Texas Court Lacks Jurisdiction as Pro Se Bob Kruckemeyer Continues with Cowboy Court Tactics

“Texas Lawyer “Andy Taylor is a real clown and I will forever recuse myself from ALL cases that he files…He’s a disgrace to the entire Bar” – Judge Tami Craft

DISCLAIMER: DEFENDANT’s SOUGHT TO DISMISS THE CASE BY AGREEMENT

Ad Villarai, LLC v. Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2017)

(“we have held that an order “is void when a court has no power or jurisdiction to render it.”

Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Court, 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986).

Void orders are not waivable on direct review.

See, e.g., Easterline v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1932)

(“The decisions hold that a void judgment is one entirely null within itself, and which is not susceptible of ratification or confirmation, and its nullity cannot be waived.”).”).

Defendant’s commence this reply by documenting the fact that Mark Burke reached out to Plaintiff, Robert “Bob” Kruckemeyer to end this void and time-barred litigation by mutual consent and agreement.

Bob refused.

[EXHIBIT A].

As such, this reply is necessary to provide further analysis and arguments to enable the court to dismiss the case, with prejudice.

In support, the Defendant’s believe it is important to raise awareness with this court that Bob’s last defamation case in Harris County District Court also ended on a plea to the jurisdiction, and where his arguments failed to convince the appellate court, but only after a lengthy, and no doubt exhausting mandamus appeal.

See; In re Alief Vietnamese All. Church, 576 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Tex. App. 2019)

(“A trial court has no discretion and must dismiss the case as a ministerial act when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.”).

The litigation spanned over 2 years 8 months prior to dismissal, and only concluded after the appeal remanded the case for dismissal.

Equally so, this district court lacks [subject-matter] jurisdiction.

A trial would be a waste of time and judicial resources.

The proposed relief should be granted because there is no point in wasting scarce judicial and societal resources, including putting the defendant to great expense, inconvenience, and anxiety if the ultimate result is never in question.

RESPONDING TO PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS

Defendant’s Motion is ‘Timely’

Bob’s response challenges the timeliness of the Defendants Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (or Plea to the Jurisdiction).

Unfortunately for Bob, his one-and-only legal authority contradicts his own argument when discussing “Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” (emphasis added).

See; Carmody v. State Farm Lloyds, 184 S.W.3d 419, 421 n.1 (Tex. App. 2006)

(“We note appellants only complain of issues relating to recusal, not disqualification.

Unlike recusal, an argument that a trial judge is constitutionally disqualified cannot be waived and may be raised at any point in the proceeding.

See Bank of Tex., N.A. v. Mexia, 135 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).”).

Subject-matter jurisdiction: Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008)

(“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004).”).

Texas law is certain: “If the court has no jurisdiction, it should proceed no further with the case other than to dismiss it for want of power to hear and determine the controversy.

In such a case, any order or decree entered, other than one of dismissal is void.”

Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1046 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1931), affirmed 55 S.W.2d 797.

See; City of Hutto v. Legacy Hutto, 684 S.W.3d 810, 819 (Tex. App. 2022)

(“However, subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to entertaining the merits, and when a court finds a lack of jurisdiction, it is obligated to go no further and dismiss.”).

Accord; City of Houston v. Ledesma, No. 01-22-00377-CV, at *10 (Tex. App. Aug. 29, 2023)

(“Without jurisdiction, a court lacks authority to act at all in a case other than to determine that it lacks jurisdiction.

A court may not assume jurisdiction for purposes of deciding the merits of a case, and a judgment is void if rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot “be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of the proceeding.”).

Preeminent Martindale-Hubbell Plaintiff’s Response Lacks Credibility

Texas Attorney Bob Kruckemeyer has been practicing law for over 40 years and his response can only be described as lacking any credibility.

It is disingenuous, at best.

As a pro se lawyer in these proceedings, his whole argument and response is to rely upon one case from nearly two decades ago, and which evades the crux of Rule 18a and Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (“TRCP”) pertaining to disqualification of Harris County District Court #189’s Judge Tamika “Tami” Craft [-Demming].

The Crux: Rule 18a and 18b mandates referral to the Regional Presiding Judge for the appointment of any subsequent judge upon presentation of Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming.

Regional Presiding Judge for Harris County:

“The Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas was created by the 2017 legislature as six counties carved out of the existing Second Region. It began operation on September 1, 2017. [Regional] Presiding Judge Susan Brown was appointed by the Governor in 2018.”

(https://www.justex.net/office11, last visited Feb. 20, 2025).

See; ELEVENTH ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL REGION OF TEXAS REGIONAL RULES OF ADMINISTRATION,

and specifically;

RULE 11: RECUSAL PROCEDURES (emphasis added) as Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 3a, the Supreme Court approves the following Regional Rules of Administration for the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region.

Misc. Docket No. 18-9136. Dated: October 16, 2018.

(https://www.justex.net/dca/JustexDocuments/0/11th%20Admin/11th%20AJR%20Regional%20Rules.pdf, last visited Feb. 20, 2025).

Plaintiff’s Timeline and Argument:

Bob provides a summary timeline of events and short argument, however, in doing so he materially misinterprets and omits key sections of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a and 18b.

For example, Bob does not directly confront the fact that Defendants’ motion was to “disqualify” Judge Craft, which is constitutional, jurisdictional and TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(2) applies.

See; Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012)

(“The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested.”

Tex. Const. art. V, § 11.

A judge is “interested” in a case—and thus disqualified under Article V, Section 11—if an order or judgment in the case will directly “affect him to his personal or pecuniary loss or gain.”.

A disqualified judge has no power to act in the case.

Discretionary judicial acts by a disqualified judge are void.

Thus, the disqualification of a judge is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived.”)

(cleaned up, citations omitted).

Additionally, Bob relies upon outdated rules and legal authorities.

Mark addresses those arguments with specificity.

Three-days to Act:

First, Bob wildly argues that despite the Texas Supreme Court rules specifically including terms such as “mandatory,” “three days,” and “must,” the court should not apply their clear and unambiguous meaning.

Instead, he suggests these terms should be construed as discretionary or “not mandatory.”

This interpretation would undermine the enforcement of court-imposed deadlines.

See; In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007)

(“When a rule of procedure is clear and unambiguous, we construe the rule’s language according to its plain or literal meaning.”);

Energy Service Co. v. Superior Snubbing, 236 S.W.3d 190, 198 (Tex. 2007)

(“Every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose.”).

Judge Craft had three days to act, not 44 days.

It was not discretionary.

She failed to act within the mandated time.

Her subsequent “order” stating she is “ORDERED to recuse myself”, and which was docketed 44 days later is void, including the obvious fact that this order still refused to address the Defendant’s motion.

Regional Presiding Judge versus Local Administrative Judge:

Second, Bob would have the court substitute the Regional Presiding Judge with the “Administrative Judge of the Civil Division”, effectively rewriting the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (“TRCP”) pertaining to disqualification and recusal of judges.

That argument is absurd.

This case falls under the Eleventh Administrative District, and there is no Local Rule which deviates from Rule 18(a) or (b)’s mandatory referral to the Regional Presiding Judge.

See; ELEVENTH ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL REGION OF TEXAS REGIONAL RULES OF ADMINISTRATION,

and specifically;

RULE 11: RECUSAL PROCEDURES.

In the alternative, and as discussed further in this reply, Bob’s reliance on the majority’s opinions in Carmody and In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P., is outdated and obsolete.

Indeed, reading 18a (e) Duty of the Clerk (1) and (2), the rule allows for notice to the Regional Presiding Judge.

In short, nowhere is the “Administrative Judge of the Civil Division” mentioned and hence nobody, including Bob, can or should misconstrue the “language” of the Rules to include wording or job titles that do not exist in the promulgated Texas Supreme Court Rules.

Day 44;

The Joint Recusal and Transfer Order:

Third, whilst ambiguous, it appears Bob is suggesting the Order which was signed on day 44 is a voluntary recusal by Judge Craft.

“January 23, 2024: Judge Craft entered an Order Recusing Herself. Judge Craft took no further actions in the case.”.

Bob continues:

“Although Rule 18a includes language regarding the time limit in which a judge must act on a motion to disqualify, such timeline is not mandatory.”.

Bob contends the wording of the joint order can be textually interpreted as Judge Craft “recusing herself”.

Mark disagrees.

The wording on the order advises “I am ORDERED to recuse…”.

ORDERED is not a word synonymous with ‘voluntary’:

*ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER: “I am ORDERED to recuse myself and refer this case to the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division for Transfer to another court.

– Signed on January 23, 2024.

Mark’s argument is supported by the Order signed by Judge Reeder in Mark Burke’s HCA case (202268307 – BURKE, MARK vs. KPH-CONSOLIDATION INC (DBA HCA HOUSTON HEALTHCARE (Court 234)), and where the templated Order’s wording provides two options.

The first option is relevant here:

“I have read the Motion to Recuse filed in the above numbered cause of action and recuse myself voluntarily.”.

(emphasis added), Image # 107147127, 3/20/2023

(three days after Mark’s [verified] motion [to disqualify Judge Reeder] filed on 3/17/2023).

[EXHIBIT B].

Legal Authority:

Bob’s sole legal authority which he hangs his 10-gallon cowboy hat on is Carmody, a nearly twenty-year-old case from Collin County, and which he claims provides credible legal support for his incredulous argument.

It lacks credibility on several grounds.

Interpreting Bob’s position in conjunction with the sole case and decision in Carmody allows for violation of the Rules by;

(i)              Skipping the mandatory 3-day requirement to act on the disqualification motion;

(ii)            Skipping referral to the Regional Presiding Judge;

(iii)          Converts a tardy and void joint recusal and transfer order to a “voluntary recusal” by Judge Craft;

(iv)           Which, in turn, condones and authorizes Judge Palmer, as “Administrative Judge of the Civil Division” to transfer the case to Judge Reeder (234) in the same order;

(v)             Rinses and repeats the void procedural steps in the purported “voluntary recusal” by Judge Reeder;

(vi)           Which, in turn, condones and authorizes Judge Palmer, as “Administrative Judge of the Civil Division” to transfer the case to Judge Schaffer (152), and, finally;

(vii)         Allows Judge Schaffter to continue with the case over the formal objections of Defendants.

Alas, for Bob, Carmody’s lawlessness (which discusses Dunn for ‘good cause’, and not relevant here), as well as In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P.,

and where there was a dissenting opinion by former Chief Justice Nathan Hecht  In re Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 8 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Tex. 1999)

(“These petitions should be granted because the Hidalgo County local district court rules cannot be applied to conflict with statutes and state rules of procedure and administration that prescribe the procedure for involuntary recusal of a judge and the authority generally of regional presiding judges to assign judges. ”)

– these legal authorities can be discounted.

In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P., is inapposite, as the local rules in Hidalgo were not adopted by Harris County.

Furthermore, Rule 11(d) ‘Assignment of a Judge to a Referring Court’ states, in relevant part

‘After assignment of a new judge [by the Regional Presiding Judge], the case may be transferred in accordance with the Local Rules.

As the record clearly shows, there was never an assignment of a [District] Judge by Regional Presiding Judge Brown in this case.

Terminally, both cases are now superseded by TEX. GOV’T CODE § 24.002, as detailed in the 2017 opinion and analysis in Ex parte Thuesen, which is far more recent and accurate.

For the purposes of illustration, Mark considers (but ultimately disavows) Bob’s assertion that Judge Craft’s order – which is joined by Judge Palmer to then transfer the case – is to be interpreted as Judge Craft recusing herself voluntarily.

See; Ex parte Thuesen, 546 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

(“Further, twenty years after the Dallas court decided Dunn, the Texas Legislature passed Section 24.002 of the Texas Government Code providing the procedure that must be followed when a district judge voluntarily recuses himself…).

The opinion then provides the mandatory procedures, all requiring referral to the Regional Presiding Judge for judicial selection.

Additionally at 145;

“Judge Bryan gave no reason for the recusal in his order. But,”in accordance with Rule [of Civil Procedure] 18a,” he requested that the Presiding Judge of the Second Administrative Judicial Region, the Honorable Olen Underwood, appoint another judge to preside over applicant’s case.”,

and at 153 the opinion reinforces TEX. GOV’T CODE § 24.002;

“In the instant case, Judge Bryan initially complied with the dictates of Section 24.002.”.

(Again, Judge Craft did not comply at all).

It is prudent to recite Ex parte Thuesen, pertaining to these mandatory procedural steps;

“TEX. GOV’T CODE § 24.002.

Thus, if a district judge decides sua sponte that he “should” recuse himself for some reason, the judge “shall” take the following steps:

(1) enter a recusal order;

(2) request that the presiding judge appoint another judge to sit in the case at issue;

and

(3) take no further action and make no further orders in the case unless the “the order in which the action is taken” contains a statement of “good cause.”.

Further, Rule 18a additionally provides that, when a recusal is granted, the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region “must transfer the case to another court or assign another judge to the case.”

Rule 18a(g)(7).”.

In summary, even assuming Judge Craft voluntarily recused, the order fails to overcome the immediate transfer of the case by Judge Elaine Palmer to Judge Lauren Reeder (234), when referral to Regional Presiding Judge Susan Brown is mandatory.

Defendant’s Clarify the Critical Timeline of Events Which Destroyed Jurisdiction

In relation to the underlying proceedings, the critical points to be highlighted include the distinction between judicial disqualification versus recusal, and Elaine Palmer as Civil Administrative District Judge versus Susan Brown as Regional Presiding Judge:

(i)              The Defendants’ Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Craft was on the basis she was constitutionally disqualified.

See; Davis v. West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Tex. App. 2014)

(“judicial disqualification is a jurisdictional issue, and any judgment rendered by a constitutionally disqualified judge is void.”).

(ii)            Judge Craft’s “recusal”, filed 44 days later was void upon her signature, and unauthorized transfer to Judge Lauren Reeder (234) by Judge Palmer.

(iii)          The correct “procedure” would have been to act, by signing her order within the 3-day timeframe and, importantly, this would result in her order being referred to Judge Susan Brown as the Regional Presiding Judge – which never happened.

(iv)           Compounding the error, her extremely tardy “recusal” [which Bob erroneously contends should be interpreted as a “voluntary recusal”] would be reassigned by the Civil District Administrative Judge [Palmer]

who appointed Judge Lauren Reeder,

who in turn entered an Order of recusal;

and then Civil District Administrative Judge [Palmer] reassigned it once more,

to this court and before former Judge Robert Schaffer.

But, even considering Judge Reeder’s appointment had gone through the correct court procedures, she had no authority to recuse either.

As a result, even if one were to argue that (i) Judge Craft was not ‘constitutionally’ disqualified (but for “Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” which maintains she is constitutionally disqualified), what happened thereafter, as described in (ii)-(iv) completely extinguished this court’s jurisdiction and any authority to act over the proceedings.

This Court Must Dismiss the Case

The Defendants Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction should be GRANTED and this case dismissed with prejudice.

VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]

In closing, I, Mark Stephen Burke, as Defendant with due authority and competency, ….

CONCLUSION

The Defendant has provided full reasoning in this reply with relevant authority provided.

The Defendant prays the Court, which has plenary power, GRANTS the Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and for such other and further relief at law or in equity to which Defendant’s may be justly entitled.

A proposed order was previously provided.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th day of February, 2025.

A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a plea to the jurisdiction.”

See Wheeler v. Law Office of Frank Powell, No. 01-22-00479-CV, 2023 WL 5535670, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Texas Lawyer “Andy Taylor is a real clown and I will forever recuse myself from ALL cases that he files…He’s a disgrace to the entire Bar”

– Judge Tami Craft

When a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge, the responding judge, regardless of whether the motion complies with the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, must, within three business days after the motion is filed

(1) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal

or

(2) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1).

Failure to comply with the rule renders void any actions taken subsequent to the violation.

In re A.R., 236 S.W.3d 460, 477 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). Barnhill v. Agnew, No. 12-12-00080-CV, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 16, 2013).

            PREAMBLE

Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion

Congratulations Judge Francis on your appointment from Harris County DON to the bench after a controversial and contested election by long-time incumbent and now former Judge Robert Schaffer.

This purported defamation case mirrors those controversies.

Judicial Transfer Orders: In particular, the ultimate transfer of these proceedings to this court (152) after Judge Craft of the original district court (189) recused.

It would initially be transferred to Judge Reeder’s court (234) before transferring to this court (152).

However, these purported transfers were without proper judicial authority, without substantive, procedural and constitutionally mandated due process, and as such this case lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to continue to trial for the reasons explained herein and confirmed by legal authorities.

Legal Authority: A trial court abuses its discretion when it errs in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts.

In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1998).

It is mandatory that this case be dismissed when a judge acts outside of his or her court’s jurisdiction, i.e., when the judicial act is void.

In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 nn. 1, 2 (Tex. 1998);

In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).

The case mandates dismissal with prejudice as the allegations of defamation in the complaint are time-barred.

The court lost jurisdiction on entry of the first void judgment on Jan 23, 2024 and more than a year has passed since that time.

See; Hernandez v. Axtell, No. 13-23-00225-CV, at *8-9 (Tex. App. May 2, 2024).

The Supreme Court has made clear that a challenge to the jurisdiction can be raised by several procedural vehicles, including a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment.

See Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

While Section 51.014(a)(8) and (c) utilize the phrase “plea to the jurisdiction,” it is well established that the statute is not restricted to rulings on a pleading titled “plea to the jurisdiction.”

The proper focus is on the substance of the pleading, not its title.”

Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006).

FACTS

Timeline of Events and Facts after Disqualification Motion

The timeline of events and facts after the Defendants Motion to Disqualify are critical to the mandatory disposition of this case.

“Defendant’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Tami Craft AKA Tamika Craft-Demming” [Judge Craft] was docketed on Monday, Dec. 11, 2023.

Within three days, Judge Craft had to act on the Defendant’s motion, with two options available.

Judge Craft failed to act timely upon either Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (f)(1) or (2) as detailed in the opening citation above.

When Judge Craft finally responded, she did so some 44 days after the motion was filed or 41 days after the three business days expired.

This establishes her subsequent order is void.

Additionally, the wording of her order fails to meet the required statutory language associated with (A) and (B) above, where she writes in a two-part order:-

*ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER: “I am ORDERED to recuse myself and refer this case to the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division for Transfer to another court. – Signed on January 23, 2024.

*This is a court template, usually signed when a new case is generally transferred, for example, upon litigants returning with a case which was previously decided by a specific district court.

The Joint Transfer Order’s Critical Error

The very same Order is also signed by the Administrative [District] Judge, transferring the case to another District Court, namely Judge Lauren Reeder’s (234).

However, the wording of Rule 18 is clear; “…referring the motion to the regional presiding judge”, e.g. Susan Brown – not the Administrative (Civil District) Judge, namely Elaine Palmer.

The KPH Case Study (Judge Reeder)

Defendant Mark Burke became very familiar with this administrative judicial process in Judge Reeder’s court – Burke v. KPH-Consolidation Inc., No. 202268307.

See Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration on March 17, 2023, and where Judge Reeder duly complied with the 3-day timeline by ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on March 20, 2023.

What transpired thereafter was alarming, including Judge Susan Brown hand-selecting the judge in a severed case – a proceeding where Judge Brown and Judge Reeder were the only named defendants.

See; 202268307A – BURKE, MARK vs. REEDER, LAUREN HONORABLE (234).

The Choudri Case Study (Judge Craft)

Compare Defendants cases with Ali Choudri’s case before Judge Craft – 202310986 – ABDULLATIF, OSAMA vs. CHOUDHRI, ALI (133) – and before transfer, due to her ethical and constitutional violations:

Defendant Ali Choudhri’s Motion for Recusal on Wednesday, Aug. 23, 2023, wherein there’s an ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE on Monday, Aug. 28, 2028, complying with the 3-day mandatory timeline.

This court is prevented from taking judicial notice of the well-documented and shocking acts by Judge Craft which made local news headlines along with her unethical behavior in the Choudri case.

See, Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

(“However, one trial court generally lacks the power to take judicial notice of the records or documents that might be on file in another trial court.”)

That stated, these facts were detailed in Defendants pleadings in this case which the court can take notice of, including the verified motion to disqualify Judge Craft, arguing she was constitutionally disqualified by her outrageous behavior, including unassailable written statements of fact.

Lack of Jurisdiction Equals Void (a Nullity in Law)

A court cannot act if it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, and if it does, any action taken is void.

H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 124 (citing Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)).

When the joint order was signed by Judge Craft, the order was void because it did not follow the implemented rules and denied substantive due process to Defendants, who were not afforded the opportunity for a hearing before the sua sponte recusal and transfer of the case per Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (6)(A-C).

Additionally, the fact Judge Palmer signed the order on the same day transferring the case to another district court was procedurally improper as the Regional Presiding Judge is Susan Brown.

Email Communications

When Plaintiff (Bob) notified Defendant (Mark) that he was proceeding with discovery requests and hearings, Mark objected.

The first email, on February 5, 2024, at 10.16 am stated:

Mr. Burke, Attached is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests. For the purposes of satisfying the requirement for a certificate of conference, please advise me by 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 7, 2024, whether Blogger is opposed to the Motion. If I don’t receive a response by that date and time I will advise the court that you are opposed to the Motion.

The second email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.14 pm stated:

Mr. Burke, As you know, the above-referenced case has been transferred to the 234th Judicial District Court. Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures require litigants to have person-to-person communication regarding discovery motions to compel. I called you moments ago and left you a voice mail requesting that you return my call at 713-600-3473 so that we could discuss the Motion to Compel that I sent to you via email on Monday, February 5, 2024, and to satisfy Judge Reeder’s Court Procedures regarding certificates of conference. Please return my call as soon as possible.

Mark responded to Bob’s email, on February 7, 2024, at 3.55 pm:

There’s nothing to compel or discuss Bob.  See; O’Connor v. Trish Ho, No. 07-23-00172-CV, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 25, 2023) (“”[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). An order entered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). ”).

Three minutes later, at 3.58 pm, Bob writes;

We will let the Court decide whether there is anything to compel or discuss. Please respond whether you are opposed or unopposed to the Motion to Compel that I sent you on Monday, February 5, 2024.

The final response was sent a 4.03 pm on February 7, 2024:

Court 189’s Judge, Tami Craft, had 3 days to enter an order regarding my motion to disqualify. She failed to do so. Anything after that time is void and the orders of recusal/transfer are void.

The Timeline and Key Events in Courts 234 and 152

Returning to the timeline of events in these proceedings, it appears the email thread with Bob garnered an immediate reaction by the court, with an impromptu joint ORDER OF RECUSAL AND TRANSFER signed Feb. 8 by Judge Reeder and on Feb. 9, 2024 by Judge Palmer, transferring the case to this court (152), which is discussed in more detail further into this motion.

Thereafter, key events and dates include ORDER SIGNED [by Judge Schaffer] COMPELLING ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES on Mar. 8, 2024;

ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED by Judge Schaffer on Aug. 6, 2024;

A revised and erroneous DOCKET CONTROL ORDER on Aug. 14, 2024;

and finally,

Bob sent Mark a Notice of Service on Dec. 16, 2024, which comprises of an untimely Expert Report of Richard A. Jones, CPA which is automatically excluded per 193.6.

See: Rule 193.6(a) exclusion applies when a party “fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response, including a required disclosure, in a timely manner . . . .” Id.

Rule 195.5(4)(A), in turn, mandates that an expert designation include the production of a report.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 195.5(a)(4)(A)

(“[A] party must provide . . . all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations . . . prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony”).

Accordingly, Bob’s failure to timely produce the Report triggers the application of Rule 193.6(a), (b).

See Int. of A. N.C. , No. 04-23-00497-CV, 2023 WL 7134865, at *4 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.)

(holding that a failure to timely disclose information required by Rule 195.5 triggers the exclusion under Rule 193.6(a)).

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

“No [wo]man is allowed to be a judge in [her] own cause, because [her] interest would certainly bias [her] judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt [her] integrity.”

The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison), cited by then Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, in Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015),

currently a sitting 5th Circuit Judge.

Above is the opening of DEFENDANT’s VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE TAMI CRAFT AKA TAMIKA CRAFT-DEMMING, docketed on Dec. 11, 2023 along with supporting exhibits.

Defendants respectfully request the court take judicial notice of the docket and these pleading(s), e.g. the entire docket for these proceedings.

See; Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

(“a trial court may take judicial notice of its own orders, records, and judgments rendered in cases involving the same subject matter and between practically the same parties.”).

All Docket Entries After Dec. 11, 2023 are Without Authority

This Verified Motion to Dismiss is premised on the application of Texas laws and’ Rules, including the plain reading of the same.

The court’s docket entry system was recently discussed in Vetri Ventures, LLC v. Westridge Eagles Nest Owners Ass’n, No. 05-21-01172-CV at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2024)

(“When a judge has no authority to render an order or judgment, that order or judgment is void.”).

Generally, a void order does not end a case.

However, applying Texas law requires mandatory dismissal of this case.

See; Mapco Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)

(A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.

Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 362 (Tex. 1985)).

As discussed in more detail below, only the regional presiding judge had authority to address the disqualification motion.

Regional presiding judge Susan Brown was never included in the subsequent order transferring the case to Judge Reeder in Court 234.

Then, defying Rule 18 once more, Judge Reeder immediately recused, and once more without involvement of the regional presiding judge, the case was transferred to former Judge Schaffer in Court 152 again by the civil division administrative judge Elaine Palmer.

All the checkboxes from Mapco are ticked in these proceedings, as the transfer orders by Judge Palmer effectively dissolved the judicial capacity to act as a court, and for every act thereafter “it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had

(i) no jurisdiction of the parties,

(ii) no jurisdiction of the subject matter,

(iii) no jurisdiction to enter the judgment,

[and]/or (iv) no capacity to act as a court”.

Only the Regional Presiding Judge Had Authority

The referral for the Verified Motion to Disqualify any judge should be directed to the “Regional Presiding” judge, rather than the Administrative judge for the civil division.

This situation is similar to when Defendants attempted to substitute Attorney General Ken Paxton in order to effect process of service, but the request was denied by the court.

The denial was based on the fact that the complaint correctly listed the Acting Attorney General, who was in place during Paxton’s impeachment proceedings when the lawsuit was filed.

The court refused to issue the citation in an email from Monica Jackson (DCO), on Nov. 27, 2023 at 11.08 am, stating:

“The service request for Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr cannot be processed because they are not a party to the case.”.

Essentially, Texas laws and rules apply equally in both directions.

Judge Elaine Palmer is not Judge Susan Brown.

The Texas Government Code provides that a District Court Judge [Craft] shall request the Regional Presiding Judge to assign another judge to hear a motion relating to the recusal of the judge of the case pending in his court.

TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.059.

The duty to make the request of the Regional Presiding Judge is a mandatory duty.

Any order, other than an order of recusal or referral, entered by a court after a proper motion to recuse is entered is void.

See, In re PG & E Reata Energy, L.P., 4 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Tex. App. 1999)

(“The mandatory provisions of rule 18a are rendered meaningless if, following recusal and assignment by the regional presiding judge, a local administrative judge may simply override the presiding judge’s orders by transferring the case to a court (and judge) of his own choosing. Under such circumstances, transfer effectively nullifies the mandatory recusal procedures in rule 18a”).

Procedural and substantive due process has been denied to Defendants in these civil proceedings, with particular focus on the events after the Defendants Verified Motion to Disqualify Judge Craft was docketed.

See, e.g., Mabee v. McDonald, 107 Tex. 139, 175 S.W. 676, 680 (1915)

(“‘Due process of law,’ as used in the fourteenth amendment, and ‘due course of the law of the land,’ as used in Article I, § 19, of the Constitution of Texas, … according to the great weight of authority, are, in nearly if not all respects, practically synonymous.”).

The judge(s) and court actions cannot overcome the appearance of impropriety.

See, e.g. Ex parte Sanchez, WR-84,588-03, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2024)

(“The Court received this writ application on October 3, 2023. Applicant alleges that prosecutor Ralph Petty was working both as a prosecutor on his case and as a judicial legal clerk at the time of his trial and habeas application. On December 6, 2023, this Court denied the application without a written order. However, the Court has since decided that the appearance of impropriety entitled applicants in this situation to relief. Ex parte Lewis, 688 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).”).

This Court Must Dismiss the Case

Texas law is certain:

“If the court has no jurisdiction, it should proceed no further with the case other than to dismiss it for want of power to hear and determine the controversy. In such a case, any order or decree entered, other than one of dismissal is void.”

Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1046 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1931), affirmed 55 S.W.2d 797.

Void and Time-Barred: Interlocutory Order re Three Article on LIT

When Bob approached Defendants, he did so by leaving a comment on the only article he objected to on LIT.

The original petition filed by Bob as docketed on Feb. 21, 2023 was based upon the same article on LIT.

Bob’s complaint in these proceedings has now expanded, seeking new relief regarding 3 articles, and Judge Schaffer’s Order grants this sweeping request.

However, setting aside the improvident grant of this relief, the fact remains uncontestable, namely

(a) the court acted in all absence of jurisdiction and thus the order void,

and;

(b) over a year has passed since the Jan. 23, 2024 void order of transfer was signed by Judge Palmer, and as such more than a year has passed.

In short, any dispute over LIT’s articles is now time-barred.

VERIFIED DECLARATION [OATH]

In closing, I, Mark Stephen Burke, …, do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct. This verified declaration includes and applies to the named exhibits, and is made under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which holds significant weight in legal precedent, as evident in ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020), McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, at *15-17 (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021), and In re Whitfield, No. 03-21-00170-CR, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2021).

CONCLUSION

The Defendant has provided full reasoning in this verified motion with relevant authority provided. The Defendant prays the Court, which has plenary power, GRANTS the Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and for such other and further relief at law or in equity to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of January, 2025.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

A Dallas judge found earlier this week that a plaintiff who tried to silence a blogger through a temporary injunction in a defamation suit did not meet the burden for the injunction.

Judge Mark Greenberg of Dallas County Court at Law #5 denied on Wednesday the request of Fernando Rosales, who filed a defamation suit against Avi Adelman and his blog BarkingDogs.org in December. Rosales, the owner of a Dallas bar called Lost Society, filed a request in March for a temporary injunction against the website asking that the judge shut down the blog and prevent Adelman from printing anything about Rosales in future posts.

It also called for Adelman to remove content discussing the restaurant or Rosales, who alleges that Adelman made false statements about the bar on the blog and claimed that the statements have resulted in “damages and loss of business dealings.”

In the plaintiff’s brief in support of the application for injunction, Rosales’ attorney notes: “Movant requests a[n] evidentiary hearing to allow the court to determine whether these statements oublished [sic] y Defendant are defamatory and whethere [sic] to issue a limited temporay [sic] injunction, that includes a time. place and manner, ordering only defendants not to repeat these defamatory statements.”

In a brief opposing the plaintiff’s order, the defense said granting the request “would constitute a prior restraint on speech, which is unconstitutional under the Texas and United States Constitutions.”

In Wednesday’s ruling, the judge noted in his decision that “[a]fter considering the parties’ briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of establishing entitlement to a temporary injunction.” He did not elaborate.

The decision marked Rosales’ second failed attempt to have the posts removed. In December, his attorney filed a request for a temporary restraining order on the blog. That request said: “The Court should order that the Defendants, Avia Aderman [sic] and Barkingdog.org [sic] be restrained from publishing defamatory statements concerning plaintiffs, Fernado [sic] Rosales, Lost Society and Initiatve [sic] Partners, LLC.”

Adelman noted that Rosales is simply trying to shut down the website before going to trial.

“This was the second attempt by the plaintiff Fernando Rosales to close down my website, remove previously published content, and place a prior restraint on future posts he believes are defamatory,” Adelman said in an email message.

“If they think they have such a solid case, let them bring it to the court and go to a trial now, instead of trying to short circuit the process by shutting the website down first then holding a trial at their convenience only.”

Adelman added that this second failed attempt by the plaintiff should make Rosales reconsider his efforts: “And instead of taking me to court, he should change the business practices at the so-called neighborhood bar he owns in order to stop drawing the attention of the local authorities, neighborhood residents and my blog.”