US SUPREME COURT – 5TH CIR.,

Order List for Monday, Nov 12, 2019

What happened when people or companies appealed to the US Supreme Court
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari)

18-9692 (18-10733) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Response Requested) – Pet. Denied
19-5862 (16-20283) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied
19-6132 (19-10246) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied
19-6178 (18-11306) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied
19-6256 (17-30810) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – (Supplemental Brief filed) – Pet. Denied

19-479 (18-11657)  Probate Appeal Case by Pro Se, CAROL KAM, RE; State Judicial Misconduct re High Profile State Judge who presided over case and was soon after removed from Bench for an unrelated case and charge of inappropriate relations with counsel for one of the parties (See D-News Article, Ardor in the Court). Read her Petition.

19-6036 (18-11238) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied
19-6142 (18-40476) Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied
19-6209 (18-60479)  Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis – Pet. Denied

Latest Order from #CA5 – On remand from #SCOTUS with panel judge #higginbotham and judge #haynes and judge jones – wherein they “stayed the case” while a #Constitutional question remained pending… unlike 19-20267 where STAY was DENIED by Higginbothamhttps://t.co/nXlY72GIu5 pic.twitter.com/8cG6wdmvRo

— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 12, 2019

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES (HOMEOWNER/BANK/NON-BANK RELATED)

None this week.

ORDER IN JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT CASE OF KENTUCKY CHIEF JUDGE MAZE

19-300 – Beth Lewis Maze, Circuit Judge, Petitioner v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission (SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY)

WE’RE LIT UP: November’s #StateBarofTexas Journal Invited Law #professor Fred C. Moss to Discuss #Attorney #ethics and Duties Relative to a Clients’ Fraud or Crime (Moss: an emeritus prof.of law at SMU Dedman School of Law, 30 yrs ethics) #AuditTexas https://t.co/t7vdydWT5n

— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 2, 2019

Kentucky Judge Faces New Misconduct Charges

Posted: 11:12 AM, Sep 11, 2018

(LEX 18) — Kentucky’s Judicial Conduct Commission added two new charges of official misconduct against a circuit court justice.

In a filing signed Monday by commission chairman Stephen D. Wolnitzek, the commission accused 21st Judicial Circuit Court Judge Beth Lewis Maze of forging names on officials documents and failing to acknowledge having done so during the investigation. These join two previous charges that all stem from accusations that Lewis Maze ordered her ex-husband, former Bath County attorney Donald “Champ” Maze, to be drug tested even though she wasn’t assigned to his district court case.

Lewis Maze represents Bath, Menifee, Montgomery and Rowan counties.

Lewis Maze previously told LEX 18’s Leigh Searcy that no other judges were available and that she would have done signed it for anyone.

For the new charges, the commission says Lewis Maze “wrote ‘Bath Co. Attorney’ on the ‘Attorney for the Plaintiff’ signature line … [and] ‘Commonwealth Att. & Bath Co. Attorney’ on the ‘Attorney for the Plaintiff’ signature line. … You additionally signed Michael Campbell’s name on the ‘Attorney for Defendant’ signature line.”

The commission added a charge based on Lewis Maze’s alleged failure to mention having signed the documents in such a manner.

Lewis Maze has 15 days to respond to the new charges.

CASE CODE KEY

Carol Kam v. John Peyton, Jr. (18-11657)

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
July 18, 2019

CAROL M. KAM, Plaintiff – Appellant
v.
JOHN B. PEYTON, JR.,
Defendant – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:18-CV-1447

Before JONES, HIGGINSON, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal from a district’s court dismissal, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, of the Appellant’s claims relating to a probate matter that was fully litigated, decided, and upheld in Texas state courts.

The Appellant filed a variety of pro se claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state judge who presided over the original probate matter, predicated upon the Appellant’s theory that the judge was without jurisdiction to preside over the dispute.

The district court, upon the recommendation of a magistrate judge, characterized the Appellant’s claims as a thinly-veiled collateral attack on the state courts’ final judgment and dismissed the claims under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine as articulated by this court in  Phinizy v. State  of Ala.,  847 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1988).

After a careful review of the parties’ briefs, the district court’s decision, and applicable case law, this court AFFIRMS the district court’s decision for substantially the same reasons articulated in the magistrate’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation and adopted by the district court in that case.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Carol Kam v. Dallas County, State of Texas. (18-10735)

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
March 7, 2019

CAROL M. KAM, Plaintiff – Appellant
v.
DALLAS COUNTY; STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendants – Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:18-CV-1447

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and OWEN and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Carol M. Kam appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

In the proceedings below, Kam brought a pro se action in federal district court against the State of Texas and Dallas County upon the conclusion of extended probate litigation involving two will contest suits arising from the deaths of her brother and father.

The first will contest suit, as to Kam’s brother’s amended trust, resulted in a judgment against Kam. The probate court also found her in violation of the “no contest” provision in her brother’s trust, resulting in revocation of her benefits, i.e., her $10,000 inheritance. She was further assessed with over $226,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.

The second will contest suit, as to Kam’s father’s will, resulted in a judgment in her favor with an award of costs.

The relief Kam sought in the federal district court included:

(1) a retrial of the first will contest suit to remove the “malicious judgment” entered against her;

(2) her $10,000 inheritance; and

(3) reimbursement of all litigation expenses she had incurred to date.

Because granting relief would require the district court to reverse the state court judgment entered in one of the will contest suits, the district court found that it was divested of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed Kam’s claims with prejudice.

II.

We review the district court’s application of the Rooker–Feldman de novo. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390 (5th Cir. 2012).

III.

“[The Rooker-Feldman] doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.” See Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

“Further, in addition to the precise claims presented to the state court, Rooker–Feldman prohibits federal court review of claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dist. Ct. of Columbia Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983)).

On appeal, Kam argues that the State of Texas and Dallas County:

(1) failed to provide her with an unbiased tribunal;

(2) failed to provide her with proper jurisdictional notice and authority;

(3) failed to allow her to depose certain witnesses;

(4) failed to allow her to provide opposing evidence;

(5) failed to provide her with a judgment based on the evidence presented;

(6) failed to provide her with findings of fact and reasons for judgment;

(7) “failed to address the improper use of the trial court as revenge”; and

(8) permitted the court system to be used in a malicious manner that deprived her of her inheritance and placed an unfair financial burden on her.

We agree with the district court that the claims Kam presents and the relief she seeks would require reversal of one of the state court judgments in the proceedings below—the judgment in the first will contest suit.

Consequently, we are barred from reviewing Kam’s claims and find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to hear Kam’s claims.1

See Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317; see also Burciaga, 871 F.3d at 384–85 (observing that federal courts are prohibited from reviewing “claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision”).

IV.

The district court’s judgment dismissing Kam’s claims is affirmed.

——————————————

1 To the extent, if any, that Kam appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to amend her complaint, we hold that the district court did not err in doing so on grounds of futility in that all of Kam’s proposed amendments were also “inextricably intertwined” with the prior state court judgment. See Burciaga, 871 F.3d at 384–85.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.