UPDATE; Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Micaela Alvarez. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 4/10/2018.
The parties appeared for a status conference to determine how to proceed in light of the Fifth Circuits recent opinion, and apprised the Court that they have conferred and hope to settle the case, specifically requesting sixty days to achieve settlement. The Court granted this request and reset the status conference for June 12, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. Moreover, the Court ordered the parties to file a settlement status report at least five days before this status conference in the event the case is not fully resolved by that time. Appearances:Ricardo Guerra / Daron Janis (ERO: Sandra Silva [9:00-9:06]) (DUSM: M.Buban )., filed.(JulieSanchez,mm 7)
ORDER. Case Terminated on 7/12/2018.
(Signed by Judge Micaela Alvarez) Parties notified.(AdrianDeLaRosa, 7) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
Castrellon brought this lawsuit, saying that agreement was made with Deutsche Bank but they later reneged. That’s fine says the Fifth Circuit, we have no issue with it.
“Plaintiff–Appellee Gloria Castrellon sued Defendants–Appellants Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., and Deutsche Bank National Trust, alleging that they violated various Texas consumer protection laws during the foreclosure of her home.
The parties quickly began to negotiate a settlement agreement. Under that agreement, Castrellon would dismiss her claims in exchange for a loan modification.
Castrellon executed the agreement, but the defendants never did. Instead, they subsequently made another settlement offer on less advantageous terms to Castrellon.
Castrellon then filed a motion to enforce the first settlement agreement, which the district court granted.
On appeal, the defendants claim that there was a mutual mistake of material fact that renders the settlement agreement unenforceable.
Contrary to what the defendants claim the parties believed, Castrellon lacked the authority to agree to the loan modification because only her ex-husband had signed the loan agreement.
They also claim that the ex-husband’s consent is a condition precedent and that performance is impracticable because he has not yet consented.
We hold that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on the defendants’ mutual mistake claim. As such, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. “
Before KING, ELROD, and GRAVES