1).”).

Judicial Integrity and Impartiality

Federal judges should always seek to promote confidence that they will dispense evenhanded justice. See Canon 2(A), Code of Conduct for United States Judges (requiring judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”). At its core, this judicial impartiality is “the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,” which “assures equal application of the law.” Repub. Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (1992) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Buntion v. Quarterman , 524 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that defendants’ “right to a fair trial” is in part “fulfilled by a judicial officer who impartially presides over the trial”) (citing Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904–05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) )…the court may unintentionally convey its tacit approval of the litigant’s underlying legal position. See , e.g. , United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez , 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (observing that a trial judge “must make every effort to preserve the appearance of strict impartiality,” including by “exhibit[ing] neutrality in his language”). Even this appearance of bias, whether real or not, should be avoided. – United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2020).

ARGUMENT

As raised in the Statement of Issues above, Plaintiff provides cases where Surreplies and/or Supplements are granted, but ultimately the relief is denied.

See; “ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 31 Plaintiff Paul Casey Blank’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply to Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.”

– Blank v. Deutsch Bank National Trust Company (3:16-cv-01463) District Court, N.D. Texas (Sep 8, 2017);

Closer to home, this court decided:

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Saihat Corp., No. 21-20002, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) and on appeal the Fifth Circuit stated in their opinion affirming this court’s decision;

“Saihat was permitted a sur-reply following Deutsche Bank’s reply”

– However, this statement is not accurate.

Saihat Corp., aka Nanik Bhagia, represented by sanctioned attorney Jerry L. Schutza – who has been warned several times in this federal court for filing similarly frivolous cases and sanctioned on appeal by the Fifth Circuit – did not obtain permission to file his Surreplies (also referred to as Supplemental pleadings), according to DBNTCO and their counsel, Mackie Wolf, including the “attorney of many hats”, Mark D. Cronenwett (who was the appointed substitute trustee in Plaintiff’s underlying proceedings).

See; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Saihat Corporation (4:19-cv-00825) District Court, S.D. Texas, ECF 44 and 50 (Saihat) and DBNTCO’s ECF 51, which states at 4.

“On March 17, 2020, without seeking leave, Defendant filed its Surreply to Plaintiff’s Reply (“Surreply”). (ECF No. 44.)”;

and at 5.,

“Defendant did not continue negotiation efforts and filed a Supplemental Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2020 (“Supplemental Surreply”). (ECF No. 50.)”.

This case was processed and decided directly by Judge Eskridge.

Despite failing to seek leave of this court to file, Saihat’s Surreply and Supplemental Surreply were included in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion as being granted, but ultimately the relief requested therein denied by this court and affirmed on appeal.

However, ferreting into the Saihat pleadings in this court:

DBNTCO, ECF 51, Page 4, II. Argument and Authorities – OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S SURREPLIES AND ANY OTHER RESPONSE 1-4, DBNTCO specifically request (without a separate motion) that the court should enforce its own rules by striking ECF 44 and 50.

Similarly, the Plaintiff urged the same request of PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment [27].

It should have been stricken – and can still be stricken – sua sponte by the court, see LR11.4.

For similar deficiencies, the same fate should be afforded to PHH’s Vexatious Motion [28].

This Raises the All-Important Question

What are the court’s procedures if there’s no consistency in the application of the court’s own procedures or local rules?

In this court and specifically in these proceedings, the facts are irrefutable.

When you [Joanna Burke] follow the court procedures and rules, due process is denied, but when you play “fast and loose” [e.g. as described in ECF 60, docketed Jan. 29, 2025] with the court procedures [PHH], you’re granted all the relief requested, either by Order, and/or by failing to strike the deficient filings.

This is a manifest error of law, that is plain and indisputable, and which amounts to a complete disregard of controlling law.

PHH’s Motion Deficiencies Violate The Court’s Procedures and Local Rules

No Certificate of Word Count

Judge Eskridge’s procedures are based on word count, not pages.

As filed by PHH’s veteran counsel, both their Motion for Summary Judgment [27] and Motion [28] exceed the allowed word-limit.

Additionally, PHH’s deficient Motion should have a Certificate of word count, but it does not.

See: Meadows v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Civil Action 4:23-cv-01536, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2024)

(“Costco’s original motion for leave was stricken because it lacked a certificate of conference.”).

Judge Eskridge’s limit is restricted to 5,000 words per 18 c. and as stated, there is no Certificate of word count included by PHH’s motions, which is reason alone to strike PHH’s Motions.

In short, Judge Eskridge could have chosen page-limit, but he chose a word-count limit.

PHH’s Footnote Arguments and/or Evidence Should Be Disregarded

Furthermore, PHH’s motion included verbose argument in disfavored footnotes.

Judge Eskridge goes on to say at 18 d. of his court’s procedures:

“Evidence or argument raised only by footnote will be disregarded.”.

Judge Bennett’s Order Striking Oversized Motion

Now, compare MJCAB with Judge Bennett in Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (4:21-cv-02591), District Court, S.D. Texas, [OVERSIZED MOTION] STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD per Order (Doc # 40) Modified on 12/13/2021 (ledwards, 4). (Entered: 12/10/2021).

To put this in perspective, in these proceedings and specifically PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment [27], they demanded that Plaintiff detail each cause of action with specificity.

That was a struggle based on the word count allowed per Judge Eskridge’s court procedures (5,000), when answering a motion that was one and a half times that allowance.

Ultimately, this resulted in the “how” element in the fraud claim being excluded inadvertently.

Despite this, MJCAB allowed PHH’s non-compliant and supersized motion [27] by incredulously denying as moot [55] PHH’s tardy motion, filed after more than 5 months late [50] requesting leave to file excess words and ignoring the many other deficiencies and procedural violations, but then she turns around and immediately denies Plaintiff’s small amendment, and where Joanna Burke, acting pro se, did comply with all the court’s procedures.

MJCAB: (1) “Plaintiff presents no good cause for granting leave to file a supplement to her Response”

MJCAB claims ‘no good cause’ for granting leave to file a Supplement, Plaintiff assumes on the premise of (2) and (3) below.

Compare this decision with the preceding Argument regarding DBNTCO v Saihat before this court.

While MJCAB refers to (2) and (3), there is no reasons, legal authority, nor does she even acknowledge, let alone discuss in her three sentences what the supplement was for, which in this case was Plaintiff answering PHH’s deficient and supersized motion with specificity pertaining to the Fraud claim, and where she inadvertently excluded the “how” element while trying to ensure her response was within the word-limit.

In short, her Order should be reversed per the reasoning in (2) and (3) below.

MJCAB: (2) “The proposed Supplement offers no arguments that could not have been raised in the Surreply.”

As argued here, and in the respective M&R and “Certified Questions” motion, this statement and resulting decision based on 3-sentences is categorized by the Fifth Circuit as an abuse of discretion.

Nor is this Magistrate Judge Bryan’s or the court’s first offence in recent cases which have been remanded by the Circuit Court, as Anadarko and Hager both confirm.

MJCAB: (3) “Further, the Court has reviewed the proposed Supplement and determined that it raises no meritorious arguments.”

As argued here, and in the respective M&R and “Certified Questions” motion, this statement and resulting decision based on 3-sentences is categorized by the Fifth Circuit as an abuse of discretion.

Nor is this Magistrate Judge Bryan’s or the court’s first offence in recent cases which have been remanded by the Circuit Court, as Anadarko and Hager both confirm.

DECLARATION

Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna …, and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsiders MJCAB’s Orders [in tandem with the Related Memorandum and Recommendation] and grant the relief requested herein.

To the extent this court maintains the opinion it has jurisdiction in these proceedings, Order 54 should be reversed, thus accepting Plaintiff’s pleadings, and after considering the related series of pending objections, only the District Judge can decide the next steps, including any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 6th day of February, 2025.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE, AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

“A district court judge may reconsider a magistrate judge’s order on pretrial matters “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). ” – United States v. Davis, No. 23-50797, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2024)

Court Procedures and Local Rules are Cancelled

Plaintiff and nonprisoner Joanna Burke wishes to notify the District Court Judge that the court’s local rules and his own court procedures have been completely cancelled by veteran Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan (“MJCAB”).

This is clearly erroneous, contrary to the law and the court’s own rules, all to circumvent due process and Plaintiff’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal.

This is a manifest error of law, “that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law” (United States v. Newton, CRIMINAL H-19-816-01, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2024) supported by irrefutable evidence, as discussed herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, MJCAB issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].

The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].

Relevant here: Plaintiff’s Nov. 15 Motion for Leave [45, Docketed Dec. 5, 2024] and First Amended Surreply [44, Docketed Nov. 21, 2024], court Order 55 which cites to the M&R 58.

Notably, ECF’s 44 and 45 were part of one USPS Express Mailing which was signed for by the Court on Nov. 21, 2024, but the Motion to Leave was somehow separated and docketed 15 days later, on Dec. 5, 2024.

The Order recorded as ECF 55 provides a one-sentence curt response in relation to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s (“PHH”) deficient Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file the First Amended Surreply:

“Plaintiff presents no good cause for granting leave to file an amended Surreply and no arguments that could not have been raised in the Surreply.”.

The Magistrate Judge then addresses the PHH’s supersized brief, excusing them but not addressing any of Plaintiff’s arguments.

As a result, this leaves the operative pleadings which were considered in her M&R as ECF 27 [PHH Motion]; ECF 35 [Plaintiff Response]; ECF 40[PHH Reply], ECF 52-1 [Plaintiff’s (Original) Surreply]; (and resulting pleadings by both sides objecting and responding).  Notably, ECF 51[Leave to file Supplement and Supplement] as well as ECF 52 [Leave to file Surreply and Surreply] and ECF 53.

All three filings have been in this court’s possession since Nov. 15, 2024 and Nov. 21, 2024, but only docketed [backdated] on Jan. 23, 2025, the very same day as the omnibus of Orders and M&R’s were released.

The reasons are discussed in the three related Objections to the M&R’s, concerning the “lost” and “separated” USPS Express Mail which contained these pleadings.

Justice Requires Full Argument and Fairness to All

In reversing this court, Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho recently stated:

“Our adversarial system of justice requires that we give both sides full and fair opportunity to present their strongest possible arguments to the court.

It is through that clash of ideas that we ensure that justice is done pursuant to the laws that govern the dispute in question.”.

Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.).

MJCAB has rejected this notion once more by denying the Motion for Leave [45] and First Amended Surreply [44], in violation of Fifth Circuit precedent and where the opinion states unequivocally (at 774):

“The district court therefore abused its discretion by denying Anadarko leave to file a sur-reply.”

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.         Whether the Court should reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s Order 55, which materially affects the disposition of the case in MJCAB’s M&R 58.

2.         Whether the Magistrate Judge’s single sentence without properly addressing the specific arguments, and without legal authority is sufficient to deny the motion and [first] amended Surreply, considering the severity of the M&R’s final recommendation and the implications to the Plaintiff’s liberty and property rights.

4.         Whether an Order should specifically address the merits of the supplement, applying the same rationale the Fifth Circuit held when eviscerating this court in Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692, 697 (5th Cir. 2024):

“The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s M&R without assigning reasons, analysis, or any change, over Sharnez’s objection, in a three-sentence-long order.”

5.         Whether the Court should sua sponte (a) issue a stay, and/or (b) reject the M&R(s) if the court agrees that 1 constitutes an abuse of discretion by MJCAB, considering the Fifth Circuit’s precedential published opinion in Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.), reversing this court for the same issue less than 9 month ago.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Objections, Timeliness and Standard of Review

U.S. v. Rodriguez, Criminal No. G-04-01, Civil Action No. G-06-458, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2006) (“Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report within the allowed time SHALL bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”).

Reconsideration

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (2017).  A district court may reconsider an order “for any reason [a court] deems sufficient,” id., “even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,” Pfeiffer v. Ajamie PLLC, No. 4:19-cv-02760, 2020 WL 13420831, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020).  Moreover, the “[c]lassic reasons for granting reconsideration” include that the order rests upon an erroneous factual basis.  Shih v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. Inc., No. 4:21-CV-01530, 2022 WL 444476, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022) (noting that reconsideration is appropriate if “the judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law”).

Docket Filings Should Never be Backdated

Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1988) (“the judgment, signed December 24, 1987, was apparently entered on the docket sheet at the district court clerk’s office on December 29, and the defendants’ notice of appeal, filed January 27, 1988, was entered on the docket sheet on January 28… The district court’s docket sheet in this case reveals that the order appealed from was not docketed until December 29, 1987, and the filing of the notice of appeal on January 27, 1988 was, therefore, within the 30-day requirement of F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1).”).

Judicial Integrity and Impartiality

Federal judges should always seek to promote confidence that they will dispense evenhanded justice. See Canon 2(A), Code of Conduct for United States Judges (requiring judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”). At its core, this judicial impartiality is “the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,” which “assures equal application of the law.” Repub. Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (1992) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Buntion v. Quarterman , 524 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that defendants’ “right to a fair trial” is in part “fulfilled by a judicial officer who impartially presides over the trial”) (citing Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904–05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) )…the court may unintentionally convey its tacit approval of the litigant’s underlying legal position. See , e.g. , United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez , 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (observing that a trial judge “must make every effort to preserve the appearance of strict impartiality,” including by “exhibit[ing] neutrality in his language”). Even this appearance of bias, whether real or not, should be avoided. – United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2020).

ARGUMENT

As raised in the Statement of Issues above, Plaintiff provides cases where Surreplies and/or Supplements are granted, but ultimately the relief is denied.

See; “ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 31 Plaintiff Paul Casey Blank’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply to Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.”

– Blank v. Deutsch Bank National Trust Company (3:16-cv-01463) District Court, N.D. Texas (Sep 8, 2017);

Closer to home, this court decided:

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Saihat Corp., No. 21-20002, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) and on appeal the Fifth Circuit stated in their opinion affirming this court’s decision;

“Saihat was permitted a sur-reply following Deutsche Bank’s reply”

– However, this statement is not accurate.

Saihat Corp., aka Nanik Bhagia, represented by sanctioned attorney Jerry L. Schutza – who has been warned several times in this federal court for filing similarly frivolous cases and sanctioned on appeal by the Fifth Circuit – did not obtain permission to file his Surreplies (also referred to as Supplemental pleadings), according to DBNTCO and their counsel, Mackie Wolf, including the “attorney of many hats”, Mark D. Cronenwett (who was the appointed substitute trustee in Plaintiff’s underlying proceedings).

See; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Saihat Corporation (4:19-cv-00825) District Court, S.D. Texas, ECF 44 and 50 (Saihat) and DBNTCO’s ECF 51, which states at 4.

“On March 17, 2020, without seeking leave, Defendant filed its Surreply to Plaintiff’s Reply (“Surreply”). (ECF No. 44.)”;

and at 5.,

“Defendant did not continue negotiation efforts and filed a Supplemental Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2020 (“Supplemental Surreply”). (ECF No. 50.)”.

This case was processed and decided directly by Judge Eskridge.

Despite failing to seek leave of this court to file, Saihat’s Surreply and Supplemental Surreply were included in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion as being granted, but ultimately the relief requested therein denied by this court and affirmed on appeal.

However, ferreting into the Saihat pleadings in this court:

DBNTCO, ECF 51, Page 4, II. Argument and Authorities – OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S SURREPLIES AND ANY OTHER RESPONSE 1-4, DBNTCO specifically request (without a separate motion) that the court should enforce its own rules by striking ECF 44 and 50.

Similarly, the Plaintiff urged the same request of PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment [27].

It should have been stricken – and can still be stricken – sua sponte by the court, see LR11.4.

For similar deficiencies, the same fate should be afforded to PHH’s Vexatious Motion [28].

This Raises the All-Important Question

What are the court’s procedures if there’s no consistency in the application of the court’s own procedures or local rules?

In this court and specifically in these proceedings, the facts are irrefutable.

When you [Joanna Burke] follow the court procedures and rules, due process is denied, but when you play “fast and loose” [e.g. as described in ECF 60, docketed Jan. 29, 2025] with the court procedures [PHH], you’re granted all the relief requested, either by Order, and/or by failing to strike the deficient filings.

This is a manifest error of law, that is plain and indisputable, and which amounts to a complete disregard of controlling law.

PHH’s Motion Deficiencies Violate The Court’s Procedures and Local Rules

No Certificate of Word Count

Judge Eskridge’s procedures are based on word count, not pages. As filed by PHH’s veteran counsel, both their Motion for Summary Judgment [27] and Motion [28] exceed the allowed word-limit. Additionally, PHH’s deficient Motion should have a Certificate of word count, but it does not.

See: Meadows v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Civil Action 4:23-cv-01536, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2024)

(“Costco’s original motion for leave was stricken because it lacked a certificate of conference.”).

Judge Eskridge’s limit is restricted to 5,000 words per 18 c. and as stated, there is no Certificate of word count included by PHH’s motions, which is reason alone to strike PHH’s Motions.

In short, Judge Eskridge could have chosen page-limit, but he chose a word-count limit.

PHH’s Footnote Arguments and/or Evidence Should Be Disregarded

Furthermore, PHH’s motion included verbose argument in disfavored footnotes.

Judge Eskridge goes on to say at 18 d. of his court’s procedures:

“Evidence or argument raised only by footnote will be disregarded.”.

Judge Bennett’s Order Striking Oversized Motion

Now, compare MJCAB with Judge Bennett in Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (4:21-cv-02591), District Court, S.D. Texas, [OVERSIZED MOTION] STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD per Order (Doc # 40) Modified on 12/13/2021 (ledwards, 4). (Entered: 12/10/2021).

To put this in perspective, in these proceedings and specifically PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment [27], they demanded that Plaintiff detail each cause of action with specificity.

That was a struggle based on the word count allowed per Judge Eskridge’s court procedures (5,000), when answering a motion that was one and a half times that allowance.

Ultimately, this resulted in the “how” element in the fraud claim being excluded inadvertently.

Despite this, MJCAB allowed PHH’s non-compliant and supersized motion [27] by incredulously denying as moot [55] PHH’s tardy motion, filed after more than 5 months late [50] requesting leave to file excess words and ignoring the many other deficiencies and procedural violations, but then she turns around and immediately denies Plaintiff’s small amendment, and where Joanna Burke, acting pro se, did comply with all the court’s procedures.

MJCAB: “Plaintiff presents no good cause for granting leave to file an amended Surreply and no arguments that could not have been raised in the Surreply”

MJCAB claims ‘no good cause’ and ‘no arguments’ for granting leave to file the First Amended Supplement which was filed 6 days after the original.

She also states that “the Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully briefed, and the issues are ripe for determination.

See ECF 27; ECF 31; ECF 35; ECF 40; ECF 44 [sic].”

Well, that not true, as ECF 44 IS THE FIRST AMENDED SURREPLY, which is apparently denied in this Order [55].

Notably, the earlier and “ORIGINAL” SURREPLY went missing from Nov. 15, 2024 until Jan. 23, 2025, and then backdated onto the docket, but with the later ECF Number 52-1.

Additionally, PHH would submit their  “RESPONSE in Opposition to 45 MOTION for Leave to File [FIRST AMENDED] Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Hopkins, Mark) (Entered: 12/16/2024)” in mid-December, 2024, with Plaintiff’s “REPLY to Response to 45 MOTION for Leave to File [FIRST AMENDED] Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Joanna Burke. (dah4) (Entered: 12/30/2024)”.

All the while, Plaintiff was writing letters to the court about the “missing” filings, the first docketed on Dec. 6, 2024 [46] and another follow-up letter docketed on Jan 2, 2025 [49].

Compare this decision with the preceding Argument regarding DBNTCO v Saihat before this court.

While MJCAB refers to (2) and (3), there is no reasons, legal authority, nor does she even acknowledge, let alone discuss in her one sentence what the First Amended Surreply was for, which merely distinguishes Texas Civil Properties and Remedies Code § 16.036 from 16.035.

In short, her Order should be reversed.

As argued, and in the respective M&R and “Certified Questions” motion, this statement and resulting decision based on one-sentence is categorized by the Fifth Circuit as an abuse of discretion.

Nor is this Magistrate Judge Bryan’s or the court’s first offence in recent cases which have been remanded by the Circuit Court, as Anadarko and Hager both confirm.

While she does address the oversized brief, it’s another one-sided statement on behalf of PHH, recanting verbatim their argument.

At no point does MJCAB entertain Plaintiff’s objections and legal argument, including the disadvantage to Plaintiff when the court allows only one party such an enormous brief and then denies the other party for complying with the rules and procedures of this court, when considering what’s at stake.

It’s a clear example of an abuse of discretion.

DECLARATION

Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna …, and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsiders MJCAB’s Orders [in tandem with the Related Memorandum and Recommendation] and grant the relief requested herein.

To the extent this court maintains the opinion it has jurisdiction in these proceedings, Order 55 should be reversed, thus accepting Plaintiff’s pleadings, and after considering the related series of pending objections, only the District Judge can decide the next steps, including any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 6th day of February, 2025.