Judge James Browning Denies Former Sheriff Tommy Rodella Early Release

Originally Published: Jan. 31, 2020  Republished by LIT: Nov. 28, 2020

Former Rio Arriba sheriff Tommy Rodella will serve the remaining five years of his sentence for violating a motorist’s civil rights, after a federal judge rejected his argument that a 2019 U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidated a portion of his sentence.

Through attorney Susan Clouthier, Rodella argued late last year that a June 2019 ruling in United States v. Davis that a portion of federal law offering a supplementary definition of a “crime of violence” was “unconstitutionally vague.”

In March 2014, Rodella and his son, Thomas Rodella Jr., chased down a motorist in a personal vehicle in a road rage incident before the then-sheriff—in plainclothes—pulled out the driver while brandishing a gun and slammed his badge into the man’s face. Deputies arrested the man.

Rodella’s use of a firearm during a crime of violence tacked on an additional mandatory seven years to his three year sentence for violating the man’s constitutional rights.

Judge James Browning agreed with U.S. prosecutors that the portion of federal law applied in Rodella’s case was the primary definition of “crime of violence” and not the supplementary definition found to be unconstitutional. Browning issued an order Jan. 23 dismissing Rodella’s motion to vacate his sentence, but acknowledging that the ruling could be applied retroactively.

Rodella unsuccessfully appealed his case in 2015. In early 2019, prior to the United States v Davis ruling, he attempted to vacate his sentence based on claims his trial attorney was ineffective and that the prosecution failed to disclose a 911 call beneficial to his defense.

Prosecutors stated that his attorney received and signed for the 911 call transcript, and that the trial attorney’s decision against using it as evidence was beneficial to Rodella’s defense.

Contrary to the U.S. Attorney’s Office argument that Rodella was too late to present the amended motion to vacate, Browning did rule that the new Supreme Court decision justified the filing.

The court held a final hearing on the motion to vacate Jan. 24, though the order to dismiss the proceedings was completed the day before. Rodella, who is married to former state representative Debbie Rodella, is currently incarcerated in a federal prison in Texas.

U.S. Supreme Court

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)

No. 79-1186

Argued October 8, 1980

Decided November 17, 1980

449 U.S. 24

Syllabus

After a Texas state court’s injunction against respondents’ production of minerals from certain oil leases was dissolved by an appellate court as having been illegally issued, respondents filed suit in Federal District Court alleging a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the judge who issued the injunction, the corporation that had obtained the injunction, its owner, and the sureties on the injunction bond (one of whom is the petitioner).

Respondents claimed that the injunction had been corruptly issued as the result of a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants, thus causing a deprivation of property without due process of law.

The District Court dismissed the action, holding that the judge was immune from liability in a § 1983 suit because the injunction was a judicial act within the jurisdiction of the state court, and that, with the dismissal of the judge, the remaining defendants could not be said to have conspired “under color” of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

The Court of Appeals agreed that the judge was immune from suit, but ultimately reversed as to the dismissal of the claims against the other defendants.

Held: The action against the private parties accused of conspiring with the judge is not subject to dismissal.

Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.

And the judge’s immunity from damages liability for an official act that was allegedly the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge does not change the character of his action or that of his coconspirators.

Historically at common law, judicial immunity does not insulate from damages liability those private persons who corruptly conspire with a judge.

Nor has the doctrine of judicial immunity been considered historically as excusing a judge from responding as a witness when his coconspirators are sued, even though a charge of conspiracy and judicial corruption will be aired and decided. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, distinguished.

The potential harm to the public from denying immunity to coconspirators if the factfinder mistakenly upholds a charge of a corrupt conspiracy is outweighed by the benefits of providing a remedy

Page 449 U. S. 25

against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and, in so doing, inflict injury on other persons. Pp. 449 U. S. 27-32.

604 F.2d 976, affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)

U.S. Supreme Court
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)
West v. Atkins

No. 87-5096

Argued March 28, 1988

Decided June 20, 1988

487 U.S. 42

Syllabus

Respondent, a private physician under contract with North Carolina to provide orthopedic services at a state prison hospital on a part-time basis, treated petitioner for a leg injury sustained while petitioner was incarcerated in state prison.

Petitioner was barred by state law from employing or electing to see a physician of his own choosing.

Alleging that he was given inadequate medical treatment, petitioner sued respondent in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, relying on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97.

The court entered summary judgment for respondent, holding that, as a “contract physician,” respondent was not acting “under color of state law,” a jurisdictional prerequisite for a § 1983 action. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed.

Held: A physician who is under contract with the State to provide medical services to inmates at a state prison hospital on a part-time basis acts “under color of state law,” within the meaning of § 1983, when he treats an inmate. Pp. 487 U. S. 48-57.

(a) If a defendant’s alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights satisfies the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendant’s conduct also constitutes action “under color of state law” for § 1983’s purposes, since it is “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 457 U. S. 935, 457 U. S. 937.

Thus, a state employee generally acts under color of state law when, while performing in his official capacity or exercising his official responsibilities, he abuses the position given to him by the State. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, distinguished. Pp. 487 U. S. 49-50.

(b) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that defendants are removed from § 1983’s purview if they are professionals acting in accordance with professional discretion and judgment, and that professionals may be liable under § 1983 only if exercising custodial or supervisory authority.

The court’s analogy between respondent and the public defender in Polk County, supra, is unpersuasive. Pp. 487 U. S. 50-54.

(c) Respondent’s conduct in treating petitioner is fairly attributable to the State. The State has an obligation, under the Eighth Amendment

Page 487 U. S. 43

and state law, to provide adequate medical care to those whom it has incarcerated. Estelle, supra, at 429 U. S. 104; Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293.

The State has delegated that function to physicians such as respondent, and defers to their professional judgment.

This analysis is not altered by the fact that respondent was paid by contract, and was not on the state payroll, nor by the fact that respondent was not required to work exclusively for the prison.

It is the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that is determinative.

Pp. 487 U. S. 54-57.

815 F.2d 993, reversed and remanded.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, O’CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 487 U. S. 58.

LIT Note;

A criminal lawyer’s professional and ethical obligations require him to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the State. Id., at 318-319, 320. The Court accordingly concluded that when representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding, the public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 because he “is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State’s adversary.” –West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988)

Baxter v. Bracey, No. 18-1287 (June 15, 2020)

No. 18-1287.

06-15-2020

ALEXANDER L. BAXTER v. BRAD BRACEY, ET AL.

THOMAS, J., dissenting ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

Petitioner Alexander Baxter was caught in the act of burgling a house. It is undisputed that police officers released a dog to apprehend him and that the dog bit him. Petitioner alleged that he had already surrendered when the dog was released. He sought damages from two officers under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Applying our qualified immunity precedents, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the officers’ conduct violated the Constitution, they were not liable because their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. Petitioner asked this Court to reconsider the precedents that the Sixth Circuit applied.

I have previously expressed my doubts about our qualified immunity jurisprudence. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___, ___-___ (2017) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2-6). Because our §1983 qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray from the statutory text, I would grant this petition.

I
A

In the wake of the Civil War, Republicans set out to secure certain individual rights against abuse by the States. Between 1865 and 1870, Congress proposed, and the States ratified, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These Amendments protect certain rights and gave Congress the power to enforce those rights against the States.

Armed with its new enforcement powers, Congress sought to respond to “the reign of terror imposed by the Klan upon black citizens and their white sympathizers in the Southern States.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 337 (1983). Congress passed a statute variously known as the Ku Klux Act of 1871, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the Enforcement Act of 1871. Section 1, now codified, as amended, at 42 U. S. C. §1983, provided that

“any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall . . . be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” Act of Apr. 20, 1871, §1, 17 Stat. 13.
Put in simpler terms, §1 gave individuals a right to sue state officers for damages to remedy certain violations of their constitutional rights.

B

The text of §1983 “ma[kes] no mention of defenses or immunities.” Ziglar, supra, at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2). Instead, it applies categorically to the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

For the first century of the law’s existence, the Court did not recognize an immunity under §1983 for good-faith official conduct. Although the Court did not squarely deny the availability of a good-faith defense, it did reject an argument that plaintiffs must prove malice to recover. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 378-379 (1915) (imposing liability); id., at 371 (argument by counsel that malice was an essential element). No other case appears to have established a good-faith immunity.

In the 1950s, this Court began to “as[k] whether the common law in 1871 would have accorded immunity to an officer for a tort analogous to the plaintiff’s claim under §1983.” Ziglar, supra, at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4). The Court, for example, recognized absolute immunity for legislators because it concluded Congress had not “impinge[d] on a tradition [of legislative immunity] so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language” of §1983. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951). The Court also extended a qualified defense of good faith and probable cause to police officers sued for unconstitutional arrest and detention. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 557 (1967).

The Court derived this defense from “the background of tort liabilit[y] in the case of police officers making an arrest.” Id., at 556-557. These decisions were confined to certain circumstances based on specific analogies to the common law.

Almost immediately, the Court abandoned this approach. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), without considering the common law, the Court remanded for the application of qualified immunity doctrine to state executive officials, National Guard members, and a university president, id., at 234-235.

It based the availability of immunity on practical considerations about “the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based,” id., at 247, rather than the liability of officers for analogous common-law torts in 1871.

The Court soon dispensed entirely with context-specific analysis, extending qualified immunity to a hospital superintendent sued for deprivation of the right to liberty. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 577 (1975); see also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison officials and officers).

Then, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), the Court eliminated from the qualified immunity inquiry any subjective analysis of good faith to facilitate summary judgment and avoid the “substantial costs [that] attend the litigation of” subjective intent, id., at 816.

Although Harlow involved an implied constitutional cause of action against federal officials, not a §1983 action, the Court extended its holding to §1983 without pausing to consider the statute’s text because “it would be ‘untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law.'” Id., at 818, n. 30 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 504 (1978)).

The Court has subsequently applied this objective test in §1983 cases. See, e.g., Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 28).

I express no opinion on qualified immunity in the context of implied constitutional causes of action against federal officials. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).

II

In several different respects, it appears that “our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act.” Id., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 5).

There likely is no basis for the objective inquiry into clearly established law that our modern cases prescribe. Leading treatises from the second half of the 19th century and case law until the 1980s contain no support for this “clearly established law” test.

Indeed, the Court adopted the test not because of “‘general principles of tort immunities and defenses,'” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 339 (1986), but because of a “balancing of competing values” about litigation costs and efficiency, Harlow, supra, at 816.

There also may be no justification for a one-size-fits-all, subjective immunity based on good faith.

Nineteenth-century officials sometimes avoided liability because they exercised their discretion in good faith.

See, e.g., Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89, 130-131 (1849); see also Nielson & Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1853, 1864-1868 (2018); Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev. 45, 57 (2018); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 48-55 (1972). But officials were not always immune from liability for their good-faith conduct. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 (1804) (Marshall, C. J.); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 548, 26 N. E. 100, 103 (1891) (Holmes, J.); see also Baude, supra, at 55-58; Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 414-422 (1986); Engdahl, supra, at 14-21.

Although I express no definitive view on this question, the defense for good-faith official conduct appears to have been limited to authorized actions within the officer’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wilkes, supra, at 130; T. Cooley, Law of Torts 688-689 (1880); J. Bishop, Commentaries on Non-Contract Law §773, p. 360 (1889).

An officer who acts unconstitutionally might therefore fall within the exception to a common-law good-faith defense.

Regardless of what the outcome would be, we at least ought to return to the approach of asking whether immunity “was ‘historically accorded the relevant official’ in an analogous situation ‘at common law.'” Ziglar, supra, at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976)).

The Court has continued to conduct this inquiry in absolute immunity cases, even after the sea change in qualified immunity doctrine. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 489-492 (1991). We should do so in qualified immunity cases as well.

Qualified immunity is not the only doctrine that affects the scope of relief under §1983.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), the Court held that an officer acts “‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State'” even when state law did not authorize his action, id., at 183.

Scholars have debated whether this holding is correct.

Compare Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499, 559 (1985), with Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 323, 341-361 (1992), and Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42 U. S. C. §1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 1, 56-60. Although concern about revisiting one doctrine but not the other is understandable, see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting), respondents—like many defendants in §1983 actions—have not challenged Monroe. ——–

* * *
I continue to have strong doubts about our §1983 qualified immunity doctrine. Given the importance of this question, I would grant the petition for certiorari.