Bankruptcy

The Dorman Phenomenon: LIT’s Founder Intervenes Asserting Absurdity in Law Proves Targeted Persecution

Dorman’s case verifies LIT’s assertion of gov. interference and conspiracy to corruptly and unlawfully target LIT’s founder and his family.

LIT UPDATE & COMMENTARY

“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”

Marbury v. Madison, 1803

Totally expected response when obtaining docket update today. Y’all couldn’t have telegraphed your intentions any more clearly.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME and FOR CLARIFICATION

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant asks the Court to extend the time to file its amended petition, as authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), and to clarify or expand upon its January 10th, 2024 order requiring Plaintiff to re-plead.

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.    Plaintiff is Dianne Dorman; defendants are Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 and PHH Mortgage Corporation.

2.   Plaintiff sued defendant for attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s homestead without following the requirements set out by the Texas Property Code, for violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act, and for violations of Federal Regulation X.

3.   The Court ordered Plaintiff to re-plead on January 10th, 2024, however, counsel for Plaintiff miss- read/miss-understood the order and did not realize that it was an order to replead, but instead thought that it was an order stating that if re-pleading is necessary, it must be done by the date stated in that order.

Once the second order to re-plead by April 15th, 2024 was served on Plaintiff’s counsel, it was then apparent that the court saw a defect in Plaintiff’s petition and was ordering Plaintiff to re-plead.

4.  Plaintiff must re-plead its petition by April 15th 2024.

5.   Plaintiff began drafting and then filed this motion to extend time as soon as she became aware of the need for additional time and before the deadline, which was approximately 4:00p.m. on April 15th, 2024.

This was after a week of researching the issues brought up by the court in the order, off and on, and comparing them to Plaintiff’s petition to see what needed to be amended.

Then, after spending most of the day on this again on April 15th, 2024, it became apparent to Plaintiff at approximately 4:00p.m. that it was unclear as to what the court saw was wrong with Plaintiff’s petition, and Plaintiff therefore decided the best course of action would be to file this motion to extend time in order seek clarification from the court as to what needs to be amended.

B.  ARGUMENT

6.   A court may grant a request to extend time for good cause.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A); Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394–95 (10th Cir. 2016); Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2010).

7.  Plaintiff requests an extension of time to file its amended petition because after a week of researching the issues brought up by the court in the order to amend plaintiff’s petition, off and on, and comparing them to Plaintiff’s petition to see what needed to be amended.

And after spending most of the day on this again on April 15th, 2024, it became apparent to Plaintiff at approximately 4:00p.m. that it was unclear as to what the court saw was wrong with Plaintiff’s petition, and Plaintiff therefore decided the best course of action would be to file this motion to extend time in order seek clarification from the court as to what needs to be amended.

8.   Plaintiff asks the Court to extend the deadline until two weeks after the court provides guidance to Plaintiff’s counsel as to what is deficient in Plaintiff’s petition.

9.  Plaintiff’s request to extend time is for good cause and is not intended to delay these proceedings.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A).

10.  Defendants will not be prejudiced by the extension of time.

Rachel, 820 F.3d at 394–95; Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1259–60.

C.  CONCLUSION

11.   For these reasons, Plaintiff asks the Court to extend the time to file its amended petition until 2 weeks after the court provides guidance as to what is deficient in Plaintiff’s petition.

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF Ryan Daniel

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
04/09/2024 24 ELECTRONIC ORDER denying 13 Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff and Memorandum of Law in Support for the reasons stated in Defendants’ response. See also Burke v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 4:21-CV-2591, 2022 WL 4597975, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2022). The Court notes that a motion to intervene is a non-dispositive, pretrial matter. See, e.g., MT223, LLC, v. Depositors Ins. Co., No. MO:21-CV-00044-DC-RCG, 2022 WL 20507651, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2022). (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/9/2024) (Entered: 04/09/2024)
04/11/2024 25 Mark Stephen Burke’s as Proposed Intervenor’s Reply to Defendant’s Response and Objection to Timely Intervention filed by Mark Stephen Burke re: 15 Response (wxc) (Entered: 04/12/2024)
04/15/2024 26 First MOTION to Extend Time to re-plead filed by Dianne Dorman (Daniel, Ryan) (Entered: 04/15/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
04/16/2024 21:10:04

LIT PREPARES THE IRREFUTABLE DATA FOR THE FINAL REPLY

APR 3, 2024

Apr 3, 2024: A hat tip to the Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cureton who responds within an hour or two of today’s X post, confirming what LIT expected; a planned dismissal.

CounselGate

Data mining LIT in preparation of the final reply. It will be difficult to condense into 10 pages.

Feb 23 (Reuters) – U.S. law firm Locke Lord has settled claims that it gave faulty legal advice to an insurer whose health benefit plans became insolvent and was investigated by the U.S. Labor Department.

A federal judge in Chicago on Wednesday dismissed the lawsuit against Locke Lord by Receivership Management Inc after the two parties said they had reached a settlement, opens new tab. The terms of the agreement were not disclosed.

Lawyers representing Locke Lord and Receivership did not immediately respond to a request for comment, nor did a spokesperson for the firm.

The lawsuit stemmed from a series of opinion letters and legal documents Locke Lord drafted for ALLInsurance Solutions Management LLC between 2013 and 2016. AISM, which became AEU Holdings LLC in 2016, sought to create a health benefit plan that complied with federal law but that did not constitute a multiple employer welfare agreement that would be scrutinized by state regulators.

AEU’s plans became insolvent after they were unable to pay an estimated $60 million in insurance claims made by doctors, hospitals and other medical providers.

That led to a lawsuit from the Labor Department, opens new tab, which alleged that the plans were “on the verge of collapse.”

Receivership Management was tapped to serve as the independent fiduciary overseeing the AEU plans.

Its lawsuit against Locke Lord, opens new tab sought “tens of millions of dollars” in damages.

The case is Receivership Management Inc v. Locke Lord LLP, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 1:18-cv-08158

Ex-Locke Lord partner struck off for misconduct that landed his firm record fine

22 May 2018

FBI: Contact was red flag

The former partner whose conduct in a dubious investment scheme led to the record £500,000 fine for US law firm Locke Lord last year has been struck off by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT).

Multiple allegations against Jonathan Denton – including that he acted dishonestly – were found proven and it emerged that he is now also facing criminal charges.

Last November, Locke Lord accepted the £500,000 fine over its failure to stop Mr Denton. It also became the first law firm to found to have lacked integrity.

Mr Denton had sought to adjourn the SDT hearing on the ground that North Yorkshire Police had confirmed that he would shortly stand trial on two charges of fraud.

However, in balancing the risk of prejudice to Mr Denton with its duty to protect the public and the reputation of the profession, the tribunal decided that it could proceed by hearing his evidence in private and not reference its detail in a full written ruling until after the trial concluded.

In any case, he chose not to attend, or be represented at, the hearing.

Mr Denton was born in 1959 and qualified in 1989. He was a partner at Locke Lord from March 2012 until the turn of 2014, after which he became an employee with the title ‘of counsel’. He was put on gardening leave for three months in mid-2015.

In late summer 2012, Mr Denton began to act on a series of transactions for companies called Ikaya and Slonne. He was the sole director of the former, with his wife the company secretary.

He acted for them until 2015 – Locke Lord even allowed him to continue doing so during his gardening leave – and over that time seven trusts were established with the two companies as trustees.

Through these they purported to operate a scheme where investors’ money provided security for a line of credit much larger than the security fund. A trader was to purchase a medium-term note which could then be sold on, discharging the debt and creating a profit for investors.

The scheme promised that whilst the margins were small, the sums involved were substantial and so generated a significant profit, with the invested funds not at risk unless the bank failed.

In all, more than £40m passed through Locke Lord’s client account in different currencies. Some of it was paid away to unrelated third parties – including a Buddhist retreat in the Andalusian mountains – some was paid as ‘profit’ to other investors, and some was used to repay investor capital.

Seven allegations were made and upheld against Mr Denton. The SDT said he had undertaken no due diligence on behalf of clients and encouraged them to invest in a venture that bore the hallmarks of being a dubious investment scheme “from the outset”, in breach of several SRA Principles.

It continued: “[He] had numerous opportunities to withdraw from the investment schemes and safeguard his clients’ monies.

“Instead, he offered false assurances as to the progress of the transactions and paid non-existent ‘profits’ to some of the investors. He continued to receive monies in and monies out of the trusts despite the red flags.”

These red flags included the firm being contacted by both the FBI and the Metropolitan Police. It was, the tribunal said, “inconceivable” that Mr Denton did not recognise the dubious nature of the schemes.

Other findings included that he misled third parties, failed to protect client money, and acted in conflicts of interest. These included a conflict with his employer – as the director of Ikaya, he wanted to keep legal fees down, but as an employee of Locke Lord, he was rewarded with a bonus if a certain amount was billed.

Indeed, the SDT noted that Mr Denton signed the retainer on behalf of both firm and client.

Deciding to strike him off, the tribunal found that Mr Denton’s conduct was motivated by financial gain and was “a flagrant breach of trust placed in him by his clients and investors who relied on his status as a solicitor”.

He had also caused “significant harm” to individual investors, who had lost substantial amounts of money and some of whom were left suffering severe financial difficulties.

“The harm he had caused to the reputation of the profession was immeasurable. His conduct demonstrated a complete departure from the standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness expected of a solicitor.

“The seriousness of his misconduct was aggravated by his proven dishonesty.”

Mr Denton was also ordered to pay costs of £70,000, in addition to the £30,000 paid by Locke Lord.

It emerged last year that Locke Lord and its insurer have already paid out millions of pounds to settle claims brought by investors.

Stokey v. PHH Mortgage Corporation and Wells Fargo (4:23-cv-01101)
District Court, E.D. Texas – snap removed by Lord

FFGGP Inc aka Kingman Holdings (Ken Harter) v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (3:24-cv-00470)
District Court, N.D. Texas – snap removed by Lord

Shelley Hopkins would do a Sammy the Bull, and “Rat” on Harter in recent cases

Luna n’ Spinoso v. PHH Mortgage Corporation (4:24-cv-00551)
District Court, S.D. Texas – snap removed by Lord

Dorman (Ryan Daniel) v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (4:24-cv-00024)
District Court, N.D. Texas – THIS CASE/ARTICLE

Notes; Daniel attacked by Shelley Hopkins and Ryan also defended the jailed mortgage broker Jose Antonio Caballero in Dallas, (along with Wade Kricken), post release, a case highlighted on LIT.

Shepherd (Jeff Jackson) v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (4:24-cv-00415)
District Court, S.D. Texas

It’s unusual for Lord only to have one, not 3 lawyers on the case billing. However, this case only lists Jones, and her bio on Lord’s website shows her as “counsel”.

Dorman (Ryan Daniel) v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (4:24-cv-00024)
District Court, N.D. Texas – THIS CASE/ARTICLE

Notes; Taneska Jones is fairly new at Lord. Her past firm seems to have focused on labor/employment law.

In both Shepherd and Dorman, the non judicial foreclosures could have proceeded. The snap removal is just added time, fees and expenses for the foreclosure mill’s unsuspecting clients.

Case (Cause) Number Style File Date Court Case Region Type Of Action / Offense
202407548- 7
Active – Civil
SULLIBRA PROPERTIES LLC vs. PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES LLC 2/5/2024 080 Civil Quiet Title
202006644- 7
Disposed (Final)
YATES, DOREEN vs.
LILEP LLC (D/B/A KING PROPERTY MANAGEMENT)
1/30/2020 080 Civil OTHER CIVIL
201807764- 7
Disposed (Final)
CEPEDA, ASCENCION vs. PAIZ, SAM 2/5/2018 165 Civil Debt / Contract – Debt / Contract

DRAFTING A REPLY…

APR 3, 2024

The Defendants provide their interpretation of the background of Dorman proceedings related to her (Southlake) homestead (at A.). Thereafter they provide their own legal interpretation of Mark’s reasoning for intervention, providing legal argument as to why this should be denied (At B.). In their summation of Mark, they admit he has two methods of intervening; first as a “legal blogger”,  and second; he resides at a “property that serves as his home office and (Kingwood) residence”.

In Defendants legal arguments, they are fixated on Mark’s lack of relationship between the two properties and/or legal proceedings between legal homeowners Dianne Dorman and Joanna Burke (“Joanna”).  Notably, at no point do they refer to Mark as a tenant in the Kingwood property which has been subject to wrongful foreclosure sale proceedings on at least two occasions so far in 2024, and we’re only starting April. Instead, they malign Mark and maliciously attribute him to Joanna’s past litigation which includes motions to intervene.

Mark has never been a party in the underlying foreclosure litigation, and which primarily involves a dispute surrounding clouded title of the homestead. As a tenant, Mark is not named in the deed of trust or related legal documents and as such he does not hold a legal interest in the litigation. Yet, despite this Defendants assert “Plaintiff and Movant (Mark) are similarly involved in foreclosure litigation based on underlying contracts with Defendants.”. Mark has no contract with Defendants.

They also falsely attack Mark’s intervention in Dunn’s Houston federal case.

In direct response to Defendants objections, further analysis of Mark’s legal standing is necessary to address both intervention as a right and/or permissively. As admitted, Mark is a legal blogger with a keen interest in foreclosure proceedings in both Texas and nationwide. Most recognized journalists, bloggers or writers’ find their niche based on their own experiences, and Mark is no different. Since the launch of his blogs, he’s published many articles about all of the parties, and who are regularly involved in foreclosure lawsuits. He is also affected by Texas laws as an occupant of a residence involved in lengthy foreclosure litigation lasting over 14 years.

Critically, it was only in November 2023 that Mark was formally put on notice by Defendants, when he signed for the notice of the scheduled illegal foreclosure sale of his residence at auction on January 2, 2024 from the USPS carrier who rang his doorbell and asked for his signature. That notice clearly included “all occupants”. At that moment, Mark (occupant) became  a noticed party for the very first time.

Additionally, as a very active legal blogger who publishes articles or updates on foreclosure litigation on a daily basis, he has extensive and detailed knowledge and access to a database of legal cases involving both state and federal foreclosures on his legal blogs and web servers.

Armed with this information and illegal notice from Defendants, Mark invoked his own legal rights as an occupant and legal blogger by intervening in the Dunn case. When that case was closed without resolution of his motion, and the Defendants filed for a second auction hard on the heels of the first, scheduled for March 5, 2024, he scoured both state and federal courts for any foreclosures involving the same parties, and came across these proceedings and parties, which were a match. A forensic legal analysis was conducted, comparing how Defendants litigated both Dorman and Joanna’s cases and non-judicial foreclosures. Dorman’s litigation was treated completely differently from Joanna’s. Joanna, as an 85-year old widow and pro se, was discriminated against. She was repeatedly, willfully, and maliciously abused by Defendants. In comparison, Dorman was not, notably aided by legal counsel. In a nutshell, this is why Mark is intervening in these proceedings, in order to obtain critical information about Defendants discriminatory practices – by right or permissively – as well as non-party (occupant) damages and injunctive relief (to prevent any future attempts at illegal foreclosure) related to the same, and to ensure he wasn’t staring at an eviction notice next, see; Tex. Prop. Code § 24.001.

For the reasons provided herein, and relying upon cases of public concern and interest which sanctioned litigation abuses such as witnessed here in the Sundquist case and in Texas, the live and ongoing $4 million dollar triple-damages judgment and current settlement talks in the Jones case involving Defendants, their objections are without legal merit and Mark should be granted permission to intervene as a right and/or permissively in order to pursue non-party damages, injunctive relief and other relief as may be determined by Mark or the court itself.

When Mark reviewed Defendants response, he immediately recognized sanctionable conduct by current counsel for Deutsche Bank and PHH: Locke Lord. After switching places with Mark Cronenwett of Mackie Wolf, Lord’s attorneys, well known to Mark from his blogging, responded with allegations and arguments therein which are without legal merit or foundation, and legally categorized as frivolous, intended to harass, and brought in bad faith. Mark requests sanctions by the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are appropriate.

Defendants and Lord spent a considerable amount of time and effort maligning Mark as a vexatious litigant, when the facts, the law, and Lord’s own cases and pleadings reject that legal assertion. See, generally; “2. Movant’s intervention will cause unduly delay and prejudice Plaintiff and Defendants.” (p. 9-10). Lord has no legal authority to respond for Plaintiff, who is unopposed to Mark’s intervention.

Mark has frequently blogged about the third branch of government. It is fair to say, he is probably the most public critic. His blogs curated brand persona is likely the most contentious of  all online media outlets, as witnessed by the repeated attempts by the federal government agencies and their contractors to interfere with his First Amendment rights, including threatening take-down requests pertaining to federal judges on his blogs. These are not conclusory allegations; they are supported by publicly available published articles on Mark’s legal blogs with supporting evidence.

Aware of the changing dynamic surrounding social media, blogging, and diminishing First Amendment and Constitutional rights of citizens and the media, Mark attempts to stay abreast of judges’ own commentary in published legal opinions. Here, Judge Pittman has previously vented his frustration at why Dorman was before him after snap removal from state court by Defendants, and yet unbelievably her state case returns once more. As recently as last week, Judge Pittman has vehemently rejected forum shopping, while at the same time Congress and the administrative offices of the US Courts seeks to curb judge shopping, which this District refuses to adopt, voluntarily.

With a material interest in Joanna’s litigation, and the legal fall-out between former Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith and supported by recognized lawyers (referred to as ‘legal titans’ by their peers) such as Steve Berman of Hagens Berman and Constance Pfeiffer, formerly of Beck Redden, and the Fifth Circuit, Mark’s investigative blogs conclusively prove that the application of the laws in both state and federal courts’ is inconsistent and unequal; that self-represented litigants are not treated the same as litigants with legal counsel, and; that orders and opinions are manufactured based on who the court has before them, and not based upon the facts and attributable law which should control the decisions made.

In Mark’s case, the Dunn intervention is a perfect example which affirms his findings. The case involves title deed fraud, perjury, non-disclosure, legal, judicial and government interference (“the conspiracy”). More recently, when Mark circled back to the case, he’s discovered that the home was “sold” to a realtor/builder and this buyer obtained his loan from “Houston Evictions”, a firm which proudly announces if you’re looking for a great referral to a creditor rights lawyer or law firm, just ask as they know them all (obviously, considering their line of work). Mark alleges the conspiracy determined the early and premature dismissal of the removed federal case, in light of his proposed intervention.

Before reaching the specific legal prongs necessary to intervene, it is important to provide a quick summary of Defendant’s main argument, which is Mark cannot intervene as a right because he has no interest in the current litigation or property.

However, they conveniently exclude from their argument;

“Alternatively, under Rule 24(b), a court may permit intervention where the proposed intervenor “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).” – United States v. Erie Cnty., No. 09-CV-849S, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013), which clearly Mark does, as detailed in Mark’s “Non-Party Damages” and “Injunctive Relief” sections of his motion.

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
04/03/2024 20 SECOND ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiff, no later than April 15, 2024, shall file an Amended Complaint that complies with the Court’s January 10, 2024 Order. Failure to timely file an amended complaint could result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice for lack of prosecution without further notice. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/3/2024) (saw) (Entered: 04/03/2024)
04/05/2024 21 ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS to 15 Response/Objection by Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 04/05/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
04/07/2024 13:46:14

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MARK STEPHEN BURKE’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PLAINTIFF

MAR. 29, 2024

Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1 (“Deutsche Bank”) and PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH,” collectively “Defendants”), file this Response in Opposition to Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff and Memorandum of Law in Support and respectfully show the Court as follows:

I.  BACKGROUND

A.                 Plaintiff Dianne Dorman’s Current Lawsuit

On December 28, 2023, Dianne Dorman (“Plaintiff”) filed Plaintiff’s Verified Original Petition, Notice of Automatic Stay Under Rule 736.11, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, and for Injunctive Relief (“Petition”) in Cause No. 048-349030-23 in the 48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, styled Dianne Dorman v. U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Holders of the Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Asset-Back Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-HE3 and Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (the “State Court Action”).1

Plaintiff filed the instant suit to prevent foreclosure on real property located at 100 Ascot Drive, Southlake, Texas 76092 (“the Property”) pursuant to a mortgage secured by the Property.

(See Petition at ¶¶ 6-8).

Plaintiff alleges that (1) certain mortgage payments were not applied to her loan account; (2) inconsistent payment amounts were reported to the IRS; (3) lender-placed insurance was improperly placed on the Property; and (4) proper notices were not provided prior to the January 2024 foreclosure sale.

(See Petition at ¶¶ 10-11, 13).

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Texas Debt Collection Act, and Section 51 of the Texas Property Code.

(See Petition ¶¶ 28-33, 36-56).

Plaintiff seeks an automatic stay of Defendants’ foreclosure order granted in the 153rd Judicial District Court in Tarrant County.

(See Petition at ¶¶ 57-60).

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks an accounting of the loan, injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees. (Id.).

Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 8, 2024.

(Doc. No. 1).

Defendants filed an Original Answer and Counterclaim (the “Answer”) on January 12, 2024.

(Doc. No. 6).

Defendants assert counterclaims for non-judicial foreclosure and, in the alternative, judicial foreclosure.

(See generally, Answer).

On March 8, 2024, Mark Stephen Burke (“Movant”) filed his Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff and Memorandum of Law in Support (the “Motion”).

(Doc. No. 13).

1 Plaintiff incorrectly identified the Defendants in the style of her Petition; however, they are identified in the Petition at Section II and have appeared in their correct name and capacity.

B.               Litigation Surrounding Movant’s Property

Movant is a self-proclaimed legal blogger who investigates “foreclosure cases involving the Defendants, including their defense counsel and/or agents.”

(See Motion at p. 2).

Movant’s fixation on Defendants’ alleged wrongful actions stems from a foreclosure proceeding against his mother, Joanna Burke’s, property located at 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77339

(“Movant’s Property”). (Id.).

The Movant’s Property is wholly unrelated to the Property at issue in Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

For more than a decade, Movant has been embroiled in foreclosure litigation against Defendants and/or its predecessor involving the Movant’s Property, which purportedly serves as Movant’s residence and home office.

The history of litigation surrounding Movant’s Property was summarized by Judge Alfred H. Bennett in a previous lawsuit filed by the Movant’s parents and styled Burke v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al:

This case has an eleven-year litigation history that began in 2011 when Deutsche Bank Nation Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) sued pro se Plaintiffs Joanna and John Burke (“Plaintiffs” or “the Burkes”) for judicial foreclosure of Plaintiffs’ property commonly known as 46 Kingwood Greens Dr., Kingwood, Texas 77339 (the “Property”), based on Plaintiffs’ failure to make payments on their Texas Home Equity Note. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Burke et al, Civil Action No. 4:11-CV-01658 (“Burke 1”). After United States Magistrate Judge Smith found Deutsche Bank’s assignment to be invalid, Deutsche Bank appealed to the Fifth Circuit, who reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Deutsche Bank met the remaining requirements to foreclose under Texas law. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Burke, 655 F. App’x 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2016). When Judge Smith found in favor of Plaintiffs on remand, Deutsche Bank once again appealed. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Burke, 902 F.3d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 2018). In September 2018, the Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank on its foreclosure claim, noting that “[g]iven nearly a decade of free living by the Burkes, there is no injustice in allowing that foreclosure to proceed.” Id. at 552.

Unhappy with the outcome in Burke I, Plaintiffs filed two suits in state court two months later: one against Ocwen Loan Services LLC (“Ocwen”), the servicer of Plaintiffs’ loan, and another against Deutsche Bank’s attorneys during Burke I: Mark Daniel Hopkins, Shelley Hopkins, and Hopkins Law, PLLC (the “Attorney Defendants”). Both cases were removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Burke et al v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-4544 (“Burke II”) and Burke et al v. Hopkins et al, Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-4543 (“Burke III”). Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari for Burke I, which the United States Supreme Court denied. Doc. #17 at

4. Around the same time, Plaintiffs filed three Motions to Intervene and one Renewed Motion to Intervene in three unrelated lawsuits in the United States District Courts for the District of Kansas, Southern District of Florida, and Northern District of Illinois, each of which involved Ocwen or Deutsche Bank. Id. at 3 n.4, 6-7. All four motions were denied, with one ruling affirmed on appeal and another currently pending on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit. Id.

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180610 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 29, 2022)

(See Judge Bennett’s Order attached hereto as Exhibit A, pp. 1-2.) (emphasis added).

Movant now attempts to insert himself into Plaintiff’s foreclosure prevention case that is completely unrelated to the property that serves as his home office and residence.

The Motion to Intervene before this Court should be denied as such interventions related to Movant’s Property have failed in the past for similar reasons discussed below.

II.  ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A.                 Movant Does Not Have the Right to Intervene Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)

Movant seeks intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

(See Motion at p. 7).

To intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2), Movant must show that:

(1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the case; (3) disposition of the case may practically impair or impede his ability to protect his interest; and (4) he is inadequately represented by the existing parties.

Cruz v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:19-CV-340-M-BN, 2020 WL 4561855, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-340-M-BN, 2020 WL 4569042 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2020)).

“In the absence of any of these elements, intervention as of right must be denied.” Graham v. Evangeline Par. Sch. Bd., 132 F. App’x 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2005).

The movant “bears the burden of establishing its right to intervene” under Rule 24. Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014).

Movant cannot demonstrate any of the four required elements to satisfy his burden to intervene in this case.

1.                  Movant did not timely seek intervention.

Plaintiff filed suit on December 28, 2023.

Movant did not seek to intervene until more than two months into the lawsuit—and only when Movant’s Property was again scheduled to be sold at a foreclosure auction on March 5, 2024.

(See Motion at p. 4).

At this point in the instant proceeding, Defendants had filed their Answer and asserted counterclaims against Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff and Defendants conferred to outline the disputed issues, parameters of discovery, important case deadlines, and the possibility of an early resolution in accordance with Rule 26(f).

(See Doc. No. 9).

Moreover, this Court issued a Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 10) that includes fast- approaching deadlines, such as the April 1, 2024, deadline to file motions for leave to join parties or amend pleadings.

If Movant intervenes after April 1, the existing parties will not have an opportunity to assert additional claims or counterclaims against Movant if necessary.

Movant’s intervention in this case will also necessitate further discovery and litigation costs, in particular for Defendants to defend themselves against wrongful foreclosure allegations pertaining to two separate homes.

Movant’s untimely attempt to intervene will delay the proceeding and prejudice the parties.

See MT223, LLC v. Depositors Ins. Co., No. MO21CV00044DCRCG, 2022 WL 20507651, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2022)

(denying untimely motion to intervene that would prejudice the existing parties through delay).

The Motion to Intervene should be denied.

2.                Movant does not have an interest in Plaintiff’s Property.

A Movant must have a “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the action.”

MT223, LLC, 2022 WL 20507651, at *3 (quoting Ross v. Marshall, 456 F.3d 442, 443 (5th Cir. 2006)).

Whether an applicant has a legally protectable interest in the main action “turns on whether the intervenor has a stake in the matter that goes beyond a generalized preference that the case come out a certain way.

So, an intervenor fails to show a sufficient interest when he seeks to intervene solely for ideological, economic, or precedential reasons; that would-be intervenor merely prefers one outcome to the other.”

Id. (emphasis in original).

“[I]ntervention is improper where the intervenor does not itself possess the only substantive legal right it seeks to assert in the action.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1984).

“[C]ourts have found that asserted interests are not sufficient to justify intervention when . . . the interest asserted was too contingent, speculative, or remote from the subject of the case.”

Bear Ranch, LLC v. HeartBrand Beef, Inc., 286 F.R.D. 313, 316 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (collecting cases).

Moreover, a motion to intervene should be denied where Movant’s “claim of an interest in this case is facially frivolous.”

Cruz, 2020 WL 4561855, at *5.

Here, Movant fails to articulate his legitimate interest in the property or transaction subject to the lawsuit—namely Plaintiff’s Property or Defendants’ right to foreclose Plaintiff’s Property.

Movant does not allege that he is a borrower on the note secured by the Property, a party to the loan agreement, a third-party beneficiary to the loan agreement, or that he claims any legal interest in the Property.

(See generally, Motion).

Movant asserts that his “interests are intricately tied to the fraud and predatory lending practices affecting vulnerable and distressed homeowners, including conspiracy claims asserted.”

(See Motion at p. 7).

Movant further contends that “[t]he imminent threat to his home office (residence) as a result of the latest conspiracy and legal maneuver by the Defendants directly implicates his business, possessions, civil liberty, and constitutional rights.” (Id.).

However, Movant does not explain the connection between his home office and residence located at 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77339, and the current foreclosure litigation involving the Property in Southlake, Texas in which Plaintiff resides.

The Movant’s sole goal is to prevent foreclosure of his home office and residence. Said goal is wholly unrelated to the Property at issue in this suit.

The Motion to Intervene should be denied as Movant cannot demonstrate an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding before this Court.

3.                  The disposition of Plaintiff’s lawsuit will not impair or impede Movant’s ability to protect his interest in Movant’s Property.

Movant cannot establish the second element regarding his interest in the Property at issue and, thus, cannot prove that his (non-existent) interest will be impaired or impeded by the outcome of Plaintiff’s case.

The Court is incapable of determining whether the Movant’s right to protect that interest may be impeded by the disposition of this action when the Movant fails to assert an interest related to the property at issue in the present suit.

See Howse v. S/V “Canada Goose I,” 641 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1981)

(“In the absence of some interest in the main action, the remaining considerations of practical harm and adequacy of representation become irrelevant.”) (emphasis added).

Even if Movant could assert an interest in the Property or its foreclosure (which he cannot), Movant failed to articulate how a win or loss for Plaintiff will impact or impede Movant’s ability to protect his interest in the foreclosure proceeding involving his own home office and residence in Kingwood, Texas.

(See generally, Motion).

The Motion to Intervene should be denied.

4.                  Whether Movant is adequately represented is moot because he has no interest in the subject matter of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

“In the absence of some interest in the main action, the remaining considerations of practical harm and adequacy of representation become irrelevant.”

See Howse, 641 F.2d at 322. (emphasis added).

As discussed above, Movant failed to demonstrate an interest in the Property or whether the Property is foreclosed upon.

The Court does not need to consider whether Plaintiff and Defendants will adequately represent the Movant’s interest because said interest are not aligned with the named parties.

The existing parties are not obligated to represent Movant’s interest given that his focus is to save his own home office and residence located at a different location than the Property at the basis of the lawsuit.

The Movant is not an appropriate intervenor based on the requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

B.                 Alternatively, Movant Should Not be Granted Permission to Intervene Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)

Rule 24(b)(1) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who … (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

Permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary with the [district] court . . . even though . . . the requirements of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d at 470–71.

Permissive intervention is not appropriate if it will “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

1.                  Movant does not assert a claim that bears a common question of law or fact with Plaintiff’s causes of actions.

Setting aside the issue of Movant’s untimely Motion, he also failed to show a common question of law or fact that connects Plaintiff’s case to the foreclosure proceeding against his home office and residence in Kingwood, Texas.

A common question of law or fact does not exist because the instant lawsuit and the protracted litigation surrounding Movant’s Property derive from two distinct disputes.

See Nationwide Money Servs., Inc. v. Convenient Cash Sys., L.L.C., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0931-D, 2002 WL 31455506, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2002)

(denying permission to intervene because movant and plaintiff’s lawsuits presented sufficiently distinct contractual disputes such that they should not be litigated as one).

Here, Plaintiff and Movant are similarly involved in foreclosure litigation based on underlying contracts with Defendants.

However, the contractual obligations of Plaintiff and Movant (or his mother as borrower) and Defendants’ right to foreclose each property are governed by their respective loan agreements.

Movant and Plaintiff’s lawsuits are based on separate and distinct loan agreements executed by different borrowers, secured by real property located in two different counties, and purchased for different amounts which they agreed to repay to Defendants based on different terms.

There is not a common question of law or fact shared between the lawsuits for which the Court should grant Movant permission to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B).

2.                  Movant’s intervention will cause unduly delay and prejudice Plaintiff and Defendants.

The original parties to the proceeding before this Court will experience delay and prejudice if Movant is granted permissive intervention given his litigious nature and the litigation history surrounding Movant’s Property.

(See supra at Section I.B).

In August 2022, after filing three rejected motions to intervene Defendants’ lawsuits (among other actions), Judge Bennett stated that plaintiffs Joanna and John Burke (presumably via Movant) had a “history of litigation” that includes “vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits” that put substantial burden on the courts, Defendants, and even entirely unrelated parties.””

(See Ex. A at II, p. 6).

Judge Bennett further warned plaintiffs that “any additional litigation against Defendants [including PHH as Successor by Merger to Ocwen Loan Servicing] related to the Property or its foreclosure proceedings will be clear and compelling evidence of bad faith, such that the imposition of sanctions and pre-filing injunctions would be just.”

(Id. at IV, p. 7) (emphasis added).

Movant admits in this current Motion to Intervene that he, through his own actions and/or on his parent’s behalf, ignored Judge Bennett’s warning by filing another motion to intervene in a foreclosure action styled Dunn vs. PHH Mortgage Corporation in the U.S. Southern District of Texas—Houston Division—in December 2023.

(See Motion at p. 2).

Movant further demonstrates through the filing of this recent Motion to Intervene before the Court that he will continue to file vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits in connection with foreclosure of Movant’s Property against the courts’ admonishments.

These frivolous pleadings will undoubtedly increase litigation costs for Defendants, drain judicial resources, delay the instant proceeding, and distract from a possible early resolution of the instant case between Plaintiff and Defendants.

For the reasons noted above, Defendants respectfully implore this Court not to allow permissive intervention by Movant.

III.  CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants request that this Court deny the Motion to Intervene and for all other relief, in law and in equity, to which Defendants are entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

LIT UPDATE

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P-BJ

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
03/28/2024 14 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 13 MOTION to Intervene filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendants’ Opposed Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 03/28/2024)
03/29/2024 15 RESPONSE filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation re: 13 MOTION to Intervene (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Denying Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff) (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 03/29/2024)
03/29/2024 16 ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS to 15 Response/Objection by Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, PHH Mortgage Corporation. (Jones, Taneska) (Entered: 03/29/2024)
04/01/2024 17 ORDER: It is ORDERED that the above-captioned case is hereby referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cureton for all pre-trial case management proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)(B). (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 4/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 04/01/2024)
04/01/2024 18 ELECTRONIC ORDER finding as moot 14 Defendants’ Opposed Motion to Extend Time to Response to Mark Stephen Burke’s Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff as Defendants filed their response on March 29, 2024 [doc. 15]. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/1/2024) (chmb) (Entered: 04/01/2024)
04/01/2024 19 ORDER STRIKING AND UNFILING DOCUMENT(S) 16 Additional Attachments to Main Document filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company due to the following deficiency: The document(s) must be in proper form. See LR 10.1 or LCrR 49.3. Defendants shall refile their Appendix in proper form no later than 4/5/2024. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton on 4/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 04/01/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
04/01/2024 18:13:46

There’s no response by Locke Lord to the intervention, despite their objection when conferencing. This is an admission.

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
03/08/2024 13 Motion to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke with Memorandum of law in support. (saw) (Entered: 03/13/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
03/27/2024 16:38:33

Motion to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke with Memorandum of law in support. (saw) (Entered: 03/13/2024)

This was recovered directly from pacer at 10.54 am on Mar. 13, 2024, as nothing was shown on Courtlistener and no notice issued to intervenor.

Despite the first and second motions arriving in NDTX on a Thursday lunchtime, there was a big delay in docketing the latest motion to intervene – the first filed and stricken on a Monday and the second, filed and…. today, Wednesday.

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
03/04/2024 12 ORDER STRIKING AND UNFILING DOCUMENT 11 MOTION to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke due to the following deficiency: Movant’s Certificate of Conference is deficient. Movant does not state that a conference was held, nor does Movant explain why it was not possible to confer. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 3/4/2024) (bdb) (Entered: 03/04/2024)
03/08/2024 13 Motion to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke with Memorandum of law in support. (saw) (Entered: 03/13/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
03/13/2024 10:54:23

LIT COMMENTARY

LIT’s founder intervenes in Dorman foreclosure proceedings in Fort Worth. The underlying investigation and facts surrounding the reasoning are provided in this article, published on LIT.

In The Federalist Papers, James Madison and others argued that the proposed U.S. Constitution

would protect the liberty and property of the citizens from usurpations of power from the federal government.

Power in the new government was to be divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. This would create a system of checks and balances necessary to hinder the unwarranted expansion of political power.

The division of power would also make it more difficult for a majority to oppress a political minority and political stability would more likely result.

In the following passage James Madison discusses the problems of “mutable policy” (governmental activism). Madison believed that the new Constitution would establish a consistent, stable set of laws necessary to promote prosperity. Otherwise, he warned:

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself.

It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.

Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

MARK STEPHEN BURKE’S [REFILED] MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PLAINTIFF AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

AS FIRST PLEADING STRICKEN BY COURT

MARCH 5, 2024

As it has to be mailed, the Intervenor’s Motion is being tracked on USPS website and Tracking says; Delivered on Thursday, Mar. 7, 2024 at 12.07 pm.

Despite this, today, Sunday March 10, nothin’ is on the docket (see tab below).

LIT anticipates the federal court will mirror last week’s shenanigans and backdate the docket to the delivery date and upload it – after LIT’s founder wrote to the court on Monday, asking when the motion would be docketed.

Notably, at the same time the court would strike the motion, thus keeping it from public view.

We wonder what will happen this Monday…11th March, 2024.

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
03/04/2024 12 ORDER STRIKING AND UNFILING DOCUMENT 11 MOTION to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke due to the following deficiency: Movant’s Certificate of Conference is deficient. Movant does not state that a conference was held, nor does Movant explain why it was not possible to confer. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 3/4/2024) (bdb) (Entered: 03/04/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
03/10/2024 10:38:13

As it has to be mailed, the Intervenor’s Motion is being tracked on USPS website

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
02/01/2024 10 SCHEDULING ORDER: (This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025. Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.), MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024)
03/01/2024 11 ***STRICKEN & UNFILED PER 12 ORDER*** Motion to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (saw) Modified on 3/4/2024 (bdb). (Entered: 03/01/2024)
03/04/2024 12 ORDER STRIKING AND UNFILING DOCUMENT 11 MOTION to Intervene filed by Mark Stephen Burke due to the following deficiency: Movant’s Certificate of Conference is deficient. Movant does not state that a conference was held, nor does Movant explain why it was not possible to confer. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 3/4/2024) (bdb) (Entered: 03/04/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
03/04/2024 12:36:43

As it has to be mailed, the Intervenor’s Motion is being tracked on USPS website

U.S. District Court
Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00024-P

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al
Assigned to: Judge Mark Pittman

Case in other court:  48th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Te, 048-349030-23

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 01/08/2024
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: All Other Real Property
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
02/01/2024 10 SCHEDULING ORDER: (This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025. Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.), MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024. (Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

03/01/2024 13:18:26

MARK STEPHEN BURKE’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PLAINTIFF AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

Motion to Intervene

Proposed Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke (“Mark”), contends that intervention is justified in this matter, aligning his interests with the ongoing litigation. This motion is accompanied by the memorandum in support herein, and in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c).

Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervention

The removed Federal Court proceedings involve a dispute between Ms. Dianne Dorman (“Dorman”), represented by Texas lawyer Ryan Daniel, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DBNTCO”), PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”), represented by Texas lawyers Mark Cronenwett of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann P.C. until recently replaced by Locke Lord lawyers shortly after the snap removal.

The original state court legal proceedings allegedly aimed to safeguard Dorman’s residence from foreclosure, which proved successful, despite the reasons provided herein as to why it should have failed, and the auction sale executed.

Before reaching that discussion, it is prudent to discuss Mark Burke’s interests in the foreclosure case before this court.

Mark, as the proprietor of Blogger Inc. and the legal blog LawsinTexas.com, is dedicated to investigative journalism, particularly focusing on legal matters of public concern.

This case is part of an ongoing series on LIT,  which is investigating related foreclosure cases involving the Defendants, including their defense counsel and/or agents.

To comprehend the significance, a brief overview is necessary. Behind every business stands an owner, entwined with a personal life. In Mark’s case, his digital media businesses facilitate a home office, doubling as his residence, which has been embroiled in prolonged litigation due to a predatory loan.

Legally owned by Joanna Burke, Mark’s mother, the property has hosted Mark’s home office since 2009.

Currently, Joanna Burke pursues an active civil suit against PHH Mortgage Corporation in Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation (0:23-cv-01119-WMW-DTS), District Court, D. Minnesota, currently under appeal to the 8th Circuit.

Despite this effectively tolling any foreclosure notice or sale, the same defendants listed here have collectively defied the rule of law.

The First Illegal Foreclosure Notice:

Astonishingly, the Defendants first scheduled Mark’s home office for auction on January 2, 2024, disregarding the ongoing legal proceedings.

Those proceedings would eventually be halted by Joanna Burke applying “the Dorman Phenomenon”, which results in an automatic stay.

The Dunn Intervention:

Prior to the stay, and in order to preserve his own separate and independent legal rights to prevent Defendants’ illegal act(s) and threatened eviction, Mark intervened in a case proceeding in Houston Division:

Dunn v PHH Mortgage Corporation, and which is featured on LawsinTexas.com

(https://lawsintexas.com/pr/2v2).

This article and related series systematically reveal a conspiracy, a troubling pattern of collusion and corruption, and which alarmingly includes title deed fraud that disproportionately impacts vulnerable homeowners, as illustrated in the Dunn case, and Mark’s related motion to intervene.

Allegations of fraud and illicit activities by the Plaintiffs and their counsel are emphatically presented in these publications.

Notably, the Defendants, along with their legal representatives, are seemingly complicit in downplaying these fraudulent activities.

This collaboration extends to both state and federal courts, creating an environment where deceptive legal proceedings, laden with perjury, are utilized to halt foreclosures.

It is worth highlighting that the involved parties share legal counsel, and as witnessed in these proceedings, forming a tight-knit community within the creditor rights and foreclosure defense vertical.

Mark contends that the adverse publicity directed at all named parties and the court has triggered collusion and retaliation, especially within the small and interconnected network of legal professionals representing the involved parties.

This retaliatory response has taken a particularly contemptible turn with the latest legal maneuvers.

In the Dunn case, Judge Lake would first deny electronic filing permissions to Mark.

Then, Mark’s postal mail would be intercepted by the government and held by USPS in excess of a month, until Mark challenged them on social media.

Furthermore, it was a premeditated and calculated conspiracy during the Christmas and New Year holidays, and where courts were on reduced hour and taking into considering his personal interests and focus would be diverted to keeping his own residence from being snatched by an illegal foreclosure.

That stated, by the time these filings were delivered to the court, the date of the foreclosure sale had long passed, nullifying key requested declaratory and injunctive relief.

During this intervening period, the case would be dismissed without prejudice, a concerted move by the court  and conspirators to avoid contending with Mark’s motion to intervene, including the shocking but irrefutable criminality of the allegations contained therein.

The Second Illegal Foreclosure Notice:

Fast forward to this month, Defendants have apparently listed the Burke’s residence for sale again for March 5, 2024, triggering this emergency motion to intervene in this Dorman case, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Dorman Intervention:

Mark has investigated and featured this and Dorman’s past litigation history on LIT

(https://lawsintexas.com/pr/30z)

arguing when Dorman exited her latest bankruptcy in 2023, there was no requirement for Defendants’ to file another suit in September to obtain foreclosure judgment, as several had been obtained over the past, including this court on May 31, 2021, and another state court order of foreclosure after that, dated Nov. 15, 2023.

Furthermore, even supposing  another lawsuit was necessary, the scheduled auction could have continued as Plaintiff’s counsel’s pleadings were deficient in order to stop the sale.

Instead, the sale was stopped, and Mark Cronenwett on behalf of Defendants removed the case to federal court – no doubt to the chagrin of Judge Pittman, who previously objected to the practice in Dorman’s prior visit to this court in 2021.

Incredulously, the current docket indicates that mediation has been mandated, rather than show cause orders issued as to why this case has returned to Judge Pittman’s court.

Instead, the court has appointed Bryan D Bruner as mediator, with a deadline of November 1, 2024.

As historical records confirm (Case 4:19-cv-00592-P, Doc. 87, Filed 03/03/21) and as documented on LIT, Magistrate Judge Hal Ray (https://lawsintexas.com/pr/31j) previously conducted a failed attempt at mediation.

Furthermore, there is no active injunctive relief or any applications for injunctive relief in this court by Dorman preventing a sale;

nor  memorialized  agreement by the parties duly signed and filed as a formal pleading preventing any future sale;

nor in their Rule 26(f) agreement and which seeks to waive the initial conference is there any specific discussion of any future sale;

nor is there any order from the court specifically addressing any future auction or sale.

Alternatively, the latest precedent emanating from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entirely discounts the need for any reliance on the aforementioned to facilitate an expedited foreclosure in favor of the Defendants.

The Fifth Circuit now relies upon “prudential standing”.

See; Sechler v. U.S. Bank, No. 23-60103, at *3-4 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) as detailed in Exhibit DBPHH1, p.67-69.

Judge Pittman advocates his binding commitment on such orders in his own court rules, and even though the case is unpublished, he is duty bound to adhere and apply case law relevant to each case before him.

Here, his own opinion from March 2021 opens with the following three sentences:

“(1) Plaintiff Dianne Dorman brought this action to stop foreclosure.

(2) Dorman failed to make her April 2010 mortgage payment, and over the last decade, has still not made it.

(3) Instead, Dorman filed for bankruptcy three times and, after all were dismissed, sued her mortgagee and mortgage servicers, Defendants, to further delay”

Thus, relying on (2), the Sechlers precedent applies to Dorman.

If Judge Pittman was not aware before, he is now on early notice of this appellate court opinion.

It should be disclosed, however, that Mark and his mother both assert that this latest Fifth Circuit opinion is a manufactured opinion, and as such: judicial activism.

In light of all these facts, including the fact that the Defendants are not zealously advocating their case to show Dorman’s lawsuit as baseless, frivolous and in the words of Judge Pittman, brought “to further delay”;

and which should be subject to sanctions and dismissal due to prior orders of foreclosure;

and/or res judicata/estoppel arguments in the form of formal summary judgment or motion to dismiss pleadings;

and/or a request for a pre-motion conference to allow for this discussion to take place;

along with the disconcerting fact the court appointing a mediator when it would  be more prudent to issue a show cause order;

leads Mark to one definitive and final conclusion: the Defendants and conspirators, including the “judicial machinery itself” are maliciously targeting and persecuting the self-represented Burkes’ as part of a unified effort to violate the Burke’s constitutional rights in order to unlawfully and illegally steal the Burke’s residence by continuing with a March 2024 auction and sale.

The [Un]Civil Conspiracy

As well as the foregoing statements, there are many reasons why this ongoing abuse and brazen assault by the Defendants is described by Mark as a conspiracy.

First, and applicable to these proceedings, it meets the definition of civil conspiracy in law.

Douglas v. Dorchester Props., 3:22-CV-100-K-BK, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 2, 2022).

Second, the Defendants are openly  aided and abetted by State and Federal government agencies and branches, including the “judicial machinery itself”.

In support, these allegations have been well documented  and explained in Exhibit DBPHH1 and Exhibit DBPHH2 which should be recognized by the court and the parties, and which forms part of this motion and supplement, outlining the complaint in the words of the homeowner and ratified by the intervenor.

Intervention Under Civil Rule 24(a)(2)

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed Intervenor must satisfy four essential requirements for intervention: timeliness, a necessary interest, impairment of that interest without intervention, and the inadequacy of protection absent intervention (Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)).

Necessary Interest

Proposed Intervenor asserts a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation, a necessary condition for intervention

(Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2001)).

This interest, related to the subject of the action, is legally protectable even if not enforceable,

as per Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 566 (5th Cir. 2016).

Mark’s interests are intricately tied to the fraud and predatory lending practices affecting vulnerable and distressed homeowners, including the conspiracy claims asserted.

In the case before the court, the Defendants stopped a valid foreclosure from proceeding, but as detailed in this motion and supporting evidence and exhibits, continue to proceed with an illegal proceeding in Texas against the Burke household.

The imminent threat to his home office (residence) as a result of the latest conspiracy and legal maneuver by the Defendants directly implicates his business, possessions, civil liberty, and constitutional rights.

The urgency of Mark’s proposed intervention is evident in the intertwined personal, business, and legal battles.

Timeliness of Intervention

Proposed Intervenor contends that the intervention is timely, considering the contextual nature of the timeliness inquiry

(Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994)).

This case was removed on January 8 and has been set for mediation and a 2025 trial. Mark’s intervention is clearly timely.

Impairment of Interest Without Intervention

Failure to allow intervention would impair Mark’s substantial interests, given PHH’s premature actions in seeking foreclosure despite ongoing legal actions.

Adequate representation is clearly lacking due to the reasoning and facts provided, requiring intervention to safeguard Mark’s interests

(Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1967)).

Inadequacy of Protection Absent Intervention

Proposed Intervenor maintains that his interest cannot be adequately protected without intervention.

Even if the existing parties have not colluded or taken an adverse position, representation remains plainly inadequate where the existing parties fails to diligently pursue the intervenor’s interests

(International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1962)).

The Defendants are willingly extending litigation, most likely as appointed counsel continues to over-bill their clients for unnecessary lawsuits and repetitive orders of foreclosure, as documented in these proceedings and reaffirmed in other foreclosure cases, as published on LIT.

Furthermore, it is implausible that the involved parties would offer assistance or safeguard Mark, given their active conspiracy against his mother, Mark personally, and his non-profit media enterprise.

Their collaborative efforts aim to dismantle his home office, posing a severe threat to the viability of Mark’s business and his blog at LawsinTexas.com.

Mark contends this shared objective is apparent among the parties, the courts, and government agencies which have recently targeted him and his business pursuits.

Non-Party Damages

A home office undeniably holds significant importance, and any potential disruption, such as eviction, warrants protection—even if Mark is not directly involved in the foreclosure proceedings.

Whether Mark has ownership in the property or is a party or obligor on the debt is irrelevant in the context of the standing inquiry.

This principle is supported by legal precedents, such as Monroe (936 S.W.2d at 660), which established that standing to bring claims under the TDCA (Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act) extends beyond the “parties to the consumer transaction,” and Campbell (616 S.W.2d at 374), stating that “persons other than the debtor may maintain an action for violations of the TDCA.”

As per the TDCA (Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(2)),

“A person may sue for: actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter,”

as cited from McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), N.A., 788 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2015).

Mark can establish damages, including mental anguish resulting from this latest legal conspiracy and targeted harassment, leading to the unwarranted threat of foreclosure and planned eviction.

As highlighted in McCaig, mortgage servicer PHH Mortgage Corporation violates the Texas Finance Code by asserting legal rights it does not possess, concluding that because Wells Fargo (the loan servicer) did not have a right to foreclose, then its threat of initiating foreclosure proceedings was actionable under the TDCA.

Mark has met the necessary burden of proof, see; Williams v. Lakeview Load (sic) Servicing, LLC, Civil Action 4:20-CV-1900, at *49 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2023)

(“Proof of an actual injury is a liability element of Plaintiffs’ TDCA claims).

Injunctive Relief

Additionally, Mark will separately filed for emergency temporary and permanent injunctive relief to refrain PHH Mortgage Corporation from proceeding with the foreclosure sale.

See; Marauder Corp. v. Beall, 301 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App. 2010)

(“Under the statute, a person may sue for an injunction to “prevent or restrain” a violation of the TDCA.

TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.403(a) (Vernon 2006).”).

This injunction would also cap his injuries and damages, benefiting all parties affected as Mark is likely to succeed on the merits.

See; Vanderstok v. BlackHawk Mfg. Grp., Civil Action 4:22-cv-00691-O, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2023)

(“For these reasons, the Court holds that the balance of equities weighs in favor of granting Defense Distributed’s motion for a preliminary injunction and that the public interest is not disserved by affording such relief.”);

citing League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(“the Court has recognized that the public’s interest “in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations” weighs in favor of an injunction.”).

Conclusion

Based on the facts presented, Mark acknowledges the inherent challenges in seeking favorable consideration from this court, or any court in Texas due to his activism and investigative journalism.

Nevertheless, Proposed Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke—a recognized publisher of legal cases and matters of public concern—respectfully requests the court to grant leave for intervention, facilitating full participation as a party with rights and responsibilities.

Alternatively, permissive intervention, at the court’s discretion, is recognized as a viable option.

The inclusion of pertinent case law serves to emphasize the legal foundation for intervention in this case.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this day, 26th of February, 2024

/s/ Mark Burke

Mark Stephen Burke
Harris County, State of Texas

46 Kingwood Greens Dr
Kingwood, Texas 77339
Phone Number: (346) 763-2074
Fax: (866) 705-0576
Email: blog@bloggerinc.org

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This motion and memorandum complies with FRCP and the  Motion Practice for Judge Mark Pittman:

General Motions Practices

Any motion, response, or reply must be formatted as follows: Times New Roman, 12-point font, double-spaced text, single-spaced and bolded headings, one-inch margins on all sides, justified, centered page numbers, and single-spaced footnotes. Citations should be in text (not in footnotes), include italicized case names (not underlined) and statutes in small caps, and otherwise comply with the most recent edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.

See; https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-mark-pittman

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/civil-rules), I attest to the preparation of this motion on a Sunday and filing prior to court hours on Monday, a deviation necessitated by the urgent nature of this intervention. The proposed intervenor’s liberty and constitutional rights hang precariously in the balance, compelling swift action.

It is pertinent to note that the same Defendants in the Dunn case were duly notified in advance, an opportunity they regrettably chose to disregard. Given this precedent, it is reasonable to anticipate the motion is opposed.

/s/ Mark Burke

Mark Stephen Burke
Harris County,  State of Texas

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of February 2024, I filed the foregoing electronically and emailed a copy, including the proposed order in word document format to Judge Pittman’s clerk, in compliance with the court’s rules and Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.

/s/ Mark Burke

Mark Stephen Burke
Harris County,  State of Texas

Dorman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

(4:24-cv-00024)

District Court, N.D. Texas

JAN 8, 2024 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: FEB 8, 2024
FEB 8 23 26, APR 9, 2024

Above is the date LIT Last updated this article.

Deutsche Bank and PHH Mortgage aka Ocwen’s 2008 foreclosure litigation still going forward in 2024

SCHEDULING ORDER:

(This case is set for trial on this Court’s four-week docket beginning February 17, 2025.

Counsel and the Parties must be ready for trial on two days’ notice at any time during those four weeks., Joinder of Parties due by 4/1/2024., Amended Pleadings due by 4/1/2024., Discovery due by 10/18/2024., Motions due by 11/18/2024., Pretrial Order due by 1/23/2025.),

MEDIATION ORDER. The court appoints Bryan D Bruner as mediator. Alternative Dispute Resolution Summary form provided electronically or by US Mail as appropriate. Deadline for mediation is on or before 11/1/2024.

(Ordered by Judge Mark Pittman on 2/1/2024) (saw) (Entered: 02/01/2024)

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