FDCPA

Sanctioned Lawyer Ray L. Shackelford’s Repeat Frivolous Filings and Perjury Is Fine, Sayeth Courts

Ray Shackelford fails to disclose his relationship with buyer McQueen, the property will not cover the debt due, or his past litigation.

LIT COMMENTARY AND UPDATES

Feb 15, 2023

The Untouchable Shack: Judge Drew Tipton let’s the Wolves of Texas motion to strike and PROPOSED ORDER percolate on his bench for 2 and a half months, so we selected the share and publish on courtlistener today to send a memo about the Bandit’s personal family foreclosure.

What we do see, is the Shack’s bookkeeper Natasha Martinez, who’s also a HAR Realtor these days, is offering her services once more. As she’s done previously (around September 2022, as this article discusses), she listed the home “for sale” and after 63 days at the time of this update on Feb. 15, 2024, it’s “under contract – pending” once more.

This leads LIT to assume Federal Judge Tipton’s delay is so that the non-bank servicer can settle the accrued $600k plus debt for cents on the dollar for Bandit Shack, which will allow the case to be part of the Wolves and Gov. “Operation Cleanup”.

One will never know how much the debt settlement will be, but Shack clearly wants to keep this family home, and as it’s benefiting the judiciary in their ultimate quest to target LIT, they’ll probably write Shack a check.

That stated, this delay should never have stopped the Catholic Bandit and his Wolves from auctioning the home, based on his recent acts – as this homestead has been facing foreclosure for over 22 years.

LIT COMMENTARY AND UPDATES

Dec 14, 2023

Defendants U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-21 (“U.S. Bank”), and Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS” and together with U.S. Bank, “Defendants”) file this their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Surreply to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and shows as follows:

I.    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.                  Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Althea Shackelford on June 23, 2023.

[ECF Doc. No. 10.]

Due to an oversight of Plaintiff’s counsel not being registered in the ECF system, Defendants’ counsel was unable to complete service initially.

On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended certificate of service serving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s counsel via certified mail, U.S. mail and by email.

[ECF Doc. No. 12].

1 Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-2, is appearing herein in its correct capacity and is defending all claims against the named “U.S. Bank N.A.” in this action.

2.                  Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4(A), and Court Procedures 15(e)2, Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was due within 21 days on September 20, 2023. Local Rule 5(g).

Plaintiff failed to timely file a response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

3.                  The Court set a status conference on November 9, 2023, at 2:30 P.M.

[ECF Doc No. 15].

On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter advising the Court that he would be filing his Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and his Pro Hac Vice motion.

The Court cancelled the status conference.

4.                  After Plaintiff failed to file his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and submit a motion to appear pro hac vice, the Court notified both parties that a Show Cause Hearing would be set on November 16, 2023 at 1:15 P.M.

[ECF Doc. No. 16].

5.                  On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

[ECF Doc. No. 17].

6.                  On November 21, 2023, Defendants’ filed a Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

[ECF Doc. No. 20].

7.                  On December 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Response to Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Surreply”)

[ECF Doc. No. 21].

II.     ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

8.                  Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s Surreply because Plaintiff failed to ask leave of court to file it. “Surreplies are heavily disfavored by courts.”

Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. v. ATP Titan M/V, 551 F. App’x 749, 751 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014).

Neither the Federal Rules nor the Local  Rules  provide  for  the  right  to  file  a surreply.

Hence,  Plaintiff  should  have requested leave to file and explained why the surreply was appropriate.

See McClyde v. Jackson, No. CIV.A.H-07-4244, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11082, 2010 WL 519763, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2010), aff’d, 405 F. App’x 891 (5th Cir. 2010) (Ellison, J.) (striking surreply because the party did not obtain leave of the court to file it).

9.                  Furthermore, pursuant to this Court’s Procedures, parties are required to seek advanced permission from this Court to file a surreply to any motion. See Court Procedures 15(e). Plaintiff has failed to obtain such permission. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Surreply should be stricken from the record.

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that the Court grant their Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Surreply to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and grant such other relief to which Defendants may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Nicholas M. Frame

MARK D. CRONENWETT
Texas Bar No. 00787303
Southern District Bar No. 21340
mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com

NICHOLAS M. FRAME
Texas Bar No. 24093448
Southern District Bar No. 3121681
nframe@mwzmlaw.com

Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P. C.
14160 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75254
Telephone: (214) 635-2650
Facsimile: (214) 635-2686

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT:

COMES NOW, ALTHEA SHACKELFORD, Plaintiff in the above-styled and numbered cause and files her Response to Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on the Pleadings and in support thereof would show unto this Honorable Court as follows:

BACKGROUND

Since the execution of the Texas Home Equity Security Instrument on or about April 3, 2007, payments were made in a timely and consistent manner through December 2009.

Due to the change in the health and medical condition of Plaintiff, Lingie Shackelford and began to inquire with the former mortgage servicer, Taylor Bean and Whitaker Mortgage Corp. regarding the mortgage in either the form of a loan modification and/or short sale to process a reverse mortgage on the above captioned property.

For the next several years, the Plaintiff encountered the transfer and assignment of her mortgage several times from Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. to American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (AHMSI) to Homeward Residential Inc. and finally to Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.

Throughout these transfers and assignments, Plaintiffs have encountered dilatory and repetitive actions and requests by each of the aforementioned mortgage servicers including litigation in an effort to complete her loan workout request.

Plaintiff, at the request of Defendant, forwarded the completed short sale package and documentation on or about March 15, 2015 and to date after several inquires have not received any response.

As a result, counsel for Plaintiff has continued to make inquires with the Defendant’s short sale department to resolve this matter and finalize the short sale request. Again, counsel for Plaintiff has submitted the required updated information and has made several requests for a field inspection of the property to complete the evaluation of the property in question for the short sale request and has previously supplied a copy of the short sale application from September 2018.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

RESPA is a consumer protection statute designed to protect mortgagors from “‘unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices’ in the real estate mortgage industry,” and “to ensure ‘that consumers . . . are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement process.'”

Nash v. PNC Bank, N.A. Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil Action No. ELH-18-8, 15 (D. Md. Sep. 12, 2018)

“Among other things, RESPA requires a mortgage servicer to respond to a borrower’s “qualified written request” (“QWR”) seeking “information relating to the servicing of” a mortgage loan.”

Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil Action No. ELH-18-8, 16 (D. Md. Sep. 12, 2018)

“Plaintiff fails to address that violations under 12 C.F.R. §§1024.35 and 1024.39 are not private causes of action.”

A “notice of error” is described in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. It is “a form” of a QWR. Nash, 2014 WL 2895779, at *6.

The section imposes a duty on a servicer to respond to a notice informing the servicer of specified categories of “covered errors.”

12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(b) (listing the categories of “covered errors”).

Upon receipt of a notice of a covered error, a servicer must investigate the borrower’s assertions and provide a response within the specified time, which varies with the nature of the alleged error.

See12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e).

Failure to comply with the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 is enforceable by private action under 12 U.S.C. 2605.

See Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 839 F.3d 1003, 1007 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that there is a private right of action to enforce 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 under 12 U.S.C. § 2605). Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil Action No. ELH-18-8, 19 (D. Md. Sep. 12, 2018)

In McCants et al v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage et al the Plaintiff centers on 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 of Regulation X, which prohibits dual-tracking and governs error resolution procedures and permits borrowers to submit written notices of serving errors to a servicer, and damages owed pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605.

The Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that here is no private right of action under Section 1024.35 and Section 1024.36 of RESPA. … the Fifth Circuit has held that “Section 1024.41 (g) prohibits dual tracking, and 1024.41(a) expressly provides for a private right of action in the event the lender violates the provision.”

Gresham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 642 F. App’x 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2016). …Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III was DENIED.

McCants et al v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage et al, No. 6:2021cv00129 – Document 204 (W.D. Tex. 2023)

Violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 Error resolution procedures.

The Plaintiff has plead repeatedly the Defendant violated the following sections:

(a) Notice of error.

A servicer shall comply with the requirements of this section for any written notice from the borrower that asserts an error and that includes the name of the borrower, information that enables the servicer to identify the borrower’s mortgage loan account, and the error the borrower believes has occurred.

A notice on a payment coupon or other payment form supplied by the servicer need not be treated by the servicer as a notice of error.

A qualified written request that asserts an error relating to the servicing of a mortgage loan is a notice of error for purposes of this section, and a servicer must comply with all requirements applicable to a notice of error with respect to such qualified written request.

The Defendant asserts “Plaintiff has offered no evidence from which the Court could infer the existence of a special relationship that would trigger a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of Defendants. …

Plaintiff has thus failed to raise a question of fact about the existence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of Defendants.”

Based on the loan agreement, Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff under the Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations.

Defendant had a duty to mortgagors and mortgage servicers such as themselves, to provide notice of any transfers, assignment or sale of the note, to properly manage the loan and escrow account, to comply with the notice provisions contained in the deed of trust before accelerating the note and foreclosing on the property, and when applying for a mortgage modification to protect her rights and not mislead her.

As shown above, Defendant breached the duties it owned to Plaintiff and as a result of this breach she was damaged.

Violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39 Early intervention requirements for certain borrowers.

The Plaintiff has also plead repeatedly the Defendant violated the following sections:

(b)   Written notice.

(1)  Notice required. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a servicer shall provide to a delinquent borrower a written notice with the information set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section no later than the 45th day of the borrower’s delinquency and again no later than 45 days after each payment due date so long as the borrower remains delinquent.

A servicer is not required to provide the written notice, however, more than once during any 180-day period. If a borrower is 45 days or more delinquent at the end of any 180-day period after the servicer has provided the written notice, a servicer must provide the written notice again no later than 180 days after the provision of the prior written notice.

If a borrower is less than 45 days delinquent at the end of any 180-day period after the servicer has provided the written notice, a servicer must provide the written notice again no later than 45 days after the payment due date for which the borrower remains delinquent.

They also failed to inform Plaintiff of any assistance option and conduct a loss mitigation evaluation before accelerating the loan and proceeding with foreclosure.

U.S. Bank violated section 1024.39 by “failing to provide accurate information to [them] for loss mitigation options and foreclosure.”

HN5 Under certain circumstances, this Section requires the servicer of the loan to “make good faith efforts to establish live contact with a [*223] delinquent borrower . . . [and] inform the borrower about the availability of loss mitigation options.”

Id. § 1024.39.

As pointed out by the district court, Appellants allege only that U.S. Bank did not provide accurate information, not that U.S. Bank failed to make a good faith effort to inform them of their loss mitigation options.

Solis v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 726 Fed. Appx. 221.

In the case at bar however, Plaintiff is asserting specifically that the Defendant failed to make a “good faith effort” to supply her with loss mitigation options.

Defendant committed violations under RESPA by failing to do the following:

a.       Failing to provide Plaintiff with a specific reason or reasons for Chase’s determinations for each such trial or permanent loan modification option;

b.      Failing to provide accurate information to Plaintiff for loss mitigation options and foreclosure as required by 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39;

c.       Failing to provide a specific reason or reasons for denial of all loan workout alternatives prior to posting the home for foreclosure;

d.      Moving for foreclosure judgment or order of sale or conduct a foreclosure sale prior to providing a specific reason or reasons for denial of all loan workout alternatives.

Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant as a mortgage servicer violated the Texas Debt Collection Act by failing to respond timely to Plaintiff’s attempts to cure, to obtain a loan modification and all other issues asserted above.

Plaintiff has plead sufficient and specific facts and allegations that give the Defendant notice of the claims made against it, which is all Plaintiff is required to do.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has addressed her claims when it comes to the violations committed by the Defendant and has provided sufficient evidence of the same.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, and Plaintiff should be entitled to any and all further relief either in law or in equity.

WHEREFORE, ALTHEA SHACKELFORD, Plaintiff prays that this Court deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and that Plaintiff have such other and further relief to which she may be justly entitled.

 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ray L. Shackelford

RAY L. SHACKELFORD
Attorney at Law

Shackelford & Associates, L.L.C.
Texas Bar No.: 18071500
1406 Southmore Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77004
(713) 520-8484 [Office]
(713) 520-8192 [Facsimile]
E-Mail: rshackctic@yahoo.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

Defendants U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-21 (“U.S. Bank”), and Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS” and together with U.S. Bank, “Defendants”) file this their Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and shows as follows:

I.    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.                  Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Althea Shackelford on June 23, 2023. [ECF Doc. No. 10.] Due to an oversight of Plaintiff’s counsel not being registered in the ECF system, Defendants’ counsel was unable to complete service initially. On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended certificate of service serving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s counsel via certified mail, U.S. mail and by email. [ECF Doc. No. 12].

1 Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-2, is appearing herein in its correct capacity and is defending all claims against the named “U.S. Bank N.A.” in this action.

2.                  Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4(A), and Court Procedures 15(e)2, Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was due within 21 days on September 20, 2023. Local Rule 5(g). Plaintiff failed to timely file a response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

3.                  The Court set a status conference on November 9, 2023, at 2:30 P.M. [ECF Doc. No. 15]. On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter advising the Court that he would be filing his Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and his Pro Hac Vice motion. The Court cancelled the status conference.

4.                  After Plaintiff failed to file his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and submit a motion to appear pro hac vice, the Court notified both parties that a Show Cause Hearing would be set on November 16, 2023 at 1:15 P.M. [ECF Doc. No. 16].

5.                  On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF Doc. No. 17].

II.     ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

No special relationship between parties to support duty of good faith and fair dealing

6.                  Texas does not “recognize a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing in transactions between a mortgagee and mortgagor, absent a special relationship marked by shared trust or an imbalance in bargaining power.”

Visconti v. Bank of Am., No. 4:10cv532, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124315, *6, 2012 WL 3779083, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2012) (quoting Coleman v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67056, 2011 WL 2516169, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2011) (unpublished)) (quotation marks omitted);

see Souto v. Bank of Am., No. H-11-3556,

2 The parties also conferred via email on August 30, 2023, and Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to a deadline for a response 21 days from Plaintiff’s amended certificate of service.

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118841, 2012 WL 3638024, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2012); Casterline v. Indy Mac/One West, 761 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 709 (1990).

7.                  Plaintiff has offered no evidence from which the Court could infer the existence of a special relationship that would trigger a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of Defendants.

Additionally, Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any case law supporting the existence of a special relationship.

Plaintiff has thus failed to raise a question of fact about the existence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of Defendants.

No private cause of action under 12 CFR §§1024.35 and §1024.39

8.                  Beyond restating the applicable code provisions in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and offering conclusory allegations, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

9.                  Plaintiff fails to address that violations under 12 C.F.R. §§1024.35 and 1024.39 are not private causes of action.

Solis v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. H-16-00661, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211711, 2017 WL 4479957, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2017), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 221 (5th Cir. 2018); Vallier v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. CV H-17-0998, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42134, 2018 WL 1319166, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-0998, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41187, 2018 WL 1322247 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2018)

(“there is no private cause of action for any violation of 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35”)

By failing to address this argument, Plaintiffs abandoned these claims.

Defendants are, therefore, entitled to dismissal with prejudice of these claims.

See Mayo v. Halliburton Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113816, 2010 WL 4366908, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2010).

10.              In fact, Plaintiff attempted the same argument in previous litigation against Defendant’s predecessor in interest.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s RESPA claims with prejudice holding, “The Fifth Circuit has also held that neither 12 CFR § 1024.35 nor 12 CFR § 1024.39 provide for a private right of action.”

Shackelford v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. 4:19-cv-01540, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113226, 2020 WL 3542276, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2020).

No viable cause of action to support injunctive relief

11.              “[A] request for injunctive relief must be dismissed unless it is supported by a viable claim.”

Denman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. SA-13-CV-11-XR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62799, 2013 WL 1866580, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2013).

Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim they are not entitled to injunctive relief.

Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. SA-12-CV-00905-DAE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59469, 2013 WL 1773670, at *13 (W.D. Tex. April 25, 2013)

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that Plaintiff takes nothing on her claims plus Defendants recover its attorneys’ fees and all costs of suit as a further obligation on the debt.

Defendants further request such other and further relief to which it may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:22-cv-03496

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC et al
Assigned to: Judge Drew B Tipton

Case in other court:  334th District Court Harris County, TX, 22-63554

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 10/11/2022
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
10/30/2023 13 NOTICE of No Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment re: 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed. (Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/30/2023)
11/02/2023 14 NOTICE of Setting re: 13 Notice (Other). Parties notified. Status Conference set for 11/9/2023 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 8C before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed. (KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/02/2023)
11/03/2023 15 NOTICE of Resetting re: 13 Notice (Other). Parties notified. Status Conference reset for 11/9/2023 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 8C before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed. (KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/03/2023)
11/13/2023 16 NOTICE of Setting re: 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Parties notified. Show Cause Hearing set for 11/16/2023 at 01:15 PM in Courtroom 8B before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed. (KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/13/2023)
11/13/2023 17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Ray Shackelford (Fee Paid: $100, receipt number 400002796) by Althea Shackelford, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/4/2023. (TerriHanniable, 4) (Entered: 11/14/2023)
11/13/2023 18 RESPONSE to 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by Althea Shackelford. (TerriHanniable, 4) (Entered: 11/14/2023)
11/14/2023 19 ORDER granting 17 Motion for Ray L. Shackelford to Appear Pro Hac Vice Note: Instructions to request Texas Southern CM/ECF registration through PACER are found here.(Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified.(KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/14/2023)
11/21/2023 20 REPLY in Support of 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment , filed by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,. (Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 11/21/2023)
12/01/2023 21 First RESPONSE to 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Althea Shackelford. (Shackelford, Ray) (Entered: 12/01/2023)
12/04/2023 22 MOTION to Strike Plaintiff’s Surreplyto Defendants’ Reply In Support of Summary Judgment by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/26/2023. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/04/2023)

 


 

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Transaction Receipt
12/14/2023 12:34:24

LIT COMMENTARY AND UPDATES

Next court hearing before Judge Tipton provisionally set for Nov. 9, 2023 to discuss unchallenged MSJ.

NOV 3, 2023

One Year Later The Wolves of Texas Still Refuse to Seek Sanctions with their Lost their Bite When it Comes to a Vexatious, Admonished Bandit Lawyer Ray L. Shackelford in their unchallenged Motion for Summary Judgment

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-21 (“U.S. Bank”), and Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS” and together with U.S. Bank, “Defendants”) file this its Motion for Final Summary Judgment (“Motion”) against Plaintiff Althea Shackelford (“Plaintiff”), and states as follows:

I.  SUMMARY

Plaintiff is a borrower on a promissory note secured by real property.

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Injunctive Relief (the “Complaint”) relate to a deed of trust and foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiff’s real property located at 3241 Ozark Street, Houston, Texas 77021 (the “Property”).

(See Complaint at ¶ 4.1).

Plaintiff alleges that foreclosure of the Property cannot proceed because Defendants improperly denied her an opportunity for a loss mitigation workout, specifically pursuing a short sale or selling the Property by other means.

1 Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for TBW Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2007-2, TBW Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-2, is appearing herein in its correct capacity and is defending all claims against the named “U.S. Bank N.A.” in this action.

The home has been facing foreclosure ever since the year 2000, per real property records (23 years)

For these alleged wrongs, Plaintiff brings causes of action for

(1) breaching a duty of good faith & fair dealing,

and

(2) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Section 6 (f); 12 USC § 1024.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction against foreclosure, attorney fees, and actual damages.

(See Id. at Prayer.). (See Complaint at ¶¶ 37-39, 56, 57, Prayer).

This Motion will show that Defendants all times complied with the terms of both the promissory note and its accompanying deed of trust.

Further, Defendants have not violated any state or federal statutes.

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s causes of action all fail because, despite Defendant’s best efforts to assist, Plaintiff remains severely delinquent on her Loan.

Plaintiff will be unable to produce any admissible evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the history of his loan.

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

I.     EVIDENCE

Where appropriate, Defendants rely upon the following evidence, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference for all purposes:

Exhibit A:       Order Granting Independent Administration, signed May 16, 2018

Exhibit B:                    Judgment Declaring Heirship, signed May 16, 2018

Exhibit C:        Case Docket for Probate Proceeding

Exhibit D:       Memorandum and Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, cause no. 4:19-cv-01540

Exhibit E:        Final Summary Judgment Order, cause no. 2019-08212

Defendants also rely on the pleadings on file in this cause where specifically referenced herein.

II.      UNDISPUTED AND RELEVANT FACTS

The Loan

On or about April 3, 2007, Plaintiff and Lingie Shackelford (collectively, the Borrowers”) obtained a mortgage loan (the “Loan”) from Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“TBW”) in the original principal sum of $276,000.00, which was evidenced by a Note secured by a Texas Home Security Instrument (First Lien) (the “Security Instrument” and together with the Note, “Loan Agreement”) encumbering the real property commonly known as 3241 Ozark Street, Houston, TX77021.

Prior Legal History

LIT Note: Ray L. Shackelford, attorney in these proceedings, deeded the home to his mom, Althea Shackelford in 1984.

On February 14, 2017, Lingie Shackelford passed away. (See Exhibit A.)2

A Judgment Declaring Heirship was signed on May 16, 2018, in the matter of In the Estate of Lingie Shackelford, Cause No. 459780 in Probate Court No. 1, Harris County, Texas (the “Probate Proceeding”). (See Exhibit B.)

The judgment states that 100% of the community real property goes to Plaintiff. (Id.)

Thus, any interest Mr. Shackelford had in the Property was inherited by Plaintiff and Plaintiff is the sole owner of the Property.3

On February 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Original Petition against the former servicer of the loan and SLS’s predecessor in interest, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (“Ocwen”), under Cause No. 2019-08212, in the 61st Judicial District, Harris County, Texas.

Plaintiff brought claims for

(i) breach of contract;

(ii) violations of RESPA;

(iii) violations of the TDCA;

and

(iv) negligence.

Ocwen filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure.

2 Defendant respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Probate Proceeding, state, and federal filings. See Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1994).

3 The Probate Proceeding was closed on February 7, 2019. See Case docket for Probate Proceeding, attached and incorporated hereto as Exhibit C.

The state court action was subsequently removed to the United States Southern District of Texas, Houston Division under Cause No. 4:19-cv-01540.

On June 29, 2020, the Court granted Ocwen’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. See Exhibit D.

The case was subsequently remanded to the state court.

On November 29, 2021, the state court granted Ocwen’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim for foreclosure finding that “due to an event of default on the Note, PHH and/or U.S. Bank, or its successors and assigns, may enforce their security interest against the Property through non-judicial foreclosure of the Property as provided in the Deed of Trust and section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code .” See Exhibit E.

I.        SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court has further held that the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden of proof by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point to the absence of any fact issue in the record, and the evidentiary burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show with “significant probative” evidence that there exists a triable issue of fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“The moving party may meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that that record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.”).

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).

The non-moving party must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)

(non-movant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment with “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or a mere “scintilla” of evidence).

On summary judgment, the district court must view the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant.

FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1993).

II.  GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.     Plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing fails because there is no special relationship between the parties.

B.     Plaintiff’s RESPA claim fails because the Loan was previously modified and Plaintiff suffered no actual damages;

C.     Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because Plaintiff does not have a valid underlying claim.

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing fails because there is no special relationship between the parties.

“[A]bsent a special relationship, parties to a contract have no duty to act in good faith.”

Barrow-Shaver Resources Company v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 490 (Tex. 2019).

“It is well settled that the relationship between a borrower and its lender is neither a fiduciary relationship, nor a special relationship.”

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

The Texas Supreme Court has refused to imply a duty of good faith and fair dealing into Texas contracts.

English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).

Texas courts “have found no special relationship between a mortgagor and a mortgagee . . . that would impose an independent common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.”

UMLIC VP LLC v. T & M Sales & Envtl. Sys., Inc., 176 S.W.3d 595, 612 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (citations omitted).

“Ordinarily, there is no such duty in lender/lendee relationships.”

Vogel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1990)); English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).

Texas law does not “recognize a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing in transactions between a mortgagee and mortgagor, absent a special relationship marked by shared trust or an imbalance in bargaining power.”

Coleman v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67056, 2011 WL 2516169, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-709 (Tex. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which would constitute a “special relationship” with the Defendants, nor has Plaintiff pointed to any authority to show that there is a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the mortgage context.

See Casterline v. Indy Mac/One West, 761 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Smith v. National City Mortg, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86221, 2010 WL 3338537, at *12 (W.D. Tex. 2010).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty and good faith and fair dealing fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s RESPA claims fail as a matter of law.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violations of RESPA. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated various provisions of RESPA. Plaintiff specifically invokes 12 U.S.C. § 2614, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39, and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. She alleges that

Defendants violated these provisions by:

(i) failing to provide her with a specific reason for its determinations “for each such trial or permanent loan modification option[;]”

(ii) failing to provide her with accurate information regarding loss mitigation options and foreclosure;

(iii) failing to provide a specific reason for its denial of “all loan workout alternatives;”

and

(iv) improperly moving for foreclosure judgment prior to providing a specific reason for its denial of all “loan workout alternatives.”

See Petition at ¶6.4.

As a threshold matter, 12 U.S.C. § 2614 is a jurisdictional statute. It does not impose any requirements on Defendants in connection with its servicing of the Loan.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not have a private right of action for violations of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 and/or 1024.39.

See Solis v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211711, at *8-9 (S.D. Tex. 2017).

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is therefore legally deficient to the extent it is based on 12 U.S.C. § 2614 and 12 C.F.R. §§1024.35 and 1024.39.

Section 1024.41 establishes procedures for reviewing applications for loss mitigation assistance.

See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated these procedures by failing to provide clarification on what additional documentation was needed. There is very little factual support for these conclusory allegations in the Petition.

Attached to Plaintiff’s Petition are two notices from SLS informing Plaintiff that her application is incomplete and the specific documents needed to complete her application.

See Petition, Exhibit A, B.

Ultimately, the requirement for a servicer to provide a specific reason for its denial of a loss mitigation application is dependent on a borrower submitting a complete application.

See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d).

An application is “complete” when “a servicer has received all information that the servicer requires from a borrower in evaluating applications for the loss mitigation options available to the borrower.”

See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1).

Plaintiff has failed to establish the “completeness” of her short sale application and her own exhibit demonstrates that the application was incomplete.

Plaintiff also fails to allege that the application at issue was her first application for loss mitigation assistance. Absent such an allegation, Plaintiff has not established that SLS was obligated to review the application.

See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(i) (recognizing that a servicer is not required to review duplicative loss mitigation applications);

see also Solis, 726 F. App’x at 223

(affirming dismissal of claim under section 1024.41 where borrowers failed to allege that application at issue was there first application).

8.                  Further, to recover, a claimant must show that actual damages resulted from a RESPA violation. § 2605(e), (f).

Whittier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 594 F. App’x 833, 836 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“To recover, a claimant must show that actual damages resulted from a RESPA violation.”)

Plaintiff cannot show any damages suffered in relation to a RESPA violation.

As a result, Plaintiff’s RESPA claim fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs is not entitled to injunctive relief because she does not have a valid underlying claim.

Plaintiff has requested a temporary injunction, a permanent injunction, a restraining order, and general equitable relief.

(See Petition at Prayer). To prevail on a claim for injunctive relief in federal court, a plaintiff must show, among other things, “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.”

Green v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1498-N, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191364, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2013) (citing DSC Communs. Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Further, injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action. Garza v. Morgan, No. 1:17cv82, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208298, at *34 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2017)

(citing Howard v. AMH ROMAN TWO TX, LLC, Case No. 4:15CV526, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78701, 2016 WL 3392417, at *5 (E.D. Tex., May 11, 2016)

(“A request for equitable or injunctive relief must be premised upon the existence of a viable underlying legal claim. Here, Plaintiff’s claims for legal relief have failed. Thus, his claims for equitable and injunctive relief also fail.”);

Hanna v. RFC Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76314, 2012 WL 1969948, at *5 (N.D. Tex., 2012).

Since Plaintiff does not have a valid underlying claim, she is not entitled to injunctive relief.

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that Plaintiff takes nothing on her claims plus Defendants recover its attorneys’ fees and all costs of suit as a further obligation on the debt. Defendants further request such other and further relief to which it may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

By:  /s/ Nicholas M. Frame

MARK D. CRONENWETT
Texas Bar No. 00787303
Southern District Bar No. 21340
mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com

NICHOLAS M. FRAME
Texas Bar No. 24093448
Southern District Bar No. 3121681
nframe@mwzmlaw.com

Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P. C.
14160 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75254
Telephone: (214) 635-2650
Facsimile: (214) 635-2686

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on the persons listed below on Friday, June 23, 2023, in the manner indicated.

Via Electronic Case Notice
Ray L. Shackelford, Esq.
rshackctic@yahoo.com
1406 Southmore Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77004

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Nicholas M. Frame
NICHOLAS M. FRAME

LIT COMMENTARY AND UPDATES

Oct 21, 2022

The Wolves of Texas Have Lost their Bite When it Comes to a Vexatious Bandit Lawyer, replying With a Standard Answer

There's No Shame when You're Playin' the Ochlocracy Game

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC

(4:22-cv-03496)

District Court, S.D. Texas, Judge Drew Tipton (Hughes off the case)

NOTICE of Setting re: 13 Notice (Other). Parties notified.

Status Conference set for 11/9/2023 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 8C before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed.

(KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/02/2023)

Admonished Lawyer Shack’s non-responsive to Motion for Summary Judgment.

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:22-cv-03496

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC et al
Assigned to: Judge Drew B Tipton

Case in other court:  334th District Court Harris County, TX, 22-63554

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 10/11/2022
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
10/30/2023 13 NOTICE of No Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment re: 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed. (Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/30/2023)
11/02/2023 14 NOTICE of Setting re: 13 Notice (Other). Parties notified. Status Conference set for 11/9/2023 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 8C before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed. (KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/02/2023)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
11/03/2023 08:01:55

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:22-cv-03496

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC et al
Assigned to: Judge Drew B Tipton

Case in other court:  334th District Court Harris County, TX, 22-63554

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 10/11/2022
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
12/09/2022 7 STATUS REPORT by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed.(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/09/2022)
12/14/2022 8 Discovery ORDER. By 6/9/2023, discovery will be complete. By 6/23/2023, the parties may move dispositively. By 6/30/2023, the parties must jointly report as ordered. Internal review set for 7/3/2023 (Signed by Judge Lynn N Hughes) Parties notified. (CrystinaHuerta, 4) (Entered: 12/14/2022)
02/13/2023 9 NOTICE of Reassignment to Judge Drew B Tipton, pursuant to General Order No. 2023-3. Deadlines in scheduling orders remain in effect Judge Lynn N Hughes no longer assigned to the case. Parties notified, filed. (DawnaKelly, 4) (Entered: 02/13/2023)
06/23/2023 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed. Motion Docket Date 7/14/2023. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 06/23/2023)
08/24/2023 11 NOTICE of Setting re: 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment . Parties notified. Motion Hearing set for 8/30/2023 at 03:15 PM by video before Judge Drew B Tipton, filed. Zoom Link: https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1610690763?pwd=Y1ZydDU3TWxIUDNla0FrSjVxN1FvUT09 Meeting ID: 161 069 0763 Passcode: 307095 Dial by your location +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose) +1 646 828 7666 US (New York) +52 815 351 6659 (Mexico) Per L.R. 83.7 Except by leave of the presiding judge, no photo- or electro-mechanical means of recordation or transmission of court proceedings is permitted. (KelliePapaioannou, 2) (Entered: 08/24/2023)
08/30/2023 12 Amended Certificate of Service of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed.(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 08/30/2023)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
09/08/2023 20:36:17

Let’s percolate for months, again.

No movement since reassignment on Feb. 14, a Valentine’s Day Gift for the Bandit Shack.

Hughes cases reassigned as Bandit Lawyer Shack keeps truckin’ with full support of SDTX.

Let’s percolate for months, again.

No movement since reassignment on Feb. 14, a Valentine’s Day Gift for the Bandit Shack.

Hughes cases reassigned as Bandit Lawyer Shack keeps truckin’ with full support of SDTX.

Hughes cases reassigned as Bandit Lawyer Shack keeps truckin’ with full support of SDTX.

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:22-cv-03496

Create an Alert for This Case on RECAP

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC et al
Assigned to: Judge Lynn N Hughes

Case in other court:  334th District Court Harris County, TX, 22-63554

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

Date Filed: 10/11/2022
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 290 Real Property: Other
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Plaintiff
Althea Shackelford represented by Ray L Shackelford
Shackelford & Associates, LLC
1406 Southmore Blvd
Houston, TX 77004
713-520-8484
Fax: 713-520-8192
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC represented by Mark Douglas Cronenwett
Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, P.C.
14160 N. Dallas Parkway, Ste. 900
Dallas, TX 75254
214-635-2650
Fax: 214-635-2686
Email: mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDNicholas Michael Frame
Mackie Wolf Zientz Mann, P.C.
5177 Richmond Avenue
Suite 1230
Houston, TX 77056
713-730-3219
Email: nframe@mwzmlaw.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
U.S. Bank, N.A., represented by Mark Douglas Cronenwett
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICEDNicholas Michael Frame
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
10/11/2022 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL from 334th Judicial District of Harris County, Texas, case number 2022-63554 (Filing fee $ 402 receipt number ATXSDC-28904173) filed by U.S. Bank, N.A.,, Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Cronenwett, Mark) (Entered: 10/11/2022)
10/11/2022 2 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed.(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/11/2022)
10/12/2022 3 NOTICE in a Removed or Transferred Case (Signed by Judge Lynn N Hughes) Parties notified.(AntonioBanda, 4) (Entered: 10/12/2022)
10/21/2022 4 ANSWER to 1 State Court Petition/Notice of Removal by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, U.S. Bank, N.A.,, filed.(Frame, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/21/2022)

 


 

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt
10/24/2022 18:20:39

Screenshot, Oct. 18, 2022 at 20:00 hrs

Shackelford v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC

(4:22-cv-03496), District Court, S.D. Texas

Now SDTX CAN rely upon the TRO Order by Judge Brantley Starr,

Akerman Pushes for Dissolution of TRO and Jason Leboeuf Claims This Ain’t About Res Judicata

assumin’ the foreclosure mill lawyers apply for dissolution of the TRO against “One of Their Own”.

202263554

SHACKELFORD, ALTHEA vs. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC

(Court 334, JUDGE DAWN ROGERS)

Vexatious, Sanctioned Lawyer Ray L. Shackelford files his fourth case for Althea Shackelford to stop a foreclosure sale.

SEP 30, 2022 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: OCT 1, 2021

Vexatious Lawyer Ray Shackelford files on Oct. 10, 2022 for 14 day extension of TRO, extending time to Oct 28, 2022.

Will Judge Rogers or the correct court and Judge, Fredericka Phillips Grant the Meritless motion?

Fact #1

Judge Dawn Rogers granted the TRO the same day the case was filed when she would know the case should be reassigned to the last court that heard the case, which is Court 061, Judge Fredericka Phillips.

13 YEARS AGO ALTHEA SHACKELFORD DEFAULTED ON HER $276K MORTGAGE (Per Motion for Summary Judgment in 2021)

Fact #2

Houston lawyer Ray L. Shackelford‘s FOURTH complaint is laced with perjury, fails to mention 3 past cases (res judicata), and it’s a frivolous lawsuit.

RAY L. SHACKELFORD FRIVOLOUS AND VEXATIOUS FILING HISTORY IN THIS CASE ALONE

Fact #3

Houston lawyer Ray L. Shackelton claims that he’s found a buyer for the residential property at 3421 Ozark St, Houston, TX 77021 via Natasha Martinez of Refind Realty.

That buyer happens to be a past client of Ray’s, Lawrence McQueen who has multiple lawsuits for tax evasion.

Realtor Natasha Martinez is also a past client of Ray’s, defending Natasha’s foreclosure and – you guessed it – a tax delinquency lawsuit – there’s a pattern here Ray…including non disclosure of these important facts in your complaint.

REAL ESTATE AGENT SELLING HOME IS NATASHA MARTINEZ (Screenshot as at Sep. 30, 2022)

Fact #4

Lawrence McQueen has entered into a sale to purchase the home for $160,000 with Althea Shackelford, $8k down and $152k via a secured loan. Setting aside McQueen’s most likely damaged credit rating based on his past judgments, Ray Shackelford fails to disclose his relationship with McQueen, as a client.

LAWRENCE McQUEEN's DECADE LONG TAX EVASION LAWSUITS

Fact #5

Ray Shackelford also confidently assets at 5.11 of the complaint that realtor Natasha Martinez has secured a reasonable offer for the property that would allow her to

(i) resolve the debt owned to the lender,

and

(ii) recoup some equity.

Sounds great, huh!

There’s a problem with the arithmetic though.

(i) Althea Shackelford ain’t paid a dime since September 2009 toward the original mortgage of $276k. That’s 13 years.

(ii) There’s a payoff statement produced in the 2019 foreclosure case (Shackelford III), with an amount due of $570k.

So how do you pay off a loan and ‘recoup some equity’ when your sale is to a friend and legal client for $160k?

Where’s the shortfall balance owed of $410,000?

PAYOFF AMOUNT 12 YEARS AFTER DEFAULT (Per Motion for Summary Judgment in 2021)

Magistrate Judge Christina Bryan Dismisses Pro Se With Prejudice and Without Leave to Amend

A premature motion to dismiss was filed by Kasey Davis 3 days after removal from state court. The M and R issued in 55 days.

4704 Schlipf Road is Back in Houston Federal Court, or should that be 4707?

4707 Schlipf Rd, Katy, TX 77493

This is a Case of a Judge Protecting the Judiciary and Fellow Colleagues by Despotism

Death-Row Murderers and Rapists Obtain More Constitutional and Federal Protection in Houston Federal Courts than Law-Abiding, Elder Citizens.

Sanctioned Lawyer Ray L. Shackelford’s Repeat Frivolous Filings and Perjury Is Fine, Sayeth Courts
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