Bankers

Mackie Wolf: Stop Litigation Elder Abuse is the Clear Message to the Wolves in Supreme Court Opinion

LIT founder is suing Mackie Wolf, creditor rights law firm for elder abuse by commencing a wrongful foreclosure against an 85 yr-old widower.

LIT COMMENTARY

Currently, Joanna Burke pursues an active civil suit against PHH Mortgage Corporation in Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation (0:23-cv-01119-WMW-DTS), District Court, D. Minnesota, currently under appeal to the 8th Circuit.

Despite this effectively tolling any foreclosure notice or sale, the same defendants listed here have collectively defied the rule of law.

Astonishingly, they have scheduled the 85-yr old widower’s home for auction on January 2, 2024, disregarding the ongoing legal proceedings.

As the Texas Supreme Court Opinion confirms today, “dismissal [of Joanna’s case in Minnesota] does not become final until the party has exhausted their appellate remedies and the appellate court’s power to alter the judgment ends.”.

As a result of this malicious maneuver by the Christian Wolves, Mark Burke, LIT’s founder, is seeking intervention. Despite no appearance  in Joanna’s Minnesota case, the Wolves newest client – PHH Mortgage Corporation – obtained dismissal by ochlocracy [mob rule] and a corrupt ruling from Magistrate Judge David Schultz, endorsed by the retiring United States District Judge Wilhelmina Wright.

It is of particular note that the fact Joanna raised the fact that Magistrate Judge Schultz worked as counsel for PHH Mortgage Corporation on the case which led Joanna to Minnesota, was completely whitewashed out of any orders of that district court.

Patently, corruption knows no boundaries when wearing judicial black robes.

Ms. Burke,

The foreclosure sale has been properly set and your notice of lis pendens presents no reason to cancel the sale.

Mark D. Cronenwett
Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, PC

Dec. 3, 2023

By  USPS Priority Mail and to Email List
RE Case No.: 23-3593, Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir.
Case: Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation et al

Your references:
MWZM No.: 14-003766-670-3
Loan No.: ending in 1333

Dear Sir or Madam

Re: Demand Letter to Cancel Scheduled Foreclosure Sale and Provide Notice of Cancellation: Lis Pendens for 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77339

I, Joanna Burke, the rightful owner of the property located at 46 Kingwood Greens Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77339, am writing this formal demand letter to your law firm regarding the scheduled foreclosure sale set for January 2nd, 2024. It has come to my attention that this proposed sale is in direct violation of both state and federal laws.

In conjunction with this letter, I refer to the lis pendens which has been duly submitted to Harris County for recording in the real property records. This legal filing has been taken to protect my rights and interests in the property.

I hereby demand written notice, as well as immediate confirmation via email, from your law firm and your client, formally cancelling the scheduled foreclosure sale. This request is made in light of the aforementioned legal proceedings and the violation of pertinent laws.

Given the urgency of this matter, I emphasize that this is a one-time request. I have also communicated this demand via email to the addresses listed below. I expect a response within 72 hours upon your receipt of this letter, confirming the cancellation of the scheduled sale. A copy should be emailed to joanna@2dobermans.com and/or faxed to +1 (866) 705-0576.

List of email recipients:

kmackie@mwzmlaw.com
bwolf@mwzmlaw.com
mzientz@mwzmlaw.com
mcronenwett@mwzmlaw.com
nframe@mwzmlaw.com
rrebong@mwzmlaw.com
litigationfilings@mwzmlaw.com

Failure to provide a prompt response or the absence of notice of immediate cancellation will be considered a blatant violation of consumer protection laws. I want to make it explicitly clear that I will take all necessary and reasonable actions to preserve my rights, prevent further harassment, and address what I perceive as an irrefutable case of elder abuse.

I look forward to your immediate attention to this matter and a prompt resolution. Please consider this letter as an earnest effort to resolve the issue amicably before pursuing legal avenues.

Sincerely,

Joanna Burke

46 Kingwood Greens Dr.,
Kingwood, Texas, 77339
Email: joanna@2dobermans.com
Fax: (1) 866-705-0576

Elder abuse in Texas includes physical abuse, mental abuse and emotional abuse. A variety of programs in Texas ensure that senior citizens will not be abused or taken advantage of in any form. Anyone convicted of elder abuse will be charged with a felony in either the first, second, or third degree, depending on the circumstances of the abuse. Texas residents are required by law to report any known elder abuse. Those who don’t will be convicted of a misdemeanor.

MARK STEPHEN BURKE’S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS PLAINTIFF AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

Introduction

Proposed Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke, contends that intervention is justified in this matter, aligning his interests with the ongoing litigation.

The removed Federal Court proceedings involve a dispute between Ms. Kristina Dunn, allegedly retained and represented by Texas lawyer Jason Leboeuf of LeBoeuf Law Firm, PLLC, and PHH Mortgage Corporation, represented by Texas lawyers Mark Cronenwett and Nicholas “Nick” Frame of Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann P.C.

These legal proceedings aim to safeguard Dunn’s residence from foreclosure, with the additional objective of facilitating a transaction wherein a non-party, Epiphany Properties, LLC, is purportedly set to acquire the property for $93,000, backed by a nominal earnest sum of $100.

The state court has granted injunctive relief in the form of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), effectively halting the scheduled foreclosure sale.

Mark, as the proprietor of Blogger Inc. and the legal blog LawsinTexas.com, is dedicated to investigative journalism, particularly focusing on legal matters of public concern.

The ongoing series on related cases, including Dunn v PHH Mortgage Corporation, has been featured on LawsinTexas.com (https://lawsintexas.com/pr/2v2).

These articles systematically reveal a troubling pattern of title deed fraud that disproportionately impacts vulnerable homeowners.

Allegations of fraud and illicit activities by the Plaintiffs and their counsel are emphatically presented in these publications.

Notably, the defendants, along with their legal representatives, are seemingly complicit in downplaying these fraudulent activities.

This collaboration extends to both state and federal courts, creating an environment where deceptive legal proceedings, laden with perjury, are utilized to halt foreclosures.

It is worth highlighting that the involved parties share legal counsel, forming a tight-knit community within the creditor rights and foreclosure defense vertical.

Mark contends that the adverse publicity directed at all named parties and the court has triggered collusion and retaliation, especially within the small and interconnected network of legal professionals representing the involved parties.

This retaliatory response has taken a particularly contemptible turn with the latest legal maneuver.

To comprehend the significance, a brief overview is necessary. Behind every business stands an owner, entwined with a personal life.

In Mark’s case, his digital media businesses facilitate a home office, doubling as his residence, which has been embroiled in prolonged litigation due to a predatory loan.

Legally owned by Joanna Burke, Mark’s mother, the property has hosted Mark’s home office since 2009.

Currently, Joanna Burke pursues an active civil suit against PHH Mortgage Corporation in Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corporation (0:23-cv-01119-WMW-DTS), District Court, D. Minnesota, currently under appeal to the 8th Circuit.

Despite this effectively tolling any foreclosure notice or sale, the same defendants listed here have collectively defied the rule of law.

Astonishingly, they have scheduled Mark’s home office for auction on January 2, 2024, disregarding the ongoing legal proceedings.

Intervention Under Civil Rule 24(a)(2)

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed Intervenor must satisfy four essential requirements for intervention: timeliness, a necessary interest, impairment of that interest without intervention, and the inadequacy of protection absent intervention (Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)).

Necessary Interest

Proposed Intervenor asserts a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation, a necessary condition for intervention (Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2001)).

This interest, related to the subject of the action, is legally protectable even if not enforceable, as per Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 566 (5th Cir. 2016).

Mark’s interests are intricately tied to the exposed title deed fraud and predatory lending practices affecting vulnerable and distressed homeowners.

The imminent threat to his home office (residence) as a result of the latest conspiracy by and legal maneuver by the defendants directly implicates his business, possessions, civil liberty, and constitutional rights.

The urgency of Mark’s proposed intervention is evident in the intertwined personal, business, and legal battles.

Timeliness of Intervention

Proposed Intervenor contends that the intervention is timely, considering the contextual nature of the timeliness inquiry (Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994)).

This case, active for one and a half months, aligns with the commencement of discovery after Thanksgiving. Mark received formal notice of the scheduled foreclosure sale on Nov. 25.

Impairment of Interest Without Intervention

Failure to allow intervention would impair Mark’s substantial interests, given PHH’s premature actions in seeking foreclosure despite ongoing legal actions.

Adequate representation is lacking, requiring intervention to safeguard Mark’s interests (Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1967)).

Inadequacy of Protection Absent Intervention

Proposed Intervenor maintains that his interest cannot be adequately protected without intervention. Even if the existing parties have not colluded or taken an adverse position, representation remains plainly inadequate where the existing parties fails to diligently pursue the intervenor’s interests (International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1962)).

It is implausible that the involved parties would offer assistance or safeguard Mark, given their active conspiracy against him and his non-profit media enterprise.

Their collaborative efforts aim to dismantle his home office, posing a severe threat to the viability of Mark’s business and his blog at LawsinTexas.com.

Mark contends that this shared objective is apparent among the parties, the courts, and government agencies that have recently targeted him and his business pursuits.

Non-Party Damages

A home office undeniably holds significant importance, and any potential disruption, such as eviction, warrants protection—even if Mark is not directly involved in the foreclosure proceedings.

Whether Mark has ownership in the property or is a party or obligor on the debt is irrelevant in the context of the standing inquiry.

This principle is supported by legal precedents, such as Monroe (936 S.W.2d at 660), which established that standing to bring claims under the TDCA (Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act) extends beyond the “parties to the consumer transaction,” and Campbell (616 S.W.2d at 374), stating that “persons other than the debtor may maintain an action for violations of the TDCA.”

As per the TDCA (Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(2)), “A person may sue for: actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter,” as cited from McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), N.A., 788 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2015).

Mark can establish damages, including mental anguish resulting from this latest legal conspiracy and targeted harassment, leading to the unwarranted threat of foreclosure and planned eviction.

As highlighted in McCaig, mortgage servicer PHH Mortgage Corporation violates the Texas Finance Code by asserting legal rights it does not possess, concluding that because Wells Fargo (the loan servicer) did not have a right to foreclose, then its threat of initiating foreclosure proceedings was actionable under the TDCA.

Mark has met the necessary burden of proof, see; Williams v. Lakeview Load (sic) Servicing, LLC, Civil Action 4:20-CV-1900, at *49 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2023) (“Proof of an actual injury is a liability element of Plaintiffs’ TDCA claims).

Injunctive Relief

Additionally, and subject to the Proposed Intervenor’s motion being granted, Mark will seek emergency temporary and permanent injunctive relief to refrain PHH Mortgage Corporation from proceeding with the foreclosure sale.

See; Marauder Corp. v. Beall, 301 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App. 2010) (“Under the statute, a person may sue for an injunction to “prevent or restrain” a violation of the TDCA. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.403(a) (Vernon 2006).”).

This injunction would also cap his injuries and damages, benefiting all parties affected as Mark is likely to succeed on the merits.

Conclusion

Mark acknowledges the inherent challenges in seeking favorable consideration from this court.

Nevertheless, with the recent amendments by the assigned Judge to curb premature motions to dismiss, there is a glimmer of optimism that not all Judges are predisposed to act maliciously or corruptly under the guise of judicial immunity.

In light of this, Proposed Intervenor, Mark Stephen Burke—a recognized publisher of legal cases and matters of public concern—respectfully requests the court to grant leave for intervention, facilitating full participation as a party with rights and responsibilities.

Alternatively, permissive intervention, at the court’s discretion, is recognized as a viable option.

The inclusion of pertinent case law serves to emphasize the legal foundation for intervention in this case.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this day, 28th of November, 2023

Daniels v. Ortolani, Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-2665-L, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2015) 

“A lis pendens does not operate as a lien on property.

In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

It instead is a means of providing notice of the pendency of an action involving real estate and may have the effect of protecting the filing party’s alleged rights to the property that are in dispute in the litigation.

A lis pendens is not an independent cause of action and has no existence separate and apart from the litigation of which it provides notice.

A notice of lis pendens, therefore, “operates only during the pendency of the lawsuit and terminates with the judgment, in the absence of appeal.”

Berg v. Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. denied).

Once a lis pendens has been filed, the Texas Property Code provides two methods for removal of the lis pendens:

(1) expunction of a notice of lis pendens under section 12.0071;

and

(2) cancellation of a lis pendens under section 12.008.

See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 12.0071, 12.008 (West 2014).

Wells Fargo seeks to expunge Plaintiff’s notice of lis pendens pursuant to section 12.0071.

Section 12.0071 identifies three circumstances in which the trial court presiding over the action in which a lis pendens is filed must “order the notice of lis pendens expunged” upon request by a party to the action in connection with which the notice of lis pendens has been filed.

§ 12.0071(c)(1)-(3).

One of those circumstances is when the trial court determines that “the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.”

§ 12.0071(c)(2).

Section 12.0071 further provides that notice of a motion to expunge must be served on each affected party on or before the 20th day that the motion is heard.

§ 12.0071(d).”)

Sanders v. Boeing Co., S.W.3.d, 2023 WL

(Tex. Dec. 1, 2023) [23-0388]

OPINION AUTHORED BY; JUSTICE JEFF BOYD

This certified question from the Fifth Circuit opinion authored by federalist Judge Elrod, and former Harris County State Judge, concerns the interpretation of Section 16.064 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

DEC 1, 2023

Texas Supreme Court Opinion.

Above is the date LIT Last updated this article.

Case Summaries December 1, 2023

Case summaries are prepared by court staff as a courtesy. They are not a substitute for the actual opinions.

OPINIONS PROCEDURE—PRETRIAL

Statute of Limitations

Sanders v. Boeing Co., S.W.3.d, 2023 WL  (Tex. Dec. 1, 2023) [23-0388]

This certified question concerns the interpretation of Section 16.064 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which tolls limitations when a prior action is dismissed “because of lack of jurisdiction” and then is refiled in a court of “proper jurisdiction” within sixty days after the date the dismissal “becomes final.”

Two flight attendants sustained injuries on the job. They sued the Boeing Company and other defendants in federal district court, which later dismissed their suit for failure to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction.

The flight attendants filed this suit shortly after the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but the district court dismissed it as barred by the statute of limitations.

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the flight attendants argued that Section 16.064 tolled the statute of limitations while they pursued their prior suit because that case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and they filed this suit less than sixty days after the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court:

(1) Does Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where the flight attendants could have invoked the prior district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction with proper pleadings?;

and

(2) Did the flight attendants file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Section 16.064?

The Supreme Court answered both questions “Yes.”

First, the Court concluded that Section 16.064 applies whenever the prior action was dismissed “because of lack of jurisdiction,” even if the court could have had jurisdiction.

The statute does not require that the prior court be a “court of improper jurisdiction.”

Second, the Court held that a dismissal “becomes final” under the statute only after the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the appellate court’s power to alter the judgment ends.

III.

Dismissal Becomes Final

We now turn to the Fifth Circuit’s second certified question:

“Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became ‘final’ for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.064(a)(2)?” Sanders, 68 F.4th at 984.

This question focuses on Section 16.064(a)(2), which requires that, “not later than the 60th day after the date the dismissal or other disposition becomes final, the action is commenced in a court of proper jurisdiction.”

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064(a)(2).

Boeing contends that a dismissal “becomes final” under this section when the court that dismisses the action loses plenary power over the case, regardless of whether the losing party appeals.

In contrast, the flight attendants argue that when a party appeals a dismissal order, the dismissal does not become final until the party has exhausted their appellate remedies and the appellate court’s power to alter the judgment ends.

We agree with the flight attendants.

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Sanders v. The Boeing Company

(4:18-cv-04248)

District Court, S.D. Texas, Judge Kenneth Hoyt

NOV. 8, 2018 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: DEC 1, 2023
DEC 1, 2023

Above is the date LIT Last updated this article.

ORDER FOLLOWING TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on April 27, 2023 at 9:00 a.m.

Appearances: Shannon Dugan Don Swaim, Alex Joseph Whitman, Joshua Paul Davis. (Court Reporter: H. Alcaraz).

The Court’s Memorandum addressed all pending issues in this case.

Therefore, the case is removed from the Court’s trial docket

. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified.(chorace) (Entered: 05/03/2023)

Sanders v. The Boeing Company

(3:18-cv-03165)

District Court, N.D. Texas, Judge Brantley Starr

 

NOV. 29, 2018 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: DEC 1, 2023
DEC 1, 2023

JUDGMENT of USCA as to 101 Notice of Appeal filed by Matthew Sodrok, Lee Marvin Sanders.

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. Issued as Mandate: 9/21/2021.

Sanders v. The Boeing Company

(4:18-cv-04248)

District Court, S.D. Texas, Judge David Hittner

NOV. 8, 2018 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: DEC 1, 2023
DEC 1, 2023

This case was voluntarily dismissed shortly after filing, docket entry no. 5, Nov. 27, 2018

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Mackie Wolf: Stop Litigation Elder Abuse is the Clear Message to the Wolves in Supreme Court Opinion
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