Texas Foreclosure Defense Law Firm’s Outrageous Violation of Texas Laws

His Dad may have been a Judge, but this Texas Lawyer and Firm is not licensed in the State with the OCCC as a debt settlement agency.

J. Gannon Helstowski Law Firm | TexasCreditLaw.Com

Gannon is Not Registered with Texas OCCC

JUN 6, 2022


LIT ain’t seen a single case in Texas Courts where Gannon kept the homeowner in their home by defeating a wrongful foreclosure.

If we’re wrong Gannon – which we doubt very much – feel free to reach out.

Stop PHH Mortgage Foreclosure

Note: This is an old rate card, Gannon the Cannon’s prices have increased.

J Gannon Helstowski and his firm have represented my interest on several occasions.

They have always provided me all the facts needed to make real time decisions to my best interest.

Lead council and his team co council Jason Taylor and Litigation Mgr Ron Monroe lead an energetic and professional staff of paralegals always ready to respond to your inquiries and reach out to you regarding your case proactively to keep you ahead of issues.

I highly recommend the firm for its family oriented approach and dedication to your legal success.

James Sasser

U.S. District Court
Eastern District of TEXAS [LIVE] (Sherman)

Sasser v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Assigned to: District Judge Robert W. Schroeder, III
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Kimberly C Priest Johnson

Case in other court:  366th District Court of Collin County, TX, 366-03490-2019

Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 07/30/2019
Date Terminated: 09/26/2019
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
James Sasser represented by John Gannon Helstowski
J Gannon Helstowski Law Firm – Colleyville
5209 Heritage Ave
Suite 510
Colleyville, TX 76034
Fax: 817.382-3155
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. represented by Robert T Mowrey
Locke Lord LLP – Dallas
2200 Ross Ave, Suite 2800
Dallas, TX 75201-6776
Fax: 214/740-8800
Polsinelli PC – Dallas
2950 N Harwood Street
Suite 2100
Dallas, TX 75201
Fax: 214-397-0033
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDElizabeth Frances Hayes
Polsinelli PC – Dallas
2950 N Harwood Street
Suite 2100
Dallas, TX 75201
Fax: 214-594-5571


Date Filed # Docket Text
07/30/2019 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. from 366th District Court of Collin County, TX, case number 366-03490-2019. (Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0540-7370373), filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (index of docs filed), # 2 Civil Cover Sheet (Ex. B), # 3 Exhibit C (state court docket), # 4 Exhibit C-1 (original petition), # 5 Exhibit C-2 (certificate of conference), # 6 Exhibit C-3 (TRO), # 7 Exhibit C-4 (Certificate of cash deposit in lieu of bond), # 8 Exhibit C-5 (request for issuance of service), # 9 Exhibit C-6 (issued citations), # 10 Exhibit C-7 (returns of service), # 11 Exhibit C-8 (original answer), # 12 Exhibit D (list of parties), # 13 Exhibit E (name and address of court from which being removed), # 14 Exhibit F (list of counsel of record), # 15 Exhibit G (Collin County Appraisal District property info))(Hayes, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
07/30/2019 2 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. identifying Corporate Parent Wells Fargo & Company for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Hayes, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
07/30/2019 3 NOTICE by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS) (Hayes, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
07/30/2019 4 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Robert T Mowrey on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Mowrey, Robert) (Entered: 07/30/2019)
07/30/2019 5 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Marc Daniel Cabrera on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Cabrera, Marc) (Entered: 07/30/2019)

COMPLAINT against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., filed by James Sasser.(baf, ) (Entered: 07/30/2019)

07/30/2019 7 ***ANSWER FILED IN STATE COURT***

ANSWER to 6 Complaint by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A..(baf, ) (Entered: 07/30/2019)

08/06/2019 8 ORDER. The Court REFERS the above-styled and numbered civil action to United States Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson to conduct all pretrial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636. Signed by District Judge Robert W. Schroeder, III on 8/6/2019. (daj, ) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
09/23/2019 9 Joint MOTION to Dismiss With Prejudice by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Agreed Order of Dismissal With Prejudice7, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Final Judgment)(Hayes, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/23/2019)
09/26/2019 10 ORDER. Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. Docket No. 9. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), it is hereby ORDERED that the above-titled action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Each party shall bear its own costs. Signed by District Judge Robert W. Schroeder, III on 9/26/2019. (baf, ) (Entered: 09/26/2019)
09/26/2019 11 FINAL JUDGMENT. Pursuant to the Court’s order dismissing the case, the Court hereby enters Final Judgment. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the above-styled action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). All motions by either party not previously ruled on are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by District Judge Robert W. Schroeder, III on 9/26/2019. (baf, ) (Entered: 09/26/2019)

James Sasser’s Removed Lawsuit was in federal court for 2 months before a joint dismissal WITH PREJUDICE was filed and granted.

Based on the fee structure above, Sasser would have paid $3K for the first month and $1,500 for the second, that’s $4,500 for 2 months [stayed in home much longer].

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State Court Docket

From start to finish – 10 days.

Sasser filed IFP, meaning he has no money to pay court filing fees, e.g. all his available liquidity and cash was exhausted by paying Gannon.

Eviction Docket (IFP by Sasser)

Pricing from Zillow (Currently $246 / sq ft)

The eviction filing against Sasser is by a corporation run by  a real estate investor Mark DiSanti, namely MENNO MARION BACK RAZOR, INC.

His lawyer, Kenneth ‘Ken’ Harter, is well recognized by LIT and he’s the agent for Menno. Harter filed the eviction suit for DiSanti.

It would appear that the property was flipped to another real estate investor, Shao Jun Xu, as he is registered as the latest property owner per the Collin County Tax records.

State Court Docket

Why is Texas lawyer Jason LeBoeuf paying the cash bond on July 1, 2019 for Gannon’s client?

Stop PHH Mortgage Foreclosure

Stop PHH Mortgage Foreclosure

For BDF Hopkins Hourly Rate for Attorney's, You Could Only Hire a Paralegal at J. Gannon Helstowski Law Firm

Barron v. Countryman, 432 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“Though Texas ethical opinions have not prohibited flat fees [a.k.a. advance payment retainers] as unethical per se, they have recommended that all client funds whose nature of ownership is subject to question be placed into a trust account and segregated from funds belonging entirely to the attorney.
Id. at 678 n. 6 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Ethics Opinion 391 (discussing treatment of an advance payment retainer).”)

1.04 Fees

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee. A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is reasonable.

(b) Factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include, but not to the exclusion of other relevant factors, the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

(c) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.

(d) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph(e) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined.

If there is to be a differentiation in the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, the percentage for each shall be stated.

The agreement shall state the litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.

Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement describing the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(e) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(f) A division or arrangement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is:

(i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or

(ii) made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the representation; and

(2) the client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the association or referral proposed, including

(i) the identity of all lawyers or law firms who will participate in the fee-sharing arrangement; and

(ii) whether fees will be divided based on the proportion of services performed or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation; and

(iii) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made; and

(3) the aggregate fee does not violate paragraph (a),

(g) Every agreement that allows a lawyer or law firm to associate other counsel in the representation of a person, or to refer the person to other counsel for such representation, and that results in such an association with or referral to a different law firm or a lawyer in such a different firm, shall be confirmed by an arrangement conforming to paragraph (f).

Consent by a client or a prospective client without knowledge of the information specified in subparagraph (f)(2) does not constitute a confirmation within the meaning of this rule.

No attorney shall collect or seek to collect fees or expenses in connection with any such agreement that is not confirmed in that way, except for:

(1) the reasonable value of legal services provided to that person; and

(2) the reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred on behalf of that person.

(h) Paragraph (f) of this rule does not apply to payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement, or to a lawyer referral program certified by the State Bar of Texas in accordance with the Texas Lawyer Referral Service Quality Act, Tex. Occ. Code 952.001 et seq., or any amendments or recodifications thereof.


1. A lawyer in good conscience should not charge or collect more than a reasonable fee, although he may charge less or no fee at all. The determination of the reasonableness of a fee, or of the range of reasonableness, can be a difficult question, and a standard of reasonableness is too vague and uncertain to be an appropriate standard in a disciplinary action.

For this reason, paragraph

(a) adopts, for disciplinary purposes only, a clearer standard:

the lawyer is subject to discipline for an illegal fee or an unconscionable fee.

Paragraph (a) defines an unconscionable fee in terms of the reasonableness of the fee but in a way to eliminate factual disputes as to the fees reasonableness.

The Rules unconscionable standard, however, does not preclude use of the reasonableness standard of paragraph (b) in other settings.

Basis or Rate of Fee

2. When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. If, however, the basis or rate of fee being charged to a regularly represented client differs from the understanding that has evolved, the lawyer should so advise the client.

In a new client-lawyer relationship, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established.

It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation.

It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, in order to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee.

When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client.

A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding, and when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client it is preferable for the basis or rate of the fee to be communicated to the client in writing.

Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer’s customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth.

In the case of a contingent fee, a written agreement is mandatory.

Types of Fees

3. Historically lawyers have determined what fees to charge by a variety of methods. Commonly employed are percentage fees and contingent fees (which may vary in accordance with the amount at stake or recovered), hourly rates, and flat fee arrangements, or combinations thereof.

4. The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the interests of both client and lawyer.

The determination of reasonableness requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including those stated in paragraph (b).

Obviously, in a particular situation not all of the factors listed in paragraph (b) may be relevant and factors not listed could be relevant.

The fees of a lawyer will vary according to many factors, including the time required, the lawyer’s experience, ability and reputation, the nature of the employment, the responsibility involved, and the results obtained.

5. When there is a doubt whether a particular fee arrangement is consistent with the client’s best interest, the lawyer should discuss with the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications.

6. Once a fee arrangement is agreed to, a lawyer should not handle the matter so as to further the lawyer’s financial interests to the detriment of the client. For example, a lawyer should not abuse a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

Unconscionable Fees

7. Two principal circumstances combine to make it difficult to determine whether a particular fee is unconscionable within the disciplinary test provided by paragraph (a) of this Rule.

The first is the subjectivity of a number of the factors relied on to determine the reasonableness of fees under paragraph (b).

Because those factors do not permit more than an approximation of a range of fees that might be found reasonable in any given case, there is a corresponding degree of uncertainty in determining whether a given fee is unconscionable.

Secondly, fee arrangements normally are made at the outset of representation, a time when many uncertainties and contingencies exist, while claims of unconscionability are made in hindsight when the contingencies have been resolved.

The unconscionability standard adopts that difference in perspective and requires that a lawyer be given the benefit of any such uncertainties for disciplinary purposes only.

Except in very unusual situations, therefore, the circumstances at the time a fee arrangement is made should control in determining a question of unconscionability.

8. Two factors in otherwise borderline cases might indicate a fee may be unconscionable.

The first is over-reaching by a lawyer, particularly of a client who was unusually susceptible to such overreaching.

The second is a failure of the lawyer to give at the outset a clear and accurate explanation of how a fee was to be calculated.

For example, a fee arrangement negotiated at arms length with an experienced business client would rarely be subject to question.

On the other hand, a fee arrangement with an uneducated or unsophisticated individual having no prior experience in such matters should be more carefully scrutinized for overreaching.

While the fact that a client was at a marked disadvantage in bargaining with a lawyer over fees will not make a fee unconscionable, application of the disciplinary test may require some consideration of the personal circumstances of the individuals involved.

Fees in Family Law Matters

9. Contingent and percentage fees in family law matters may tend to promote divorce and may be inconsistent with a lawyer’s obligation to encourage reconciliation.

Such fee arrangements also may tend to create a conflict of interest between lawyer and client regarding the appraisal of assets obtained for client.

See also Rule 1.08(h). In certain family law matters, such as child custody and adoption, no res is created to fund a fee.

Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations cases are rarely justified.

Division of Fees

10. A division of fees is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm.

A division of fees facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring or associating lawyer initially retained by the client and a trial specialist, but it applies in all cases in which two or more lawyers are representing a single client in the same matter, and without regard to whether litigation is involved.

Paragraph (f) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation.

11. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (d) of this Rule.

12. A division of a fee based on the proportion of services rendered by two or more lawyers contemplates that each lawyer is performing substantial legal services on behalf of the client with respect to the matter.

In particular, it requires that each lawyer who participates in the fee have performed services beyond those involved in initially seeking to acquire and being engaged by the client. There must be a reasonable correlation between the amount or value of services rendered and responsibility assumed, and the share of the fee to be received.

However, if each participating lawyer performs substantial legal services on behalf of the client, the agreed division should control even though the division is not directly proportional to actual work performed.

If a division of fee is to be based on the proportion of services rendered, the arrangement may provide that the allocation not be made until the end of the representation.

When the allocation is deferred until the end of the representation, the terms of the arrangement must include the basis by which the division will be made.

13. Joint responsibility for the representation entails ethical and perhaps financial responsibility for the representation.

The ethical responsibility assumed requires that a referring or associating lawyer make reasonable efforts to assure adequacy of representation and to provide adequate client communication.

Adequacy of representation requires that the referring or associating lawyer conduct a reasonable investigation of the client’s legal matter and refer the matter to a lawyer whom the referring or associating lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle it.

See Rule 1.01.

Adequate attorney-client communication requires that a referring or associating lawyer monitor the matter throughout the representation and ensure that the client is informed of those matters that come to that lawyer’s attention and that a reasonable lawyer would believe the client should be aware.

See Rule 1.03.

Attending all depositions and hearings, or requiring that copies of all pleadings and correspondence be provided a referring or associating lawyer, is not necessary in order to meet the monitoring requirement proposed by this rule.

These types of activities may increase the transactional costs, which ultimately the client will bear, and unless some benefit will be derived by the client, they should be avoided.

The monitoring requirement is only that the referring lawyer be reasonably informed of the matter, respond to client questions, and assist the handling lawyer when necessary.

Any referral or association of other counsel should be made based solely on the client’s best interest.

14. In the aggregate, the minimum activities that must be undertaken by referring or associating lawyers pursuant to an arrangement for a division of fees are substantially greater than those assumed by a lawyer who forwarded a matter to other counsel, undertook no ongoing obligations with respect to it, and yet received a portion of the handling lawyer’s fee once the matter was concluded, as was permitted under the prior version of this rule.

Whether such activities, or any additional activities that a lawyer might agree to undertake, suffice to make one lawyer participating in such an arrangement responsible for the professional misconduct of another lawyer who is participating in it and, if so, to what extent, are intended to be resolved by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, ch. 33, or other applicable law.

15. A client must consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the association or referral proposed. For this consent to be effective, the client must have been advised of at least the key features of that arrangement. Those essential terms, which are specified in subparagraph (f)(2), are

1) the identity of all lawyers or law firms who will participate in the fee-sharing agreement,

2) whether fees will be divided based on the proportion of services performed or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and

3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or the basis on which the division will be made if the division is based on proportion of service performed. Consent by a client or prospective client to the referral to or association of other counsel, made prior to any actual such referral or association but without knowledge of the information specified in subparagraph (f)(2), does not constitute sufficient client confirmation within the meaning of this rule.

The referring or associating lawyer or any other lawyer who employs another lawyer to assist in the representation has the primary duty to ensure full disclosure and compliance with this rule.

16. Paragraph (g) facilitates the enforcement of the requirements of paragraph (f).

It does so by providing that agreements that authorize an attorney either to refer a person’s case to another lawyer, or to associate other counsel in the handling of a client’s case, and that actually result in such a referral or association with counsel in a different law firm from the one entering into the agreement, must be confirmed by an arrangement between the person and the lawyers involved that conforms to paragraph (f).

As noted there, that arrangement must be presented to and agreed to by the person before the referral or association between the lawyers involved occurs.

See subparagraph (f)(2).

Because paragraph (g) refers to the party whose matter is involved as a “person” rather than as a “client,” it is not possible to evade its requirements by having a referring lawyer not formally enter into an attorney-client relationship with the person involved before referring that person’s matter to other counsel.

Paragraph (g) does provide, however, for recovery in quantum meruit in instances where its requirements are not met.

See subparagraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2).

17. What should be done with any otherwise agreed-to fee that is forfeited in whole or in part due to a lawyer’s failure to comply with paragraph (g) is not resolved by these rules.

18. Subparagraph (f)(3) requires that the aggregate fee charged to clients in connection with a given matter by all of the lawyers involved meet the standards of paragraph (a) — that is, not be unconscionable.

Fee Disputes and Determinations

19. If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by a bar association, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it.

Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer’s fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, or when a class or a person is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the measure of damages.

All involved lawyers should comply with any prescribed procedures.

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Granting this Motion will not only save time and expense but also ensure a streamlined and efficient resolution of the related issues.

Texas Foreclosure Defense Law Firm’s Outrageous Violation of Texas Laws
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