

# THE COMPONENTS OF CDS BID-ASK SPREADS: A REDUCED-FORM APPROACH

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**November 13, 2021**

# THE PAPER IN ONE SLIDE

## Motivation

- What are the drivers of bid-ask spreads in single-name CDS market?

## What the paper does

- Reduced-form (aka intensity-based) credit risk model;
- Enriched to include various wedges
  - *liquidity,*
  - *adverse selection,*
  - *dealers' market power,*
  - *inventory costs,*
  - *counterparty risk.*
- Decompose bid-ask spreads into components using data from Markit
- Analyze behavior of various components over time
- Study how changes in adverse selection relates to changes in CDS
- Study adverse selection's explanatory power in x-section of CDS returns

## COMPONENTS OF BID-ASK SPREAD

What are the frictions rationalizing bid/ask spreads?

In the current draft: *liquidity, adverse selection, dealers' market power, counterparty risk.*

Reduced form vs. structural/micro-founded

- Currently, various frictions only appear in reduced form
- Why do these wedges have the economic interpretation given by the authors?
- Are there structural models of adverse selection and imperfect competition that end up as time-invariant wedges as in the model?

## COMPONENTS OF BID-ASK SPREAD (CONTINUED)

What happened to inventory costs? (could not find a wedge for this friction discussed in the paper)

Is counter-party risk relevant?

- For OTC trades between dealers,
  - credit support annex (“CSA”) to ISDA master agreement
  - daily collateral posting, USD cash, remunerated at FF
- Single-name CDS cleared by ICE
- If CDS traded without “perfect CSA”, then price depends on
  - Exact contractual details of collateral posting arrangement
  - Identity of counter-parties
  - Markit quotes are certainly not related to these contracts

What about search?

- Prominent friction in OTC world
- Potentially easy to micro-found and cast into current reduced form framework (Duffie, Garleanu & Pedersen ECMA 2005)

# IDENTIFICATION

**Observable prices:** bid and offer across CDS maturities

**Q-measure model parameters:**

- default hazard  $\lambda$ , LGD  $w$  and convenience yield  $\eta$  for mid-market CDS
- adverse selection wedge  $l_A$ , mkt power wedge  $\gamma_A$  for offer-side CDS
- adverse selection wedge  $l_B$ , counter-party wedge  $\gamma_B$  for bid-side CDS

**Suggestion:** spend more time discussing identification

- 7 unobservable parameters to recover
- minimum 7 prices needed
- each CDS maturity observed provides 2 prices (bid and offer)
- $\Rightarrow$  need at least observability on 4 different maturities
- what are the features of the data that help identify all these parameters?

## MORE THOUGHTS ON IDENTIFICATION: LIQUIDITY COMPONENT

### Duffie & Singleton RFS 1999

- Value of defaultable claim to  $X$  is

$$V_0 = \mathbb{E}_0^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ \exp \left( - \int_0^T R_t dt \right) X \right], \quad R_t := r_t + h_t L_t + \ell_t$$

- Risk-free rate  $r_t$
- Risk-neutral default hazard  $h_t$ , risk-neutral mean-loss rate  $L_t$
- Risk-neutral “liquidity” factor  $\ell_t$

Longstaff, Mithal & Neis JF 2005:  $\ell_t$  proxy for bond-CDS basis

### Identification?

- With a unique instrument, how we can disentangle  $h_t L_t$  from  $\ell_t$ ?
- Include in calibration/estimation the price of corporate bonds for identification purposes?

## Q MEASURE: ACADEMIA VS. PRACTITIONERS

### Practitioners' approach

- Q measure changes every day based on market moves
- Changes are needed to make sure
  - model and market prices coincide
  - Greeks are “current” for appropriate risk-management purposes

### Academic approach

- Q measure usually time-invariant
- In this paper, this means
  - either constant default intensities, LGD, and all wedges – meaning that the model fit will be poor given CDS mkt volatility
  - default intensities, LGD, and all wedges change each day – in which case, why do economic agents not acknowledge this when pricing CDS?
- either way, result interpretation gets murky

### One solution

- Build model with time-varying default intensity/wedges (for e.g. exp. affine Markov models as in Duffie, Pan & Singleton ECMA 2000)
- Change in CDS mid are effectively change in the Markov state


## BID-ASK SPREADS VS. TRADING VOLUMES

What exactly do bid and ask spreads provided by dealers represent when volumes are non-existent?




# TOP 25 CREDITS – WEEKLY VOLUME

Average weekly trading volume per credit (top 25 single-name CDS)




# TOP 25 CREDITS – NUMBER OF TRADES




# INDEX CONSTITUENTS – WEEKLY VOLUME

Average weekly trading volume per credit (index constituent)




# INDEX CONSTITUENTS – NUMBER OF TRADES

Average number of weekly trades per credit (index constituent)



# ALL TRADED CREDITS – WEEKLY VOLUME

Average weekly trading volume per credit (all listed single-name CDS)



# ALL TRADED CREDITS – NUMBER OF TRADES

Average number of weekly trades per credit (all listed single-name CDS)

