Operation Elder Abuse: PHH Mortgage Corp Maintain Admitted Liars Mark and Shelley Hopkins as Counsel

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1332(a), and 1334, Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”) hereby removes this action from the 11th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, and in support thereof PHH would show unto the Court the following:

I.                   STATE COURT ACTION

1.                  On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff Joanna Burke (“Plaintiff” or “Burke”) filed her Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order (the “Complaint”), Joanna Burke v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, et al; Cause No. 202386973; in the 11th District Court of Harris County, Texas in order to once again prevent the foreclosure of the property located at 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77339 (the “Property”).

2.                  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), this Notice of Removal will be filed with the 11th District Court of Harris County, Texas, and a copy of this Notice of Removal will also be served on all parties.

3.                  In the current State Court Action, Plaintiff renews her over a decade long crusade of filing repetitive lawsuits taking aim at anyone involved with the foreclosure of her home loan.

Plaintiff’s claims have been repeatedly rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on at least four occasions, those appeals being:

(1) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Burke, 655 Fed. Appx. 251 (5th Cir. 2016); (2) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Burke, 902 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2018); (3) Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 855 Fed. Appx. 180 (5th Cir. 2021); and (4) Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., No. 22-20504, 2023 WL 6374190 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2023).

4.                  Through the current State Court Action, Plaintiff requests affirmative and injunctive relief, damages, and court fees based upon the alleged violation of her due process rights by PHH in moving forward with the judicially authorized foreclosure (by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas) of Plaintiff’s deed of trust.

Plaintiff has also brought claims against what she describes as the “judicial machinery itself,” namely those attorneys, law firms and judges who Plaintiff claims have either ruled against her (the judges and their staff) or taken legal action against her (all of the mortgagee’s attorneys) in connection with foreclosure of Plaintiff’s deed of trust.

5.                  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1446(a), copies of all process, pleadings, orders, and other papers filed in the 11th District Court of Harris County, Texas and obtained by Defendant PHH are attached hereto.

6.                  In support of this removal and as required by Southern District Local Rule 81, please find attached as follows:

Exhibit A:      Index of Matters Being Filed;

Exhibit B:      Civil Cover Sheet;

Exhibit C:      State Court Civil Docket Sheet;

Exhibit D:      State Court File; and

Exhibit E:      List of all counsel of record, including addresses, telephone Numbers and parties represented;

Exhibit F:       Harris County Property Valuation.

II.                TIMELINE FOR NOTICE OF REMOVAL

7.                  PHH Mortgage Corporation was served on February 12, 2024, and is the only Defendant to have been served in this action.

Less than thirty (30) days have passed since PHH received service of this lawsuit, and thus, removal is timely. 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(1).

8.                  No other defendants have been served in the State Court Action, nor have any voluntarily appeared, and as a result, it is not necessary to obtain those defendants’ consent to removal.

Getty Oil Corp., a Div. of Texaco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1261 n.9 (5th Cir. 1988)

(“Defendants … who are unserved when the removal petition is filed need not join in it.”).

Moreover, the other defendants’ consent to this removal is not required because, as discussed below, they are nominal parties and not stakeholders in the litigation.

See Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 2007)

(“[A] removing party need not obtain the consent of a co-defendant that the removing party contends is improperly joined”);

Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993); Schmelzer v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 2016 WL 4368735 (E.D. Tex. 2016).

III.             BASIS FOR REMOVAL

9.                  As addressed below, this action is removable based upon bankruptcy jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334, federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332.

a.                   Bankruptcy Jurisdiction. Plaintiff has an active bankruptcy case pending (filed on the eve of foreclosure). At issue in this current state court action is PHH’s ability to foreclose its deed of trust lien against real property owned by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s claims in the instant lawsuit are considered “core proceedings” under Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. District Courts such as the Court have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11. See, 28 U.S.C. §1334.

b.                  Federal Question. Continuing, federal question jurisdiction exists as Plaintiff alleges her due process rights were violated by the scheduling of a foreclosure sale during the pendency of a federal appeal (without bond) initiated by Plaintiff, with Plaintiff alleging that federal law and/or procedure exists to restrain such a sale.

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See, 28 U.S.C. §1331.

c.                   Diversity. PHH, Deutsche Bank and Plaintiff are diverse and all other defendants (the attorneys, substitute trustee, and members of the judiciary) are all nominal parties whose citizenship should be disregarded.

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.

See, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

A.                Bankruptcy Jurisdiction.

10.              Removal in this case is proper because this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1334 and 28 U.S.C §1452.

While the state court action was pending, Plaintiff filed a second bankruptcy to stall the foreclosure of real property belonging to Plaintiff, the real property being subject to a deed of trust lien held by PHH.

The bankruptcy is Case No. 24-30885; In re Joanna Burke; In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit relate to the treatment of the real property.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1452, “a party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action … to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.”

See 28 U.S.C. §1452.

Section 1334 states (with a few exceptions that do not apply here) that the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11

. See 28 U.S.C. §1334.

11.              Plaintiff’s claims in the instant suit are “core proceedings” under Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Property and Defendants’ ability to foreclose the lien encumbering the Property are the subject of this case.

B.                 Federal Question Jurisdiction.

12.              The Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 because it involves questions of federal law.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges damages related to alleged violation of her federal rights as she asserts “(t)here is active litigation in federal court which prevents a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding.”

See, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, at pp. 13, 18.

Plaintiff also alleges that the “judgment issue by federal US District Judge Alfred Homer Bennett of S.D. Texas is void, a nullity.” Id.

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that an order issued by the Honorable Judge Hittner “falls short of meeting Texas law standards required for inducing a sale of Plaintiff’s homestead.” Id. at. 25.

C.                Diversity of Jurisdiction

13.              Removal in this case is proper because this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1).

Where there is complete diversity among parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, an action may be removed to federal court.

14.              This controversy is entirely between citizens of different states as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1), in that every defendant, save the nominal and improperly joined defendants, is diverse from Plaintiff.

15.              Based upon Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff is a citizen of Harris County, Texas.

16.              PHH is a New Jersey Corporation with its principal place of business located at 1 Mortgage Way, Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 08054.

A corporation’s citizenship is determined by the state where it is incorporated and location of its main office as set forth in its articles of association.

See 28 U.S.C. §1332(c); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006).

PHH’s main office is located in New Jersey. Thus, PHH is a citizen of New Jersey.

17.              Further, though not properly served, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2007-A8 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-H was improperly named herein as Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

Defendant Deutsche Bank is the trustee of a trust.

When determining the citizenship of the real parties in interest for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, it is the citizenship of the trustee which controls, not the citizenship of the beneficiaries of the trust.

Navarro Sav. Assoc. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464-66 (1980); Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 564 F. Supp.2d 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Defendant is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in California.

Therefore, Defendant is a citizen of New York and California for diversity purposes.

18.              Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Texas, Defendant PHH is a citizen of New Jersey, and Deutsche Bank is a citizen of New York and California, accordingly this lawsuit is between citizens of different states and complete diversity exists between Plaintiff, PHH and Deutsche Bank. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1).

D.                Improper Joinder of In-State Defendants.

19.              Under Section 1441 (b), while complete diversity of citizenship must exist between plaintiff and all defendants to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, only the citizenship of properly joined parties can establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, 28 U.S.C. §1441(b); Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2004).

The doctrine of improper joinder “prevents defeat of federal removal jurisdiction premised on diversity jurisdiction by an improperly joined, non-diverse defendant.”

Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2009).

The improper joinder doctrine is an exception to the complete diversity rule.

See, e.g., Cuevas v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 648 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2011).

The doctrine ensures “that the presence of an improperly joined, non-diverse defendant does not defeat federal removal jurisdiction premised on diversity.”

Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Salazar v. Allstate Tex. Lloyd’s, Inc., 455 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2006)).

“In other words, it allows a court to disregard the citizenship of an improperly joined defendant for purposes of determining diversity.”

Adams v. CitiBank, No. 3:11- cv-3085, 2012 WL 2122175, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2012), rec. adopted, 2012 WL 2130908 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 12, 2012) (citing Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 385 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2004)).

20.              “If no reasonable basis for recovery exists, a conclusion can be drawn that the plaintiff’s decision to join the local defendant was indeed improper, unless the showing compels dismissal of all defendants.” McDonald v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted).

“To prove improper joinder based on a plaintiff’s inability to establish a cause of action against a non-diverse defendant, a removing defendant must demonstrate no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against the in-state defendant, i.e. no reasonable basis for predicting that the plaintiff might be able to recover against the in-state defendant.”

Adams, 2012 WL 2122175, at *3 (citing Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 572).

In determining whether a party has been improperly joined, the district court should conduct “a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine whether, under state law, the complaint states a claim against the in-state defendant.”

Larroquette v. Cardinal Health 200, Inc., 466 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2006).

Notably, a “mere theoretical possibility of recovery under local law” will not preclude a finding of improper joinder. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573 n. 9;

see also Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002).

i.                    Attorney Defendants have been Improperly Joined and their Citizenship Should be Disregarded.

21.              Plaintiff has included the law firm of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, PC (a Texas professional corporation) and law firm of Hopkins Law, PLLC (a Texas professional limited liability company) in her complaint. Additionally, named by Plaintiff in the Complaint are two of Hopkins Law’s attorneys, Mark Hopkins and Shelley Hopkins (both citizens of Travis County, Texas). (Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, PC, Hopkins Law, PLLC, Mark Hopkins and Shelley Hopkins are collectively referred to as the “Attorney Defendants”).

Plaintiff has previously sued Hopkins Law and its attorneys arguing, as Plaintiff does herein, that the attorneys should be subjected to liability for their legal work performed on behalf of their mortgage client against Plaintiff.

Specifically rejecting Plaintiff’s arguments, the Fifth Circuit determined in prior litigation (by the same Plaintiff herein) that the mortgagee’s attorneys are insulated from liability given the protections provided by the attorney immunity doctrine.

See, Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 855 Fed. Appx. 180 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Kelly v. Nichamoff, 868 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2017))

(affirming dismissal with prejudice of suit against mortgage servicer’s attorneys based upon attorney immunity).

22.              All Attorney Defendants have been improperly joined in the State Court Action because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would give rise to a viable claim against them under Texas law.

To the extent Plaintiff named the Attorney Defendants as attorneys representing the mortgagee and/or mortgage servicer in pursuing non-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage lien on the Property, Attorney Defendants have qualified attorney immunity in the course of representing their client(s) under Texas Law.

Plaintiff has no right to recovery against an attorney or law firm arising from the discharge of its duties in representing a client.

See Troice v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341, 248 (5th Cir. 2016), Haynes and Boone, LLP, 631 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. 2021); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Smith v. Nat’l City Mortgage, No. A-09-CV-881- LY, 2010 WL 3338537, *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2010).

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that where attorneys are sued solely for undertaking actions to represent a lender or servicer client in connection with a non-judicial foreclosure sale, the attorneys have qualified immunity and are improperly joined for diversity purposes.

Lassberg v. Bank of Am., N.A., 660 Fed. Appx. 262, 267 (5th Cit. 2016)

(“As [the foreclosure firm] was acting in a representational capacity, we find it is protected by qualified immunity and was therefore improperly joined.”).

23.              Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations that Attorney Defendants acted contrary to their duties as attorneys, Plaintiff has no basis to state a claim against Attorney Defendants. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not even raise the “theoretical possibility” that any causes of action could be maintained against Attorney Defendants.

See Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259-60 and n. 8 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

(affirming denial of motion to remand, in part, on grounds that plaintiff’s complaint did not contain allegations which could support a claim against the non-diverse defendant);

see also Cantor, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 611-12 (denying remand and disregarding the citizenship of the defendant upon a finding that no reasonable basis existed for plaintiff’s recovery).

24.              In light of the foregoing, no reasonable basis exists for Plaintiff’s recovery against any of the Attorney Defendants in this matter.

Therefore, Attorney Defendants are nominal parties that have been improperly joined and whose citizenship should be disregarded for removal purposes.

Accordingly, this case is properly in federal court. See Great Plains Trust Co., 313 F.3d at 313 (where nondiverse defendant is fraudulently joined, case properly in federal court).

ii.                  State Court District Judges (and their staff) have been Improperly Joined and their Citizenship Should be Disregarded.

25.              Self-imagined grandeur by Plaintiff has led Plaintiff to conclude that a vast conspiracy is afoot against her. In reality, Plaintiff is simply a home owner who borrowed funds on the equity in the home, and continues to refuse to pay back her home loan.

In justifying her ways, Plaintiff has created a fantasy world that, “due to the high profile of Joanna Burke’s son, Mark Burke who operates a legal blog which investigates legal, judicial and government corruption, there is a conspiracy which is prejudicial to both Joanna and Mark Burke because of their verifiable claims against “the judicial machinery itself.” [Doc. 8, p. 40].

26.              Cycling through Plaintiff’s ever-changing list of conspirators, through the present the State Court Complaint Plaintiff complains of the Honorable Judge Elaine Palmer, Honorable Judge Tami Craft and Court Clerk Sashagaye Prince. (collectively, the “Judges”). [Doc. 8, pp. 28- 41].

Plaintiff asserts that the Judges are civilly liable to Plaintiff as a result of the Judge(s)’denial of a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) requested by Plaintiff and as a result of the Judge(s)’ assignment of Plaintiff’s lawsuit to available court(s) for resolution.

These types of claims brought by vexatious and unhappy litigants are the very reason judges are given absolute immunity with respect to judicial conduct.

27.              Judicial officers (and their staff) are entitled to absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.

Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.1993).

The alleged magnitude of the judge’s errors or the mendacity of the acts is irrelevant.

Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir.1991).

Judicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991).

A judge’s acts are judicial in nature if they are “normally performed by a judge” and the parties affected “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, (1978).

In addition, Court clerks, such as Sashagaye Prince, “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s direction. ”

Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981).

28.              Plaintiff does not complain of any actions taken by the Judges that were nonjudicial in nature, and as such the Judges possess immunity from suit by Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Judges are nominal parties that have been improperly joined and whose citizenship should be disregarded for removal purposes.

Accordingly, this case is properly in federal court.

See Great Plains Trust Co., 313 F.3d at 313.

iii.                The Substitute Trustee has been Improperly Joined and its Citizenship Should be Disregarded.

29.              AVT Title Services, LLC is a Texas limited liability company engaged to assist with the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s deed of trust lien. Plaintiff asserts liability against AVT as a result of AVT being the substitute trustee handling the anticipated foreclosure of the deed of trust.

[Doc. 40, p. 19].

AVT is a citizen of Texas, but its citizenship should be disregarded for diversity purposes because Plaintiff improperly joined the AVT to this lawsuit.

See Larroquette v. Cardinal Health 200, Inc., 466 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2006).

30.              “[C]ourts routinely hold that the mere inclusion of a non-diverse trustee as a nominal party will not defeat diversity jurisdiction.”

Mendez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. SA- 14-CV-326-XR, 2014 WL 1923056, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 13, 2014); see also Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 571 F. App’x 274, 277–78 (5th Cir. 2014); Eisenberg v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. SA-11-CV-384-XR, 2011 WL 2636135, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July5, 2011)

(“Texas law recognizes that a trustee named solely in his or her capacity as trustee under a deed of trust or security instrument is not a necessary party in a suit to prevent a foreclosure.”);

Turner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-CV-2701, 2013 WL 2896883, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2013)

(trustee named solely in action to enjoin foreclosure is a nominal party whose presence does not affect diversity jurisdiction);

Tex. Prop. Code §51.007

(providing procedure for dismissal of causes of action asserted against trustees solely in their capacity as trustees under a deed of trust, contract lien, or security instrument).

31.              In addition, the Texas Property Code provides a safe harbor for substitute trustees.

See Tex. Prop. Code §51.007(f).

“Courts considering the good faith element of §51.007(f) have generally held that ‘§51.007(f) imposes a substantive pleading requirement on a plaintiff seeking to recover against a substitute trustee.’”

Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, 4:13-CV-825, 2014 WL1024003, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2014) (citing Felder v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. H– 13–0282, 2013 WL 6805843, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2013); Cantor v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 641 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (N.D. Tex. 2009)).

“Where the plaintiff did not allege bad faith on the part of the defendant, courts have held that substitute trustees were improperly joined for the purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction.”

Williams, 2014 WL 1024003, at *5 (quoting Purported Lienor Claim Against Bond v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP, No. G– 12–188, 2013 WL1619691, at *3 (S.D. Tex. March 22, 2013) (aggregating cases)).

See also Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 571 F. App’x 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2014)

(holding that the substitute trustee “was improperly joined because the Texas Property Code creates a qualified immunity for mortgage trustees who make good faith errors” and plaintiff did not allege bad faith so had no reasonable basis for recovery)

(citing Tex. Prop. Code §51.007(f)).

32.              Here, Plaintiff does not plead any factual allegations in the State Court Complaint, with any degree of specificity, that would suggest bad faith on the part of the substitute trustee.

Consequently, Plaintiff does not raise the “theoretical possibility” that any cause of action could be maintained against the substitute trustee.

See Cantor v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, 641 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611-12 (N.D. Tex. 2009)

(denying remand and disregarding the citizenship of the defendant trustee upon a finding that no reasonable basis existed for plaintiff’s recovery against the trustee).

Therefore, AVT Title Services, LLC has been improperly joined and its citizenship should be disregarded for removal purposes.

Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002)

(holding that where non-diverse defendant is improperly joined, case is properly in federal court).

E.                 Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000.

33.              Although Plaintiff’s State Court Complaint does not specifically allege the amount in controversy, it is clear from review of the Complaint and the evidence attached hereto that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

At a minimum, the Complaint seeks injunctive relief, and damages and title related to the foreclosure on the Property.

“In actions seeking declaratory relief or injunction relief the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.”

Leininger v. Leininger, 705 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1983).

Put another way, “[t]he amount in controversy, in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, is the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented.”

St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. V. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1252-1253 (5th Cir. 1998).

“It is well established in actions in which declaratory or injunctive relief is sought, the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes is measured by the direct pecuniary value of the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect or the value of the object which is the subject matter of the suit.”

Martinez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing. LP, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1044 (W.D.Tex.2010); see also Hartford Ins. Group v. Lou– Con Inc., 293 F.3d 908, 910 (5th Cir.2002)

(“The amount is controversy is ‘the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented.’”)

(quoting Leininger, 705 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir.1983)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that when the right to the property is at issue, the value of the property controls the amount in controversy.

Waller v. Prof’l Ins. Corp., 296 F.2d 545, 547–48 (5th Cir.1961); see also Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Knox, 351 Fed. Appx. 844, 848 (5th Cir.2009)

(Waller extended to a suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent foreclosure).

34.              The most recent tax appraisal for the Property set the market value of the Property at $1,130,461.00.1

This alone satisfies the $75,000 requirement.

See Griffin v. HSBC Bank, 2010

1 See Exhibit F.

WL 4781297 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2010)

(considering appraisal district figure as evidence that amount in controversy requirement was met); Eisenberg v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, No. SA–11–CV–384–XR, 2011 WL 2636135, *1 (W.D. Tex. 2011), 2011 WL 2636135 at *1 (same).

Accordingly, considering the value of the Property, it is apparent on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000.

IV.             VENUE

35.              Venue for this Removal is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, because this district and division includes Harris County, Texas, which is the location of the pending state court action. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a); 28 U.S.C. §124(d)(1).

V.                CONCLUSION

Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation removes this action from the 11th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, so that this court may assume jurisdiction over the cause as provided by law.

Respectfully submitted,