Judge Starr Preaches the Bible and Orders Anti-Abortion Group Education to Sanctioned Lawyers

1.    Attorney Fees

“[A]n assessment of attorney’s fees is undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power[.]”47 Here, Southwest has agreed to “reimburse [Carter] for all her reasonable attorneys’ fees connected to the Motion for Contempt and Motion to Compel proceedings.”48 Accordingly, the Court awards Carter attorney fees and costs and directs Carter to file a bill of costs and a motion with proof of fees for the motion-for- contempt and motion-to-compel proceedings.

2.    Flat Fine

Carter requests a “punitive sanction[]” of a flat fine in the “high six figures.”49 But the Court is holding Southwest in civil contempt. “[A] flat, unconditional fine . . . is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance.”50 Accordingly, the Court declines to impose a flat fine.

3.    Revised Notice

Carter wants Southwest to “issue corrective notices,” and she provides specific language she’d like Southwest to use.51 Although Southwest has agreed to “re-issue

47 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991).

48 Doc. 419 at 5. The motion to compel involves Carter’s request to compel Southwest to produce documents regarding the sanctions motion. The Court previously granted the motion to compel. In addition to attorney fees for the motion to compel and the motion for sanctions, at the show- cause hearing, Southwest orally agreed to reimburse Carter’s reasonable costs as well.

49 Doc. 428 at 7, 10.

50 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) (cleaned up).

51 Doc. 382 at 14–16.

the Email Notice . . . with the ‘may not discriminate’ language,” Southwest opposes Carter’s proposed language.52 So the only issue is whether reissuance is an appropriate sanction or whether more language is necessary. The Court considers the four factors.

First, Southwest’s noncompliance caused significant harm. The Court had to devise its remedies in this case “to vindicate the policies of” Title VII.53 Accordingly, it was important for Southwest flight attendants to be aware that Title VII prohibits Southwest’s religious discrimination. But Southwest’s Recent Court Decision notice suggested that there’s no such thing as Southwest’s religious discrimination, and the IIOTG memo suggested that Southwest may, in fact, unabashedly curtail flight attendants’ religious beliefs and practices expressed in their online interactions in the name of civility. Worse, the Recent Court Decision notice suggested that the Court endorsed Southwest’s erroneous views. Accordingly, the Court finds significant harm from Southwest’s noncompliance.

Second, mere reissuance would have little probable effectiveness against that harm. To adequately inform flight attendants of Title VII’s protections, any revised notice must—at the risk of stating the obvious—reference Title VII. But Southwest has not agreed to reference Title VII in its reissued notice. Next, any revised notice needs to remedy the fact that, as Southwest concedes, the Recent Court Decision notice misrepresented the Court’s position. Southwest has not agreed to clarify that

52 Doc. 419 at 5.

53 Gordon v. JKP Enters. Inc., No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at *7 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (per curiam) (cleaned up).

misrepresentation. Lastly, any revised notice needs to highlight the error in the Recent Court Decision notice. Here’s why: Multiple e-mails on a single topic pose a significant risk of confusing people. Sans any highlighting of the error in the previous message, Southwest’s flight attendants would likely harbor confusion about the reissued notice. Accordingly, mere reissuance lacks probable effectiveness.

Third, Southwest has vast financial resources, and there’s no evidence that a more extended statement would meaningfully cost Southwest anything more than reissuance.

Fourth, Southwest’s disregard of the Court’s order was willful. When confronted with its error, Southwest doubled down for months, claiming that Carter’s complaint constituted “a distinction without a difference.”54 Unsurprisingly, then, at no point has Southwest maintained that its “does not discriminate” language was an inadvertent mistake. And, for the reasons described in the ex parte addendum, Southwest cannot with a straight face chalk up its language to a mistake or inadvertence. Southwest’s disregard of the Court’s order was willful. Accordingly, the Court concludes that mere reissuance is an inadequate sanction.

Southwest lodges one objection, namely that “a particular statement would violate Southwest’s First Amendment right against compelled speech.”55  Under

54 Doc. 383-6 at 3; accord Doc. 394 at 9 (averring on January 6, 2023 that Southwest’s use of “does not discriminate” didn’t “mislead the reader[s] or cause confusion”).

55 Doc. 394 at 18.

strict scrutiny,56 a governmental entity may compel speech only when the speech is “narrowly tailored to promote the government’s compelling interest.”57

First, there’s a compelling governmental interest in informing flight attendants of their rights under Title VII. Title VII requires courts to fashion “remedies [] devised to vindicate the policies of [Title VII].”58 And one of Title VII’s policies is to “eliminat[e] discrimination.”59 To begin to do that, the Court sought to inform flight attendants of Southwest’s prior discrimination—by having Southwest provide the jury verdict and the Court’s judgment—and inform flight attendants of Title VII’s prohibition on Southwest’s future discrimination. But Southwest did effectively the opposite. It warranted that it does not discriminate against its flight attendants and then implied in the IIOTG memo that it may, in fact, discriminate against its flight attendants in the future if they are uncivil in its opinion. That language obfuscated the fact of Southwest’s prior discrimination and utterly failed to convey Title VII’s prohibition. In a word, Southwest stymied Title VII’s policies with Carter and continues to do so now. The Court must remedy that. And, as noted, the only effective remedy is to call attention to the error in the Recent Court Decision

56 Lesser scrutiny likely applies here. For instance, two courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to court-ordered notices, finding that the notices constituted commercial speech, which is subject to lesser scrutiny. See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 437, 453 (5th Cir. 2015), on reh’g, No. 13-20250, 2015 WL 13768849 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 2015);

Barajas v. Acosta, No. H-11-3862, 2012 WL 1952261, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2012). Likewise, regulation of attorney speech is often subject to lesser scrutiny. Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 756 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that attorney speech may be subject to diminished First Amendment protection[.]”). But because neither party engages in any meaningful First Amendment analysis, the Court assumes, arguendo, that strict scrutiny applies.

57 Hersh, 553 F.3d at 768.

58 Gordon, 2002 WL 753496, at *7 (cleaned up).

59 Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (cleaned up).

notice and then to convey Title VII’s prohibition. There’s a compelling governmental interest in vindicating Title VII’s policies in that manner.60

Second, the compelled speech is narrowly tailored to vindicate Title VII’s policies. As noted, a mere reissued statement alone would serve only to confuse flight attendants. To vindicate Title VII’s policies, the Court must highlight the error in the Recent Court Decision notice and then accurately convey Title VII’s prohibition. But to ensure that that speech remains narrowly tailored, the Court will not require further language. For instance, Carter has requested a compelled communication that includes an apology, a summary of the jury’s verdict, and multiple admissions that the Recent Court Decision notice was misleading. Those statements would not be narrowly tailored to vindicate Title VII’s policies, so the Court will not compel those statements.61

Southwest cites a slew of cases in support of its compelled-speech objection, but all are inapposite. Initially, Southwest cites two unpublished Central District of California cases. Although both cases recognized possible First Amendment implications of court-ordered speech, neither found that a court-ordered statement violated the First Amendment or conducted any First Amendment analysis—they ruled on other grounds.62

60 Cf. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 748, 766 (finding that Congress had a sufficiently compelling interest in requiring “debt relief agencies to disclose specific basic information about bankruptcy to assisted persons whom they are counseling through the bankruptcy process” to “ensur[e] that debtors who are contemplating filing for bankruptcy have some basic knowledge about the process”).

61 See Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 F. App’x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n apology will little serve the purposes of Title VII.”).

62 See Cameroon Ass’n of Victims of Ambazonia Terrorism Inc. v. Ambazonia Found. Inc., No. CV 20-1115 PA (ASx), 2020 WL 4852858, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2020) (concluding that a court-ordered

Next, Southwest cites cases where courts declined to compel apologies because “an apology will little serve the purposes of Title VII.”63 But those cases didn’t deal with the First Amendment. And, in any event, the Court is not requiring Southwest to apologize.

Next, Southwest cites cases prohibiting courts from ordering public readings of court-ordered notices because public readings create “[t]he ignominy of a forced public . . . confession of sins.”64 But the Court isn’t mandating that Minchey publicly proclaim the errors of his ways whilst detained in stocks at the town square. And, tellingly, the same courts that criticized public readings approved of written notices.65 Southwest’s cases are inapposite. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Southwest to provide the following notice verbatim to its flight attendants.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ordered Southwest to issue the following statement to you: On December 20, 2022, Southwest’s Legal Department issued an e-mail to all flight attendants entitled “Recent Court Decision” regarding a federal court judgment against Southwest and Transport Workers Union, Local 556. That e-mail said, “[t]he court . . . ordered us to inform you that Southwest does not discriminate against our Employees for their religious practices and beliefs.” The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas subsequently found that the statement’s use of “does not discriminate” was incorrect. Accordingly,

statement “raises significant First Amendment considerations” without conducting any First Amendment analysis); Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms v. Claremont Unified Sch. Dist., No. EDCV 18- 2185JGB (SHKx), 2020 WL 5792475, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2020) (recognizing the “irony in [a] First Amendment case” where plaintiffs requested a court-ordered statement, but only concluding that “[s]uch a remedy does not meet the standards . . . for injunctive relief under Section 1983”).

63 Woodruff, 29 F. App’x at 346.

64 HTH Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 823 F.3d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

65 See, e.g., Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. N. L. R. B., 383 F.2d 230, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Amongst the approved remedies are the requirements that the employer mail to each employee the notice which informs the employee of his statutory right to be free from coercion, interference, and restraint, and to post copies of this same notice.”).

the Court has ordered Southwest’s Legal Department to issue the following amended statement:

Under Title VII, Southwest may not discriminate against Southwest flight attendants for their religious practices and beliefs, including—but not limited to—those expressed on social media and those concerning abortion.

4.    Religious-Liberty Training

Training that’s tailored to address a contemptuous action is a commonplace sanction.66 Training “in the relevant subject area” is particularly appropriate when a party “does not appear to comprehend” an area of the law.67 In light of the four factors, religious-liberty training is an appropriate sanction.

First, as noted, there’s been significant harm from Southwest’s noncompliance. Second, as noted, Southwest’s disregard of the Court’s order was willful.  Third,

66 See, e.g., Hardy v. Asture, No. 1:11CV299, 2013 WL 566020, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2013)

(requiring an attorney “to attend eight hours of continuing legal education courses on the subject of the practice of social security litigation in federal court”); Petrisch v. JP Morgan Chase, 789 F. Supp. 2d 437, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (ordering an attorney “to attend four hours of continuing legal education courses on the subject of federal practice and procedure within one year of this decision”); Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 137 F. App’x 482, 490 (3d Cir. 2005) (approving a district court’s order that an attorney “attend two continuing legal education courses, one entitled Federal Practice and Procedure, the other entitled Attorney Professionalism and Rules of Professional Conduct”); see also, e.g., In re Marshall, No. 3:15-MC-88-JWD, 2016 WL 81484, at *11 (M.D. La. Jan. 7, 2016) (requiring an attorney to “attend . . . six hours of ethics and/or professionalism training”); Ball v. LeBlanc, 300 F.R.D. 270, 273 (M.D. La. 2013) (“[P]ossible sanctions [] include . . . ethics training[.]”); Moser v. Bret Harte Union High Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 2d 944, 988 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Ms. Yama is . . . ordered to attend 20 hours of CLE ethics training[.]”).

67 Edmonds v. Seavey, 379 F. App’x 62, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ounsel does not appear to comprehend the function of the civil RICO statute. Thus, the district court’s chosen sanction is particularly apropos: requiring that counsel attend CLE courses in the relevant subject area.”); see In re Burghoff, 374 B.R. 681, 686–87 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007) (“It appears that the concept of the inappropriateness of plagiarism is lost on Mr. Cannon which unfortunately reveals a fundamental professional deficiency . . . . Because Mr. Cannon does not appreciate the nature of plagiarism, . . . Mr. Cannon’s deficiency calls for the [] method of instruction offered in a law school course on professional responsibility.”); Managed Care Sols., Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., No. 09-60351, 2011 WL 4433570, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011) (requiring ethics training because, “[b]ased on Warrick’s appearance before this Court, his conduct reflects a significant failure to understand his ethical responsibilities, particularly the exercise of independent judgment, and a profound lack of basic competence”).

religious-liberty training will impose a minimal burden on Southwest. In particular, the Court is not requiring Southwest to pay for that training. And, as noted below, the Court requires Southwest to arrange for a representative of ADF to fly to Dallas.68 Flying one person to and from a city imposes a minimal burden on one of the United States’s major airlines.

Lastly, religious-liberty training has significant probable effectiveness. Southwest habitually points to its policies as a pretext for discrimination.69 For instance, in the IIOTG memo, Southwest maintained its belief that firing Carter was justified because she “did not adhere to Southwest policies.”70 Even in these show- cause proceedings, Southwest couldn’t resist crowing about recent revisions to its policies.71 But “whether or not Southwest followed its policies, it violated federal law.”72 And “Southwest [continually] misses th[at] point.”73

Here’s how that concern relates to Carter’s contempt motion. Southwest did two things wrong here: Southwest issued (1) the erroneous “does not discriminate” language, and (2) the IIOTG memo, strongly implying that Southwest may permissibly discriminate against flight attendants if they violate Southwest’

68 To further reduce any burden on Southwest, the Court is not requiring Southwest’s employees to travel to receive their training.

69 See, e.g., Doc. 374 at 13 n.54 (recognizing that Southwest “earnestly recommit[ted] to following the same policies that got it in trouble with the jury”).

70 Doc. 383-3 at 2 (conveying Southwest’s belief that Carter “did not adhere to Southwest policies and guidelines” in her online interactions).

71 See, e.g., Doc. 429 at 5; see also, e.g., Doc. 429-1 at 2–6.

72 Doc. 374 at 13 n.54.

73 Id.

policies. Here, the contemnor’s conduct is worse than the mine-run contempt easily “cured” by a remedial notice: Southwest did not evade the Court’s order; Southwest inverted the Court’s order. In the future, Southwest could follow its Court-ordered remedial statement with a second IIOTG memo lambasting Carter for “not adher[ing] to Southwest policies” and mandating that all flight attendants “adhere to” Southwest’s “established policies.”74 Because Southwest maintains the right to speak, the Court needs to impose some sanction that will help ensure that Southwest will not again attempt to undermine the Court-ordered notice with another citation to its policies.

That’s where religious-liberty training comes in. When a litigant “does not appear to comprehend” a legal concept, training in “the relevant subject area” constitutes a “particularly apropos” sanction.75 As explained in the ex parte addendum, Forbes, Minchey, and Maberry were at the root of the problem. Accordingly, the Court directs Southwest to send those individuals to religious-liberty training in the hopes that, on round two, that training will coerce compliance with (instead of the continued undermining of) the Court’s orders in this case.76

Unfortunately, this isn’t the first time an entity has needed religious-liberty training after it attempted to suppress speech.

Fortunately, there are esteemed non-

74 Doc. 383-3 at 2.

75 Edmonds, 379 F. App’x at 64–65.

76 Cf. Doc. 383-6 at 2–3 (requiring that new flight attendants—and apparently Carter—attend four weeks of training to ensure they understand Southwest’s policies and practices for flight attendants). The Court finds that religious-liberty training and the verbatim notice are the least severe sanctions adequate to coerce compliance with its order.

profit organizations that are dedicated to preserving free speech and religious freedom.77 And some of those entities laudably provide training free of charge for those who have struggled to respect religious liberties in the manner federal law requires. For instance, ADF recently agreed to “conduct a First Amendment training session” for three professors who allegedly discriminated against a student for posting “materials to her social media accounts” and sending “messages to fellow students” containing, among other things, religious views.78 And, in that case, the defendants allegedly cited their school policies as a reason to curtail religious speech.79 Because this case also involves an entity’s citation to its policies in an apparent attempt to end-run legal protections against religious discrimination based on online activities, ADF is particularly well-suited to train Southwest’s employees who are most responsible for the communications at issue here.

Southwest raises four counterarguments. First, Southwest’s witnesses repeatedly averred that they do, in fact, know that federal law trumps Southwest’s policies.80 Au contraire. Southwest has never disclaimed its view in the IIOTG memo that its discrimination against Carter was justified by Southwest’s policies. In any event, Southwest refused to confess that federal law trumps its policies until it caught

77 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1722 (2018) (recognizing that ADF was counsel on a successful Supreme Court appeal).

78 DeJong v. Pembrook, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://adfmedia.org/case/dejong-v- pembrook (last visited Aug. 7, 2023).

79 Complaint at 46, DeJong v. Pembrook, No. 3:22-cv-1124-NJR (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2022), ECF No. 1 (“Defendants applied Policies 3C6 and 3C7 when they imposed the no-contact orders against Ms. DeJong.”).

80 See, e.g., Tr. Trans. at 321, 356, 381.

wind of the Court’s skepticism. At this point, Southwest’s tardy “[p]rotestations o[f] repentance and reform timed to . . . blunt the force of a [contempt order] offer insufficient assurance that the practice sought to be enjoined will not be repeated.”81 Southwest’s gallows conversion doesn’t fly here.

Second, Southwest contends that “training [] will not secure compliance with the judgment” because the “judgment did not order Southwest to attend religious- liberty training.”82 But the implied proposition is asinine: A sanction need not be co- extensive with a prior order—it need only coerce compliance with a prior order.83

Third, Southwest contends that “religious-liberty training would not compensate [] Carter for any loss.”84 That’s true, but inapposite. The Court orders training to coerce compliance with its orders, not to compensate Carter.

Fourth, the Court held a civil contempt proceeding—not a criminal contempt proceeding. And “a judgment of civil contempt is conditional[] and may be lifted if the contemnor purges himself of the contempt.”85  Court-ordered training isn’t

81 James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 354–55 (5th Cir. 1977) (cleaned up). It’s also not clear that Southwest’s agreement to treat Carter “like every other employee” is an assurance it will comply with the law. See id. at 355.

82 Doc. 429 at 3.

83 E.g., Marshall, 2016 WL 81484, at *11 (requiring ethics training that the court had not previously ordered); Hampton v. Henderson, No. 93-5318, 1994 WL 14070, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 1994) (per curiam) (recognizing that a court can sanction a litigant by prohibiting them from proceeding in forma pauperis even where the court had not previously ordered such conduct). Conditional imprisonment and fines also provide obvious examples of civil sanctions that are not co-extensive with the prior orders for which compliance is sought.

84 Doc. 429 at 3.

85 United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1976).

conditional.

Thus, Southwest’s argument goes, training isn’t a civil sanction—it’s criminal.

At the outset, even on its face, Southwest’s citation to caselaw divulges the error in Southwest’s reasoning: “[A] judgment of civil contempt” must be conditional—but that doesn’t mean that every sanction must be avoidable.86 Unsurprisingly, then, courts routinely impose unconditional, civil sanctions with which a party must comply in order to purge itself of contempt.87 Here, Southwest may purge itself of contempt but only after attending religious-liberty training.

But more fundamentally, Southwest misunderstands the legal framework. “[W]hether a contempt is civil or criminal turns on the character and purpose of the sanction involved.”88 In that analysis, conditionality isn’t the lodestar. Instead, contempt is civil in character if it “compensates the party in whose favor the breached order was issued[] or coerces compliance with the court’s orders.”89

Conditionality factors in where the “character” of the sanction isn’t self- evident. For instance, when a court fines or imprisons a contemnor, those sanctions “to some extent punish . . . as well as coerce . . . obedience.”90  To render those

86 Id.

87 For instance, courts have “authority . . . to award attorneys’ fees in a civil contempt proceeding.” Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272–73 (5th Cir. 1977). Attorney fees aren’t conditional, but they’re still civil in nature. Likewise, when a litigant makes “repetitive and frivolous filings,” the Court may unconditionally forbid that litigant from proceeding in forma pauperis. Hampton, 1994 WL 14070, at *1.

88 Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 (cleaned up); see also Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) (recognizing that the “the critical feature[]” in determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal is “the character of the relief” at issue).

89 In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1515 (5th Cir. 1990).

90 Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828.

sanctions coercive instead of punitive, courts must introduce some coercive characteristic. Enter conditionality. “A conditional penalty . . . is civil because it is specifically designed to compel the doing of some act.”91 In short, courts ascertain a coercive characteristic of conditional penalties because the contemnor “has it in his power to avoid any penalty” by complying with a court order.92

Tellingly, Southwest doesn’t cite any case requiring a training sanction to be conditional—it only cites cases about fines and imprisonment.93 That’s likely because training is an intrinsically “coercive sanction[]” that helps “obtain compliance with

[a] [c]ourt’s [o]rder.”94 Here’s how that works: In some cases, a contemnor’s conduct shows that the contemnor “does not appear to comprehend” an area of the law with which it must comply.95 In such situations, training “in the relevant subject area”96 helps the contemnor to “appreciate the nature of” the prohibited conduct.97 Armed with a better understanding of the legal area at issue, a contemnor can better conform its conduct to the law. Accordingly, no conditionality is necessary to render training coercive.

91 Hicks, 485 U.S. at 633.

92 Id. (cleaned up).

93 Doc. 429 at 2 (citing Rizzo, 539 F.2d at 463 and Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221

U.S. 418, 442 (1911)); see also Rizzo, 539 F.2d at 462 (recognizing that the district court ordered “incarceration” and “a fine”); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 449 (considering fines and imprisonment).

94 Portland v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-CV-00917-HZ, 2021 WL 982613, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2021).

95 Edmonds, 379 F. App’x at 64–65.

96 Id. at 65.

97 Burghoff, 374 B.R. at 686–87.

Unsurprisingly, then, courts routinely send parties and lawyers to training as a coercive civil sanction.98 The Court declines to hold that, in order to impose that routine sanction, courts must empanel a jury, appoint an independent prosecutor, and give all the other procedural protections accompanying a criminal contempt proceeding.99

IV.    Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Carter’s motion for sanctions and holds Southwest in contempt. The Court ORDERS Southwest to take the following actions, and Southwest may purge itself of this contempt judgment by taking all of the following four actions:

1.    Southwest must send Kerrie Forbes, Kevin Minchey, and Chris Maberry to religious-liberty training. That training shall be conducted by ADF at a time set by ADF, it shall last a minimum of 8 hours of instructional time, and it must be completed by August 28, 2023.100 Southwest must transport ADF’s representative to Dallas and be responsible for any food, accommodation, or other travel expenses for ADF’s representative.

98 See, e.g., Marshall, 2016 WL 81484, at *1, 11 (holding a lawyer “in civil contempt” and requiring ethics training); Portland, 2021 WL 982613, at *2 (finding that training of a party was a “coercive sanction” that helps “obtain compliance with [a] [c]ourt’s [o]rder”).

99 Ravago Ams. L.L.C. v. Vinmar Int’l Ltd., 832 F. App’x 249, 256–57 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting the requirement of “involvement of an independent prosecutor,” “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” and sometimes even “the right to [a] jury trial” in criminal contempt proceedings (cleaned up)).

100 See, e.g., Roy v. Am. Prof’l Mktg., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 687, 693 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (requiring several attorneys “to attend the seminar on November 23, 1987, entitled ‘Practicing in the Western District’”).

2.    Southwest must e-mail to each of its flight attendants the following language verbatim:

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ordered Southwest to issue the following statement to you: On December 20, 2022, Southwest’s Legal Department issued an e-mail to all flight attendants entitled “Recent Court Decision” regarding a federal court judgment against Southwest and Transport Workers Union, Local 556. That e-mail said, “[t]he court . . . ordered us to inform you that Southwest does not discriminate against our Employees for their religious practices and beliefs.” The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas subsequently found that the statement’s use of “does not discriminate” was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court has ordered Southwest’s Legal Department to issue the following amended statement:

Under Title VII, Southwest may not discriminate against Southwest flight attendants for their religious practices and beliefs, including—but not limited to—those expressed on social media and those concerning abortion.

Southwest may not issue that statement until Forbes, Minchey, and Maberry have completed the above-mentioned training.101

3.    Southwest shall file a declaration on the docket by September 5, 2023 at 5:00 PM, certifying that Forbes, Minchey, and Maberry all attended that training and providing proof that Southwest issued the required verbatim statement only after Forbes, Minchey, and Maberry attended religious- liberty training.102

101 The Court requires Southwest to attend training before issuing the verbatim notice so that, to the extent Southwest feels compelled to issue any new communication similar to the IIOTG memo contemporaneously with the verbatim notice, it has the benefit of training before it issues that new communication.

102 See, e.g., Roy, 117 F.R.D. at 693 (“[C]ounsel will provide proof of attendance in the form of an affidavit filed with this Court.”); Moser, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (“Ms. Yama is . . . ordered to . . .

4.    Southwest must pay Carter’s reasonable attorney fees and costs for the motion-for-contempt and motion-to-compel proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of August, 2023.