Bankers

Federal Judges Invent Jurisdiction to Issue Lawless Writ of Execution Aimed at 86-Yr Old Widow

Contrary to what Plaintiff argues, subject matter jurisdiction existed in this Court at the time of removal. – Magistrate Judge Chris Bryan.

LIT REMAINS RESOLUTE: WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPOSE THE 15 YEAR FIGHT AGAINST OCHLOCRACY AND ELDER ABUSE IN FEDERAL COURTS

#WeThePeople

MAR 14, 2025

As expected. The anticipated and duly received rubber stamp of judicial ochlocracy and corruption in the lawless courts of Texas, endorsed by the United States Government, and which continues under Trump 47.

DISHONORABLE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

Plaintiff Joanna Burke initiated this lawsuit in state court against several defendants as a pro se litigant.

All defendants other than PHH Mortgage Corporation were dismissed after removal to this Court.

Dkt 23.

The matter was then referred for pretrial management to Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan.

Dkt 26.

Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation filed motions for summary judgment and to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

Dkts 27 & 28.

Plaintiff filed her own motion to dismiss.

Dkt 33.

Pending are several Orders and Memoranda and Recommendations from Judge Bryan dated January 23, 2025.

In sum, these rulings:

o    Deny a motion by Plaintiff (Dkt 51) for leave to supplement her response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion;

o    Deny as moot her motion (Dkt 45) for leave to file a surreply to Defendant’s summary judgment motion;

o    Deny her motion (Dkt 53) for leave to file a surreply to Defendant’s motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant;

o    Recommend denying Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt 33) to dismiss;

o    Recommend granting Defendant’s motion (Dkt 27) for summary judgment;

and

o    Recommend granting Defendant’s motion (Dkt 28) to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

Dkts 54–59.

Also pending are objections by Plaintiff to each of the above.

Dkts 64–69.

And pending is an Order of the Magistrate Judge on February 20, 2025, denying Plaintiff’s motions to stay or to certify questions to the Fifth Circuit for review.

Dkt 70 (order); see Dkts 61 & 62 (motions).

Also pending is an objection and request for reconsideration by Plaintiff.

Dkt 72.

Although unclear, it may also request reconsideration of certain of the Orders noted above.

See id at 5.

As to the Orders, a district court will set aside a non- dispositive order of a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically objected only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

See FRCP 72(a) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A);

see also Castillo v. Frank, 70 F3d 382, 385 (5th Cir 1995).

The objections by Plaintiff to the Orders of Judge Bryan from January 2025 are substantially identical despite addressing different rulings.

The objections lack merit.

The Orders clearly detail the pertinent facts and correctly apply controlling law.

As such, the objections will be overruled.

Dkts 67, 68 & 69.

And the Orders of the Magistrate Judge will be adopted as the Orders of this Court.

Dkts 54, 55 & 56.

The objection and request for reconsideration of the Order from February 2025 has been reviewed de novo.

It contains no specifics, and indeed, no arguments.

As such the objection will be overruled and the request for reconsideration denied, inclusive of any underlying motion referenced by citation.

Dkt 72.

And the subject Order will be adopted as the Order of this Court.

Dkt 70.

As to the Memoranda and Recommendations, a district court reviews de novo those conclusions of a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically objected.

See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C);

see also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir 1989, per curiam).

The district court may accept any other portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no clear error appears on the face of the record.

See Guillory v PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc);

see also FRCP 72(b) advisory committee note (1983).

Plaintiff has filed substantially identical objections to the three separate Memoranda and Recommendations by Judge Bryan.

Dkts 64, 65 & 66.

Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to file “specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”

By this standard, it is legally insufficient to present the district court with a broad assortment of issues accompanied by little more than a directive to resolve them.

But that, in the main, is all that’s been done here.

Certain standards from the Fifth Circuit are clear in this regard.

For instance, the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge needn’t be reiterated on review.

See Keotting v Thompson, 995 F2d 37, 40 (5th Cir 1993). Likewise, objections that are frivolous, conclusory, or general in nature needn’t be considered.

See Battle v United States Parole Commission, 834 F2d 419, 421 (5th Cir 1987);

United States v Ervin, 2015 WL 13375626, at *2 (WD Tex), quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Association v County of Albany, 281 FSupp2d 436, 439 (NDNY 2003).

And de novo review isn’t invoked by simply re-urging arguments contained in the underlying motion.

Edmond v Collins, 8 F3d 290, 293 n7 (5th Cir 1993);

see also Smith v Collins, 964 F2d 483, 485 (5th Cir 1992)

(finding no error in failure to consider objections because plaintiff “merely reurged the legal arguments he raised in his original petition”);

Williams v Woodhull Medical & Mental Health Center, 891 F Supp 2d 301, 310–11 (EDNY 2012)

(de novo review not warranted for conclusory or general objections or which merely reiterate original arguments).

Simply put, where the objecting party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates original arguments, review of the memorandum and recommendation may permissibly be for clear error only.

That’s the situation here.

Reasonable depth and explanation were needed to properly present any one of these issues if de novo review was intended.

No clear error appears upon review and consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendations, the record, and the applicable law.

Even though that’s all of the review required, the Court has nevertheless also examined the objections de novo and finds that they lack merit for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge.

The objections by Plaintiff will be overruled.

Dkts 64, 65 & 66.

And the Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be adopted as the Memoranda and Orders of this Court.

Dkts 57, 58 & 59.

*  *  *

The objections by Plaintiff Joanna Burke to the Orders of the Magistrate Judge of January 23, 2025, are OVERRULED.

Dkts 67, 68 & 69.

The Orders of the Magistrate Judge are ADOPTED as the Orders of this Court.

Dkts 54,

55 & 56.

As such, the related motions by Plaintiff are DENIED.

Dkts 45, 51 & 53.

The objection by Plaintiff Joanna Burke to the further Order of the Magistrate Judge of February 20, 2025, is OVERRULED, and the included motion for reconsideration is further DENIED upon de novo review.

Dkt 72.

The Order of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Order of this Court.

Dkt 70.

As such, the related motions by Plaintiff are DENIED.

Dkts 61 & 62.

The objections by Plaintiff to the Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.

Dkts 64, 65 & 66.

The Memoranda and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge are ADOPTED as the Memoranda and Orders of this Court.

Dkts 57, 58 & 59.

As such, the related motions by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation are GRANTED

Dkts 27 & 28.

And the related motion by Plaintiff is DENIED.

Dkt 33.

Any other pending motion, if any, is DENIED AS MOOT.

This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff is hereby declared to be a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT.

A FINAL JUDGMENT and a PRE-FILING INJUNCTION ORDER will both enter separately.

So ordered.

Signed on March 14, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION AND REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE RELATIVE TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION ECF 57 RE PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

FEB 6, 2025

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Thursday, Jan. 23, 2025, MJCAB issued a collective set of three Orders and three Memorandum and Recommendation(s) (“M&R”) [ECF 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59].

The court also filed three of Plaintiff’s “lost” or “missing” pleadings which were backdated to Nov. 15, 2024 [ECF 51, 52 and 53].

Relevant here: Plaintiff’s Nov. 15 Pleading 53, and court Order 56 which cites to the M&R 57.

The M&R recorded as ECF 57 provides a curt summary of her reasons why this court maintains jurisdiction over these proceedings.

For reasons explained in the Argument section below, the recommendation should be fully rejected.

For the purposes of analysis, this leaves the operative pleadings which were considered in her M&R as ECF 33 [Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss]; ECF 42 [PHH Response]; ECF 43[Plaintiff’s Reply].

Justice Requires Full Argument and Fairness to All

In reversing this court, Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho recently stated:

“Our adversarial system of justice requires that we give both sides full and fair opportunity to present their strongest possible arguments to the court…

We agree with Anadarko that the district court failed to perform a full [] analysis.”

Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772, 775 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.)”

MJCAB has rejected this notion once more by failing to consider both sides of the argument and only considering PHH’s Response [42], for example, converting the motion to one for reconsideration was part of PHH’s response, as highlighted in Plaintiff’s Reply [43], which was not considered.

Furthermore, this contradicts Judge Werlein’s own opinion ECF 18, page 5 of 8,

“In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff does not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction over her claims against Defendants.”.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Disclaimer: The Plaintiff submitted her timely objection(s) by ensuring they were filed directly with the clerk in compliance with the 14-day rule, confident that this court would not decide any pending motions prior to the expiration of this deadline, or before receipt of the objection(s).

1.         Whether the court should entirely reject the Magistrate Judge’s M&R [57], and/or stay these proceedings considering PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60.

2.         Whether MJCAB should have addressed the Plaintiff’s arguments and reply, applying the same standard the Fifth Circuit held when eviscerating this court in Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692, 697 (5th Cir. 2024), and considering the severity of the M&R’s final recommendation and the implications to the Plaintiff’s liberty and protected property rights.

3.         Whether the Magistrate Judge incorrectly relabeled the Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as a Motion for Reconsideration.

4.         Whether the court agrees with Plaintiff insofar as the Magistrate Judge’s M&R and related Order constitutes an abuse of discretion, because she has willfully and knowingly defied the Fifth Circuit’s very recent admonishment by replicating the same conduct in this case, see:

Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 772 (5th Cir. 2024, pub.),

reversing this court for the same issue less than nine months ago.

5.         Whether this court agrees with Plaintiff that this case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and remanded back to Harris County District Court.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Objections, Timeliness and Standard of Review

U.S. v. Rodriguez, Criminal No. G-04-01, Civil Action No. G-06-459, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2006)

(“Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report within the allowed time SHALL bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”).

Reconsideration

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (2017).

A district court may reconsider an order “for any reason [a court] deems sufficient,” id., “even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,”

Pfeiffer v. Ajamie PLLC, No. 4:19-cv-02760, 2020 WL 13420831, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020).

Moreover, the “[c]lassic reasons for granting reconsideration” include that the order rests upon an erroneous factual basis.

Shih v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. Inc., No. 4:21-CV-01530, 2022 WL 444476, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022)

(noting that reconsideration is appropriate if “the judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law”).

Docket Filings Should Never be Backdated

Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1988) (“the judgment, signed December 24, 1987, was apparently entered on the docket sheet at the district court clerk’s office on December 29, and the defendants’ notice of appeal, filed January 27, 1988, was entered on the docket sheet on January 28…

The district court’s docket sheet in this case reveals that the order appealed from was not docketed until December 29, 1987, and the filing of the notice of appeal on January 27, 1988 was, therefore, within the 30-day requirement of F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1).”).

Judicial Integrity and Impartiality

Federal judges should always seek to promote confidence that they will dispense evenhanded justice.

See Canon 2(A), Code of Conduct for United States Judges (requiring judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”).

At its core, this judicial impartiality is “the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,” which “assures equal application of the law.”

Repub. Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (1992) (cleaned up);

see also, e.g., Buntion v. Quarterman , 524 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that defendants’ “right to a fair trial” is in part “fulfilled by a judicial officer who impartially presides over the trial”)

(citing Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904–05, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) )

…the court may unintentionally convey its tacit approval of the litigant’s underlying legal position.

See , e.g. , United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez , 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977)

(observing that a trial judge “must make every effort to preserve the appearance of strict impartiality,” including by “exhibit[ing] neutrality in his language”).

Even this appearance of bias, whether real or not, should be avoided.

– United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2020).

ARGUMENT

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

“Plaintiff, a veteran litigant proceeding pro se, initiated this case in state court on December 21, 2023, as part of her approximately 14-year effort to thwart foreclosure on residential property located in Kingwood, Texas (Property).”

As recently as December 20, 2024, and in a published opinion, the Fifth Circuit remanded the “veteran litigant(s) [the Walden’s] proceeding pro se, opposed “U.S. Banks latest suit, filed on December 31, 2021, arguing that it had a right to foreclose pursuant to the final judgment the district court issued ” as part of [their] approximately 14-year effort to thwart foreclosure on residential property located in [San Marcos, Texas (Property).”,

and where

“in 2008, the Waldens executed a Texas Home Equity Note (“Note”) and Security Instrument (“Security Instrument”) in the amount of $316,800, and where it is undisputed that “the Waldens have been in default on the Loan Agreement since July 15, 2011.”

-MTGLQ Inv’rs v. Walden, A-19-CV-0992 RP, at *1-2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2020).

See; U.S. Bank Tr. v. Walden, No. 23-50662, at *13 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2024)

(“Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment is contrary to controlling circuit precedent, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment, VACATE the judgment it entered, and REMAND the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Boren.”).

The Plaintiff has listed many more examples during these proceedings, all blanked by Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan.

She has also refused to acknowledge or discuss the millions of dollars in judgments, sanctions, fines and misconduct by PHH and their counsel in Texas, as well as former judges and clerks of this courthouse.

Prejudging the outcome of this case was clear upon reassignment and referral commencing with MJCAB’s first Order [31] released on September 18, 2024.

These facts are well-documented in Plaintiff’s pleadings relating to this motion but avoided in the purported M&R and Order(s), which at first blush could be confused with a filing by PHH.

In support, and as summarized in the Statement of Facts and Issues, Plaintiff notes MJCAB provided a curt opinion as to why Plaintiff’s motion should be DENIED, but only discusses PHH’s arguments, by snubbing Plaintiffs Response entirely [ECF 33].

MJCAB fails to address any of Plaintiff’s arguments with legal authorities in support

(See; Montes v. Tibbs, No. 24-20135, at *7-8 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2024)).

Plaintiff objects to the entire memorandum’s one-sided reasoning:

“The Court finds no reason to reconsider the June 17, 2024 Order denying Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Remand.”

Plaintiff denies and objects to the Magistrate Judge relabeling her Motion and additionally to her conclusion in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as incorporated in Plaintiff’s motion [33] and reply [43].

“Contrary to what Plaintiff argues, subject matter jurisdiction existed in this Court at the time of removal.”

Plaintiff denies and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that subject matter jurisdiction existing “in this court’ at the time of removal in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as incorporated in Plaintiff’s motion [33] and reply [43].

“Plaintiff contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the case should have been removed to bankruptcy court rather than district court. Plaintiff is incorrect..”

Plaintiff denies and objects to to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that Plaintiff is incorrect existing “in this court’ at the time of removal in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as incorporated in Plaintiff’s motion [33] and reply [43].

“At the time the Court ruled on Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Remand, her bankruptcy proceeding…had been dismissed…”

Plaintiff denies and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that Plaintiff is incorrect existing ‘in this court’ at the time of removal in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as incorporated in Plaintiff’s motion [33] and reply [43].

Additionally, the Magistrate Judge contradicts herself with frivolous arguments, as she agreed in her M&R [57], page 3 of 4;

“jurisdictional facts that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal”

citing Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000)).

“For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s “Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” (ECF 33) be DENIED.”

Plaintiff denies and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s M&R – who follows PHH and Judge Werlein driving the wrong-way in a one-sided memorandum and recommendation – in its entirety for the well-reasoned arguments with legal citations as incorporated in Plaintiff’s Motion [33] and Reply [43].

The recommendation should be rejected.

As Plaintiff has discussed throughout these proceedings, including the objections by Plaintiff to these omnibus M&R’s and Orders, MJCAB’s reliance upon this court having jurisdiction is flawed, res judicata is inapplicable, and Judge Hittner’s 2018 order is invalid, void and time-barred as PHH “slept on [its] rights”

-Pie Dev. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., No. 24-60155, at *7 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).

MJCAB’s assertions otherwise are without merit and baseless.

See; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUITPLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME RE ECF ENTRIES 51-60.

(These latest motions with exhibit, proposed orders and cover letter were delivered by USPS Express Mail on Tuesday, Feb. 4, 2025 at 10.17 am and signed for by “T Hannibal” at 3.42 pm.).

As with all MJCAB’s Orders and M&R’s, the procedural due process violations are clear and obvious.

The Fifth Circuit has admonished this court and Magistrate Judge for the very acts repeated here.

In short, this litigation is meritorious, and PHH’s deficient, second motion has been granted improvidently, as it is moot.

After reviewing both the Motion [33] and Reply [43] along with PHH’s Response [42], Magistrate Judge Bryan has failed to address a single argument by Plaintiff.

(Compare with; Jones v. Heuer, No. 24-50348, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2024)

(“The magistrate judge (“MJ”) issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) analyzing Jones’s numerous claims.”)).

DECLARATION

Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and “In lieu of a sworn affidavit, a litigant may submit an unsworn declaration as evidence against summary judgment.

See 28 U.S.C. §1746.”, I hereby provide my unsworn declaration. My name is Joanna … and I declare under penalty of perjury that all information herein is true and correct.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsiders MJCAB’s Order and Related Memorandum & Recommendation and grant the relief requested herein.

To the extent this court maintains the opinion it has jurisdiction in these proceedings, the District Judge should

(i) reject MJCAB’s M&R 57, or

(ii) stay the proceedings based on Plaintiff’s “Certified Questions” motion, or

(iii) remand for reevaluation based on the evidence and argument presented by Plaintiff, or

(iv) dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand to state court, and

(v) for any and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 6th day of February, 2025.

Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation

(4:24-cv-00897)

District Court, S.D. Texas

Judge Weiner, now Eskridge / MJ Bryan

MAR 12, 2024 – to present.

We’re checkin’ for all the “lost” and “missing” filings in these proceedings and manipulation of docket dates.

For example, as shown on the screenshots, this afternoon there was 4 filings dockets as Feb. 6, 2025 and tonight, that was modified, showing ECF 61 and ECF 62 as Feb. 4, 2025 – the date the USPS Express Mail containing these filings was signed for by the court but who refused to upload them until after they were hand-delivered on Friday morning (Feb. 6, 2025).

We’ve got a screenshot showing at 12.30 pm on Friday afternoon there wasn’t any ECF recorded after # 60 and certainly none dated Feb. 4, 2025.


DOCSENT,MAG

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897

Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al
Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan

Case in other court:  11th District Court of Harris County, Texas, 23-86973

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief

Date Filed: 03/12/2024
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Date Filed # Docket Text
01/28/2025 60 RESPONSE to 50 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Word Count filed by Joanna Burke. (bmn4) (Entered: 01/29/2025)
02/04/2025 61 MOTION to Stay or in the Alternative for an Extension of Time re ECF Entries 51-60Motions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/25/2025. (dah4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/04/2025 62 MOTION to Certify Questions to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/25/2025. (dah4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 63 Letter from J. Burke re: Filings, filed. (dah4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 64 OBJECTIONS to 59 Memorandum and Recommendations, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (dah4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 65 OBJECTIONS to 58 Memorandum and Recommendations, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (th4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 66 OBJECTIONS to 57 Memorandum and Recommendations, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (th4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 67 OBJECTIONS to 56 Order on Motion for Leave to File, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (th4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 68 OBJECTIONS to 55 Order on Motion for Leave to File, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief,, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (th4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/2025 69 OBJECTIONS to 54 Order on Motion for Leave to File, filed by Joanna Burke. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (th4) (Entered: 02/06/2025)

 

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DOCSENT,MAG

U.S. District Court
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:24-cv-00897

Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al
Assigned to: Judge Charles Eskridge
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan

Case in other court:  11th District Court of Harris County, Texas, 23-86973

Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory Relief

Date Filed: 03/12/2024
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Diversity

 

Date Filed # Docket Text
11/15/2024 51 MOTION for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary JudgmentMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement to Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
11/15/2024 52 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary JudgmentMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
11/15/2024 53 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious LitigantMotions referred to Christina A Bryan. by Joanna Burke, filed. Motion Docket Date 12/6/2024. (Attachments: # 1 Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant, # 2 Cover Letter) (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 54 ORDER DENYING 51 Motion for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s Response to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 55 ORDER DENYING 45 Motion for Leave; DENYING AS MOOT 50 Motion to Exceed Word Count; DENYING 52 Motion for Leave.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 56 ORDER DENYING 53 Motion for Leave to File Verified Surreply to PHH Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 57 MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 33 Verified MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction- The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s “Verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” (ECF 33) be DENIED. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025 (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 58 MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment – The Court RECOMMENDS that PHH’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 27) be GRANTED and all of Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025 (Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)
01/23/2025 59 MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 28 MOTION Declare Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant- The Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion (ECF 28) be GRANTED and Plaintiff Joanna Burke be declared a vexatious litigant and that she be enjoined from filing any further pleadings in the Southern District of Texas without first seeking, in writing, permission from the Miscellaneous District Judge on duty for the moth in which the filing would be made. Objections to M&R due by 2/6/2025(Signed by Magistrate Judge Christina A Bryan) Parties notified. (mem4) (Entered: 01/23/2025)

 


 

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